Tactics question

[John Beaman]

I am posing what may be a stupid question. I, apparently, do not understand Luftwaffe fighter tactics as well as I thought I did.

I have been reading Volumes 9/I, 9/II, and 9/III of Jochen’s magnificent Jagdwaffe series. He has conveniently organized the Abschusse sections most often by Stab, I, II, and III Gruppen as opposed to a straight day by day for a whole Geschwader. As I was reading, I realized that during this time period (Dec ’41-Jan ’43) the Geschwader Stab had some peculiar claiming patterns. The short of it is that the Kommodore had, by a vast number, the majority of claims. In the cases of JGs 54 and 77, 100% of the Stab claims were by the Kommodore; in other units over 98%.

Now, if I have tactical doctrine down right, the Kommodore’s Stab would be a schwarme of 4 a/c, 2 rote, the Kommodore leading one rote and another pilot leading the other. Each would have a wingman to cover them. The two rote leaders were the “hunters” and the wingmen covered them. The schwarme would work together as four when necessary, such as the event of a heavy attack or against large numbers; i.e., the second rote would then be more of a covering force more than a hunter.

Copying the Luftwaffe, the RAF and USAAF worked this way and the Germans originated the “finger four” concept even to using more of a “fluid four” later.

So, my question is, why are there virtually no claims by other Geschwader Stab members and in some cases zero over this period? Usually, during this period, the Jagdwaffe was operating as “hunters”, i.e., on the offensive so both rote leaders should be hunting and making claims. It boggles the mind that Gollob could make over 70 claims in this period and no one else in the Stab did. What were they doing?

I would appreciate some insight.