RAF and dive-bombing.

[Bill Walker]

Slightly off topic, but ...

AOP aircraft rarely operated behind enemy lines, except when flak and enemy fighter aircraft were absent. Standard AOP procedure was to fly just behind the front line to observe and correct their own gun fire, and to fly well behind the line, observing enemy shell strikes from as close to directly above as possible, in order to plot a line back to the enemy guns.

The Stinsons in Burma were on a different mission, supply and communications behind enemy lines, but again they were very careful of flaks and enemy air operations.

[Juha]

Tony
I dug out my copy of Peter C. Smith’s, the great devotee of dive-bombing, Dive Bomber! from my attic and yes, according to him (p. 7) Shallow Glide Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was descending at an angle not greater than 20deg. Steep Glide Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was descending at an angle of between 20deg and 60deg. Dive Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was in a dive at an angle of between 60deg and 90deg. And yes, in the book there is 3 pages on Spits dive-bombing in Italy and of course 7 pages on use of Vengeance by RAF and RAAF.

I don’t see it very fruitful to develop new, different definitions to those already in common use only to prove one’s own theme.

Secondly, clear Allied air-superiority over NW Europe was achieved only in spring 44 after bitter fight between LW vs. mostly 8th FC with big help by LW attrition in MTO and in East. So much planning and training for invasion was made before the air superiority was established fact, that’s why British Armoured units had those AA Crusaders at the beginning of Invasion, they were later dropped out from establishment when it was seen how small the danger of LW fighter bomber and dive bomber attacks was, even if there was isolated fighter bomber attacks on British tanks.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

If dive bombing Spitfires were shot down by flak then why would your Vengeance a/c not suffer the same fate?

If the 300+mph Spitfires were shot down by flak, then so would your much slower Austers and Stinsons which also would be operating well behind the front lines.

Your answer is through organised and very heavy, indeed overwhelming, Flak suppression.
Remember the V2 launch sites in the Hague were the number one priority target for the RAF.
The RAF had an overwhelming number of aircraft and complete air superiority.
German Flak in the Hague was associated with the launch groups, and would not fire until these had been spotted and the Spitfire was in the dive - according to Simpson.
The RAF operated no Flak suppression - Fighter Command and 2TAF pilots were ordered not to hunt for Flak because the contest was too one-sided.
V2 launchings were defended by 37-mm Flak on half-tracks which Spitfires couldn't hit, but the Vengeance could.
Also the Vengeance was more Flak-resistant than the Spitfire and Typhoon.
The Germans would not have fired at Auster and Stinson spotters for fear of revealing the position of the launch groups and attracting heavy Flak suppression and attacks on the launchers. They played possum.
It keeps coming back to the need for an accurate dive-bomber, which the RAF refused to operate for well-known dogmatic reasons - they would not cooperate with the Army except on their own terms of complete independence, lest the Army "become drugged with bombs" and dependent on the RAF.
There was only a limited number of mobile Flak and launch groups available to the Germans in the Hague.
The RAF should have concentrated on taking most of them/all of them out - once they were gone they were gone.
The RAF had the means.
They had the Vengeance in numbers, but used them for target-towing in Devon.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Tony
Steep Glide Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was descending at an angle of between 20deg and 60deg.

I don’t see it very fruitful to develop new, different definitions to those already in common use only to prove one’s own theme.
Juha

So we agree? - 2TAF therefore didn't do dive-bombing.

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
I cannot recall exact details of attack tactics of 2TAF but if its fighter-bombers always used dives less than 60deg, yes, we agree, but at least led Spits used to dive at 60deg as were Typhoons, according to Thomas' message, so I'd say that 2TAF did at least some dive-bombing

Juha

[rob van den nieuwendijk]

Hello Tony and others,

Interesting topic. I wrote a book about the RAF operations (both Fighter Command and 2nd TAF) on Leiden railwaystations in 1944-1945; "de 'vergeten' bombardementen, de Britse luchtaanvallen op Leiden 1944-1945" (Leiden, 2008). For this book I researched various sources. You may find it interesting to study/consult:

NA (PRO) Air 41/55 The Air Defence of Great Britain, vol VI, the flying bomb and rocket campaign 1944-1945;

Graig Cabell and Graham A. Thomas: Operation Big Ben, the anti V2 Spitfire Missions 1944-45 (Stroud, 2006).

Basil Collier: The defence of the United Kingdom (London 1957).

Best regards,
Rob

[tcolvin]

Thank you, Rob.

The blurb for Cabell/Thomas claims dive-bombing was done at night in the Hague, and presumably without the benefit of something like the Leigh Light. That's interesting because, according to Simpson, the Germans thought night brought relief from the attention of the Spitfires.

Did your researches make any suggestions about how Fighter Command might have done things differently to counter the V2 Launchings from the Hague?

2TAF's contribution of course led to the disaster in Bezuidenhout on March 3, 1945 (535 Dutch killed, 432 missing and 235 seriously wounded), which was not the first mistake by mediums - Horrocks had banned them a few days earlier, if I remember correctly, for repeated incompetence leading to the death of his troops.
BTW, if you didn't know, Simpson gives the reasons for Bezuidenhout.

Tony

[rob van den nieuwendijk]

Hello Tony,

I will take the liberty of quoting from Air 41/55 where I found some interesting data:

Page 255:
Counter-Measures to Rockets
Just as counter-measures against flying bombs fell largely upon the air defences of Great Britain, so thoese against rockets were principally carried out by Fighter Command. 2nd Tactical Air Force assisted in the work of armed reconnaissance by attacking transport targets over much of Holland, leaving the rocket launching areas used for the attack of London to Fighter Command. But these activities were part of the constant offensive by continentally based aircraft against communications between the battle area and western Germany…

The heavy bomber forces were not used in the period directly against rocket targets.

(…) page 258

… the offensive took the form of sweeps and reconnaissances in which fighters and fighter-bombers attacked targets of opportunity rather than specific, pre-selected objectives. This was work better suited to 2nd Tactical Air Force than Fighter Command: first, because to be effective a large number of sorties was needed – and 2nd Tactical Air Force was a much stronger force than Fighter Command; second, because 2nd Tactical Air Froce was continentally based within easy reach of the areas to be attacked, whereas Fighter Command squadrons had to fly over a hundred miles across the sea before they reached western Holland. The sorties flown over Holland and north-west Germany by the two forces reflect the differences: for the period 15 October – 25 November they were only six hundred by Fighter Command and nearly ten thousand by 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Page 261
Air Marshall Hill wrote to the Air Ministry on 17 November, making his letter the occasion for a thorough review of the difficulties under which Fighter Command had been operating. He pointed out that the armed reconnaissance had to be carried out by Spitfires in daylight whenever weather permitted, and as winter approached their scale of effort was being seriously affected. Moreover, the majority of sorties had to be flown at low altitude if the pilots were to identify suitable targets and attack them with cannon and machine-gun fire; and this in an area where the Germans had deployed a large number of light anti-aircraft guns was a dangerous proceeding. (…) Here, Bomber Command and 2nd Tactical Air Force could help, though so far they had done very little. A number of sorties were also being flown by bomb-carrying Spitfires of Fighter Command whose pilots were, however, under strict instructions not to bomb if there was any risk of causing civilian casualties. It was particularly in this last connection that Air Marshal Hill wanted a revision of policy. (…) at a conference on 21 November (…) and members of the Dutch Government were present. The latter agreed that of bombing attacks on launching points and storage sites were indeed considered necessary and likely to prove effective they would raise no objection at this stage. (…) Hill was therefore given authority to undertake such attacks even against targets near built-up areas, provided he considered them “reasonably discriminating”. This applied only to Fighter Command and its fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. No alteration was made in ‘Crossbow’ policy as it affected 2nd Tactical Air Force and Bomber Command. Air Chief Marshal Tedder put the claims of the battle on land on 2nd Tactical Air Force higher than the needs of rocket counter-measures.

And on it goes in air 41/55. Trust the above is of interest.

Best regards,
Rob

[tcolvin]

Thank you, Rob.
Simpson makes those points so must have been using the same source.

Simpson's conclusion is unequivocal. Fighter Command and 2TAF were just going through the motions, and their results were spun by the RAF and the government;
"as the rocket campaign gained momentum and the numbers exploding on London increased, the Government had to be seen to be doing something.The hard fact was that the V2s could only be stopped before being fired, and it was very difficult to do this, but the authorities could never have admitted that they could not stop them. It would have been an admission that Britain's capital city was completely at the mercy of a ruthless enemy who, it was being said, was on the brink of defeat".
Simpson states the pilots "did their best within the limitations of the equipment they were given".

The question comes back every time to the equipment used by Fighter Command and 2TAF.
The responsibility for that deficiency lies with the RAF top brass and Churchill who gave them too much rope.

Tony

[Bill Walker]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The responsibility for that deficiency lies with the RAF top brass and Churchill who gave them too much rope.

Tony

A proper root cause analysis will lay a fair bit of blame on Herr Hitler, and the 1920s and 1930s European governments that did nothing to enforce the Treaty of Versailles. RAF top brass, Churchill, and the 2TAF did what they could with the mess they had been handed.

I have a hard time understanding why you keep bringing up the Vengeance. The Americans had a lot of them too, and found they couldn't stand up to Japanese air power. Do you really think they would have done much good in Europe? Personally, I view them as a slightly updated Fairey Battle, with all the same potential for greatness.