Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

[Kutscha]

If there were no detested heavy bombers (B-17, B-24) and their escorts (P-47, P-51) for the LW fighters to intercept, then these LW fighters would have been available to intercept the Allied dive bombers. The LW fighter force was still a viable force til ~ June 1944, not that after June 1944 it still did not have the capability to inflick losses on the Allies. It was the Allied SBC that put the LW fighter force in a death spiral to oblivion.

No SBC would have put more LW fighters over the battlefield negating the Allied air supremicy over the battlefield making it hard for Allied dive bombers to operate. If there was no SBC, there was no need for the thousands of long range fighters.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

If there were no detested heavy bombers (B-17, B-24) and their escorts (P-47, P-51) for the LW fighters to intercept, then these LW fighters would have been available to intercept the Allied dive bombers. The LW fighter force was still a viable force til ~ June 1944, not that after June 1944 it still did not have the capability to inflick losses on the Allies. It was the Allied SBC that put the LW fighter force in a death spiral to oblivion.

No SBC would have put more LW fighters over the battlefield negating the Allied air supremicy over the battlefield making it hard for Allied dive bombers to operate. If there was no SBC, there was no need for the thousands of long range fighters.

All good points Kutscha -

The SBC, combined with long range escorts for them took the battle to Germany and gave the LW no respite. Quality of training, combined with waves of fighter pilot replacements gave 8th AF (and 15th/12th AF) the ability to fight on equal terms with skilled LW core pilots.

Quantity of high performance fighters (now combined with skilled and experienced pilots) over Germany then took the initiative away, attrition during the Battle of Germany took the core of experienced LW fighter pilots away - and rendered newer high performance German fighters less capable than they Might have been.

It was gradual until the winter/Spring 1944 when it became inexorable.

[Laurent Rizzotti]

In June and July 1944 at least the bulk of the German fighter units in the West were deployed in France and their main opponents were Allied tactical units, and no more the 8th Air Force.

In most cases, the missions of fighters of both sides this summer were the same: ground attack, escort of fighter-bombers and sweep. Allied fighters were still escorting heavy bombers, of course, but the heavy raids were usually not opposed by German fighters over France.

So this was a battle seeing German fighters vs Allied fighter-bombers, and the battle was still lost by Germany.

[Kutscha]

The so called high performance German fighters did not appear in units til the fall of 1944 and in any great numbers to the very late fall of 1944. The 1.98ata Me109K-4 did not appear, and then only in penny pocket numbers if at all, til late March 1945. By mid April the 4 Gruppe authorized to use 1.98 boost had retreated to south east Germany where it was very unlikely they would encounter any Spitfires of any Mark.

To put the numbers of German fighters, by type, available on can look at Bodenplatte. Of the 990 fighters the following is the percentage:

Fw190A-9 > 2,5%
Fw190A-8 > 27.3%
Fw190D-9 > 18.6%
Me109G-6 > 0.2%
Me109G-10 > 6.3%
Me109G-14 > 18.8%
Me109K-4 > 11.9%
Me109G-14/AS > 14.4%