The momentous cost of Bomber Command.

[mhuxt]

Maybe Zuckerman knows more than I do, but I was under the impression 617 never had Oboe.

[SES]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Ses, a free-flight bomb is inherently inaccurate, and they were still being used in Vietnam.


I find it extraordinary when I am reminded today (1978) that on the night before D-Day each of ten batteries in the assault area was bombed by more than 100 aircraft of BC, and that this single operation involved the whole of the Command's effort for the night, at an expenditure of some 6,000 tons of bombs" (ibid page 260).

Tony

But those free fall bombs still had the effect desired, because they were droped against the right targets.

Not until the advent of laser and GPS guided bombs was it possible to take out a gun in a bunker, which will withstand an overpressure of 6,000 psi. So if those batteries were to be taken out, there was no other option than to turn the entire battery area into a moonscape and hope that some guns would be damaged.
bregds
SES

[tcolvin]

mhuxt, Dave Wallace on this board implied that 617 Squadron might have had Oboe in Post No. 28 here; http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?p=90002

"617 Squadron Lancasters that carried tallboys could not be equipped with H2S. I have correspondence from Harris, Cochrane, Bennett, Saundby and others discussing this and also equipping Lancasters with Oboe, which also could not be fitted on a Lancaster with H2S.
While Oboe equipped aircraft could drop bombs or target indicators with the same accuracy in any type of cloud (the Oboe crews never used any visual references on a bombing run), the main force aircraft bombing the Oboe TIs were greatly affected by cloud. Sky marking was much less accurrate than groundmarking and the winter season Oboe attacks were on the whole less successful due to the weather. "

This makes sense. To achieve accurate aiming of large bombs, 617 Squadron would need to bomb with Oboe rather than bomb the markers dropped by Oboe Mosquitos.

Tony

[mhuxt]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

mhuxt, Dave Wallace on this board implied that 617 Squadron might have had Oboe in Post No. 28 here; http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?p=90002

"617 Squadron Lancasters that carried tallboys could not be equipped with H2S. I have correspondence from Harris, Cochrane, Bennett, Saundby and others discussing this and also equipping Lancasters with Oboe, which also could not be fitted on a Lancaster with H2S.
While Oboe equipped aircraft could drop bombs or target indicators with the same accuracy in any type of cloud (the Oboe crews never used any visual references on a bombing run), the main force aircraft bombing the Oboe TIs were greatly affected by cloud. Sky marking was much less accurrate than groundmarking and the winter season Oboe attacks were on the whole less successful due to the weather. "

This makes sense. To achieve accurate aiming of large bombs, 617 Squadron would need to bomb with Oboe rather than bomb the markers dropped by Oboe Mosquitos.

Tony

That's all well and good, but I fail to see the "so what" in it. 617 did just fine without Oboe, and I can see no reason why one would even need both H2S and Oboe in the same aircraft. Oboe told you exactly where you were, but (without repeater equipment) had limited range. H2S had unlimited range, but could only give a rough location.

Again, 617 did just fine without either.

[Sid Guttridge]

My first thought is that the cost of Bomber Command cannot be viewed in isolation from the impact of Bomber Command on Germany in damage and expenditure.

My second thought is that, if there was no Bomber Command, one has to find a viable alternative that would have caused the Germans equivalent damage, expenditure, lost production and redirected military assets.

43,000 Churchill tanks is a nonsensical alternative. Firstly, they could have addressed not a single one of the targets Bomber Command did; secondly, Churchill tanks did not use either the same materials or industrial plant and so were not a direct production equivalent; and thirdly, unlike the Lancaster, they were poor at what they did.

The article seems to assume that the number of duds and misses by Bomber Command bombs were a unique problem. However, only the smallest proportion of bullets or shells hit a significant target either. Less bombs does not automatically mean more of more accurate missiles.

Despite its unrealistically narrow focus, the article was an interesting read.
Nor does Bomber Command seem prohibitively costly, given that it absorbed at most 15% of defence expenditure.

Certainly winning the war cost Britain a fortune. However, the alternative of losing it doesn't seem particularly financially attractive either!

[Steve Smith]

I initially found this discussion of interest but that soon began to wear off. I think that Tony is just interested in a confrontation to voice his own opinion and using statistics to his own advantage to justify a point.

Is this discussion about, 1) the financial cost, 2) targeting, 3) strategy, 4) accuracy, or a mix of all.

As far as I am concerned the courage, determination and sacrifice of all those who served in the ranks of Bomber Command is unquestionable.

Like wise as far as accuracy is concerned No.3 Group who pioneered the use of GH and where the only main force group within the command to be thus equipped carried out a number of very accurate raids on Benzol / oil plants / coking plants as well as transportation targets from October 1944 onwards. Bombing accuracy was measured at times to within 500 yards, or better. The Group operated in all weathers and importantly did not require to see the target. We seem to be missing the contribution of this group.

[tcolvin]

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

[SES]

The role of Air Power is to gain, maintain and exploit air superiority in pursuance of strategic and operational objectives, everything else is rubbish.
bregds
SES
Been there, done that for more than 40 years.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

At what cost to the Soviets Tony? You moan about the number of lives lost by BC yet that was minuscule compared to the Soviet military lives lost in the tactical war they fought.

[Steve Smith]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

Tony,
Having amassed a number of books and primary source material during my 30 year of interested in Bomber Command, I am sure I can find within the pages or volumes a quote from any number of high ranking officers or Air Ministry or governmental "names" to answer this post, but to be honest I can't be bothered.
I am certain that any post that does not agree with your views you will I am sure find a quote in your favour and try and contradict it.