Unresponsive VVS.

[Arsenal VG-33]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Richard Simpkin in "Deep Battle: the Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii", published in 1987, wrote on page 64;
"Despite its lavish army aviation resources, the Red/Soviet Army never seems to have come near to achieving the speed and intimacy of fixed-wing air support which the Wehrmacht possessed, and the Western Allies developed ..... The reasons for this shortcoming are twofold. One factor (which also affects artillery support) is that a request for additional support coming up from a subordinate commander was - and apparently and astonishingly still is - a one-way ticket to the nearest penal battalion. The second reason is organisational. Although the control organisation for tactical aviation is capable of putting out a tactical headquarters to army and tentacles to division, resources are concentrated in the air army under the control of front, and are not normally farmed out on an on-call basis".

Tony

Is he giving some concrete examples or just saying that with the same cleverness as "farting in water"?

I don't have the complete respunse but is seems from Perov & Restrennin books that delays for Sturmoviks intervention were reduced from some days to some hours in 41-43. So we cannot statue about VVS response (or unresponse) without considering where and when, in what conditions...

Moreover, in his book the famous anti-soviet dissident Viktor Nékrassov "In the tranches of Stalingrad" remembered that for his attack mission on german lines at night, he was (personnaly) helped by two Po-2 night bombers. Considering that his combat section (he was a second Leutenant) was reduced to 9 rifles (a combat group), and german lines were distant at about 20-30 yards, i don't see in what army the air support was that close or even closer and delegated as such low subordination order...(A 2d lieutenant leading a sergeant mission).

Of course, the mission was planned and not impovised, and no question about any radio connection. However...

Regards

[tcolvin]

Graham is right that any difference between the VVS and 2TAF does not lie in the nature of their tasks. 2 TAF routinely performed CAS and interdiction on the German side of the lines.

Rather the differences in question are related to a) the responsiveness in real time to what was happening on the ground, and b) the effectiveness of that response.

From first principles the VVS should have performed better in both regards.

The VVS was an army airforce, and played an integrated role in an all-arms approach. 2TAF never subscribed to all-arms, but operated independently 'in support' and never 'under command' of 21 Army Group. The soldiers and airmen who did the fighting never met face-to-face and there was no tactical coordination between them. Graham reflects this view; "the army has many tools ......... without necessarily calling on expensive assets such as aircraft at every stumbling block". I believe that in every Russian operation, the Schwerpunkt force would have identified the PAK front and given the task of its destruction to the VVS. This never happened with 2TAF.

The VVS, unlike 2TAF, was equipped with aircraft designed for CAS; the armoured Il-2 had enhanced resistance to FLAK compared with the Typhoon and Spitfire, and the Pe-2 dive-bomber could, although the literature is silent on whether it actually did, bomb accurately in an 80 plus degree dive on enemy field positions, which was the only accurate method in WW2 for delivering high explosive.

Graham correctly states that soldiers were generally, but by no means universally, enthusiastic about seeing the German lines being pounded by the RAF; for example they stood on the parapets of their slit trenches and cheered as Bomber Command destroyed Caen. They were not informed of Zuckerman's post-operational audit which revealed no German assets were destroyed or even damaged. The army's enthusiasm was due to ignorance. The RAF might, and indeed did, state that military morale-boosting and German civilian morale-destruction was their main if not sole business, but few argue that point today.

The RAF identified their task as being to "cart bombs" to German cities and to the German front-line. The ORBs of 2TAF's fighter-bomber squadrons are replete with the word "success". By this they meant that they navigated to the target, dropped ordnance, and returned. It meant nothing more. If the StuG, PAK or MG continued to fire after being attacked by 2TAF, there was no obligation for the attack to be repeated; 2TAF had done its job, and in fact never returned to a protected target after the FLAK had been aroused.

One example must suffice. The Germans stood in February 1945 on the west bank of the Rhine. They were supplied for a month during Operation Veritable mainly over the heavily defended Rhine bridges at Wesel. The destruction of these bridges was the task of 2TAF, which they failed to perform, the bridges eventually being destroyed by the Germans after they had withdrawn on about March 10. 2TAF's lack of an effective armoured Il-2 or of a dive-bomber had serious consequences.

I suspect the VVS would never have got away with that, and they would have been ordered to return until the bridges were down. I suspect, furthermore, that the high Il-2 loss rate was due to an uncompromising insistence that the VVS perform without excuses. The RAF, on the other hand, had been traumatised in 1940 when its strategic Fairey Battle force had been 'diverted' from attacking the Ruhr to attacking the Meuse bridges with great loss. There were two consequences; the RAF refused to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft, and insisted on having the final say about whether an Army request was 'reasonable'.

Igor's comments on all of this would be interesting.

Tony

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Graham is right that any difference between the VVS and 2TAF does not lie in the nature of their tasks. 2 TAF routinely performed CAS and interdiction on the German side of the lines.

Rather the differences in question are related to a) the responsiveness in real time to what was happening on the ground, and b) the effectiveness of that response.

From first principles the VVS should have performed better in both regards.

The VVS was an army airforce, and played an integrated role in an all-arms approach. 2TAF never subscribed to all-arms, but operated independently 'in support' and never 'under command' of 21 Army Group. The soldiers and airmen who did the fighting never met face-to-face and there was no tactical coordination between them. Graham reflects this view; "the army has many tools ......... without necessarily calling on expensive assets such as aircraft at every stumbling block". I believe that in every Russian operation, the Schwerpunkt force would have identified the PAK front and given the task of its destruction to the VVS. This never happened with 2TAF.

The VVS, unlike 2TAF, was equipped with aircraft designed for CAS; the armoured Il-2 had enhanced resistance to FLAK compared with the Typhoon and Spitfire, and the Pe-2 dive-bomber could, although the literature is silent on whether it actually did, bomb accurately in an 80 plus degree dive on enemy field positions, which was the only accurate method in WW2 for delivering high explosive.

Graham correctly states that soldiers were generally, but by no means universally, enthusiastic about seeing the German lines being pounded by the RAF; for example they stood on the parapets of their slit trenches and cheered as Bomber Command destroyed Caen. They were not informed of Zuckerman's post-operational audit which revealed no German assets were destroyed or even damaged. The army's enthusiasm was due to ignorance. The RAF might, and indeed did, state that military morale-boosting and German civilian morale-destruction was their main if not sole business, but few argue that point today.

The RAF identified their task as being to "cart bombs" to German cities and to the German front-line. The ORBs of 2TAF's fighter-bomber squadrons are replete with the word "success". By this they meant that they navigated to the target, dropped ordnance, and returned. It meant nothing more. If the StuG, PAK or MG continued to fire after being attacked by 2TAF, there was no obligation for the attack to be repeated; 2TAF had done its job, and in fact never returned to a protected target after the FLAK had been aroused.

One example must suffice. The Germans stood in February 1945 on the west bank of the Rhine. They were supplied for a month during Operation Veritable mainly over the heavily defended Rhine bridges at Wesel. The destruction of these bridges was the task of 2TAF, which they failed to perform, the bridges eventually being destroyed by the Germans after they had withdrawn on about March 10. 2TAF's lack of an effective armoured Il-2 or of a dive-bomber had serious consequences.

I suspect the VVS would never have got away with that, and they would have been ordered to return until the bridges were down. I suspect, furthermore, that the high Il-2 loss rate was due to an uncompromising insistence that the VVS perform without excuses. The RAF, on the other hand, had been traumatised in 1940 when its strategic Fairey Battle force had been 'diverted' from attacking the Ruhr to attacking the Meuse bridges with great loss. There were two consequences; the RAF refused to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft, and insisted on having the final say about whether an Army request was 'reasonable'.

I think that the Russians probably did the best they could with the equipment and training then available. The soldiers and airmen were sometimes at the mercy of politics but that is a separate issue.

The British Air Ministry learned the hard way that adding more armor or guns sometimes overloaded the airplane and made it more vulnerable to interception (e.g. certain versions of the Buffalo, Hurricane, and Tomahawk).

On the Western Front, the Junkers 87 had a brief career because it was a deathtrap. Based on Korean war experience, I don't believe that the Il-2 Sturmovik would have fared much better.

The USAAF had Mustangs with cut-down superchargers and dive brakes (A-36) and the RAF had its Hurricane IID with 40mm gunpods. These airplanes were used on a limited basis because the advantages were outweighed by the disadvantages. After those types were retired, the standard fighters were used in the dive-bombing role all the time. Tank-busting rockets were carried in place of heavy cannons.

Today, the sound of the A-10 Warthog, AC-130 Spectre, and Apache helicopters are music to the ears of American ground troops. These dedicated Close Air Support aircraft have been very effective. But we cannot expect to use them without interference in the kind of high threat environment where enemy fighters outnumber friendly aircraft. If faced with that situation, fast jets will take over the CAS role in the same way that the Germans used Focke-Wulf 190 fighter-bombers to replace the Ju-87.

[tcolvin]

In other words, Nifty, you are saying that day bombers without escort or in conditions where they do not enjoy local air superiority, are vulnerable to fighters.
This is true but irrelevant in 1944 after the USAAF's Thunderbolts and Mustangs had achieved air superiority over Europe by destroying the GAF.
The British Ju-87 could then have done its accurate work unhindered by enemy fighters, and the British Il-2 would have been more effective than Typhoon and Spitfire because of its resistance to FLAK.

In any case, 2TAF's equipment proved not only to be inaccurate but also deathtraps. So much so that in early March 1945, 2TAF drastically curtailed its fighter-bomber activities - as we have seen in the matter of the Rhine bridges at Wesel - because of high losses from FLAK.
AFAIK the VVS with the right equipment never restricted its activities.

Tony

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

In other words, Nifty, you are saying that day bombers without escort or in conditions where they do not enjoy local air superiority, are vulnerable to fighters. This is true but irrelevant in 1944 after the USAAF's Thunderbolts and Mustangs had achieved air superiority over Europe by destroying the GAF.

Air superiority is not the same as no opposition. German fighters attacked Allied fighter-bombers often enough to make it very dangerous for them to fly a much slower and less manueverable airplane. If the RAF was flying a ground attack plane like the Stuka in 1944, they could lose an entire squadron in just one mission.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The British Ju-87 could then have done its accurate work unhindered by enemy fighters, and the British Il-2 would have been more effective than Typhoon and Spitfire because of its resistance to FLAK.

I've read the same kind of hyperbole about the P-47, though it is true to some extent because the Thunderbolt did not have a liquid-cooling system like the Junkers 87 and the Ilyushin Il-2. Photos are available showing Thunderbolts that returned to base with multiple cylinder heads shot away, or missing large pieces of the airframe. The Stuka and the Sturmovik would crash with the same type of damage.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

In any case, 2TAF's equipment proved not only to be inaccurate but also deathtraps. So much so that in early March 1945, 2TAF drastically curtailed its fighter-bomber activities - as we have seen in the matter of the Rhine bridges at Wesel - because of high losses from FLAK. AFAIK the VVS with the right equipment never restricted its activities.

Still not buying it. Several thousand Il-2s were lost in battle and I have watched 1950s USAF gun camera film of Sturmoviks bursting into flames and getting shot to pieces by .50 caliber guns, so I have doubts about your beliefs on the flak resistance of Il-2s.

Of course cherry-picking through anecdotal evidence isn't enough. You would need a lengthy scientific study (ORS investigation) to prove your case.

[tcolvin]

There is little unknown about 2TAF, Nifty. We even have Operational Research Reports on its ineffectiveness, let alone the encyclopaedic reference books by Shores and Thomas, and shelves-full of memoirs.

We also know that Martel as military attache in Moscow in 1943 heard about the high regard in which the Il-2 was held by the Russians for its effectiveness. He raised the matter with the General Staff in London. Their response was the predictable "Nothing to see; pass along please".

This thread is an attempt to pause, and not to pass along, but to identify what is known about the VVS in its CAS role.

All I have read is that VVS CAS was unresponsive - and I assume Simpkin had his source for that statement, even if he did not reference it.

On many grounds, some of which I have mentioned, I find it difficult to imagine that the VVS was as ineffective as 2TAF.
But it's likely that there is no one in the West who can answer that question.
Perhaps someone in Russia has some of the answers?

Tony

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

There is little unknown about 2TAF, Nifty. We even have Operational Research Reports on its ineffectiveness, let alone the encyclopaedic reference books by Shores and Thomas, and shelves-full of memoirs.

We also know that Martel as military attache in Moscow in 1943 heard about the high regard in which the Il-2 was held by the Russians for its effectiveness. He raised the matter with the General Staff in London. Their response was the predictable "Nothing to see; pass along please".

This thread is an attempt to pause, and not to pass along, but to identify what is known about the VVS in its CAS role.

All I have read is that VVS CAS was unresponsive - and I assume Simpkin had his source for that statement, even if he did not reference it.

On many grounds, some of which I have mentioned, I find it difficult to imagine that the VVS was as ineffective as 2TAF.
But it's likely that there is no one in the West who can answer that question.
Perhaps someone in Russia has some of the answers?

Tony

Can I ask about the attacks on the Wesel Bridges by the 2nd TAF. My understanding was that the attacks were undertaken by Bomber Command on the 16th - 19th February not 2nd TAF but admit to not having the exact details of 2nd TAF missions so if you could supply any dates it would be appreciated.

I admit that I wouldn't expect fighter bombers of any type to have any success against a bridge of that type. Bridges were always hard to destroy as the blast effect would be minimal and the the bombs not heavy enough to damage the foundations. The Il 2 may well carry more effective weapons but I don't know of what nature. Are there any examples of the VVS destroying similar bridges.

Lastly the impact of the IL 2 serving with the RAF or USAAF would be difficult to guess. The IL 2 was better at resisting damage but its a lot slower, a bigger target and less manoeuverable making a lot easier to hit. Typhoons were well protected with armour beneath, behind and to the sides of the pilot which isn't bad. At a guess the factors would probably balance one another. However if an IL 2 or Typhoon were intercepted by Me109 or Fw190 the Typhoon stood a much better chance, well able to evade or join combat but the IL 2 would be little more than target practice and hope the rear gunner is having a good day.

Its also true to remember that the concentration of AA guns against the RAF and USAAF was much higher as the distances on the ground were smaller. This is the only way I could see the Ju87 staying in front line service as long as it did. Operating by day over the western front would be suicide.

[SimonE]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On many grounds, some of which I have mentioned, I find it difficult to imagine that the VVS was as ineffective as 2TAF.

Tony

Tony, perhaps you could quantify what you mean by the term "ineffective" in relation to the 2TAF, or other tactical air forces of other combatants of the period?

[MW Giles]

Please could we stop using modern hindsight as a factor that planners apparently should have taken into account in their decision making processes

In mid 1942, which is about the time a commitment would have to be taken to produce the British Stuka or Il-2 in time for full squadron service in mid 1944, would anyone really have placed those orders?

The Ju87 had been shot out the sky and withdrawn from the action in the BoB. The Il-2 may have been wonderful, but they had been shot down in droves in the German advance into USSR which was still rolling eastwards (650+ Il-2, R-3, V-11 and ZKP-57s depending on what they called them claimed by Jagdwaffe by 30/6/42).

The home grown Fairey Battle had been a death trap.

Who is going to bet on the USAAF shooting the Luftwaffe out of the sky so that the RAF can waft about in safety. Not even the USAAF would have placed money on that outcome, they were firmly wedded to the bomber always getting through.

Martin

[tcolvin]

Sorry for the delay (due to travelling) in replying to the many interesting comments and questions. This will attempt to cover all outstandings.

1. Igor stated that VVS ground controllers were assigned at the infantry/tank corps level. A 1944 Russian Mechanised Corps contained 16,438 personnel and 246 tanks, equivalent to an Anglo-Canadian armoured division of 14,964 personnel and 290 tanks. Like the VVS Ground Controllers, 2TAF's FCPs (Forward Control Posts) were also assigned to corps HQs, but remember XXX Corps in Operation Veritable had 6 divisions and 3 Armoured Brigades under command and was the same as a Soviet Front. However, 2TAF provided Contact Cars to divisions with visual control posts which were allotted aircraft and sometimes a cab rank. There was therefore no difference between the modi operandi of the VVS and 2TAF.
2. Igor stated that it was only in the end phase of front operations that the VVS became detached from the forces it supported due to the distances advanced. With the exception of the Normandy breakout, this was not a factor in the West because of the much slower rate of advance. Had the advance been faster, 2TAF would have had a problem because the Typhoon, unlike the Il-2, could not operate from open fields. It required hardened runways, minimally PSP/Marsden Matting but usually reinforced concrete or brick.
3. Glider asked about the attacks on the Wesel bridges by BC. The task was in fact given by SHAEF to 3 Air Division of the US 8th Army Air Force. They attacked on five days with 377 sorties dropping 887 tons of bombs, as follows; 1 February (139 a/c dropped 381 tons); 14 Feb (37 a/c and 110 tons), 16 Feb (63 a/c and 189 tons); 19 Feb (68 a/c and 184 tons); and 24 Feb (70 a/c and 23 tons). They succeeded on 14 February in bringing down a span of the Wesel road bridge, leaving two bridges that survived to the end.
4. Glider doubted whether any fighter bomber could hit a bridge. 2TAF normally used mediums for attacking bridges. They flew above the FLAK and were notoriously inaccurate. I believe bridges were targets for the Il-2, but certainly benefited from the accuracy of dive-bombing. It was so normal for the GAF to attack bridges that the Soviets invented a method (unique AFAIK) of underwater bridging. That the famed Norden bomb sight with the claimed ability of placing a bomb in a pickle barrel from 17,000 ft was obviously the wrong tool at Wesel was neatly demonstrated by the GAF when on 24 February they destroyed at night two American bridges over the Roer (Operation Grenade). In a post-war analysis of the Wesel bridge fiasco, the RAF concluded that Mediums should have been used, which confirms they lacked the right equipment.
5. Glider's priority in a CAS aircraft is safety from enemy fighters. This was the RAF's reasoning for not operating dive bombers (Ju-87B, Pe-2, Mustang, Vengeance), armoured bombers (Il-2, He-129B) lightly-armoured bombers (Fw 190F) or large-gun carriers (Ju-87G, He-129B-3, or even Hurricane IIE which was rejected by 2TAF). However this policy threw the baby out with the bath-water. Because on most of the occasions when aircraft with dive-bombing or big-gun accuracy, or with resistance to FLAK, were desperately needed, there was little risk of GAF fighter interception. I will give just one example; the Hillman strong-point above the landing beach of La Breche held up 3 British Infantry Division all day on D-Day due to the inability of 2TAF to destroy it. The measurable consequences of Caen not being taken on D-Day, was due almost entirely, IMHO, to the absence of the Vengeance dive-bomber which could have destroyed Hillman. The Vengeances were on target-tug duties in Devon because they refused to operate dive-bombers.
6. The answer requested by Simon E as why 2TAF was ineffective is that it refused to operate the correct equipment for its assigned tasks. From the time in 1939 when ordered to France, the Army demanded its own air force equipped over time with dive-bombers, armoured aircraft, and aircraft equipped with heavy guns. The RAF's reply was that the Army need not worry, because if ever it got into difficulties the RAF would drop everything and devote its strategic bomber force to the Army. The RAF regarded specialised CAS aircraft as coming at the cost of strategic bomber numbers. But, as we have seen, strategic bombers were not the right equipment to take out the Wesel bridges. The RAF equipped 2TAF, with botched up air superiority fighters that could not deliver bombs vertically and accurately, and were equipped with unreliable RP (which suffered gravity drop when leaving the rails). Furthermore, since the RAF insisted on its independence and on delivering support to the Army only on its own terms (and Churchill let them get away with it), 2TAF's ineffective support was not always provided in a timely fashion.
7. Finally Giles believes the RAF is being condemned here retrospectively and presumably unfairly. But these matters were thrashed out at the time amid anger and recrimination. The Army nearly got its own air force (Brooke persuaded Churchill), and there was even IIRC discussion about producing the Il-2 in Britain. Martel reported on its use in Russia after discussions with Shaposhnikov; “The discussion on armoured forces ended this series of conferences with the Russians. Certain points stood out. First of all, it was clear that the Russians set great store by the Sturmovik aeroplane. No other nation had developed an aircraft which was armoured in this way. Were they all wrong and the Russians right? We made further enquiries as regards casualties in these aircraft from flak. This was not very easy to assess. The troops on the Russian front were not nearly so well equipped for producing flak. This question of using armoured aircraft was clearly very important, and we decided that we must take every opportunity of studying this matter and obtaining further information”. Dive bombers were bought from the USA by Beaverbrook at the demand of the Army, but never used in Europe and reports of their good performance in Burma were deliberately suppressed by the RAF. The very possibility of a long-range fighter that would protect the bomber was dismissed from first principles by Portal, leaving the Americans to develop the Thunderbolt and Mustang in that role and to destroy the GAF. That situation should have prompted the RAF to release the Vengeance for CAS use in NW Europe. But the RAF could never abandon Trenchard's article of faith (strategic bombing could win the war by destroying enemy morale without the need to engage the enemy forces), nor the Royal Tank Corps that of Hobart's (mobility with firing on the move). RAF and RTC thus showed themselves to be cults oblivious to reason, and wrapped up in their own illusions.

Tony