Is this a true statement about the B24?

[tcolvin]

Rainer; You say bombing was the main reason for the delay to the Type XXI Elektroboot. You ignore the fixation on the Walther propulsion system and complacency when the war was going well for Germany. It was in 1941 that someone suggested eliminating the Walther engine with its problems and using large electric motors and batteries instead: Project XVIII gave birth to Project XXI. But there was no urgency to get XXI off the drawing board until the defeat of the submarines in May 1943. Then the design was dusted off and rushed to completion in late 1943, having lost two years. There was the main reason for the delay. The second main reason was the choice of sub-contractors by Speer who had no experience of shipbuilding, which meant a large amount of rework, and delays. Wilhelmshaven was bombed heavily throughout the war. The only damage to U-boats on the stocks was by the USAAF, which destroyed two Type VII in one raid, not to be repeated. Wilhelmshaven became a supplier of Type XXI sections which were barged to Vegesack. As far as I know not one was damaged by bombing. Tony

[RodM]

Hi Tony,

by way of example, following are some paraphrased translations of Luftwaffe situation reports and civil defence reports relating to damage from Allied air attacks. These are just what I have on-hand and the Luftwaffe source of the translations was comprehensive for the period Feb-Apr 1945 (i.e. it is only possible to quote from those German/Luftwaffe sources that survived the wholesale destruction of records prior to the capitulation):

24 February 1945 - Bremen
A U-boat was sunk at the A.G. Weser works of Deschimag

11 March 1945 - Bremen
The Weser AG was most seriously damaged....it was not possible to estimate the decrease of production at the time of the report

30 March 1945 - Bremen
At the A.G. Weser most severe damage was reported to buildings and material. Seven U-boats were sunk and another severely damaged.

17 January 1945 - Hamburg
Severe damage was caused to the following firms:
Blohm & Voss, Steinwaerder...destroyed No 7 Ship Construction workshop and electrical crane installations, Heavy damage was caused to a number of workshops etc etc

7-8 March 1945 - Hamburg
At Blohm & Voss a 75 ton floating crane was sunk and severe damage was caused to a number of workshops and plant.

11 March 1945 - Hamburg
Blohm & Voss was hit...destroying...a tools store, a 250 ton crane, and a 3000 cu. metre. gas container. A number of workshops and the oxygen and hydrogen plant were severely damaged and 3 U-boats were also damaged. A number of ships in the dock at the Howaldt Works were sunk, including a U-boat and lifting tackle which capsized.

20 March 1945 - Hamburg
Blohm & Voss suffered severe damage. In the harbour a mine-sweeper and 2 other vessels were sunk and 2 U-boats damaged.

30 March 1945 - Hamburg
Blohm & Voss and the Deutsche Werft were the chief targets hit...two U-boats were sunk and 4 capsized.

8-9 April 1945 - Hamburg
Among the targets hit were Thenania-Ossag, Blohm & Voss, Deutsche Werft etc, etc. At Blohm & Voss...serious damage to all parts of the yard and dock installations and a salvage vessel. Several boats were sunk, including 3 U-boats and a further 5 were damaged. The shipyards of Howaldt A.G. were hit...and widespread damage was caused to various departments. One U-boat was severely damaged and two capsized while two floating docks were sunk. The U-boat bunker was also severely damaged.

9 April 1945 - Hamburg
The U-boat pens Nos 1, 2 & 5 at the Deutsche Werft in Finkenwaeder were pierced by several H.E. bombs.

I have no pretence in understanding how these quoted reports affected production of the Elektroboote, and due to my limited knowledge on the subject of Elektroboote production have only included info on the prime shipbuilders and not sub-contracted component manufacturers. Compilations of similar sourced and translated German reports for bombing in the years 1943 and 1944 are available as AHB translations from TNA, Kew. These translations are limited to major raids only (i.e. were the number of participating aircraft and/or bomb load carried was significant enough for inclusion in the compilations).

regards

Rod

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The only damage to U-boats on the stocks was by the USAAF, which destroyed two Type VII in one raid, not to be repeated. Wilhelmshaven became a supplier of Type XXI sections which were barged to Vegesack. As far as I know not one was damaged by bombing. Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by RodM

I have no pretence in understanding how these quoted reports affected production of the Elektroboote, and due to my limited knowledge on the subject of Elektroboote production have only included info on the prime shipbuilders and not sub-contracted component manufacturers. Compilations of similar sourced and translated German reports for bombing in the years 1943 and 1944 are available as AHB translations from TNA, Kew. These translations are limited to major raids only (i.e. were the number of participating aircraft and/or bomb load carried was significant enough for inclusion in the compilations).

regards

Rod

Rod, The USSBS Report No. 92 on the German Submarine Industry provides the answer to your question. The bombing raids you list completely shut down Type XXI production by April 1945, but the Speer/Merker system had failed already by June 1944.

USSBS No. 92 German Submarine Industry Report.


16. The first raid against the submarine industry was carried out by the RAF on 18 May 1940 with an attack on Hamburg. When the US 8th AF began operations on 17 August, 1942, submarine facilities of all types were rated as top priority. Early attacks were made chiefly against operational bases, but in January 1943 the emphasis was shifted to shipbuilding yards, as experience indicated that attacks on the former targets were not achieving the desired end. As a result of the Allied victory at sea in the battle of the Atlantic in mid-1943, submarine activities were reduced in attack priority and did not again become a primary target until November 1944, when an effort was made to disrupt the Type XXI construction program.


17. Great destruction of the facilities of the submarine producing yards took place during the last three months of the war, as a result of both RAF and 8th AF attacks. Blohm and Voss and Howaldswerke at Hamburg ceased operations after the raid of 8 April 1945. Deutsche Werke and Kripp Germaniawerft at Kiel closed down as a result of the raid of April 9, 1945. Deschimag at Bremen maintained only a token activity after the raid of 11 March 1945. Thus production in the industry practically ceased.


18. The cumulative effects of attacks on steel, transportation in general, and the canal and waterway system in particular, became so serious that it now appears that production after April 1945 would have been seriously reduced, if not entirely stopped, by these factors alone, and quite apart from the effects of yard attacks.


19. The studies of submarine production indicated that attacks upon submarines on the building slipways caused relatively more damage than those upon machine shops and component plants.


20. Bombing destroyed 18 Type XXI boats at Deschimag and 11 at Blohm and Voss. This amounted to 2.6% of the submarines constructed from September 1939 to March 1945. A review of conditions that existed throughout the the Type XXI program revealed that bombing in late 1944 and 1945 in general so disturbed the intended production scheme that finally it fell short of its goal. Of the 119 boats (Type XXI - Tony) delivered to the naval authorities in June 1944 only one was used operationally. This amazing fact must be attributed to the gamble which the Speer Ministry consciously took in the large-scale production of submarines of new and untried design, and the use of revolutionary methods of construction, which were a failure.


21. Bombing attacks directed at the submarine industry before 1945 failed to obtain results comparable with the efforts made. The bombing of the transportation system and steel industry in the last part of 1944 and the first part of 1945 impaired the production of submarines as well as the production of other munitions. There was naturally a time lag between the the attacks on transportation and steel and the actual decline in submarine production. The attack on submarine production in the last days of the war was sufficiently heavy to reduce output, even if indirect effects had not reduced production.

Tony