Operation Barbarossa 22.6.41 - KG 3 and KG 53

[Tim O.]

Hi Mirek

Schmittka's flugbuch shows three missions 'bombing Warsaw' on 25.9.39

Gollasch + Unteroffizier Schmittka Ju52 G6 + EF Bombing Warsaw
take-off Breslau 25.9.39 06:50 09:10 Landed Kaycin

Gollasch + Unteroffizier Schmittka Ju52 G6 + EF Bombing Warsaw
Take-off Kaycin 25.9.39 11:17 12:37 Landed Kaycin

Gollasch + Unteroffizier Schmittka Ju52 G6 + EF Bombing Warsaw
Take-off Kaycin 25.9.39 16:00 16:55 Landed Kaycin

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

Thanks,

There were over Warsaw on 25.09.39 47 Ju 52s of IV/KG.z.b.V 2, they droped small incendantary bombs. 2 Ju 52 were shot down by A/A fire and lost. Interesting that Ju 52 had done 3 mission this day.


BTW, are there any information about bomb loads on the mission on 22.06.41 (in Ju 88) and 25.09.39 (in Ju 52)?

regards,
mw

[Tim O.]

Hi Mirek

I have nothing for 1941 but a report from 2./KGzbV2 dated 28th Sept 1939 and held in the Bundesarchiv details 13 Ju 52 crews and states:

'The instruction to release was given by the pilot using the horn signal. The incendiary bombs themselves were thrown using a container attached to a wooden shaft, which had been made for this purpose by members of our own airfield operating company. For this purpose, three additional soldiers were assigned to each aircraft. Of the three-man crew: one threw the bombs, another armed them and the third loaded the implement. To this end all members of the squadron, the operations section and part of the Labour Service of the squadron was assigned to the task. Fulfilling the mission essentially depended on the speed of these people; because of the enemy defences it was essential to drop all 1200 bombs in the shortest possible time. This was achieved in an excellent way. In carrying out the attack brisk anti-aircraft activity was experienced. Polish fighters were not encountered.

Due to the difficulty in locating the target, it was not possible to hold together the squadron formation during the execution of the attack. Rather, it was necessary to go around again after the first flight over the city and throw off the rest of the bombs through individual holes in the clouds. Searching for the targets had been left to the separate flights and sometimes even individual pilots. In this the pilots demonstrated all prudence and independence.

The second attack was carried out on the same morning from Kachin. The approach was again performed from the northeast and on the whole the cloud cover was more dispersed than in the morning, so that the orientation was easier. On the other hand, dense clouds of smoke had enveloped the city and had formed over the centre of the capital as a result of the now numerous fires caused by the bombardment of the Stukas and bombers. In contrast, the north of the city was clear and allowed for perfect flying. The third attack had been ordered on the basis of observations from the previous results and the north of the city was the main target. An approach from the north was consequently planned and the attack directed only up to the railway line, which crosses the city from east to west. The last attack was directed high above the town centre itself. Even with that attack the Flak was still very active. Apparently the Poles possessed still more heavy Flak, which reached up to these heights.

A total of 28,610 incendiary bombs were dropped by the squadron on this day. There were no losses.'

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

Thanks
it was the the fire storym on Warsaw on 25.09.1939, the hardest day for defence and citisens. Air attack during wholy day plus strong artillery fire too.

There were many casoulties and a lot of fire on the ground.
A/A city's defence was in this period very weak. This air attack foreced defenders to capitulate on 27.09.39.

Casultis rate: 5000-10 000 citisens killed in the one day (different estiamtes)

mw

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

Tim
Ju 88s had taken SC 250 and SD 50 bombs agianst Soviet's airfields on 22.06.41.
Interesting if they had mixed or not bombs load?


mw

[Tim O.]

Thanks Mirek.

I have a Flugbuch for a man with 5./KG53. He did not fly against Russia until 23rd June but he did record the bomb loads for his Heinkel He 111 as follows:

Leutnant Horn + Unteroffizier Petersen He 111 A1+EN Target Rushan Take-off: Radom 23.6.41 12:40 15:48 Landed: Radom Bomb load 1 x 1000, 16 x 50
Leutnant Horn + Unteroffizier Petersen He 111 A1+AN Target Lusk Take-off: Radom 24.6.41 14:32 18:37 Landed:Radom Bomb load 1 x 500, 16 x 50
Leutnant Horn + Unteroffizier Petersen He 111 A1+AN Target Mogilev Take-off: Kzerwika 26.6.41 21:32 27.6.41 01:40 Landed:Kzerwika Bomb load 1 x 500, 16 x 50

Not a Ju88 I know but maybe indicates the type of mixed load carried.

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

Thanks

Rushan is probably Różan,
Lusk is Łuck,
Mogilev is Mogilew,

The I/54 in the first attack of 22.06.41 of 23 Ju 88 had dropted 44 SC 250 and 220 SD 50 against 3 airfields: Kamień Koszyrski, Kołki and Janówka. So it could be 1-2 SC 250 plus 9-10 SD 50 on each bomber in one mission. Each airfield could attacked by wave of 7-8 Ju 88s each.

In the second wave of attack 8 Ju 88s of I/KG54 used 30 SC 250 plus 80 SD 50 against only Wielick.

mw

[oquaig]

Originally Posted by Tim O.

Thanks Mirek.

I have a Flugbuch for a man with 5./KG53. He did not fly against Russia until 23rd June but he did record the bomb loads for his Heinkel He 111 as follows:

Leutnant Horn + Unteroffizier Petersen He 111 A1+EN Target Rushan Take-off: Radom 23.6.41 12:40 15:48 Landed: Radom Bomb load 1 x 1000, 16 x 50
Leutnant Horn + Unteroffizier Petersen He 111 A1+AN Target Lusk Take-off: Radom 24.6.41 14:32 18:37 Landed:Radom Bomb load 1 x 500, 16 x 50
Leutnant Horn + Unteroffizier Petersen He 111 A1+AN Target Mogilev Take-off: Kzerwika 26.6.41 21:32 27.6.41 01:40 Landed:Kzerwika Bomb load 1 x 500, 16 x 50

Not a Ju88 I know but maybe indicates the type of mixed load carried.

So, if I am to understand from these entries, this particular crew was flying only one sortie a day ?