Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[drgondog]

john - is it available in English?

[John Beaman]

Originally Posted by drgondog

john - is it available in English?

Unfortunately, no. If you have some rudimentary German knowledge, you can follow along.

[Kutscha]

GC, NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II

http://www.history.navy.mil/content/...raphs/nasc.pdf

[drgondog]

Ruy - I enjoyed re-reading the discussions and noted that for several of the posters there were misconceptions regarding the build up and relative strength of 8th FC as it related to operations and tactics.

Repositioning of LW S/E and T/E Fighter Force from East to Central Germany
The second not so well discussed facet of Operation POINTBLANK (or difference of opinion regarding the same facts) is the reaction by German command regarding the alarm created by 8th AF attacks in the summer of 1944, particularly culminating in the joint strikes by AAF and RAF on Hamburg and the re-organization of the Luftwaffe after Jeschonnek's suicide. That raid marked the end of the notion that Defense of the Reich could be adequately managed by LuftFlotte 3. The migration of experienced JG 3, JG 11, 27 and 53 started stripping the East and moving to defense of Reich. The result on expanding air operations from UK into the Reich had a two fold impact, namely reducing the LW activity in both East and South to one of defensive operations with far too few aircraft to play an important role in supporting the Wermacht, and developing a layered defense approach to Defense of the Reich.

By January 1944, 75% of German fighter strength opposing POINTBLANK was concentrated in Germany, the remainder between the Loire estuary and Norway (quoted from the Rise and Fall of the German Air Force - written by RAF General Staff).

LW night fighter units were also increasingly deployed in the late Summer and Fall 1943 with excellent results but had the effect of diminishing the threat to Bomber Command.

US Escort Fighter build up - from Q1 through Q4, 1943 - very significant but the P-47 augmentation not as impactful as the P-51
The US build up of Fighter strength was rapid. On the date of the Hamburg raids the 8th AF had three P-47 FG's (4th, 56th and 78th) which by that time had received VC's for 134 LW fighters. By the end of Feb 1944 the total VC's for the 4, 56 and 78FG's was 395... 96 of which during February 1944. By contrast the rest of the 10 operational 8th and 9th AF P-47 FG's from August 1943 through the end of February destroyed 243 more, P-38 's two operational FG's 52 and Mustang FG's (2) 144.

In January, 1944 the lone Mustang Group 354FG destroyed 145% of the combined 4th, 56th and 78th FG (46.5 to 32).

What is relevant about the statistics is that nearly all of the Mustang scores were from the Frankfurt to Hannover line - all the way to Berlin and Schweinfurt whereas the P-47 VCs' were dominantly achieved to and just past the German/Holland/Belgium/France borders

"There were Hundreds of Them"
Well, no. The 8th AF doctrine at full P-47D FG strength, augmented by 9th AF until June 1944, was to perform Penetration and Withdrawal escort to 8th BC due to lack of range capability past Stuttgart/Dummer Lake combat radius. The P-38's performed middle and long Target escort from Hannover to Berlin, from Kassel to Mulhausen, from Stuttgart to Freidrichshafen. The Mustang provided Target Escort from Hannover to Posnan/Stettin, from Kassel to Brux, from Frankfurt past Munich.

The Order of Battle for P-38s performing escort missions were 3 FG from March through April, five (including 9th AF) in June, one after July until late September.

The Order of Battle for 8th/9th AF Mustang's performing escort missions were 3 (4, 354, 357) during Big Week, five by March 9 (4, 354, 355, 357, 363), six by end of April (add 352), nine by mid May (4, 339, 352, 354, 355, 357, 359, 361, 363). June saw the diversion of two back to CAS duty in 9th AF (354, 363).

The 8th AF BC was comprised of 31 Bomb Groups in three Bomb Divisions, roughly 10 BG's each .

During a typical deep penetration raid pointed at one target, say Berlin, the 30+ Bomb groups were in trail, and with excellent formation and precise R/V, five 8th and 9th AF FG's plus several RAF squadrons of Spits would be escorting a string of bomber 60 miles long. If formations were strung out - 90-100 miles. Frequently there would be gaps between the P-47s running low and turning back while the P-51s were en route to pick their assigned bombers up and take them to the target and back until in range of Withdrawal support.

If you go back up and look at the total number of Mustang and P-38 FG's available for Big Week you will quickly note that a Maximum of one Long Range escort per 10 BG Bomb Division and One medium to long range P-38 FG per 10 BG's.

Simply stated the sky is a big place, the fighter squadrons are arranged in a dispersed fashion front, top and rear of say 50 B-17s over a 5 mile stretch, with the FG responsibility to cover two to three boxes of 40 to 50 bombers (or more). The LW was successful at detecting un-escorted bomber boxes and often attacked where the fighter coverage was nil, then dove away when the escorts arrived. But, LW could concentrate in mass and attack with significant Local superiority in a 20 mile span.

Additionally, the 8th AF FG commanders did not keep their jobs when they sent 40+ fighters after a few. The flight leaders were most often the attacking/defending force and more arrived when the battle escalated... but a squadron 5-10 miles in the rear would take several minutes to join the fight. Simply speaking there Never was much of a numerical advantage of the defending Mustang/Lightning fighter group, if any, over the attacking LW force in 1944.

Willy Reshke is often quoted, as are many other LW vets as saying "we fought against 10:1 odds".. If you could place every US 8th AF fighter Group in one section of the sky, it could achieve 10:1 over a fully equipped Gruppe - but that was impossible - more often it was One US fighter Group opposing one or more Gruppen in a local 10 cubic mile airspace.

I apologize for the length.

Bill

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Repositioning of LW S/E and T/E Fighter Force from East to Central Germany
The second not so well discussed facet of Operation POINTBLANK (or difference of opinion regarding the same facts) is the reaction by German command regarding the alarm created by 8th AF attacks in the summer of 1944, particularly culminating in the joint strikes by AAF and RAF on Hamburg and the re-organization of the Luftwaffe after Jeschonnek's suicide. That raid marked the end of the notion that Defense of the Reich could be adequately managed by LuftFlotte 3. The migration of experienced JG 3, JG 11, 27 and 53 started stripping the East and moving to defense of Reich. The result on expanding air operations from UK into the Reich had a two fold impact, namely reducing the LW activity in both East and South to one of defensive operations with far too few aircraft to play an important role in supporting the Wermacht, and developing a layered defense approach to Defense of the Reich.

By January 1944, 75% of German fighter strength opposing POINTBLANK was concentrated in Germany, the remainder between the Loire estuary and Norway (quoted from the Rise and Fall of the German Air Force - written by RAF General Staff).

Bill, the crisis in summer 1943 was caused by several operations, of which the Hamburg raids were just a part. The most prominent action on the fighting fronts at the time was the collapse of the Axis forces in Sicily in July. This forced the halt of all operations on the Eastern front and precipitated the Italian armistice. With regard to strategic bombing, the Peenemunde and Ploesti raids in August 1943 were just as important as the attack on Hamburg.

I’ve summarised the movements of 18 selected Gruppen below. Notice that several of these units moved to from the East to the Mediterranean and only then to the Western front. Several units were formed for air defence tasks in spring, so the crisis was being felt even before the summer:

1943 Gruppen:
I./JG27 Mediterranean (11.42) to West (1.43)
I./JG3 East to West 2.43
I./JG11 formed West 4.43
II./JG11 formed West 4.43
III./JG11 formed West 5.43
IV./JG3 formed West 6.43
II./JG3 East to West 8.43
III./JG3 East to West 8.43
II./JG27 East (7.41) to Mediterranean (9.41); Mediterranean to West 8.43
II./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 10.43
III./JG77 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 11.43

1944 Gruppen:
III./JG27 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 3.44
IV./JG27 formed Mediterranean 5.43; Mediterranean to West 4.44
I./JG53 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 5.44
III./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (11.41); Mediterranean to West 6.44
I./JG77 East to Mediterranean 7.42; Mediterranean to West 8.44
II./JG77 East (11.42) to Mediterranean (12.42); Mediterranean to West 8.44
IV./JG53 formed West 10.44

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Bill, the crisis in summer 1943 was caused by several operations, of which the Hamburg raids were just a part. The most prominent action on the fighting fronts at the time was the collapse of the Axis forces in Sicily in July. This forced the halt of all operations on the Eastern front and precipitated the Italian armistice. With regard to strategic bombing, the Peenemunde and Ploesti raids in August 1943 were just as important as the attack on Hamburg.

Oh, I fully agree but Ploesti was only a couple of days after Hamburg firestorm. It was a far more important Political event although Ploesti was a far more serious thrust. Ditto Peenemude,

I’ve summarised the movements of 18 selected Gruppen below. Notice that several of these units moved to from the East to the Mediterranean and only then to the Western front. Several units were formed for air defence tasks in spring, so the crisis was being felt even before the summer:

1943 Gruppen:
I./JG27 Mediterranean (11.42) to West (1.43)
I./JG3 East to West 2.43
I./JG11 formed West 4.43
II./JG11 formed West 4.43
III./JG11 formed West 5.43
IV./JG3 formed West 6.43
II./JG3 East to West 8.43
III./JG3 East to West 8.43
II./JG27 East (7.41) to Mediterranean (9.41); Mediterranean to West 8.43
II./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 10.43
III./JG77 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 11.43

1944 Gruppen:
III./JG27 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 3.44
IV./JG27 formed Mediterranean 5.43; Mediterranean to West 4.44
I./JG53 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 5.44
III./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (11.41); Mediterranean to West 6.44
I./JG77 East to Mediterranean 7.42; Mediterranean to West 8.44
II./JG77 East (11.42) to Mediterranean (12.42); Mediterranean to West 8.44
IV./JG53 formed West 10.44

Regards,

Paul

I agree all the detailed Gruppen movements as you have presented them.

Would note that several ZG and JG's moved into Defense of the Reich in fall 1943 and early winter 1944 that are not mentioned above. My previous notation was to reference movements as early as end of Battle of Kursk and near the Hamburg (and Ploesti/Peenemunde) times. II./JG 51 shows up in defense of Stuttgart in early September, for example and I don't see combat ops against 8th AF for JG 1 and JG 11 until July, 1943 (into Bfh Mitte). By August 17 all JG 1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG 26 plus the ZG and NJG units committed plus I. and II./JG 27.

The KIA/WIA as a % of the sorties stayed at or below 10% for combined LF Reich and LF 3 through the end of 1943 but nearly doubled in January and February - finally jumping to 16%-25% between March and the end of May, 1944. To me, that is the most important statistic because a.) it coincides with the Mustang operations from January forward and b.) it is the most important of the 'required replacement' numbers that had to be met by LW Training and 'foraging' (from bomber and transport ranks).

Another point to ponder regarding loss of experienced pilots is that the WIA/KIA statistics very much reflect the increasing vulnerability of Me 110 and Do 217/Ju 88 crews from the NJG units as 'two for one' to aircraft lost - in which the gunner, while equally dead, did not contribute to the shortage of pilots. The number started ramping up in October 1943 as the P-38s entered service and started catching the T/e crews by surprise past the escort range of the P-47, then the P-51 in December further compounded the problem.

I have some stuff I owe you via email

Regards,

Bill

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Oh, I fully agree but Ploesti was only a couple of days after Hamburg firestorm. It was a far more important Political event although Ploesti was a far more serious thrust. Ditto Peenemude,

Bill, we are in broad agreement. I think the tactical operations should be given equal weight with strategic operations in this period, this again is something I have to write about.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Would note that several ZG and JG's moved into Defense of the Reich in fall 1943 and early winter 1944 that are not mentioned above. My previous notation was to reference movements as early as end of Battle of Kursk and near the Hamburg (and Ploesti/Peenemunde) times. II./JG 51 shows up in defense of Stuttgart in early September, for example and I don't see combat ops against 8th AF for JG 1 and JG 11 until July, 1943 (into Bfh Mitte). By August 17 all JG 1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG 26 plus the ZG and NJG units committed plus I. and II./JG 27.

I agree with all of the above. I have put an updated list at the end of this message, with units that I have added to the list underlined. You will see that a total of 4 Gruppen were withdrawn from the East and Mediterranean even before the battles of Kursk and Sicily. JG 1 and 11 were intercepting allied tactical raids before they joined the strategic defences. Many Luftwaffe units would get caught in between Allied tactical and strategic operations, a famous example being Kurt Brändle and II./JG 3 on 3 November 1943.

Originally Posted by drgondog

The KIA/WIA as a % of the sorties stayed at or below 10% for combined LF Reich and LF 3 through the end of 1943 but nearly doubled in January and February - finally jumping to 16%-25% between March and the end of May, 1944. To me, that is the most important statistic because a.) it coincides with the Mustang operations from January forward and b.) it is the most important of the 'required replacement' numbers that had to be met by LW Training and 'foraging' (from bomber and transport ranks).

The casualties are the most important statistic, of course. I am not sure the jump from 10% to higher levels is that important in the sense that the critical level was below 10%. Allied air forces would probably have curtailed operations if they had suffered such losses.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Another point to ponder regarding loss of experienced pilots is that the WIA/KIA statistics very much reflect the increasing vulnerability of Me 110 and Do 217/Ju 88 crews

Did Don Caldwell include aircrew fatalities in his totals? I don't know, so can't comment, but your point is a valuable one.

Here is the JG list:

1943 Gruppen:
I./JG27 Mediterranean (11.42) to West (1.43)
I./JG3 East to West 2.43
III./JG54 East to West 2.43
I./JG11 formed West 4.43
II./JG11 formed West 4.43
III./JG11 formed West 5.43
IV./JG3 formed West 6.43
I./JG26 West to East 2.43; East to West 6.43
II./JG3 East to West 8.43
III./JG3 East to West 8.43
II./JG27 East (7.41) to Mediterranean (9.41); Mediterranean to West 8.43
II./JG51 East (10.42) to Mediterranean (11.42); Mediterranean (7.43) to West (8.43)
II./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 10.43
III./JG77 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 11.43

1944 Gruppen:
I./JG5 Norway to Romania (11.43); Romania to West 2.44, redesignated III./JG6 (10.44)
III./JG27 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 3.44
IV./JG27 formed Mediterranean 5.43; Mediterranean to West 4.44
II./JG5 East to West (5.44), redesignated IV./JG4 (10.44)
I./JG53 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 5.44
III./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (11.41); Mediterranean to West 6.44
II./JG4 formed West 7.44
III./JG4 formed West 7.44
II./JG6 formed East Prussia 7.44, to West 8.44
I./JG77 East to Mediterranean 7.42; Mediterranean to West 8.44
II./JG77 East (11.42) to Mediterranean (12.42); Mediterranean to West 8.44
I./JG4 Romania (11.43) to Mediterranean (12.43); Mediterranean to West (8.44)
I./JG6 formed East Prussia 7.44, to West 9.44
IV./JG54 East to Romania 4.44; Romania to East 6.44; East to West 9.44
IV./JG53 formed West 10.44

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Paul - Don C does include casualties in Table B "Reich defense force missions against the 8th AF" and Table D for the 15th AF.

Some more food for thought. The Defense of Reich sorties against US escort for March, April and May, 1944 was 40,422.

From September 1942 through December 1943 the total sorties against US escort fighters was 12, 538.

January/February 1944 showed 14,277 - more than all of 1942 and 1943 - but one third of the next three months preceding D-Day.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Paul - Don C does include casualties in Table B "Reich defense force missions against the 8th AF" and Table D for the 15th AF.

Some more food for thought. The Defense of Reich sorties against US escort for March, April and May, 1944 was 40,422...

Bill, got that, thank you for reminding me. I am not quite sure that crewmembers of twin-engined aircraft are counted in the overall casualty totals. They are definitely reported for individual days, as you will be aware.

The Luftwaffe sortie numbers did increase very sharply, as you have recounted. The context was that Allied sortie rates were increasing even faster, with some 115,000 in March-May 1944, of which 34,000 were by USAAF fighters (data from Ted Hooton's 2010 book Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power). I'll send you an email with more detailed information and some thoughts on the subject.

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Agree your points Paul - Not sure how Don Caldwell extracted KIA/MIA statistics but his table does itemize the t/e and single engine fighter losses by type within unit in detail throughout the book - in what looks like excel formatted tables (like my own). I suspect that unless he was maintaining two sets of 'books' to differentiate the t/e and s/e crew fatalities that it would be very difficult to separate them.

The only point I am making about Caldwell's sortie statistics is the incredibly steep gradient in the Feb-May timeframe for LW Sorties vs US Fighters is that the gradient for losses due to Mustangs was equally steep despite proportionately fewer Mustang sorties when compared to P-47.