Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[drgondog]

While I agree Paul's general comments, one has to be careful regarding the loss statistics vs the readiness status to 'compete'. If I used that analysis and applied it to say, the 355th or 4th FG's over a period of time - one would judge both to be ineffective based on losses.

Typical AAF ETO fighter pilot strength ranged from 80 in September 1943 to 100 in December 1944 to 110 in April 1945.

In all three cases (4th, 355th and JG 26), the measurable have to include the percentage of experienced combat pilots versus the newer replacements. In all three cases, the ewer guys (in case of 355th for example) with 10 combat missions or less comprised more than 60% of the MIA/POW/KIA. Of the 190 355th FG/2SF pilots from Steeple Morden MIA.
144 were KIA/POW. 28 Evaded, 5 were rescued. Then 13 were KIFA.

During the 1st 12 months September 14, 1943 through September 1944 the 355th loss of pilots was 138 KIA/POW or more than 137% of its operational strength in 1944 and 171% of 1943 strength. More than JG 26's % totals for 1943. The loss of skilled flight and squadron leaders to rotation assignments after Tour of Duty was another 32 pilots in reduction of combat effectiveness - another factor Not in comparison with JG 26 statistics but weighing heavily on potential 355th FG statistics.

Of the top 5 8th AF Victory credit achievers, the average of the 56th, 357th and 352nd FG's were lower - but still higher than the JG 26 statistics quoted above - and dominantly strafing losses, except for 56FG and 357FG. High experience/high scoring pilots in 8th AF were lost far more to flak than German fighters after February 1944.

The US practices (because they could afford to do so) was to rotate key experience back to train the rookies and better prepare them. It 'hurt' the individual combat Fighter Groups, but made the new replacements better for the practice. The LW practice, however force the TO&E to have a high level of skill at leadership positions through the Spring of 1944 - at the expense of cannon fodder coming from flight schools or bomber re-assignments.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

While I agree Paul's general comments, one has to be careful regarding the loss statistics vs the readiness status to 'compete'. If I used that analysis and applied it to say, the 355th or 4th FG's over a period of time - one would judge both to be ineffective based on losses.

Typical AAF ETO fighter pilot strength ranged from 80 in September 1943 to 100 in December 1944 to 110 in April 1945.

Hello Bill,

Thank you very much for providing a great degree of higly relevant detail! I agree that comparing losses to initial unit strength can be deceptive, depending on the volume of pilot flow compared to the initial stock. As you noted, the comparative statistics don't seem to be readily available, but in general terms JG 26 would have had a far smaller flow of pilots being rotated or reassigned. The USAAF fighter groups should have had significantly more pilots than JG 26 over the course of the year, relative to average unit stength.

You are right to highlight that the rate of attrition of less experienced pilots was far higher, the same conclusion was reached by the Red Baron studies of the Vietnam War and this seems to be an established general rule for most types of combat. I was able to briefly look through Top Guns just now for the losses of JG 26 commanders and I can say that they were high, 2 Gruppe COs (Galland and Seifert) and 4 Staffel COs (Ebersberger, Keller, Ruppert and Zink). That's only looking at those killed and only out of those who held commands at the end of 1942. I don't know the relevant data for the 355th, but I imagine the loss of commanders were considerably smaller and hence the overall effect on unit cohesion lower.

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Hello Bill,

Thank you very much for providing a great degree of higly relevant detail! I agree that comparing losses to initial unit strength can be deceptive, depending on the volume of pilot flow compared to the initial stock. As you noted, the comparative statistics don't seem to be readily available, but in general terms JG 26 would have had a far smaller flow of pilots being rotated or reassigned. The USAAF fighter groups should have had significantly more pilots than JG 26 over the course of the year, relative to average unit stength.

In all fairness to your original observation about the losses of 1943 JG 26 we should also remember that Jagdgeschwader strength of say 12 squadrons would map more closely to 3 8th AF FG with 9 squadrons of 16 aircraft (on operations) and as far TO&E, including full staffing of flights plus Group HQ pilots, would be closer to 25 per squadron in late 1943 plus 4 per HQ

You are right to highlight that the rate of attrition of less experienced pilots was far higher, the same conclusion was reached by the Red Baron studies of the Vietnam War and this seems to be an established general rule for most types of combat. I was able to briefly look through Top Guns just now for the losses of JG 26 commanders and I can say that they were high, 2 Gruppe COs (Galland and Seifert) and 4 Staffel COs (Ebersberger, Keller, Ruppert and Zink). That's only looking at those killed and only out of those who held commands at the end of 1942. I don't know the relevant data for the 355th, but I imagine the loss of commanders were considerably smaller and hence the overall effect on unit cohesion lower.

Regards,

Paul

Absolutely true, The 355th lost a Deputy Group CO in November 1943 (evaded) and another Deputy Group CO in June 1944 plus one 357FS CO in May 1944 plus another 358FS CO in March 1945. All flak related except first one. An anomaly for the 355th is that of 21 air aces, none were shot down by LW fighter - six were downed related to strafing (one rescued behind enemy lines, one WIA/evaded, three were POW and one was KIA).

The experience levels of the lost aces were much higher - the one rescued was my father, a major and 354FS CO, one evaded/WIA (Captain Cullerton-flight leader and second highest strafer), one POW was top ace (Capt Henry Brown - flight leader), one POW (major Lenfest- 354FS Ops Officer -stuck in mud trying to rescue Brown) the first 355th ace (Capt Norm Olson 357FS Ops Officer) and one high altitude flak (Capt Koraleski - 354 Ops officer.)

Regards,

Bill