Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[GuerraCivil]

About LW having abandoned the "finger four" at the western front by the beginning of 1944 my source is Caldwell: JG 26, Top Guns of the Luftwaffe. (page 224 in my Finnish edition).

Caldwell also gave me the idea to think that P-47 achieved aereal domination over Western Europe before the P-51 with longer range replaced it (page 396 in my edition of "Top Guns"). To make it more precise: P-47 Razorback achieved air superiority for the Allied in the areas of its range before P-51 B extended the airwar even further into German airspace. Probably also the Spitfire IX was able to turn the balance at the areas of its limited range.

When it comes to German dayfighter losses of Big Week (Feb. 1944) and the role of 8th USAAF fighters in it, I guess that ten Fighter Groups of P-47´s still shot down more German fighters than two Fighter Groups of P-51´s (+ 2 Fighter Groups of P-38) despite the more limited range of P-47´s? Even the bombing targets in the limited range of P-47´s had to be defended by Germans and thus they had to accept to facing P-47 escorts and subsequent losses in fighter vs. fighter -combat when defending the targets inside the range of P-47.

From the book of David Isby (The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs. 109, p. 362-363) about the situation of Luftwaffe by the end of March 1944: during first three months of 1944 Luftwaffe lost 3091 fighters of which 70,5 % in the defence of Germany and in the west: "For the fighter units (of LW) this was like losing Battle of Britain every month repeated without ceasing".

Fom the posts above one can conclude that the decisive change happened already in 1943 although Luftwaffe could still win big single battles against 8th USAAF bombers. Although well armed, even the heavy bombers could not be flown unescorted into well-defended enemy airspace in daylight with acceptable losses - this was what the Germans were yet able to demonstrate convincingly. Although the exaggerated air victory claims of the gunners of US bombers were taken granted at their time (at least in the official Allied propaganda) even they were not enough to make the loss rates of unescorted bombers acceptable.

From the book of Isby I found out also that Germans were still in late 1943 able to win battles at some secondary fronts like the East Aegean (the Dodecanese Campaign). Bf 109´s were still able to achieve air superiority over Spitfires there in autumn 1943. (Isby 2012, p. 300-301)

Although the eastern front was considered "easy" or at least easier than west by LW fighter pilots, it may have contributed to the downgrading of pilot training in late 1942. According to sources referred by Isby many German fighter schools were closed/downgraded by then and lots of instructors sent to help in east. During late 1942/beginning of early 1943 the Stalingrad battle caused a loss of 1000 trained aircrews to Luftwaffe, including many "irreplacebale" instructors. Isby: Future Bf 109 pilots would not learn to fly on instruments because their instructors had died in Stalingrad (campaign). (Isby 2012, p. 286).

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

About LW having abandoned the "finger four" at the western front by the beginning of 1944 my source is Caldwell: JG 26, Top Guns of the Luftwaffe. (page 224 in my Finnish edition).

Caldwell also gave me the idea to think that P-47 achieved aereal domination over Western Europe before the P-51 with longer range replaced it (page 396 in my edition of "Top Guns"). To make it more precise: P-47 Razorback achieved air superiority for the Allied in the areas of its range before P-51 B extended the airwar even further into German airspace. Probably also the Spitfire IX was able to turn the balance at the areas of its limited range.

I respect Don's opinions and we have had the discussion before. What I point out is the P-47 did well against the LW, when the LW chose to engage within the operational radius of the P-47. Unfortunately the concept of Strategic Air Power stopped at that radius, but beyond that radius the LW was able to engage in heavy number with both s/e and t/e day fighters plus bring t/e night fighters to bear with no concern about fighter escort. You COULD say the Spit IX and P-47D were more or less establishing air superiority almost to Hannover, past Frankfurt and down to Stuttgart - leaving German Oil, Chemical, Aircraft engines and airframes and Ball Bearings safely protected - until the Mustang B with 85 gallon fuselage tank added.

When it comes to German dayfighter losses of Big Week (Feb. 1944) and the role of 8th USAAF fighters in it, I guess that ten Fighter Groups of P-47´s still shot down more German fighters than two Fighter Groups of P-51´s (+ 2 Fighter Groups of P-38) despite the more limited range of P-47´s? Even the bombing targets in the limited range of P-47´s had to be defended by Germans and thus they had to accept to facing P-47 escorts and subsequent losses in fighter vs. fighter -combat when defending the targets inside the range of P-47.

True, but to set the context properly, one of the Mustang groups had only been operational 9 days. To better frame the discussion in two more weeks two more Mustang groups became operational and combine they destroyed more German fighters than all the P-47 FG's combined between Big Week and March 31...

From the book of David Isby (The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs. 109, p. 362-363) about the situation of Luftwaffe by the end of March 1944: during first three months of 1944 Luftwaffe lost 3091 fighters of which 70,5 % in the defence of Germany and in the west: "For the fighter units (of LW) this was like losing Battle of Britain every month repeated without ceasing".

Fom the posts above one can conclude that the decisive change happened already in 1943 although Luftwaffe could still win big single battles against 8th USAAF bombers. Although well armed, even the heavy bombers could not be flown unescorted into well-defended enemy airspace in daylight with acceptable losses - this was what the Germans were yet able to demonstrate convincingly. Although the exaggerated air victory claims of the gunners of US bombers were taken granted at their time (at least in the official Allied propaganda) even they were not enough to make the loss rates of unescorted bombers acceptable.

[/i]

Recall that of the 3091 fighters lost in Q1 ( or whatever the number was) that a considerable number of strafing losses to Mustangs occurred in that March and succeeding months. Those are also operational losses due to all causes.

If we pick on March/April 1944 to parse Defense of Reich losses against 8th and AF ---- from Caldwell's Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich
MAR, 1944 LF-Reich
sorties=2464 Losses=354, KIA/WIA=202 (Dominantly Mustang)
MAR LF-3
sorties =1094 Losses =70, KIA/WIA=43 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)

APR, 1944 LF-Reich
sorties =3487 Losses =370, KIA/WIA=206 (Dominantly Mustang)
APR LF-3
sorties =1100 Losses =48, KIA/WIA=19 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)

1943 Total LF_Reich or Mitte
sorties =13,377 Losses =703, KIA/WIA=396 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)
1943 Total LF-3
sorties =7294, Losses =278, KIA/WIA=134 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)

Observation - the Mustang did not get all the aircraft destroyed against the LF-Reich, some were due the bombers, some were due the P-38, a few P-47. Similarly not all the VC's against LF-3 were P-47s and Spits, some were by Mustangs and P-38s over lowlands and France.

Summary - an extraordinary total of KIA/WIA losses by the LW in March and April 1944 were primarily due to Mustangs - and Nearly as many as all of 1943

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Recall that of the 3091 fighters lost in Q1 ( or whatever the number was) that a considerable number of strafing losses to Mustangs occurred in that March and succeeding months. Those are also operational losses due to all causes.

If we pick on March/April 1944 to parse Defense of Reich losses against 8th and AF ---- from Caldwell's Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich
MAR, 1944 LF-Reich...

Observation - the Mustang did not get all the aircraft destroyed against the LF-Reich, some were due the bombers, some were due the P-38, a few P-47. Similarly not all the VC's against LF-3 were P-47s and Spits, some were by Mustangs and P-38s over lowlands and France.

Summary - an extraordinary total of KIA/WIA losses by the LW in March and April 1944 were primarily due to Mustangs - and Nearly as many as all of 1943

Hello Bill,

I am also sceptical of the Q1 number, it does feel more like the total of losses to all causes, but I will try to look that up and clarify.

The extracted data does support your point and I think it is unambiguously true that the Mustang was the main tool of the Luftwaffe's destruction during Big Week and the period up to D-Day. I have added up the total losses of twin-engine Luftwaffe aircraft presented in Don's book and I think the numbers highlight the influence of the Mustang's long range in 1944, even though these losses were not exclusively due to P-51s:
Q3 1943 – 25 aircraft
Q4 1943 – 132
Q1 1944 – 308 (12 times as many as in Q3 1943)
Q2 1944 –185

Coming back to what was happening in 1943, I extracted the full list of commander casualties from Don Caldwell's website. The Spitfire was the most commmon cause of loss (7 out of 21 cases), followed by the B-17 (4 cases) and P-47 (3 cases). I think that this kind of evidence clearly supports my view that the Luftwaffe was under extreme pressure by early to mid-1943 and that even the early operations of the Eighth caused a crisis. The point that I would highlight about targets outside of P-47, or even Spitfire, range is that attacks on those targets constituted an attempt to win air dominance rather than just air superiority, which had already been won in the Fighter Command operational area. To return to a point I have made previously, air dominance was not strictly necessary to secure Allied landings or win the war more generally. Table of JG 26 losses below:

9/8/43 Beese, Artur Oblt. WIA 1 CO W of Cambrai Spitfire
5/14/43 Borris, Karl Hptm. WIA 8 CO Issigen-Wevelgem B-17
10/24/43 Ebersberger, Kurt Hptm. KIA 4 CO 3km S of Hesdin Spitfire
8/17/43 Galland, Wilhelm-Ferdinand Maj. KIA II CO nr Liege-5km W Maastricht P-47
4/5/43 Geisshardt, Fritz Hptm. KIA III CO Ghent B-17
12/1/43 Hoppe, Helmut Hptm. KIA 5 CO Epinoy a/f Spitfire
7/31/43 Kelch, Günther Hptm. KIFA 7 CO Neuwerk-Knechtsiel crashed
3/24/43 Keller, Paul Oblt. KIA 10J CO Ashford own bomb
5/14/43 Leykauf, Erwin Oblt. no 12/54 CO Wevelgem a/f taxi
4/15/43 Matuschka, Siegfried Oblt. KIA 4/54 CO near St. Inglevert Spitfire
3/20/43 Mietusch, Klaus Hptm. WIA 7 CO Krasnogvardeisk a/f engine
6/22/43 Naumann, Hans Hptm. WIA 6 CO near Antwerp P-47
6/13/43 Ruppert, Kurt Hptm. KIA III CO Neumünster B-17
11/25/43 Seifert, Johannes Obstlt. KIA II CO nr Bethune-5km S of Estaires P-38 - coll
10/10/43 Staiger, Hermann Hptm. WIA 12 CO near Dorsten B-17
5/13/43 Stammberger, Otto Oblt. WIA 4 CO near St. Omer Spitfire
11/3/43 Steindl, Peter-Paul Hptm. WIA 11 CO E Friesland-Holtgast P-47
6/17/43 Sternberg, Horst Oblt. WIA 5 CO W of Hazebrouck Spitfire
11/29/43 Sternberg, Horst Oblt. WIFA 6 CO c/l Lille-Nord a/f Spitfire
3/5/43 Zink, Fülbert Hptm. no 2 CO S of Shvinochovo combat
3/14/43 Zink, Fülbert Hptm. KIA 2 CO E of Werschinskojec missing

Regards,

Paul