Christer Bergstrom BOB book

[mars]

Originally Posted by Peter Cornwell

Nobody can suggest that there was ever a problem with the number of fighters available to Fighter Command - BEAVERBROOK had that well under control. But there were growing concerns over the wastage rate of fighter pilots and the inexperience and/or continuing endurance of those remaining on strength. DOWDING's policy of rotating squadrons between Groups also resulted in a similar diminishing quality (though to a lesser extent) within his reserve pilot pool. Pilot attrition within RAF Fighter Command was on a knife-edge. But the continuing availability of serviceable airfields in southern England was the other major factor which brought us so close to imminent defeat in early September 1940.

Peter, I read your books, I respect you as first rate historian, but still something I have to say, till early September 1940, both RAF and Luftwaffe had suffered serious losses, and both side were more or less exhausted, but as I said, while Keith's Group 11 was almost reach end of their strength, but Group 10 and 12 were in far better condition, that means RAF fighter commander HAD NOT exhausted their reserve yet, that fact combined with RAF still had enough modern fighters, it does not seem to me RAF was in the verge of IMMEDIATE defeat, see I do not exclude the possibility that Luftwaffe still would win the Bob if they did not switch their target in early September, the thing I do not agree is these claims that Germans had victory in their sight and only be taken away by some kind of Hilter's stupid order.

[Juha]

Hello Peter
I agree with the airfields but in the pilot situation one must remember also the development on the other side, permanent losses of the SE fighter pilots were almost equal on the both sides and also LW was running out of combat ready 109 pilots. Near the end of Sept 40 they had more combat ready 109s than combat ready pilots to fly them. They had only 676 of them, that's only 60% of the establishment.

[Peter Cornwell]

Thank you for your comments. I have no wish to extend the life of this thread nor broaden its scope beyond addressing the original point raised by taitbb as challenged by mars.

Fighter Command squadrons held in immediate reserve were mainly based in adjoining Groups as you say. But many of these units had already been rotated in and out of the main battle area in No.11 Group over preceding weeks, until casualties prompted their withdrawal, and this movement inevitably created a cumulative debilitating effect on the fighting efficiency of Fighter Command as a whole. It is not simply a question of the number of pilots available at any point in time, it is also their relative experience & combat readiness. This qualitative factor, difficult to measure with any accuracy, was a source of growing concern amongst RAF Commanders. So, while they had not yet exhausted their reserve of pilots in terms of numbers, they were only too well aware, just how thin this finite resource was stretched. By the start of the critical two-week phase of the BoB commencing 24 August 1940 at least one in three of all No.11 Group pilots was deemed ‘inexperienced’ and even the balance included many pilots still relatively fresh from OTUs with little or no combat experience. Adoption of the ‘Stabilisation Scheme’ reluctantly effected by DOWDING on 8 September 1940 is ‘best proof of the seriousness which the outlook was viewed at HQ Fighter Command’. Furthermore, the strength of Category A squadrons was to be maintained by intakes from Category C squadrons - officially ‘considered unfit to meet German fighters’. (Cf. Chapters XIII & XV of the official history The Defence of the United Kingdom by Basil Collier: HMSO 1957). This would inevitably result in even further dilution in the quality of the British air defences. Fighter Command was on its knees, the Germans had the advantage, but they failed to exploit it by prematurely switching the main thrust of their attacks away from RAF airfields to London. These are well-documented and long-established facts as mentioned by taitbb in post #6.

[bearoutwest]

Perhaps what you gentlemen are not in agreement upon is not whether the RAF was on the verge of defeat, but rather what is meant by the term “on the verge of defeat”?

If local air superiority over the south-east of England was the key objective, then if it was achieved by the Luftwaffe sufficiently for airborne landings to take place; this would have been a big game changer. Once this scenario occurs, then the RAF are no longer fighting a defensive fighter-oriented battle, but the RAF light bombers (Battles, Blenheims, Hudsons, etc) would be thrown into the fight as well as the Spitfires and Hurricanes***. The lack of available airfields (even for a week) in the south-east, would require the RAF fighters and light bombers to deploy from further afield in 10 Group and 12 Group. The Luftwaffe Bf109s and 110s would still be operating from French bases, but over the parts of the south-east of England where they had a reasonable time over target. Thus the effectiveness of the Jagdwaffe would still be reasonable high, but the RAF fighter and light bomber forces would have taken a significant reduction in effectiveness.

Although, under these circumstances, the overall Battle of Britain and the invasion of the British Isles was not a foregone conclusion, the RAF could be considered to have suffered a defeat in losing local air superiority over the invasion zones.

I think it not unreasonable to draw the conclusion that had the Luftwaffe attacks on 11 Group airfields not been curtailed in favour of bombing raids on London, then local air superiority may have been achieved by the Luftwaffe over the south-east sufficiently for airborne landings to have taken place.

Regards,
...geoff




***Before anyone mentions it, I am aware that the Battle, Blenheim and Hudson light bomber squadrons were already in action with night raids on barge harbours, convoys and bomber airfields. However, the rate of loss would take a step-change upwards, if it were necessary to throw them in to daylight raids on airborne drop zones and landing beaches.

[mars]

Originally Posted by Peter Cornwell

Thank you for your comments. I have no wish to extend the life of this thread nor broaden its scope beyond addressing the original point raised by taitbb as challenged by mars.

Fighter Command squadrons held in immediate reserve were mainly based in adjoining Groups as you say. But many of these units had already been rotated in and out of the main battle area in No.11 Group over preceding weeks, until casualties prompted their withdrawal, and this movement inevitably created a cumulative debilitating effect on the fighting efficiency of Fighter Command as a whole. It is not simply a question of the number of pilots available at any point in time, it is also their relative experience & combat readiness. This qualitative factor, difficult to measure with any accuracy, was a source of growing concern amongst RAF Commanders. So, while they had not yet exhausted their reserve of pilots in terms of numbers, they were only too well aware, just how thin this finite resource was stretched. By the start of the critical two-week phase of the BoB commencing 24 August 1940 at least one in three of all No.11 Group pilots was deemed ‘inexperienced’ and even the balance included many pilots still relatively fresh from OTUs with little or no combat experience. Adoption of the ‘Stabilisation Scheme’ reluctantly effected by DOWDING on 8 September 1940 is ‘best proof of the seriousness which the outlook was viewed at HQ Fighter Command’. Furthermore, the strength of Category A squadrons was to be maintained by intakes from Category C squadrons - officially ‘considered unfit to meet German fighters’. (Cf. Chapters XIII & XV of the official history The Defence of the United Kingdom by Basil Collier: HMSO 1957). This would inevitably result in even further dilution in the quality of the British air defences. Fighter Command was on its knees, the Germans had the advantage, but they failed to exploit it by prematurely switching the main thrust of their attacks away from RAF airfields to London. These are well-documented and long-established facts as mentioned by taitbb in post #6.

Peter, I understand the problems RAF faced in the early September 1940 (Luftwaffe was suffering too though), as Mr bearoutwest said, the difference opinion of us is about "how far RAF was from defeat", your opinion I guess was matters of one or two weeks if not matter of days, my opinion is RAF had the ability to put up an effective fight for much longer times despite the situations they were in, because neither of us could go back time and see a "else if" , we will never know, so we have to agree to disagree.

[Juha]

BoB as it was was an attrition campaign, and so one must look the situation on both sides, Jagdwaffen had also lost many experienced leaders from May 40 onwards and was badly under establishment in pilots, so it also had bad problems in replacing its losses.

Airborne attack alone would have been madness, airborne troops didn't have firepower and staying power of normal troops. Even on Crete Germans needed seaborne troops to complete the conquest of the island. And seaborne invasion to England would probably have been a failure. Germans would have lost some of its best troops. Of course also RN would have suffered significant losses and KM, too. What effects that would have had to the war at sea is anyone's guess.

[mars]

Originally Posted by Juha

BoB as it was was an attrition campaign, and so one must look the situation on both sides, Jagdwaffen had also lost many experienced leaders from May 40 onwards and was badly under establishment in pilots, so it also had bad problems in replacing its losses.

Airborne attack alone would have been madness, airborne troops didn't have firepower and staying power of normal troops. Even on Crete Germans needed seaborne troops to complete the conquest of the island. And seaborne invasion to England would probably have been a failure. Germans would have lost some of its best troops. Of course also RN would have suffered significant losses and KM, too. What effects that would have had to the war at sea is anyone's guess.

Yes, it is true, the purpose of BoB from German perspective was NOT about an airborn attack, it was about to destroy RAF so that in the case Hilter decided to launch operation Sea lion, the German convoy would not need to air attack from RAF and Luftwaffe could concentrated to provide air cover for German ships

[bearoutwest]

I think you misunderstand my comment. Perhaps I should have used the phrase "initial invasion phase" rather than specifying the airborne landings. Local air superiority would need to be achieved by the Luftwaffe before any invasion operations could be initiated.

In any case, all this is now moving away from the discussion of Mr Bergstrom's book, so I shall return to my cave and allow you all to continue discussing the semantics to your wholehearted contentment.

Genuine regards,
...geoff

[Fanair]

But what do you think of the book ?

Thank you

Alain

[John Vasco]

Fanair:
I'll tell you next week after I've had a good look through it.

As for the other comments of posters, I'll give my simple views (Peter C. will disagree with some of them - Hi Peter!)
I agree with Peter re the quality of pilots as the Battle wore on. But one must also balance that with the quality of replacement pilots/aircrew with the Luftwaffe units ranged against Fighter Command. Allied to that is the manning levels of Lw units, and their aircraft complement, as the Battle wore on. Erhard Milch did a round of units starting on 20th August 1940 and highlighted shortages on both fronts (30 pilots short at JG 26, for example). He did another round between 27th August and 4th September and found things had become even worse. Chapter 23 (page 285 et seq.) of Stephen Bungay's excellent 'The Most Dangerous enemy' covers it all.
Also, when talking of pilot strength in Fighter Command, Dowding's view was that a Squadron was up to strength when it had 16 pilots. Now that is a sensible approach given the need to factor in losses, but the plain fact is that I do not know of one example where all 16 pilots from one squadron were up at the same time. What Dowding was doing was building in 'slippage' in the classic manner of running a 'Project' (for want of a better word). The net result being, as Bungay points out, that Fighter Command had more pilots on charge in October 1940 than when they entered the Battle in July!
Airfields? We had already pulled back from Manston by 24th August. That did not materially affect the prosecution of the Battle, and it was always considered that if more airfields were reduced to the state of Manston, then squadrons would operate from slightly further back. Some might say that moving back would lead one into the 'Big Wing' scenario of getting up too late - I would counter by saying go read Laddie Lucas's book on Bader. The whole Big Wing idea is explained in great clarity, and shows that over many, many, decades, most people have got hold of the wrong end of the strick completely (might get grief over this, but go read the book first and then come back to me). Fact is, there were enough airfields to maintain the presence of RAF fighter squadrons in the air even if more were put in the same state as Manston, even if those squadrons were based further back.
As for any airborne invasion, go check out the losses during the Western Campaign in the Ju52/3 units to see just what their capacity/capability was for an airborne invasion. If you can get hold of a copy, read Johannes Kaufmann's book (the title of which escapes me, but it might be 'Mein Fliegerleben') in which he describe the situation post-Western campaign (he flew Ju52/3s, later transferring to SKG 210). Not going to happen.
Seaborne invasion? In the light of what we know now, and the enormous planning and logistics required for D-Day 6th June 1944, barges ploughing across the Channel at 2 mph would have little realistic chance even BEFORE any interdiction by the RAF or Royal Navy.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but it DOES feed in to objective critical thinking and re-evaluation of events. And I say this full in the knowledge that in 1940, the defenders of our Island could not 'see over the other side of the hill' as much as they wanted to, or needed to...