New Military History Blog - first post about loss of Ju 188 in the East in 1944

[edwest2]

Hello Dan,


Your comment at the end of the article ignores many other issues. In the East, depending on location, 50 to 60 tons of supplies had to be flown in daily. The transports were sometimes shot down or crashed in reasonably good shape but were no longer airworthy, or were later destroyed on the ground. The Americans and British were not always in agreement. This was not a war of straight mathematics but a very large number of factors. Everyone was clamoring for priority of some kind: conflicts over who gets more fuel for American or British tanks and so on.

The war in the air was part of the war on the ground. Again, mistakes were made, by both sides, or depended on the changing war situation. Allocations were not made by the numbers but depended on what was available.

The Battle for France saw - with all due respect - lesser British aircraft being sacrificed to a superior German fighter force.

A bullet by bullet, engine by engine comparison is too narrow.



Best,
Ed

[Dan History]

Hello Ed,

Thank you for your response. I have to say that your comment is rather confused, because you did not select a clear main theme for your critique. I will reply to what is the central point of your argument:

Originally Posted by edwest2

Your comment at the end of the article ignores many other issues.

A bullet by bullet, engine by engine comparison is too narrow.

My comment is a reflection on a small-scale case study, but it casts a useful light on the larger issues involved. Wars are won by allocating and employing resources of equipment and manpower in a manner which is superior to that of the enemy. This is what Nazi Germany did in 1939 and 1940, until the Battle of Britain, and again in 1941 during the first stages of Operation Barbarossa. Thereafter, as Nazi strategy and operations increasingly lost focus and became incoherent, Germany began to suffer one defeat after another. The eventual collapse of Nazi Germany was caused by the Allies' ability to allocate and deploy resources in a far superior manner.

In the case of this Ju 188 loss, Germany developed a relatively advanced aircraft very late in the war and deployed it in a way which rendered it vulnerable to much less complicated Soviet aircraft. It is clear that this was an example of resource misallocation and one which reflected very broad trends within the German war effort. Instead of addressing the problem presented here, that Germany was producing the wrong aircraft for the wrong reasons and thereby weakening its own air force, you have suggested that the point I make is too narrowly drawn. I cannot agree. The Ju 188 is a small but useful illustration of the fact that the Nazi leadership did not adequately manage Germany's small resource base, which hastened German defeat.

Regards,

Dan

[edwest2]

Hello Dan,


Your analysis lacks depth. The Americans and British were quite worried about advanced German designs entering service.



Best,
Ed

[Dan History]

Ed,

Your view is not quite correct:

Originally Posted by edwest2

The Americans and British were quite worried about advanced German designs entering service.

The Western Allies were indeed worried about German jet and rocket fighters, but they were not particularly concerned about the various piston-engine designs. In the event, even the jet fighters were dealt with reasonably effectively by the late-war piston fighters of the Allies. I suggest you visit the RAF Museum in Hendon, where it becomes immediately apparent just how far advanced the P-51 and the Tempest were in comparison to German types. Allied aircraft had much more powerful engines and considerably better aerodynamics by the end of the war, so German piston engine designs were simply ineffective.

Regards,

Dan