FAA Role in the Pacific.?

[KEEP_FALKLANDS_BRITISH]

Sorry But I’m about to have a massive rant.And I Can’t Stop when I get going.

In my opinion the FAA in the Pacific went pretty well.Considering the fact that
They weren't in the "Pacific War"in the actual Pacific Ocean for as long as their US counterparts(or contributed as much).The FAA aircraft managed to shoot out of the skies 112.5 Japanese aircraft.And the FAA in the invasion of Okinawa subduing Japanese air activity from the airfields located on Okinawa Itself.And the SeaFire proved itself as a fighter when it shot down 12 Japanese aircraft with the loss of only one Seafire.TAnd the BPF possessed better armoured carriers than the Americans, The BPF carriers had armoured decks which helped against the kamikaze attacks whereas the Americans had lightly armoured decks which proved critical later on.he FAA were also involved in the attacks on Sumatran Oil Fields.The Picture shows an attack of the FAA on the Sumatran Oil Fields.
This Picture Shows F4u Corsairs of The Royal Navy In British Pacific FLeet markings.There were 42 FAA squadrons serving in the Pacific aboard 17 aircraft carriers.They FAA did a whole lot more in the Pacific but I don't have time to type up stuff about them because I'm late for a School Function.

HMS Formidabble going through the Anti- Submarine boom in Sydney Harbour.

The Carrier HMS Collossus Which served in the BPF.


HMS Indefatigable In Sydney Harbour.



The deck of a British Carrier off the Shore of Japan.

So you see the FAA Served well in the Pacific and Gave a great much of assistance and help to the Americans by using their own[FAA] aircraft to
take out other targets while the US took out other targets without having to stretch themselves to thin.And The FAA also provided invaluable air cover over the allied fleet.

[Nicholas]

I don't want to comment too much on the American pilot's opinion otherwise I might end up in a rant too. This type of derision is common in AVG (Flying Tigers) writings about their RAF counterparts in Burma. Suffice it to say that Franek's observation hits the button.

Books to add to Jim's list are:

'Carrier Pilot' by Norman Hanson (about flying the Corsair - training in USA and BPF ops. Well written and illuminating personal account)
'The Forgotten Fleet' by John Winton (comprehensive classic account of BPF)
'Task Force 57' by Peter C Smith
'Corsair KD431 - The Time Capsule Fighter' by David Morris (fascinating forensics on the FAA's surviving F4U + veteran pilot's recollections of flying)

Two further observations:

1. FAA were first at sea with the bent-wing bird - after USN said it couldn't be flown from carriers
2. FAA Avengers at Palembang were observed being flown "like fighters" and scored victories over Japanese fighters using their forward armament.

[Graham Boak]

It should be pointed out that the US pilot's comments on BPF leadership, and specifically the handling of aviation, are echoed by the comments of FAA pilots. Read Crosley or David Brown on Vian. The comparative levels of training, experience and operations are simply a matter of very obvious record. Achievements on a tactical level do not cancel out failings elsewhere.

[R Leonard]

Anecdotally, and having nothing whatsoever to do with FAA performance critcism, my father who was, at the time, Jimmy Thach's assistant in the TF-38 ops shop had the opportunity to speak with an FAA F4U driver who had landed aboard Shangri-La in the late summer of 1945. The conversation was inconsequential, but my father, at the ripe old age of 29, was amazed by the apparent youth of the RN pilot, obviously in his very late teens . . . it struck home to him then that the British had really been at war for a long, long time for their pilots to be so young.
He later flew over to and landed on one of the British carriers and was somewhat relieved to find that most of the pilots were not quite so young, though there was an identifiable population of youngsters.

For what's worth.

Rich

[fsbofk]

In The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy, Clark Reynolds devotes a chapter to the RN's participation alongside the USN in the Pacific. He discusses some of the initial difficulties and familiarizing that the BPF faced in order to operate at the pace the US Pacific Fleet was used to, including at-sea refueling techniques that were inferior to USN methods. Quoting one British author, he notes that "the actual technique of attacking airfields and the aircraft upon them was something fairly novel to the majority of the Fleet Air Arm." One thing he credits the RN with is superior fighter direction techniques, due to their experience at intercepting LW aircraft; Reynolds states that Commander Lewin, who was Vian's FDO, needed a smaller number of defensive fighters than the US was using. Reynolds also points out that RN carriers' armored flight decks could better absorb a kamikaze hit in case their fighter direction let one slip by.

[Graham Boak]

It is worth adding that the Seafire L.III, despite (or perhaps because of) its known handicaps of range and strength, was faster and better accelerating at low-level than either the Hellcat or the Corsair, thus being better suited to the close-CAP role.

[Bruce Lander]

Hello Gentlemen,

I just came across this thread - at this late stage I feel that it is also worth noting that by 1944/45 the U.S. firmly believed that the War against Japan belonged exclusively to the U.S. and accordingly only grudgingly allowed the B.P.F. to participate in what was basically a supporting role.

Cheers

Bruce Lander