stupid strategic question

[John Beaman]

I have been reading the new book, Dragons On Bird Wings (well-done BTW) so, I’m going to ask a stupid question about USSR strategy in 1943. In the spring, after the elimination of the Stalingrad pocket and other places, the Red Army was sweeping westward, albeit with hiccups here and there. They had isolated German forces in the Kuban peninsula and according to this book spent an enormous amount of army and air force resources trying to push these German forces out or eliminate them. Losses seem to have been very high.

My stupid question is: since Soviet forces were driving west north of the Sea of Asov and would cut off German forces, anyway, why spend all that effort to eliminate a small (relatively) bridgehead that the Germans were very unlikely to use as a springboard to a renewed attack into the Caucasus? Why not just let these German forces wither on the vine and keep them from retreating to the Crimea by airpower? Surely, Soviet forces employed here could have been better used elsewhere?

Thanks

[SMF144]

John,

There are no stupid questions, just dumb answers and this might be one of them. Hindsight being 20/20, I could only imagine that intelligence of the time persuaded the top brass to make such moves? It might be as simple as that?

Stephen

[Ruy Horta]

Withering on the vine might not have applied in this case. Any strong enough presence could serve as a springboard, a threat on the flank or in the rear. Hitler saw it in the same light, Crimea and Kuban as an alternative path to the Caucasus.

With 20/20 you might reason that the Kuban could have been ignored by the Soviets, but not at the time. A regenerated Wehrmacht in the East would have exploited the bridgehead for a renewed drive towards the Caucasian oil fields.

There simply is no substitute for the Army when it comes to continental warfare. IMHO the same still holds true today.

[Andy Fletcher]

At the very least the Luftwaffe may have been able to use the Kuban for forward bases to bomb the Caucasian oil fields with better aircraft like the He 177, thus denying the Soviets this vital resource as Germany was probably incapable of ever capturing the Caucasus by this stage of the war.

Maikop was wrecked at this time and Grozny was damaged. These two fields together accounted for about 10% of production but the real prize would have been the destruction of the Baku fields (80% of Soviet oil). The Soviets could not afford to let this happen.

Best Regards

Andy Fletcher

[Shikhov]

Hello Andy!
As I read the Caucasian oil wells were mainly undamaged even after some month of ground combat. Oil storages and some plants completely destroyed, but most oil still delivered to not Caucasian plants were in crude condition. As most pipelines destroyed, oil delivered by tankers through Kaspean Sea and Volga river to Saratov and norther.
Anyway, Soviet oil production suffred heavy (I have not figures right now), but not enough for any operation limitations.
Therefore I think Germans could force Soviet oil industry only by mine-laying. And really they done it according to their airpower on hand.
Moreover Luftwaffe only few times attack any sort of main Soviet plants. It happen in mid of 1943 with great success. If Luftwaffe could find main Soviet rafinery and attacked it periodically the result can be achieved also.
But seems LW not recognized rafinery location at all.
Regards.
Igor.

[Andy Fletcher]

Hi Igor,

It was the Soviets themselves that destroyed most of the oil facilities at Maikop to deny the Germans its use (poured concrete down most of the well heads, by German estimates it would take at least 6 months to start production and a year to restore a viable output). In October when it became apparent to the Germans that they would be unable to take Grozny they tried to bomb the oil facilities there but by this time the forces to do this adequately were not available, though they did cause a lot of damage. Baku the real strategic prize was never seriously damaged and as you say most of the crude was shipped across the Caspian. Oil bound for Moskow, Gorki regions was shipped to Astrakhan and then up the Volga and oil bound for the Urals and Siberia was shipped to Gurev and then by pipeline to Ufa and then onwards by train.

As you say mining the Caspian (and bombing Baku port facilities, oil terminals etc) would have been a viable German strategy if they could have reached them. All the more reason for the Soviets to try and elimate the Kuban bridgehead.

[Juha]

Hello
IMHO Ruy is right. Germans were able to stop Soviet offensive in Spring 43 and push Soviets back in places, for ex. recapture Kharkov. Also some Soviet tank spearheads were badly mauled in the progress, losing almost all of their equipments even if most of men succeeded to withdrew to Soveit lines by foot. After that Soviet decided to play backhand during Summer 43, ie they allowed Germans to attack first (Kursk battle July 43). So Soviet had forces available for a limited offensives in Late-Spring 43 onwards. Also Stalin was cautious and Kuban bridgehead was a potential threat. After all the reason of its excistence was the Hitler's hope to use it in future as a springboard for a new attack towars Caucasus. Stalin's overenthusiasm had forced Soviet armies in overstreching states in Spring 42 and early Spring 43 with rather disasterious consequencies so Soviets decided to play it safe in this time. So attack on Kuban makes sense in this frame of mind.

Andy, there might be some truth in Your argument but Kuban was not so important in that sense because Germans had the Crimea with its good airfields anyway. BTW, there were some minor oilwells in Kuban also which had some minor importance to Germans.

[Andy Fletcher]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello

Andy, there might be some truth in Your argument but Kuban was not so important in that sense because Germans had the Crimea with its good airfields anyway. BTW, there were some minor oilwells in Kuban also which had some minor importance to Germans.

Yes there were excellent airfields in the Crimea but the problem for the Germans if they wanted to attack oil (and for all intents and purposes this meant Baku) was range, Baku was over 1,200 km from the Crimea.

All the oil wells in German occupied territory in the Kuban had been thoroughly destroyed by the retreating Soviets. The Germans had a special Brigade for the exploitation of Soviet oil that was deployed to the Caucasus but the amount of oil extracted was negligible. It was estimated that it would take at least six months of repairs to extract a worth while quantity from Maikop (then there were the problems of transporting it back to Germany or at least as far as Rumanian refineries, there was no spare shipping capacity in the Black Sea or Danube).

[Juha]

Hello Andy
my point is that because Crimea and Kuban are next to each other there was no big difference whether bombers started from Kuban or from Crimea for Baku, especially IMHO the best attack route was over Black Sea to somewhere around Batumi and then to Baku.

[Andy Fletcher]

Hi Juha,

I agree the Crimea and Kuban are very close together but the Kuban offered a bridgehead for possible expansion by the Germans which may have enabled them to operate bombers from bases nearer to Baku (even 200 km closer would significantly reduce flying time), this I believe is what the Soviets were worried about.

Best Regards

Andy Fletcher