Opinions please (impact Allied fighter bombers on D-day)

[Brian]

Hi Nick

I can't comment other than fascinating! Thanks for sharing.


Cheers
Brian

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Brian

Hi Nick

I can't comment other than fascinating! Thanks for sharing.

Cheers
Brian

A pleasure. I found the report at the NA in December and remembered this thread.

[Klaus Schiffler]

The greatest impact of Allied fighter-bombers was not the physical destruction of the German Army's (and Waffen-SS') fighting power (combat, combat support, and logistical), but it was the disruption of the units approaching the combat zone in Normandy. These fighter-bombers constantly disrupted the orderly movement of the columns of the various divisions. They, of course, did cause total losses and damage (repairable) but mainly to soft skinned vehicles, especially to vehicle transporting fuel and ammunition which were particularly vulnerable to machine-gun fire. With each siting of the Jabos, the vehicles would need to find cover or drive off the roads. This was time consuming and the divisions moving to the front never arrived at the ordered time and thus they could not assault the beachhead when the Allies were most vulnerable.

The examples of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend and of the Panzer Lehr are good examples which the fighter-bombers slowed so that they could not be concentration for a concerted assault.

I am indebted to Hubert Meyer and his great work on the 12th SS. He was the chief of staff of this division during its time in combat (June 6, 1944 to the end of the war).

The war diary of I./25th PzGr Reg. states that on 6 June as this battalion was moving NW to Normandy there were "constant attacks by low-level aircraft with on-board weapons and by fighter-bombers on the marching columns. The battalion and attached weapons suffered their first losses and breakdowns. Hauptsturmführer (captain) Peinemann was wounded in the left leg by shrapnel."

Meyer states that on the afternoon of 6 June the division was being delayed constantly by fighter-bomber attacks which increased in frequency. Kurt Meyer (Panzermeyer), the regimental commander of the 25th, was forced to evacuate his vehicle which was destroyed by a bomb. Sturmmann Pock relates that "the number of our vehicles knocked out by the enemy keeps growing. They are sitting wher they were hit, burnt out, with the typically rusty-red color. Grenades are scattered about, shells, all types of ammunition, among them dead soldiers."
Here are some examples of the losses incurred by the HJ Division:

The escort company lost 16 vehicles, destroyed or damaged.
I./25 PzGr Reg. lost 4 men killed, 15 wounded, 1 missing; 8 vehicles, destroyed or damaged.
Bridge engineer column B lost all of their pontoons and most of their vehicles to fighter-bombers around Evreux.

All of these fighter-bomber attacks cost the HJ Division considerable time. The 25th Reg. set out on its march on time which was 1100 on 6 June and it could have arrived by 1600 and to attack the bridgehead at 1800 except for the disruption caused by the fighter-bombers. The entire Division could have assaulted the British forces at 0500 on 7 June. The first clash between opposing forces occured at around 1400 when the British attacked first. The planned assault by the 25th Reg. was to be at 1600, one whole day late. This is the contribution of the Allied fighter-bombers.

The story of the Panzer Lehr Division is similar as related by Helmut Ritgen. The first reports of the losses in the approach march toward the beachhead indicated the loss of 5 Panzer IVs, 84 armored personnel carriers and tractors, and some 90 wheeled vehicles. Ritgen states that this is a exaggeration but it does indicate the intensity of the fighter-bomber attacks. Again, the most important factor is the time lost. To defeat the invasion, the German armored assault would have to take place on the first day of the invasion. This would have been led by the 12th SS, Panzer Lehr, and the 21st Pz Div. as a concentrated force. This was impossible due mainly to the Allied fighter-bombers.

[mkenny]

Originally Posted by Klaus Schiffler

The story of the Panzer Lehr Division is similar as related by Helmut Ritgen. The first reports of the losses in the approach march toward the beachhead indicated the loss of 5 Panzer IVs, 84 armored personnel carriers and tractors, and some 90 wheeled vehicles. Ritgen states that this is a exaggeration but it does indicate the intensity of the fighter-bomber attacks.

'exaggerated' is an understatement. The Division lost 92 halftracks in the WHOLE of June.
The most effective tank killers in Normandy were the heavy bombers. On 18/7/44 sPzAbt. 503(Tigers) and 1/Pz.Reg. 22 (21st PD, PzIV)) were severely hit. sSS PzAbt 101(Tigers) was bombed at Everecy in June.
8 Tigers and 20 PzIV's, not bad for the heavies!

[Jukka Juutinen]

Perhaps the best indication of the effectiveness of air power would be the answer to question: what if all aircraft in the world stopped working on June 5, 1944 for the next 12 months? The effect of that would be basically negligible: not a single major battle would have its outcome changed. Just compare what would have happened if all the ships in ther world had ceased working...Perhaps air power fanatics don´t like it, but not a single war in history has been decided by the existence (=resulting in different outcome) of air power in general.

[Klaus Schiffler]

[quote]

Originally Posted by mkenny

The Division lost 92 halftracks in the WHOLE of June

.

When I quoted Ritgen, who was in charge of maintenance and repair, he was including both destroyed and damaged vehicles. A vehicle which is damaged to the degree that it can't be used in combat is no good to the combat troops. It may take one day or a month to repair before it is returned to the fighting troops. He includes both the Sd Kfz 251 and 250 APC and tractors which towed artillery pieces and anti-tank guns.

[mkenny]

[quote=Klaus Schiffler;36775]

.

When I quoted Ritgen, who was in charge of maintenance and repair, he was including both destroyed and damaged vehicles.

The 'report' about the losses was from Fritz Bayerlein and it was made in post war interrogations. It was not made in June 1944. In fact, as Zetterling points out, there is a contemporary report for 10th June stating that losses on the approach march had no significant affect on the combat value of the unit.

A vehicle which is damaged to the degree that it can't be used in combat is no good to the combat troops. It may take one day or a month to repair before it is returned to the fighting troops. He includes both the Sd Kfz 251 and 250 APC and tractors which towed artillery pieces and anti-tank guns.

Pz.Lehr had just under 700 SPW's and 300 tractors. Losing 90 of them, even temporarily, would be a major blow.

HJ lost a total of 83 men on its way to Normandy. Compare that to 26th June when the division lost 730 men in ground combat.
2 PD moved 400 kilometers in 2 days and SS Aufklarungs-Abteilung 17 made 200 kilometers in one day on its way to Normandy.

TAC had an effect but it was not decisive.

[Klaus Schiffler]

TAC had an effect but it was not decisive.

The attacks by fighter-bombers against the armored columns of the 12th SS and the Panzer Lehr were indeed decisive in that neither unit could reach the beachhead in time to make an assault when the Allied defenses were at their weakest and disorganized. The delays caused by the Jabos enabled the beachhead to be reinforced at a faster rate than the Germans could send formations to Normandy and it allowed the Allies to organize their units effectively to repulse any German attack which would have been too weak as compared to the Allied defense. As I stated earlier, it was the British who launched their attack first against the 12th SS as that unit was in its movement to contact. This occurred on 7 June. Without the constant harrassment from the air, the 12th SS could have started the assault on the afternoon of the 6th.

[Klaus Schiffler]

The reference to the 2nd PzD and the 17th SS PzGrD are totally irrelevant to the situation regarding 6 June 1944. Your claim that the 2nd PzD moved 400 km in only two days is misleading. The true situation is that the division HQ did not receive the order to begin its march to the front until 9 June and that it was only the wheeled-sections of the division arrived at the front on 11 June and the trip from Amiens to Paris was by rail. From Paris to east of Caumont was by road. The armored fighting vehicles did not arrive until 12 June and the first combat by the division was on 13 June when the recon battalion (PzAA 2) met the enemy at la Vaquerie (3 Km west of Caumont). By then all hope of defeating the Normandy invasion was gone. (See Franz Josef Strauss Geschichte der 2. (Wiener) Panzer-Division).

The first units of the 17th SS PzGrD began their movement to the front on the morning of 7 June with orders to avoid the main roads and to take secondary roads and in an emergency to drive singly and the objective was St. Lo. The division was only partly motorized with the rest riding on bicycles. The first unit to depart was the PzAA 17. The first combat engagement was on 10 June with the 7th Armored Division (British). Again, by this time there was no hope of defeating the allied invasion. (See Hans Stöber, Die Sturmflut und das Ende: Geschichte der 17. SS-Panzergrenadierdivision "Götz von Berlichingen")

[mkenny]

17th SS Pz.Gr. Division 'Gotz von Berlichingen' was not released for use in Normandy until the night of 6/7 June. Some Units set of to mark the route but the bulk did not depart by train until sundown on the night of the 7th.
2 train convoys set off. The second was attacked by Jabo's and lost one Stug. and 3 killed. The first convoy was also attacked but suffered no loss. 2 aircraft were claimed shot down.
SS -Aufklarung-Abteilung 17 reached Balleroy on the evening of 8/6/44.
First contact was with US forces north of Les Veys on 9/6/44. Elements of 16(Aukl.)Kp. were in action near Isigny-sur-Mer on the 9th June.

All this shows is that the division was not significantly affected by air attack on the way to the front. The reason why there was no counter attack on the 6/6/44 had more to do with Hitler than any interception of forces.