Me 262 should have been used as a bomber?

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.

Graham.

1. It is true the ground units cheered the Typhoons and Spitfires giving the semblance of close air support. No one on either side could believe then , and some still cannot believe today, that all that sound and fury signifieth nothing - or not very much. Time and again I have checked 2 TAF claims that their sorties were "very successful" only to find they had missed completely.
2. The Hillman strongpoint, which had no Flak, held up 3 British Infantry Division on D-Day for hours and was one of the major reasons why Caen was not taken on the first day. 2 TAF provided no help. The aircraft that could have given the crucial assistance, the Vultee Vengeance, were being used to tow target tugs in Devon on that day. The Vengeance proved its worth in the Far East - it's all on the record.
3. Hindsight is 50/50. The Army should have had its own air corps. The Army Air Corps should have had Vengeance dive bombers and Hurricane IIC tank-busters. The RAF's role would have been to gain and keep aerial superiority and ensure the LW was kept away from the battlefield.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Except of course for all the damage it inflicted on the Germans. When I've located it, I'll post a deciphered German message about the effects of Typhoon attacks on Panther tanks.

If you care to read the deciphered traffic you will find a rich strand of evidence from the German side about the disruption caused by these and other "good for nothing" Allied fighter bombers. I posted four pages of this material elsewhere on TOC a few months ago, for example.

Nick.

I'll look forward to that with interest. I'm sure in the end we will agree.

My position derives from the conclusion of No.2 ORS Report No. 15, Enemy Casualties in Vehicles and Equipment During The Retreat From Normandy to the Seine;
"Effectiveness of weapons.
The principal weapons used for the direct destruction of enemy vehicles and equipment were cannon, machine guns, RP and bombs.
We have not been able to differentiate at all clearly between the relative effectiveness of the first two; both appear to have been very deadly to all except heavily armoured vehicles and the figures given in the preceding parts of the report speak for themselves. As indicated in 2(b) above, RP have not produced the results against armour which might have been hoped for, whilst against soft-skin vehicles they are clearly less suitable than cannon and machine gun fire. It is suggested that RP in its present form suffers the grave disadvantage of being virtually a 'one shot' weapon which even in the hands of the most skilful pilot has poor accuracy, whereas the protracted burst of fire from cannon or machine guns gives a far greater chance of scoring hits."

2 TAF commented:
"The circumstances of the examination did not make it possible to take account of the moral effects of RP. A lack of effectiveness in causing material damage cannot be accepted as a reason for abandoning RP as a weapon against armour until it can be replaced with something better."

The conclusion surely is that:
1. 2 TAF, like Bomber Command, was not interested in the material damage being caused but argued the effect on morale was sufficient justification for the enormous resources being devoted to Air.
2. Resources taken by Air resulted in fewer resources available to Ground.
3. There was something better, and 2 TAF knew it.
4. The Hurricane IIC was scrapped in North Africa because it required armour which had been ordered from the manufacturer. Armour was against RAF political correctness. RAF PC also killed the dive bomber.
5. Rudel had a famous postwar argument with 2 TAF pilots telling them he had tried RP and knew the gun was better. The 2 TAF pilots even then refused to believe him.
6. Surely this debate can now be put to rest. Of course Typhoons caused damage. But they caused less damage to the Wehrmacht than more suitable aircraft would have done. And they caused more losses to the wretched pilots KIA than more suitable aircraft would have done. That's all I think I am trying to say.

Tony

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Nick.

I'll look forward to that with interest. I'm sure in the end we will agree.

1. 2 TAF, like Bomber Command, was not interested in the material damage being caused but argued the effect on morale was sufficient justification for the enormous resources being devoted to Air...
6. Surely this debate can now be put to rest. Of course Typhoons caused damage. But they caused less damage to the Wehrmacht than more suitable aircraft would have done.

Tony

Morale effect was maybe a consideration but what you seem to ignore is disruption. Allied air power severely restricted the mobility of German ground forces throughout the NW Europe campaign and the movement of supplies to the front. A tank is just as dead without fuel and shells as it would be from a direct hit.

Question 1: did this "more suitable aircraft" exist and if so what was it?

Question 2: do you think the German Schlachtgeschwader in the East were a waste of time too?

[Juha]

Hello
correction to info on Poland's AA weaponry. Poland had in Sept 1939 306 40mm Bofors AAA guns, 110 WWI wintage 75mm AAguns and 44 modern 75mm AA guns.

[Graham Boak]

My point was that any lack of success (should that be comparative lack of success?) of the IL 2 in the maritime attack role can be placed at the lack of suitable weaponry rather than any failings in the aircraft. A lack that could have been made up fairly quickly, had it occurred to the right people at the right time.

[Juha]

Hello Tcolvin
“Typhoon… could not defend itself from the air…”

IIRC Typhoon pilots claimed some 16 fighters during the Normandia campaign.

“It was grossly inaccurate in ground attack with rockets according to contemporary Operational Research. It was therefore good for nothing.”

Now, Typhoon was much less effective against tanks that claimed but so was also Il-2.
The main effect of attack planes against tanks was they effectiveness against soft-skinned vehicles and trains so they hindered badly the supply of POL and ammo and they hindered also movements of armoured formations. Why You think the Ardennes offensive in Dec. 44 was timed for a bad weather period?
And only fraction of Heer was armoured, attack planes ability to hinder artillery was very important because Heer’s defensive plans were based on artillery fire and lesser extent to mg-fire.

[Juha]

Hello Graham
sorry, I had to take the twice a week sauna session before answering.
On IL-2 successes on anti-shipping role. I cannot remember how the sinkings by Soviet naval aviation divided between ac types but IIRC Bostons/Havocs were clearly most successful type maybe Il-4s/DB-3Fs second but our Russian friends surely know this better.
My point still is that the 700 kg? armour weight was too much in anti-shipping role. 8 - 12mm armour kept out rifle calibre bullets, maybe halved, one must remember that wings, rear fuselage and tail were unarmoured, the effects of 20mm AAA, and somewhat reduced the effects of 37 - 40mm AAA. But it probably didn't give any meaningful protection against 4" - 5" AA fire, which was the principal AA weapon of naval units. That's my point.

[CJE]

Tony,
Jabos were definitely of little military value.
However, they achieved one thing: they pinned down part of the Fighter Command which would have been more useful elsewhere, in particular over Malta.
Moreover, their raids had a good influence on the morale of the Germans as they gave the illusion that the Luftwaffe was still on the offensive in the West. Their low loss rate was also good for propaganda purposes.

Chris

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by CJE

Tony,
Jabos were definitely of little military value.
However, they achieved one thing: they pinned down part of the Fighter Command which would have been more useful elsewhere, in particular over Malta.
Moreover, their raids had a good influence on the morale of the Germans as they gave the illusion that the Luftwaffe was still on the offensive in the West. Their low loss rate was also good for propaganda purposes.

Chris

Chris.

Agreed, and a fair summing up. It will also serve for me as an epitaph for this thread.

You could have added Singapore where the absence of a strong Fighter Command, which was kicking its heels in Britain, contributed, and unlike Malta, to unmitigated disaster.

Tony