Placing the Fairey Battle.

[RodM]

With all due respect, you do have a particular axe to grind and do make some sweeping statements.

"After the Meuse Bridge disaster the RAF had only one idea, which was to area-bomb at night with 4-engined heavies and cause a breakdown in civilian morale."

While this was true from 1942 onwards (not 'after the Meuse Bridge disaster', as you imply), you fail to appreciate the reasons behind the area bombing decision. You also fail to appreciate the percentage of effort put in by Bomber Command from 1944 onwards against non-city targets, and, frankly, your arguments sound like the type of simplified stuff repeated on the History Channel. While the BC effort specifically against German cities from late 1944 and during 1945 was mis-guided, I suggest that you do some study and gain an appreciation on how much effort by both the RAF and USAAF during the winter of 1944/45 effectly did result in 'area attacks' and the reasons why this was so. The OKL situation reports on attacks on Germany during Feb-Mar 1945 are also available.

Following, as an example, are the statistics, as detailed in USSBS Report 2a - "Statistical Appendix - Overall Report (European War)", relating to the tonnage of bombs specifically dropped on oil, chemical and rubber targets in Germany by the USAAF and RAF between Apr/44 and Apr/45:

MONTH/YEAR - USAAF TOTAL - RAF TOTAL

Apr/44 - 201 - 0
May/44 - 2,459 - 0
Jun/44 - 6,280 - 4,597
Jul/44 - 6.655 - 4,770
Aug/44 - 8,525 - 3,541
Sep/44 - 3,542 - 4,603
Oct/44 - 6,926 - 5.315
Nov/44 - 16,595 - 15,947
Dec/44 - 7,232 - 4,058
Jan/45 - 2,298 - 6,218
Feb/45 - 5,532 - 13,076
Mar/45 - 10,219 - 14,754
Apr/45 - 2,312 - 5,146


These statistics seem to defy your notion that: ...RAF had only one idea...

"Ironically the night-fighter threat remained to decimate Bomber Command, which then started flying by day in October 1944..."

You seem to be inferring that Bomber Command 'remained' being 'decimate(d)' at night, and a switch was made to day bombing (because of this?). Once again, back up your opinions with facts. From July 1944 onwards, the operational attrition rate of Bomber Command at night steadily decreased, and remained (on average) relatively low (compared to pre-July 1944) during the remainder of the war. Where was the decimation? In fact, from December 1944 onwards, at least, the Nachtjagd loss rate on Defence of the Reich ops was at least double that of Bomber Command (sources: RAF BC ORS Night & Day Raids Reports / RAF BC ORS Interception Tactics Reports / OKL FüSt Ic statistics and air situation reports)

Therefore, may I respectfully ask that you back up your options/statements with evidence/facts. There is no problem putting forward a hypothesis, provided that if it can be backed up with reliable evidence.

As to the Battle, the problem of it's survivability may have pre-dated May 1940 - look at some of the recon missions from the Phoney War...

Cheers

Rod

[tcolvin]

Re Nick: we had an argument about the Typhoon and Vengeance. My impression was you were convinced by evidence emanating from the Antipodes where they still remember these things.

Re Rod: of course I have an axe to grind. But the only way of judging the validity of tentative conclusions is to post a hypothesis and see if any one can shoot it down. Thanks for having a go.

Survivability was of course the problem by day and by night. That is a statement of the obvious. The Battle could not survive. True. Are you saying that was the reason for calling it obsolescent? If so then then every other aircraft in BC in 1939 was also obsolescent.

Why do you say I fail to appreciate the reasons behind area bombing? The reason was clear. BC couldn't survive by day, and it couldn't do precision bombing at night. Some in BC couldn't even find the right country to bomb in daylight; Squadron Leader P.I. Harris in Wellington L4302 bombed Esbjerg in neutral Denmark on September 4, 1939 and killed Mrs Ethel Hansen. There were no consequences and he was subsequently promoted Group Captain. So BC came up with the 'policy' of area bombing. What other idea could BC have had except to fold its tent? That was not realistic given its effect on the career prospects of the decision-makers.

You ask for evidence about BC going back to day bombing once the USAAF had made safe the daylight skies? On December 18, 1939 BC attacked shipping in the Jade and Schillig Roads, and were worse than decimated - they lost 55% (12 Wellingtons out of 22). The trauma in BC over the folloeing Christmas period is described in Revie's 'The Lost Command'. It's worth reading. After that dismal Christmas BC went to Wlhelmshaven only by night until October 15, 1944. By then the USAAF had established aerial supremacy over Germany in the face of RAF predictions that it was impossible for technical reasons x, y and z. Would you buy a used car from such people?

Please keep shooting. We might then both benefit.

[RodM]

Some in BC couldn't even find the right country to bomb in daylight....

You ask for evidence about BC going back to day bombing.....

That was not realistic given its effect on the career prospects of the decision-makers

Hi,

With regards to the first quotation, there were aircraft of the USAAF (and possibly other RAF Commands) that had the same problem in daylight, even in 1945, so what is your point?

With regards to the second quotation, I was not asking for evidence that BC went back to daylight bombing, I was questioning the validity of your implied statement that BC switched to daylight attacks because they were being 'decimated' at night.

As to the third statement, I would wager that there was more at stake for Britain, both politically and militarily, than just the "career prospects of the decision-makers"...

It's not so much the hypothesis that you are trying to put forward, but the way your frame your arguments that I question - i,e, some emotive statements that, when broken down, don't stand up to scrutiny. If your statements exhibited more objectivity, backed by evidence, then I wouldn't be saying boo...

As a point, a while back, someone posted stats from some book comparing the USAAF against Bomber Command to prove an argument. What was not mentioned is that the stats stacked up the efforts of at least three different USAAF AFs against one RAF Command, and, while implicitly noting the tonnage of incendiaries dropped by BC, failed to give a corresponding figure for the USAAF, thus implying that they didn't drop any.


As to the obsolescence of the Fairy Battle, you have a point but only from a limited perspective. The fact that the aircraft could no longer be effectively used in it's primary role, even at night, and could not be easily converted to another operational role meant that it had become obsolescent (i.e. outmoded, no longer of use). This is irregardless of pre-war doctines or specifications.

Was the Swordfish also obsolescent during the first two years of the war? Maybe from a technical standpoint but not from an operational point-of-view...

Cheers

Rod

[Ruy Horta]

Just think what these Battles could have achieved, if supported by enough fighters, bombing roads instead of the bridges during the early phase of the war in the west. These roads were absolutely filled with miles and miles of concentrated military units waiting for a breakthrough.

Even with the light weight ordenance the effect would have been noticable. The RAF misused its bomber force during the early phase and (and I may offend some) kept its fighter force at home or in rigid patrol areas. Think what a combined fighter and light bomber effort could have done against the soft elements of these mile long traffic jams?

The Anglo-French armies were too aggressive by deploying too far north, the air forces too passive by concentrating on defence.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by RodM

With all due respect, you do have a particular axe to grind and do make some sweeping statements.

"After the Meuse Bridge disaster the RAF had only one idea, which was to area-bomb at night with 4-engined heavies and cause a breakdown in civilian morale."

While this was true from 1942 onwards (not 'after the Meuse Bridge disaster', as you imply)...
Cheers

Rod

Just to back up to what Rod said. The RAF did not have "only one idea", it had a new situation where British forces were not engaged on land in Northern Europe and thus the missions required were different.

Home air defence was a pre-war "idea" I suppose but it seems to have worked OK. The all-out bomber effort against the invasion fleet was next. Another "idea" was the rapid development of anti-submarine warfare. Then there was the evolution of tactical support in North Africa and the anti-shipping strikes in the North Sea.

All of these were responses to necessity. You could even say the same of the area bombing offensive. The pre-war theories of strategic bombing fell apart fast (and as Max Hastings pointed out in "Bomber Command" nodody seems to have made the preparations for putting those theories into practice) and the RAF looked for means to "hit back" at Germany with the means that Britan had.