Placing the Fairey Battle.

[Franek Grabowski]

Graham
There were serious problems with Spitfire, Supermarine being just too small and too inexperienced for a mass production. That is why she was considered a stop-gap only, and even in 1940, due to serious delays at Castle Bromwich (oh, those commies) it was considered to cancel the production in favour of other types. The one must consider CBAF was then in hand of Morris, while Supermarine was Vickers Armstrong, hardly friends.
Of course there was a lot of conflicts on several decisions, which we find either correct or wrong, but we have a different perspective. I am wondering, how RAF would serve its purpose having no Spitfires or Mosquitoes, both types having extremelly strong opponents.
Concerning Typhoon and its qualities - well, it simply never entered intended role, and was almost cancelled due to breaking off tails. The fact it was used as a pulveriser had more to the lack of any other suitable aircraft rather than any particular qualities of the design. Considering the amount of money spend at HM citizens expense, certainly a complete failure would have caused some heads falling (including those responsible for the specification), so it is obvious some people were anxious to see it in any role.
The question remains, was there any aircraft better suit to the role of CAS and available for the RAF. Airacobra or Thunderbolt?
Concerning P-47, this was a subject of a very strong PR action, but while not as much a success, it entered intended role anyway.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Steve49

'tcolvin', to quote me out off context is fine, but did you bother to read the post. If you had you would have noticed that I was agreeing that for a 1940's 'precision' attack dive-bombers would probably have offered the most accurate platform. All I was questioning was the use of the sweeping statement that Bomber Command 'failed' to sink the cruiser as a means of supporting your dive-bomber crusade. Using the failure of two squadrons that were not even specifically attacking the KONINGSBERG as evidence hardly supports the claim in itself.

Regards,

Steve

BC dropped 30 bombs on the Koenigsberg and missed. The FAA Skuas sank it. In my book it is evidence for the claim that BC lacked competence.

But if this doesn't do it for reasons which you give but I cannot understand, please explain what evidence would convince you that a country's bombing force was incompetent. Let's ignore the divebomber versus level bomber debate, which you agree was decided in favour of the divebomber.

Would you accept the following as evidence that a country's bombers were incompetent in contrast with another country.

Two aircraft of country X surprised warship Z and dropped bombs on it, causing extensive damage and killing 31 sailors and wounding 74. The ship had to abandon its mission and return to the shipyard for repairs. The two attacking aircraft returned unharmed to base.

Ten aircraft of country Y surprised warship Z and dropped bombs causing negligible damage. The ship remained on station. Five of the attacking aircraft were shot down.

Would you say this was evidence that country Y's bombers were incompetent, or would you say that their failure was not surprising?
Contrastingly, would you say that Country X's bombers were outstanding, or would you say that their success was unsurprising?

By the way, this is no whatif.

Tony

[Graham Boak]

Steve49: "There is no denying that dive-bombers in the face of limited air defence offered a better weapons platform for 'precision' attacks and the failure to provide dedicated ground attack aircraft hampered the Allied forces in the first half of the war."

I entirely agree that divebombing is more precise. It is also more vulnerable, as your qualification implies. There is a trade-off, and clearly opinions differed on the best way to use limited resources. It is worth pointing out that, but for the urgent requirement for Hurricanes, the Henley could have been made available for late 1940/41. The RAF were not totally neglecting such types, they just were squeezed out by Beaverbrook's urgent priorities in 1940. I do think it difficult to justify any number of Henleys at the expense of a greater number of Hurricanes, in mid 1940.

The French had no shortage of dedicated ground attack aircraft, which rather deflates your second claim. Clearly there were other factors in play. The important factors are less the aircraft in hand than the weapons available for them, the training and doctrine, and the operational command and control system. I entirely agree that these were lacking, but argue that the platform is of less importance.

tcolvin: Cherry-picking single examples is futile. We can all point to bombing attacks, by all nations, that failed to damage the targets at all. How many times did the Germans claim to have sunk the Ark Royal? If you want to go after shipping targets, particularly large warships, you need trained crews and weapons capable of doing damage. It seems that the prewar RAF faith in level bombing with their 2000lb SAP was misplaced.

Franek: No, the Typhoon did enter in its intended role as interceptor, against the Jabos. It was also used for intruder missions, long range by RAF fighter standards. It can hardly be blamed for the lack of mass formations of German bombers, to try it against its design role.

As alternatives to the Spitfire and Typhoon in 1940 - what? More Hurricanes? Now I will defend the Hurricane against its more ignorant detractors, but let's be serious! The Whirlwind? The Vickers Venom, or any of the other Mercury-engined fighters? If you want other alternatives in 1940, then you have to lay the groundwork for them in 1937. How many alternative fighters could the British industry have been producing at any one time? They already had the Hurricane, Spitfire, Whirlwind and Defiant, plus the Blenheim and the Beaufighter, the Skua, Roc, Gladiator and Fulmar. Quite enough, I feel, to cover a range of possible scenarios of needs and failures.

The P-39 has nothing that the Typhoon didn't, except some agility and, initially, a better view. It was slower, much less power and much less firepower. In any competition the Typhoon would have won hands down (as, effectively, it did).

The P-47 would have done better, I believe, because of the radial engine and its accidental armouring - the stainless steel ducting for the turbocharger. However, the P-47 was not available to the RAF until two years after the Typhoon, and would not have been available in enough numbers for D-Day. It was widely and successfully used by the 9th and other US AFs.

Similar comments apply to the very similar Hellcat, otherwise an excellent choice for 2 TAF (despite being the slowest fighter ever built with a 2000hp engine - Firebrand excepted!).

The only real alternatives were the Vengeance and the Bermuda. I think we've discussed those.

I see the key problem (with platforms) as the non-availability of more powerful engines, particularly radials. Had the Centaurus been more successful early on - or had production not been stopped to redesign it "a la Fw 190" - then the Tornado would have made a superior GA aircraft to the Typhoon. Not that it would ever satisfy the dive-bomber theorists, but good enough to become the classic fighter-bomber of its time, perhaps. Perhaps a Tornado/Typhoon with an R2800 - but they weren't available in large enough numbers soon enough, either.

You may argue that the Typhoon became the RAF's main fighter-bomber by default, but I see no real alternative, other than heaping yet more duties on the long-suffering Spitfire. Which did indeed carry out much GA work, but I believe any fair comparison would show the Typhoon superior to it.

[Franek Grabowski]

Graham
Typhoon was too late and only filled the unexpected gap, never becoming the main RAF fighter. Even this was achieved with plenty of problems - I would hardly call that a success. Still, there were some alternatives, eg. Spitfire XII for low level interceptions - actually they were faster that Typhoons. There is a very interesting comparison between Tempest and Griffon Spitfire and Merlin Mustang in the mentioned AFDU report. Even far superior Tempest was a niche aircraft that actually was not that necessary, and could have been well replaced by the other types in the inventory.
Going back to 1940, indeed there was no serious alternative for Spitfire and as a stop-gap - Hurricane. But was not production of Hurricanes in later period a waste of resources?
The another question is - do we need a monster engined fighter at all? Perhaps less power, however wise designed aircraft is a better sollution? This is what lightweight Mustang actually followed.
P-39 could have been not an ideal choice but it had several advantages. Indeed it was slower, but it was still pretty fast, one of the fastest low level aircraft at the time. Forward view must have been superior to the one of Typhoon for obvious reasons and it is often crucial in ground attack duties. It was much more streamlined, thus a harder target to hit with all the internal fittings hidden behind the structure. Certainly there was a potential in the type.
On the other hand, Thunderbolt was available for RAF just for Normandy landings but it was send overseas to replace Hurricanes, which then could have been replaced by increased Spitfire production and already mentioned Vengeances. This would leave Hawker with no own type in production, however, and Hawker was the main supplier of RAF through the 1930s.
There were possible alternatives, but going to the main topic, Battle was no alternative.

[Juha]

"BC dropped 30 bombs on the Koenigsberg and missed. The FAA Skuas sank it. In my book it is evidence for the claim that BC lacked competence."


Tony
after all BC sank ½ of German battleships, Tirpitz
Knocked out for good ½ of German battlecruisers, Gneisenau.
sank 2/3 of German Pocket battleships, Admiral Scheer and Lützow.
Now the 2 pocket battleships were sunk during the last month of war but Lützow was still giving valuable gun support to hard pressed Heer when sunk. Halifaxes damaged Schanhorst badly at La Pallice on 24 July 41. Carpet bombing of La Havre sunk a number of torpedo and motor torpedoboats and forced others to move away from there during summer 44. There were also many failures and the bombings of Schanhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper at Brest were ineffective. But so were Luftwaffe's attacks on Scapa Flow, on Rosyth and on Loch Ewe or what was the RN's temporary base in NW Scotland.

BTW, how many sorties LW flew against damaged Illustrious at Valetta harbour, when it laid there during emergency repairs? IIRC they got only one hit. Was LW's anti-ship specialist Fliegerkorps incompetent? Was Ju 87 wrong plane against docked ships? To me the first question is ridiculous, what You think?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Steve49:

tcolvin: Cherry-picking single examples is futile. We can all point to bombing attacks, by all nations, that failed to damage the targets at all. How many times did the Germans claim to have sunk the Ark Royal? If you want to go after shipping targets, particularly large warships, you need trained crews and weapons capable of doing damage. It seems that the prewar RAF faith in level bombing with their 2000lb SAP was misplaced.

The P-39 has nothing that the Typhoon didn't, except some agility and, initially, a better view. It was slower, much less power and much less firepower. In any competition the Typhoon would have won hands down (as, effectively, it did).

The only real alternatives were the Vengeance and the Bermuda. I think we've discussed those.

You may argue that the Typhoon became the RAF's main fighter-bomber by default, but I see no real alternative, other than heaping yet more duties on the long-suffering Spitfire. Which did indeed carry out much GA work, but I believe any fair comparison would show the Typhoon superior to it.

1. So you won't play with real examples. But it's only by looking at actual events that discussions such as we are having are rescued from the phenomenon of people talking past each other and never engaging. There is no progress therefore towards understanding. The RAF got it terribly wrong in WWII. And this is not 20/20 hindsight. It was said at the time.

2. We are discussing the P-39 on another thread at, I believe, your suggestion. The P-39 had what the Typhoon never had; which was protection for the engine, the essential in any CAS aircraft. The sending of the Typhoon into a Flak environment without protection to the engine and its vitals shows that the RAF was never serious about CAS and butchered its pilots.
3. The alternatives (NB) to the Typhoon and Spitfire existed:
a) the Vengeance for dive-bombing, which is placing HE accurately onto the weapons preventing the army from advancing - mortars, machine-guns, Paks, and artillery. 2TAF delivered HE with Bombphoons which were inaccurate because they could not bomb from the vertical, and with mediums. Mediums were a by-word for inaccuracy and a joke. Dutchmen I have spoken to said it was common for all the houses around a bridge to be destroyed while the bridge stood unmarked. By the way, did you know that Horrocks (OC 30 Corps) banned all mediums because they were killing too many of his own troops? You won't find that in Shores & Thomas' book on 2 TAF.
b) armoured Hurricane IID or armoured P-39 for tank-busting and machine-gunning. Or best of all, let Hawkers build the IL-2 under licence.

[Graham Boak]

I will not play with one cherry-picked example, chosen to make your point, not necessarily representative, and disguised to hide any and all other contributory factors. Clear? Single cases prove nothing. That the RAF was not adequately prepared for anti-shipping operation in 1939 is clear and widely accepted already.

Your misapprehensions about the P-39 and Typhoon's armour have been addressed elsewhere, as has your continued refusal to accept the vulnerability of the dive-bomber in an intense AA environment. The armoured Hurricane Mk.IId existed in 2 TAF as the Mk.IV up until May 1944. Perhaps you should consider the reasons why it was withdrawn (to the relief of its pilots).

As for the use of emotive terms such as butchery, for every one man butchered in a Typhoon two would die in a Vengeance. I suggest that thought for its men just might have featured in RAF thinking.

[Juha]

"So you won't play with real examples"

Tony
I think it's you who cannot face reality. The according to you incompetent BC sank/disabled permanently over 50% of the heavy units of the German Navy and the LW, which had in your oppinion right planes, Ju 87 and Hs 129, sank whole 0% of the heavy units (battleships, battlecruisers and fleet carriers) of the RN. That put me wander what is your definition of competence. And also wander, are you trolling?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

"BC dropped 30 bombs on the Koenigsberg and missed. The FAA Skuas sank it. In my book it is evidence for the claim that BC lacked competence."


Tony
after all BC sank ½ of German battleships, Tirpitz
Knocked out for good ½ of German battlecruisers, Gneisenau.
sank 2/3 of German Pocket battleships, Admiral Scheer and Lützow.
Now the 2 pocket battleships were sunk during the last month of war but Lützow was still giving valuable gun support to hard pressed Heer when sunk. Halifaxes damaged Schanhorst badly at La Pallice on 24 July 41. Carpet bombing of La Havre sunk a number of torpedo and motor torpedoboats and forced others to move away from there during summer 44. There were also many failures and the bombings of Schanhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper at Brest were ineffective. But so were Luftwaffe's attacks on Scapa Flow, on Rosyth and on Loch Ewe or what was the RN's temporary base in NW Scotland.

BTW, how many sorties LW flew against damaged Illustrious at Valetta harbour, when it laid there during emergency repairs? IIRC they got only one hit. Was LW's anti-ship specialist Fliegerkorps incompetent? Was Ju 87 wrong plane against docked ships? To me the first question is ridiculous, what You think?

Juha

I tell you what I think, Juha.
I think the claims made by the RAF and BC from 1930 to 1945 were ridiculous.
In the 1930s the RAF argued that the RN did not need to build any more capital ships because the RAF could destroy all German warships much more cheaply.
The RAF said the only need for an army was to protect its airfields and the ports, and to occupy Germany after it had capitulated to the RAF. All threats everywhere would be met by bombers. They pointed to American tests in which bombers sank battleships.
The panic over being bombed that gripped the British public in the 1930s was far greater than anything today over 'Muslim extremists', and just as ridiculous. But it meant the RAF got nearly all of the funds.
In 1939 the RAF was a well-equipped and well-funded strategic bomber force.
When hostilities began BC was asked to deliver on its promises, and specifically to degrade the Kriegsmarine. But BC's attacks on the Admiral Scheer in the Schillig Roads on September 4, 1939, and on the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst off Brunsbuettelkoog on the same day, and its attack on the Koenigsberg, all failed completely. The sinking of the Koenigsberg showed where the money should have gone.
So what went wrong with BC?
I say BC's claims were always outrageous and their performance was incompetent. By the time BC learnt some competence it didn't matter because the Kriegsmarine had been destroyed by the RN, and the Wehrmacht had been beaten by the Soviet army.
Concerning the Luftwaffe, the Germans rearmed with the Luftwaffe as part of all-arms. The Germans never believed the Luftwaffe could win the war on its own. Hitler said as much. The Luftwaffe was a tactical arm and little thought was given to using it strategically.
German all-arms were successful until they met an army with better equipment and better integrated all-arms. They were beaten at their own game.
The Allies by comparison were not in the all-arms game. The game they were in could be described as glorifying the boys in blue.
But a time comes when reality replaces spin. BC never got a campaign medal.

Tony

[Franek Grabowski]

Army with better equipment and better integrated all-arms - is it about Red Army?