Placing the Fairey Battle.

[Griffon]

To come back to the original topic:

the Battle, compared to other single engine light bombers or assault planes in 1939/40 was completely outdated, no matter how one puts it.

it carried a light payload and was weakly armed and armoured, and even if it got through to its targets, it could never hit them with the same precision as a Stuka for example could.
of course, unescorted Stukas usually did not fare better than unescorted Battles, but the fact still remains, that Battles were utterly useless as light bombers, even if they got through.

compare a Battle to a SBD, Stuka or Val and you will know what I mean.

it speaks volumes for the construction of the SBD and Stuka, that both were still operational in 1944 and indeed were operationally useful by then, something that surely could have never been said about the Battle.

the Swordfish on the other hand is not fitting as an example as it mostly operated over sea and seldomly was confronted by a spirited air defense system.
the one time it did, during the channel dash, it paid a heavy price though.

and do not get me started on the TBolt.
I am pretty sure that as a fighter bomber, the TBolt was way better than any Mustang, and I am equally sure, many Mustang pilots in the Korean war would have happily traded their Ponys against the rugged TBolt, if they had the chance to do so.

just my two cents though...

best regards
phil

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Absolutley untrue. Portals' meetings continually referred to the need for a long-range fighter. The RAF tried to get the Mustang - the British damn well nearly designed the Mustang - but deliveries were prioritised to the 8th and only small numbers were delivered until late in 1944. The RAF began the war with short range fighters, a policy that paid off in 1940 but left a legacy that restrained later operations. There was, however, plenty for those fighters to do.

Air superiority over Normandy was achieved by the joint operation of the RAF and the USAAF. 8th AF operations were only possible by the support of the RAF in providing an undisturbed base and escorting the bombers out, and back, when with the range of RAF fighters. Air superiority at a distance was only maintained by air supremacy at home. That was the RAF's achievement without any help from its US allies.

Hey! Aren't you the guy that was slating strategic bombing and interdiction behind enemy lines as a waste of effort? What do you want a long-range fighter for?

I am continually amazed by our differences.

Haven't you read 'Appendix G' of John Terraine's 'The Right Of The Line'? It starts off; "My repeated assertion of the direct involvement of Sir Charles Portal, while CAS, in the question of long-range fighters for the RAF, and his personal opposition to such a weapon, has been questioned. Yet it is strongly documented in the Official History..........."
Please fisk this Appendix if you think Terraine has got it wrong. He concludes that this crucial area of long-range fighter support was a blind spot in Portal's war direction, and made me ask if you would buy a used car from people such as Portal, Tedder, Harris, Coningham and Sholto Douglas.

As to your question as to what I want a long-range fighter for, I don't. What I want is the RAF to achieve air superiority over the battlefield so the Vengeances and Hawker IL-2/Hs129B can pound the shit out of fixed defences like Hillman overlooking Sword Beach, and let the Third British Infantry Division take Caen on D-Day. As it was the only air support came late from the mediums, IIRC, who missed.

[RodM]

...these threads (of a similar ilk) get more Irvingesque by the day...

"I have quoted Schwabedissen - who is a primary source - about German awe of the IL-2"

I presume that, while Schwabedissen's comments are proof-positive and beyond reproach, parallel German comments about the significance of the Allied Strategic bombing campaign AND the effectiveness of Allied (Western) CAS and ground interdiction are somehow worthless/meaningless...

Frankly, IMHO, a number of the hypothetical alternatives that have been presented here simply do not take into account causality. But maybe one true constant does remain; in an alternate universe, a few months after D-Day, the crews of Dive Bomber Command, pitted against all that Flak that isn't needed to defend Germany, along with a strong Luftwaffe fighter force, lovingly refer to their C-in-C (who's name is obviously not Harris) as 'Butcher'. By then they have it easy, it's the Brown Jobs that are ultimately suffering the most, due to the Luftwaffe strategic bombing force.


Cheers

Rod

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Griffon

To come back to the original topic:

the Battle, compared to other single engine light bombers or assault planes in 1939/40 was completely outdated, no matter how one puts it.

it carried a light payload and was weakly armed and armoured, and even if it got through to its targets, it could never hit them with the same precision as a Stuka for example could.
phil

But, Phil, that is no reason for calling the Battle outdated, but a reason for calling the requirement for the Battle as plain wrong.

Place the blame where it belongs, on the tactical ineptitude of Bomber Command, not on the poor sods who designed and built what the RAF said it wanted, and by all accounts did a good job of it.

[RodM]

Hi,

"What I want is the RAF to achieve air superiority over the battlefield so the Vengeances and Hawker IL-2/Hs129B can pound the shit out of fixed defences like Hillman overlooking Sword Beach."

...presumably like the Luftwaffe and the Stuka did during the BoB, but with more Flak...

Cheers

Rod

[Kutscha]

I don't think you do know about the 'conflict' that was happening between the ground and air contingents of the USAAF during WW2.

Certainly Graham, for how else was air superiority over the battlefield achieved. The RAF didn't need to have long range fighters as the USAAF was over the Reich. Some people have trouble seeing the forest for the trees.

Btw tcolvin, if it was not for the Brits, and the Merlin, there would have been no P-51s doing long range escorting. And then it was only by accident since the P-51 sat at Wright-Patterson for months until the USN had to do some tests and asked why this a/c was sitting around. The 'failed fighter', the P-47, and the troubled P-38, would have had to do the long range escorting.

Others have commented on your myoptic tunnel vision in your post, so I won't.

You rag on and on about Flak doing so much damage to Brit FBs, yet totally ignore what Flak would do to your super duper dive bombers. Your super duper Vengeance in SEA did not have the opposition, ground and air, that was in NWE.

[Graham Boak]

The RAF (and USAAF) did obtain air superiority over the beaches in 1944. The P-47s and P-51s held the outer line, the Spitfires the inner line, and the Typhoons could look after themselves. Between them, they wiped out the Jagdwaffe in the key aerial battle of 1944. However, this could not have been guaranteed in 1942 when the key equipment decisions were made. The arguments for a fighter-bomber vs divebomber vs armoured truck have been thrashed out, but you do not seem to have taken any of them in. The Army did not lack CAS in Normandy: it was not a lack of CAS that prevented it taking Caen. In the first days excessive timidity perhaps paid a key part, in the reliance on experienced but over-used veterans who were inclined to take cover rather than risks after fighting through Africa and Italy. There was also a few Germans present, who perhaps could claim some of the blame/credit..... In the later days Montgomery refused to advance to his previously prepared timetable, despite massive reinforcments and building pressure on all sides.

Not that he was without a case, although he does seem to have rewritten his plans post facto, but it was certainly not due to shortage of CAS, if failure sometimes rested on misuse of aerial support (For example, timing bomber missions too far in advance of the British troops, so that the Germans had time to recover from the shock/morale effect). What was needed was fighter airfields in Normandy, so that interdiction could stop new German units reaching the front, and cut the supply chain to those there. But those airfields needed the capture of Caen.

You think the RAF needed a fighter to cover CAS missions at low level over Normandy. Hmm, sounds tailor-made for the Typhoon/Tempest family to me!

[Franek Grabowski]

Jukka
Aircraft is not a devil flown by bad forces. It is all about science called aerodynamics and the key issue in an aircraft's aerodynamics is the airfoil and then the wing. That said, Graham's (and mine) comments on Tempest vs Typhoon airfoil characteristics is based on common (tosome degree) knowledge based on years of research.
I am also intrigued on your derogatory comments on Mustang and praising of Thunderbolt. It looks you believe both Britons (yes, they had switched plans for both types, having both at hand in quantities) and Americans were complete idiots replacing Thunderbolt in escort missions. Obviously airmen's comments do not matter as well. But well, considering you have the comfort not to go there and fight for another day, you are free to live with your beliefs.

Tony
OK, I thought you meant blood loss in combat, which actually was not that high, bulk of the losses being to extermination of population on occupied territories by both regimes. That said, I have to note that the real problem was not with armed forces but a political will. This must be seen with political corruption and treason on the highest levels of both American and British societies. Philby or Harriman were just needles in the haystock, and the real and current problem is that others were not pursued with all strength available.
Concerning books, it is a serious problem, but it must be had in mind that only in recent years Soviet archives were opened to some degree allowing for independent research. Results are astonishing and definetelly change the view of the war. That said, my comments on Il-2 are based on research in primary and period Soviet documents. Most significant find is definetelly that the aircraft was frequently used for ordinary level bombing and not ground attack missions! Simply, there were no other aircraft available in quantities. I have been interested on this particular aircraft and even have had written an article-summary of recent knowledge on the type.
I would not view British policy towards army aviation through this particular scope, and while talking about butcher, I would take some comparison of numbers. Soviets claimed they have lost some 600,000 men in Poland in 1944/45 alone. US lost some 180,000 servicemen during the whole war, and you cannot say they were not fighting.

[Jukka Juutinen]

Franek, when Swedish AF pilots were testing some Allied designs in 1944, they recommended that the Thunderbolt be bought, not the Mustang.

And regarding the Typhoon/Tempest: please provide TESTED (not calculated) data on the issue. Since mr. Brown was personally flying these tests, I tend to believe his claims over calculated data. Or why did they conduct flight testing at all? Why are aircraft still tested in flight? Shouldn´t a look at your beloved Hoerner give all the answers?

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Read Hastings. Maybe I am just parrotting him. Then why the argument?

The message I got from Hastings was that Bomber Command was relatively well-funded (with much of that had gone on high-quality ground facilities) but ill-prepared and largely ill-equipped. It's aircraft weren't exactly an all-star line-up although I'd guess the Wellington and Hampden more or less on a par with contemporaries such as the Do 17 and He 111 (he said without checking the figures). But as Hasting points out, no realistic practice for their planned strategic role and no "plan B" (no serious practice in night flying and navigation, no radio navaids, target markers, thought given to blind bombing etc.).