Placing the Fairey Battle.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.
There were lots of 2TAF RP Typhoons around on D-Day, but no forward air controller. There was a naval liaison officer with 3 Div but he was killed, so no 11-inch guns could be used. There was no Flak to worry Vengeances had they been released from target-towing duties in Devon. RP Typhoons were unavailable but were not the answer. Sherman tanks were available but likewise not the answer. Maybe bombs delivered by the Vengeances were also no answer, but they were the best bet after ships' guns.
The infantry should have had dive-bombers under command, as the Royal Artillery had Austers under command flown by gunners but supplied and serviced by the RAF. Gunner forward observation officers lived with the infantry battalions who felt they had their 'own' troop of three 25-pdrs. The FOO had only to call in an emergency and the troop would always drop what it was doing and come to the help of 'its' infantry battalion. If the threat was severe, the FOO could call on a battery, or a regiment, or higher. The FOO's decision was never questioned - unlike the case in the US Army which never trusted their FOO's with that discretion.
The Army tried to develop this kind of unit relationship between squadrons and brigades, and between sections and battalions. But the RAF always categorically refused. All they would allow was the permament allocation of a Group to an Army. So Typhoon pilots never met the infantry they supported, and never got their feedback.
The wrong aircraft with the wrong weapon in the wrong organisation gave the wrong result.