FAA Role in the Pacific.?

[Jim Oxley]

Originally Posted by Smudger Smith

A question if the BPF were operating similar aircraft types as the Yanks, on similar operations, against similar targets, why was our tactics so very different. Did we not take advice from our American Allies, it would not be the first time after all. ?

The whole set-up of the BSP was totally at odds with the highly sophiscated and extremely advanced USN operation.

The RN, although they had lead the way of carrier development in WWI and the early 20's, fell well behind in design and tactical application from the early 30's, and never regained that prominance. By the start of WWII both Japan and the US were streets ahead in all areas.

The RN used, poorly, it's carriers in penny packet operations. A Malta convoy containing 2 carriers was considered a very large task force. There was no Fleet practice, or Task Force. It's aircraft were of short range, were poorly designed, it had almost no radar control defence system and the powers that be held the belief that in anti-aircraft defence the AA gun was superior to using it's own aircraft. Hence RN carriers had a preponderence of strike aircraft as opposed to fighters on board. And it's aircraft carrying capacity was limited to aproximately half that of IJN or USN Fleet carriers. In addition RN carriers were of limited range, and relied on replenishment from bases on shore. there was no fleet replenishment, and no fleet train. Also RN carriers had no provision for air-conditioning, of which both the IJN and USN did.

Even at the start of the war both the IJN and the USN were more advanced in the use of carriers - the IJN especially so. The USN quickly caught up tactically. More importantly the USN, operating in the Pacific over vast differences, had two years to develop a very sophiscated supply chain that could replenish carriers well away from base, could replace aircraft and crews at the front (wherever it may be), carry out minor repairs and maintain the fleet.

The BSP had no such organisation, worse it had made no effort to develop one. Given that the BSP had been based in the Indian Ocean since 1942, and was fully aware of the trend of carrier application as used by the USN, makes this oversight all the more glaring. Admittedly the BSP had to fight London for any resource allocation of ships and material, being lowest on the priority list. Nevertheless it was a failiure by RN staff.

After June 1944 the Admiralty could allocate many ships to the BSP, and did so. The FAA was finally receiving dedicated naval aircraft in quantity eg F6F, F4U, TBM etc. Spitfires were still retained, as were the Barracuda. When the BSP finally started major offensive operations in 1944 against the Japanese it still had some many problems.

Logistics remained the major limitation. A patchwork quilt of ships was put together for supply, drawing on basically an free merchantman in the pacific under British control. Sydney was the closed major base for the RN, thousands of milse from the front by late 1944. Aircraft carrying capacity remained a bugbear, and the AAA capability of a RN carrier was well below that of a USN carrier. In several instances it was the armoured decking of the RN carriers that saved them when confronted by kamikaze in '45.

And only one carrier captain was a flyer. All other, including commanding admirals, were not carrier qualified. And this often led to a lack of appreciation of the problems of aircraft operation from carrier decks, affecting tactic's, comditions of operation and most importantly por co-operation when involved with USN carriers.

Yet despite all this the FAA did achieve many great things in the Pacific. And developed a record it can be justly proud of. It is understandable though that in American eyes the BSP is seen as rather ineffective.

After all the USN by 1945 was fielding a navy of almost 600 ships at the front (well over a thousand if supply ships are counted), including 30 odd carriers of various sizes. By comparion the BSP had 6 carriers and less 100 ships (including supply) under it's control. Barely a Task Force by USN standards.

Phew! A bit long winded. This is just touching on the subject. Read the books mentioned for a far greater appreciation of the trials and tribulations of the BSP. Additional to those are a few more.

The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 - 1945, by Guy Robbins

Sunburst - The Rise Of Japanese Naval Airpower 1909 - 1941, by Mark Peattie.