Cobras, Mustangs, Thunderbolts, Eastern vs Western front, Franek vs ...

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

kalender, do you know how many a/c in an American fighter group?
There is 48 (3 sqd of 16 a/c).

135/48 = 2.8 groups. I would say that is a few groups.

As for the few dosens of Mustangs, don't take it so literally, besides the word is plural (the 's' on the end).

Kutscha, and you will say, this few dosen(s) wipped out the germans from the sky? How many german planes claims the 4, 354,356 FG on 6.03.1944? 30-35? My point is that the key for air superiority for the west ally was also the numerical superiority and not a single plane type. That was german idea with a few planes reach victory in air war: Me-262. The result is well known.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Kutscha, and you will say, this few dosen(s) wipped out the germans from the sky? How many german planes claims the 4, 354,356 FG on 6.03.1944? 30-35? My point is that the key for air superiority for the west ally was also the numerical superiority and not a single plane type. That was german idea with a few planes reach victory in air war: Me-262. The result is well known.

The 353rd was a P-47 Group until Dec 1944, the 354FG , 363FG and 4th FG and 357FG were only Mustang Groups.. this was first Mustang combat encounter for 4th FG who actually learned to fly the airplane only two days before.

The 354FG lost 1 air, 2 weather for 8 air awards
The 363FG lost 11 in weather over North Sea - worst day for 8th AF FC in war.
The 4FG lost 3 air (1 M/A/C with shot down Me 110, 2 shot down by Do 217 gunners), one mechanical for 15 air awards
357FG zero losses - for 18 air awards.

Actually, in my opinion Franek is right. The four Mustang and two operational P-38 Groups were all that was available to engage the LuftFlotte Reich on March 6 beyond Dummer Lake. By the end of April the 355th, 352nd would add their Mustangs and the 364th would add one more Lightning Group.

The P-47s did not perform Target Escort, only Penetration and Withdrawal. The Battle of Germany was in the very few hands of five Mustan Groups and three Lightning Groups. The Mustangs were THE major contributors to the defeat of the Luftwaffe over Germany and achieving air superiority.

In all, the 8th AF Merlin Mustang only flew half the sorties, destroyed approximately twice the German fighters in the air than the P-38 and P-47 Combined, destroyed three times as many German fighters on the ground as the P-47/P-38s combined, and lost the same amount of Mustangs in air battles as the P-47/P-38 Combined.http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...OPERATIONS.pdf



Yes, the Target Escort available during 1944 NEVER exceeded the number of single engine day fighters in LuftFlotte Reich until December when the 78th and 353rd converted to P-51s. The LW was also able to try to form masses of fighters and focus on imperfect fighter escort coverage, achiving great local numerical advantage over the Target Escorts.

Do the math. at the end of May 1944, approximately 6 Mustang and 3 Lightning Groups (~ 40-50 effectives per Group) were available to escort 3 Bomb Divisions of 500 bombers each over 40-50 miles to and from the Target... so approx 150 fighters to protect 40 miles of imperfect formations of 500 bombers per Division.

Regards,

Bill


The Luftwaffe claimed 5 Mustangs for 6 March - not 30-35.

[kalender1973]

Hi Bill,

thanks for the link. It is very intresting statistic. But with this statistic we risk the loss focus of the discussion: if the few Mustangs was key factor for the success of 8th air force.

First of all I suggest to narrow the time slice that we take in account. Our discussion focus on the first half 1944 until the landing in Normandy. As I already wrote, it was a turning point in air war. It were two different Luftwaffe, in spring and late autumn 1944. The german pilots reach there units only with 10-20 flying hours in their Bf109 or FW190. It is clear that the succeses of US fighter dramatically increased and in that time the P-51 was key US figther. And if you write about german losses on the ground, we must recall that most of them was suffered at two last week of the war, where the german put open there planes on their fields.

But if we look at the spring of 1944 the picture is something different. You write that P-47 reach only Dummer lake. But in my eyes it was enough. Due the decision of perephery defence the most german figther units were deployed even in the north and north-west Germany and Netherland: JG1, 11, I,II/JG3... And after the fight with the P-47, the germans with their short range planes must be refuelled and come rare to second concentrate attack. Therefore a few P-51 of direct escort was enough. But it is not fair to minimize role of other 8th air force fighters.

If you look at 6th march, than you must agree that it was not the best mission of USAAF. From 730 bomber was lost 69. And the main targed was not attacked. From 100 P-51 was lost 5 (5%) and from 615 P-47 was lost also 5 (0,8%). The P-51 claims only 43:36=1,2 more german planes as P-47. The numbers are not really fantastic.
And I would like to see the plane types of the P-51 claims, IIRC many of the were two engines from NJG's.

Best regards

[Kutscha]

MONDAY, 6 MARCH 1944

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 250: 504 B-17s and 226 B-24s are dispatched to hit industrial areas in the suburbs of Berlin; fierce fighter opposition claims 69 bombers (the highest number lost by the Eighth Air Force in a single day) and 11 fighters; the bombers claim 97-28-60 Luftwaffe fighters; details are:

1. 248 B-17s hit secondary targets in the Berlin area; 18 B-17s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 172 damaged; casualties are 2 KIA, 8 WIA and 184 MIA.

2. 226 B-17s hit targets of opportunity at Templin, Verden, Kalkeberge,
Potsdam, Oranienburg and Wittenberg; 35 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 121 damaged; casualties are 15 WIA and 354 MIA.

3. 198 B-24s hit the primary target (Genshagen industrial area), secondary targets in the Berlin area and targets of opportunity at Potsdam; 16 B-24s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 54 damaged; casualties are 15 KIA, 8 WIA and 148 MIA.

Escort is provided by 86 P-38s, 615 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and
100 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; results are:

1. P-38s claim 3-0-1 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38 is lost, the pilot is MIA.

2. P-47s claim 36-7-12 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 P-47s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 4 damaged; casualties are 2 WIA and 5 MIA.

3. P-51s claim 43-1-20 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 P-51s are lost and 2 damaged; casualties are 5 MIA.

Yes I know they are only claims but the P-51s had a better success rate than the P-47s.

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

Yes I know they are only claims but the P-51s had a better success rate than the P-47s.

Yes, 6 time more success rate for 6 time more loss rate. And the bomber suffers highst single day losses, also they were not able to protect they completely. Where the "miracle"?

If the ally did not land at Normandy, what increased dramatically number of sorties and as following the german losses, the bomber offensive could require the next ten year(without N-bomb). And as Korea show the result is not known.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Hi Bill,

thanks for the link. It is very intresting statistic. But with this statistic we risk the loss focus of the discussion: if the few Mustangs was key factor for the success of 8th air force.

First of all I suggest to narrow the time slice that we take in account. Our discussion focus on the first half 1944 until the landing in Normandy. As I already wrote, it was a turning point in air war. It were two different Luftwaffe, in spring and late autumn 1944. The german pilots reach there units only with 10-20 flying hours in their Bf109 or FW190. It is clear that the succeses of US fighter dramatically increased and in that time the P-51 was key US figther. And if you write about german losses on the ground, we must recall that most of them was suffered at two last week of the war, where the german put open there planes on their fields.

Igor - You are correct for many of the US Fighter Groups such as 356th and 78th and 353rd - late converters from the P-47 to the P-51 plus the 56th (all P-47), but not the 4th and 355th and 352nd etc which started destruction of German aircraft in remote reaches of Germany in March 1944 and continued through rest of war.

Further, while a lot of the a/c that were concentrated (with little fuel) on airfields in April 1945, they were there because the perimeter was shrinking and they had no fuel and few pilots making them essentially non-critical.

But if we look at the spring of 1944 the picture is something different. You write that P-47 reach only Dummer lake. But in my eyes it was enough. Due the decision of perephery defence the most german figther units were deployed even in the north and north-west Germany and Netherland: JG1, 11, I,II/JG3...

The German controllers were very clever and while P-47s (and Spitfires) engaged the JG2 and JG26 over the Occupied countries during Penetration and Withdrawal Support, the bulk of the air defense was calculated to engage beyond the range of Escorts.

March 6 was a good example. The LuftFlotte Reich defense engaged prematurely at Dummer Lake and was hurt by the 56th FG but the Mustangs were engaging from that point all the way to Berlin. From that day, there was no place that the LW controllers could have confidence that they could assemble the ZG Gruppen without suffering heavy losses - for any targets at Bremen-Stuttgart line and beyond.

The Mustangs completely changed the air superiority situation over central Germany to Poland - opening up all the Synthetic Fuel/Oil and Chemical plants to attack.

And after the fight with the P-47, the germans with their short range planes must be refuelled and come rare to second concentrate attack. Therefore a few P-51 of direct escort was enough. But it is not fair to minimize role of other 8th air force fighters.

I am not minimizing contribution of P-47 or P-38 but there is a fundamental reason that the P-51 replaced both in the ETO. Better air superiority fighter and the bombers were 'bait' to draw the Luftwaffe into fighting. The 8th AF FC mission was to kill the Luftwaffe in the air and on the ground and they performed very well in those 5 months precceding Overlord. The Mustang was the most important Allied fighter in killing the experienced fighter pilots during January to June deep over Germany.

If you look at 6th march, than you must agree that it was not the best mission of USAAF. From 730 bomber was lost 69. And the main targed was not attacked. From 100 P-51 was lost 5 (5%) and from 615 P-47 was lost also 5 (0,8%). The P-51 claims only 43:36=1,2 more german planes as P-47. The numbers are not really fantastic.
And I would like to see the plane types of the P-51 claims, IIRC many of the were two engines from NJG's.

I will dig into it but IIRC the distribution was about 65% s/e and 35% t/e. Many of the Me 110 and 210's fell to the 4th and 357th past the Dummer Lake area (where they were assembled out of range from the P-47). So a high percentage of the Mustang scores on 6 March WAS t/e. This was the beginning of the end for NJG resistance for daylight attacks and severly hurt NJG effectiveness against night RAF attacks

Best regards

The LW pilots were still receiving 'adequate' training in the first 5 months, but could not keep pace with the attrition inflicted by the Mustangs.

The Oil campaign starting on May12 was the beginning of the dramatic reduction in new pilot training and significant movement of KG and SG pilots to backfill the losses of Feb-May, 1944.

The 25-50 hour pilots were showing up in September and peaked in November when they simply should not have been in the sky. JG301 in late November was a classic example of the low time pilot in Fw 190A8's

I had a detailed conversation with Galland in 1983 before publishing my book and he permitted me to reprint a letter about the impact of the Mustang on LW Operations. Essentially the Mustang interdicted formation assembly, killed many German pilots taking off and landing, shot up airfields and reduced 'effectives' at strategic points (munich/Berlin for example) for days - shot up rail and barge traffic when Speer decentralized plants and needed to move subassemblies from one factory to another.. and put up a fighter with equal performance (or greater at bomber altitudes) over HIS cities...

If the LW have Mustangs during BoB, we might be speaking German.

Just a few of his observations about the Strategic footprint of the Mustang.

Regards,

Bill

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by drgondog

I had a detailed conversation with Galland in 1983 before publishing my book and he permitted me to reprint a letter about the impact of the Mustang on LW Operations. Essentially the Mustang interdicted formation assembly, killed many German pilots taking off and landing, shot up airfields and reduced 'effectives' at strategic points (munich/Berlin for example) for days - shot up rail and barge traffic when Speer decentralized plants and needed to move subassemblies from one factory to another.. and put up a fighter with equal performance (or greater at bomber altitudes) over HIS cities...
Regards,
Bill

Hi Bill,

I am also convinced that Mustang play very important role. But without other component of air force component they were not so successful.

I would be also careful with the statements of former responsible of wehrmacht generally and especially with Galland. He was responsible for fighter arm and he is also at least partly responsible for the disaster over Germany. After the war all former german generals try to give over own responsibility to other. And Galland was not an exception: he was the best, he understood all but Hitler, Göring, Joschenek etc were fault at the problems. And the last but not least: “Mustangs, what we can do?” But if I read his “The first and the last” and compare it with actual facts, I see many problem, where Galland was pesonally responsible.

Best regards,

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Hi Bill,

I am also convinced that Mustang play very important role. But without other component of air force component they were not so successful.

I would be also careful with the statements of former responsible of wehrmacht generally and especially with Galland. He was responsible for fighter arm and he is also at least partly responsible for the disaster over Germany. After the war all former german generals try to give over own responsibility to other. And Galland was not an exception: he was the best, he understood all but Hitler, Göring, Joschenek etc were fault at the problems. And the last but not least: “Mustangs, what we can do?” But if I read his “The first and the last” and compare it with actual facts, I see many problem, where Galland was pesonally responsible.

Best regards,

Igor - these were among many corroborating and supportive statements by Galland, Rall, Krupinski, Steinhoff and others at a Fighter Aces convention in Tuscon some 25 years ago.

In the context of the discussion, the Mustang was recognized as not necessarily the 'best', but was the most important Allied Fighter - in that it could do what the Spitfire and 109 and 190 could do in air to air combat, but had the range to do it everywhere.

It was of zero importance to RAF Heavy Bomber ops at night, or medium range bomber escort during the day (Spit, Tempest, P-47, P-38 could all perform this role) - but the daylight strategic raids would have been stopped and the Oil Campaign never started in time had it not been for the Merlin powered Mustang.

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Igor - these were among many corroborating and supportive statements by Galland, Rall, Krupinski, Steinhoff and others at a Fighter Aces convention in Tuscon some 25 years ago.

It was of zero importance to RAF Heavy Bomber ops at night, or medium range bomber escort during the day (Spit, Tempest, P-47, P-38 could all perform this role) - but the daylight strategic raids would have been stopped and the Oil Campaign never started in time had it not been for the Merlin powered Mustang.

As I already mention, I am very careful with the statements of former LW stars.
From the technical and tactical point of view I am agreed with you, but I am disagree with the consequences. Not a Mustang was a key issue, but a further splintering of the german forces. If not a landing in Normandy, if not an advance of soviet army into Romania( with cutting of 45% of german oil supply) and deep in German, all efforts of USAAF were without any result, as Beeg Week, bombing of ball-bearing industry etc.
The german would able to manage also the oil crisis, as they managed all other. The would reallocate the syntethic fuel production under ground. In june 45 Speer planed delivery of 30000 to fuel from underground facility