Small B17 bomb bay and bomb load

[Graham Boak]

At the severe risk of splintering this thread, I would point out that the quoted survival rate for the crews is almost certainly that applied after the aircraft had been shot down (I'd appreciate confirmation if otherwise!) as the loss rate of the Merlin Halifax was considerably higher than that of the Lancaster. So much so that it eventually had to be withdrawn from BC operations before the superior Hercules-engined Mk.III was available.


Re Mosquitoes: I admit I was thinking of the modified Mk.IVs rather than the Mk.XIVs, but 400 is still a small number - and how many of those were dedicated to the 4000lb rather than just being replacements for the older machines?

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Re Mosquitoes: I admit I was thinking of the modified Mk.IVs rather than the Mk.XIVs, but 400 is still a small number - and how many of those were dedicated to the 4000lb rather than just being replacements for the older machines?

All but the first 12 of the 402 B XVIs could carry the 4000lb "cookie". This is ~100 more than the B IV, not counting Canadian production of B XXs - 245. For comparison, built during the same time as the B XVI were 526 NF 30s.

[RodM]

Hi Ruy,

With the American use of air power in the Gulf, most of the targeting as aimed at objectives that would support, directly and indirectly, a ground war. Even then, it is the improved (but not perfect by a long shot) accuracy of delivery systems that make this possible.

When thinking back to the tactical use of strategic air power around D-Day, some usage just plain failed to achieve it's goals (such as the bombing that Monty always insisted upon in support of his ground forces while trying to break out). Maybe, the four-engined bomber was just unsuited to the task (oh, how the Allies would have loved an aircraft like the F-16/F-18 back then!).

And, yes, from re-reading some of the official histories, it seems that some of the main inhibiting factors on the conduct of the airwar resulted from the commanders themselves and the schools of thought they dogmatically aligned themselves with, causing mis-application or a dilution of effort.

However, the Second World War was THE testing ground of air power. To me, the only benefit of having so many advocates of different doctrines during the air war in Europe is that least the 'field was covered' - although we can theorise in hindsight how strategic air power could or should have been more effectively used, obviously the defeat of the Axis forces was a combination of many factors, one of which was strategic air power and in the application of that strategic air power, the effects of many different doctrines helped bring about the collapse of Germany. If, a single air commander had been appointed and they had aligned themselves with a particular target system, would have this have brought about the same result?

Myself, I tend to get annoyed at the some of the modern arguments made about the Strategic air offensive that seem to have more to do to nationalistic pride than honest assessment (it is from this that many black-and-white half-truths develop).

As you say, the flexible application of air power, both strategic and tactical, allied to more effective targeting and more efficient and accurate delivery systems, is the key. Where would the effective use of air power today be without the lessons learnt 60 years ago?

I guess that the first Gulf War finally saw a maturing of the use of air power, reapplying many lessons learnt in the North African campaign, under one unified battle-plan for all forces....and the acknowledgement that air power cannot win a conventional war alone without soldiers on the ground.

Cheers

Rod

[Smudger Smith]

Hi,

For what it’s worth I’m in total agreement with RodM, however as per normal the contribution of the Short Stirling is forgotten.



Regarding accuracy, Bomber Command’s accuracy steadily improved throughout the war, from mid 1944 onwards Bomber Commands major contribution towards the destruction of Germany’s synthetic oil plants and railway facilities are unfortunately overlooked in favour of the attacks upon German cities. Perhaps we should have copied the Yanks with better press covered and built up our contribution in the same way they did. !



No.3 Group RAF Bomber Command in particular played a prominent role in attacking Hitler’s oil and transport targets, equipped with G-H the group carried out a number of highly effective and destructive attacks from October 1944 onwards.



I personally feel that Harris should have been replaced mid 1944, Bomber Command could have and perhaps should have played a more prominent role in attacking selective targets, Bomber Command had the men, aircraft and the bombing and navigational aids to destroy any target in Germany, the only thing it lacked was a commander willing to explore and develop a selective bombing policy. Commanders such as Cochrane (5 Group) or Bennett (8 Group) both of whom explored new bombing and target locating techniques should have been given the chance. ( I await the flak )

Of course in hindsight it is easy to have an opinion.

Regards


Smudger

[Juha]

Hello Smudger

You'll not get any flak from me because I totally agreed with You, well said.

Juha

[Vinman]

Hello Gentlemen,

Statistics and figures can sometimes be wrong and misleading.
First, even though the Halifax and Lancaster had a max bomb capacity of 13,0000-140000 lbs, the planes that flew the missions hardly ever had their planes to full bomb capacity.
I have some references with accurate stats:
Key raids against Germany by the RAF:
1943, July 24/25: RAF Raid on Hamburg.
791 Planes (Mostly Lancaster, the rest Halifax and Sterling) dropped 2,200 tons of bombs, which works out to about 5,560 lbs per A/C.
1943, November 18/19: RAF Raid on Berlin.
444 Planes (Lancaster, Halifax and Sterling) dropped 1,500 tons of bombs, which works out to about 6,700 lbs per A/C.
1944, March 30/31: RAF Raid on Nuremberg ( Black night for Bomber Command and heaviest defeat suffered by the RAF in a bombing mission. Of the 795 A/C dispatched, 108 were lost, 70 damaged, casualties 545 men killed, 159 shot down but evaded capture)
795 Planes (mostly Lancaster and Halifax) dropped 2,500 tons of bombs, which works out to about 6,200 lbs per A/C.
So, as one can see by these three key examples, the bomb capacity was no way near the 13,000 to 14,000 range.
If the B17 had an average of 5,000 to 7,000 lb load, the Lancaster( with the exception of the B.1 special) and Halifax were not too far off.
Years ago at a hobby show here in Calgary, I talked to a Lancaster pilot, who was visiting from Saskatoon. He told me that he never flew a mission with a max bomb load on his plane, everything depended on the target and the range.
Facts and Stats: The bombing of Europe in WW2
Sorties flown by RAF Bomber Command: 1940-1945: 391,137
Sorties flown by USAAC: 1942-1945: 762,000
Tons of bombs dropped by RAF 955,000 ( 758,000 Bombs, 196,000 Incindiaries)
Tons of bombs dropped by USAAC: 1,400,000
Lancaster: Tons of bombs and incindiaries dropped, 600,000. (1940-1945)
Halifax: Tons of bombs and incindiaries dropped, 227,000. (1940-1945)
Boeing B17: Tons of bombs dropped: 640,000. (1942-1945)
Consolidated B24: Tons of bombs dropped: 460,000. (1942-1945)
*Note: The 8th Air Force alone, dropped more tons of bombs than the entire RAF and did it in 3 years compared to the RAF in 5 years!
Vinman.
References and sources: WW2 AIRCRAFT, The Allies: by Chris Chant.
1939-1945 war planes: by Andrew Kershaw.
Aviation Heritage: Black night for Bomber Commad by
N.W. Emmott.