KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.

[Franek Grabowski]

Andreas
To make my point clear, I do believe that all losses must have been noted somewhere at the time. I perfectly know that many, if not most of the records were destroyed. The problem is that the best and somewhat only source, GQ6 list is by definition prone to errors, and should be taken with a grain of salt. That is all.
Please note, that it is often used as a definite source of information, without any attempt to verify it with other sources generated at different level/place, which would not multiply the same information (eg. not GQ6 monthly sheets that will likely repeat all errors from the main list). There are some cases worth notifying as obvious errors.
16 October 1940 - a He 111 of 2./KGr126 is reported as 6955 1T+BB, but recovery of the remains proven it was 5709, while wartime RAF records noted it as 5706 1T+LK!
23 June 1941 - Fw. Bock of 4./JG2 is listed by GQ6 as lost near Ostend, but WASt says Condette near Boulogne, some 100 km away!
Of course, they were quite easy to verify, but what to do if we cannot find any evidence? Please, have another example. On 8 April 1942 Ofw. Gerhardt was reported wounded in combat over St Omer, despite no claims filed by Fighter Command. Of course this could be just another friendly fire incident, but another scenario comes to my mind. On 4 April a Polish pilot saw a German pilot shooting down a Spitfire, attacked him from close distance and claimed destruction. The pilot, just a few days earlier, has proven himself as one of the best marksmen in the whole Fighter Command, so the one should not expect him to miss. No German pilot was killed on 4 April, so his claim should be present on the victory list. That happens, Ofw. Gerhardt was among the latter. Would it be possible that the loss report was badly filed? How to verify it?
Another case. 9 April 1945, Hamburg. A Lancaster raid is intercepted by I&III/JG7. An account provided in an appropriate Luftgau report fits perfectly description of combat but one thing - no losses were filed. To the contrary, I have a Fighter Command paper noting, that on a review of gun camera film of one pilot (unfortunately, the film itself was not located), it was noticed that a bailing out airman with properly deployed parachute is visible. So what happened actually?
Finally, for the Grosse Schlag operation, Galland estimated loss of 2,6 aircraft destroyed per pilot killed. This must have been a result of some statistical analysis. It certainly does not fit the losses for 1941 the Channel clashes, where the ratio is about 1,2. So, was the estimation bogus, or perhaps the latter stats are wrong, as 1,2 is way off 2,6!
PS Please do not refer to politics. It is not the case.

[odybvig]

"16 October 1940 - a He 111 of 2./KGr126 is reported as 6955 1T+BB, but recovery of the remains proven it was 5709, while wartime RAF records noted it as 5706 1T+LK"

So no we cant trust RAF record either ?


"On 4 April a Polish pilot saw a German pilot shooting down a Spitfire, attacked him from close distance and claimed destruction. The pilot, just a few days earlier, has proven himself as one of the best marksmen in the whole Fighter Command, so the one should not expect him to miss. No German pilot was killed on 4 April, so his claim should be present on the victory list. That happens, Ofw. Gerhardt was among the latter. Would it be possible that the loss report was badly filed? How to verify it"

Another possebility is that the german A/C was not destroyed and limped back to base. Was the claim verified ? By whom ?

"Another case. 9 April 1945, Hamburg. A Lancaster raid is intercepted by I&III/JG7. An account provided in an appropriate Luftgau report fits perfectly description of combat but one thing - no losses were filed. To the contrary, I have a Fighter Command paper noting, that on a review of gun camera film of one pilot (unfortunately, the film itself was not located), it was noticed that a bailing out airman with properly deployed parachute is visible. So what happened actually"

What have this to do with the GQ6 list

"Finally, for the Grosse Schlag operation, Galland estimated loss of 2,6 aircraft destroyed per pilot killed. This must have been a result of some statistical analysis. It certainly does not fit the losses for 1941 the Channel clashes, where the ratio is about 1,2. So, was the estimation bogus, or perhaps the latter stats are wrong, as 1,2 is way off 2,6"

And your sources for this info is ?


Olve Dybvig

[Franek Grabowski]

I did not know that your name is Andreas!

Originally Posted by odybvig

So no we cant trust RAF record either ?

I would say it another way - belief that any document may be an absolute truth could be dangerous. Nonetheless in this case you are detracting from the problem of quality of German documents.

Another possebility is that the german A/C was not destroyed and limped back to base. Was the claim verified ? By whom ?

I doubt that top sharpshooter of FC would miss from 25 yards.

What have this to do with the GQ6 list

Perfectly nothing but the fact, that there are really weird documents.

And your sources for this info is ?

Galland and own calculations.

[Andreas Brekken]

Hi, Franek

I intend to write up a more lengthy answer with regards to this, but in order to get the 1944 project site ready for launch I will have to wait some days to do so.

What I do believe we should be aware of is how the system behind these records and files were made and ment to function (follow the paper trail approach...) and I feel an obligation more or less to complete my research into this matter in an article, and it will come!

As I have noted earlier - the responsibility of reporting the losses was traversed through the chain of command. Setting aside the handling of more or less autonomous units and ad-hoc units, the responsibilities for making this paper trail appear was quite straight forward, and as seen in the orders from for example the Gen.d.Lw. operating in south eastern parts of Europe, an extremely important tool in order to get the resources needed for operation! (I will quote these orders excactly in the coming article). Thus the notion brought forward by some during this discussion that what we now see as the GenQu6Abt documents were purely for statistical purposes on high levels of command is fundamentally wrong. Of note is especially the order to be even more accurate in the reporting to the GenQu with regards to formation leaders, as this influenced how the Luftflotte, Geschwader etc would have to act in order to replace these. This is not statistics, this is hands down, on the ground operative stuff.

I also acknowledge, as I have done in several of the earlier answers, that errors were made. This is natural in an organization as large as this. The company I currently work for has 151000 highly qualified persons employed world wide. Do one make errors - YES! Do dataflows brake down and introduce errors - although one use millions every year to try to amend this - YES! But we all strive to at least get the best result we can with regards to data quality. I firmly believe (oh ye have faith) that the bureaucrats of the Luftwaffe did the same thing, and this can be seen in the documents they have left behind. They were striving to get the best data quality they could, and constantly reminding the 'organisation' how this should be done.

One final note - but a fairly important one, which I have tried to relay earlier: Damage to aircraft where no personnel were injured or killed, and where the technical officer in question assessed this to below 10% was not reported at all! This is fairly important when trying to discredit the documents as a whole as a bad dataset.

Looking at this from the macro level, a dataset consisting of some 90000 records, covering damage to about that number of aircraft if not more (some single records can containg information on 100+ aircraft, while there are several records connected to some specific aircraft (damaged, repaired, damaged again)) will definitely be 'significant' for any statistical purpose.

But there will be holes, and there will be discrepancies. So my notion is - instead of using a lot of time and energy to try to discredit this data source on the fact that a few errors exist, try to add to the data, but try to fill the holes with data of better quality. As you yourself have mentioned Franek, even the RAF made errors, and they were looking directly at the remains of the aircraft in question for the specific purpose of intelligence. At this time of the war immensely important to them! But they mad a bad record nevertheless... and even Poles in the RAF can have a bad day with regards to judgement... the 315 Sq and October/November 1944 were not a very good combination...

As we have seen on this board almost countless times, the human mind is not necessarily 100% reliable after 60++ years. And what we are after as researchers is not necessarily what caught the mind of the people operating in the armed forces at the time. (German pilots operating in Bergen area in Norway generally do not have the faintest with regards to how their aircraft were camouflaged or what code this or that guy had on their aircraft, but they remember the rain and the girls very well!)

So let's get on with the real stuff, welcome to the 1944 project guys!

Regards,
Andreas B

[Franek Grabowski]

Andreas
First of all, I never said, that no attempts should be made to make German losses data more accurate and reliable. I do not know, why do you write this.
I will wait patiently for your article, as it would be hard to comment without expression of your views. Nonetheless, I would expect an answer for few simple questions like what kind of data could have been extracted from information about aircraft markings or who supplied replacement aircraft to individual Staffeln?
Andreas, please also have in mind, that all your 151,000 employees are highly skilled and trained volunteers. Comparing it to the Luftwaffe, you would have to consider following factors:
you have to multiply the number of employees,
only part of them were volunteers, while most were drafted or considered deskjob a punishment,
they are as skilled as they wanted to be, and you have to employ them anyway, due to shortages,
several of the people, especially at the bottom of information chain, have their own opinions on what is important in life,
communications is far from perfect, and in all cases prone for errors, both typing and language, not to mention hand written papers,
there is a war around, and people are more bothered to survive than to care about anything else,
careers of people in chain, especially at the bottom and the top, may be dependant on those data.
I think it is just enough, to expect gaps and inaccuracies, created to various reasons.
You say: 'instead of using a lot of time and energy to try to discredit this data source on the fact that a few errors exist', but in no moment you provide any answer about the extense of those 'a few errors'. At no moment you nor your protagonist provide a simple estimation of completness of those data. Please note, that discussing 90,000 losses, variation of accuracy in range of 1-10% is 900 to 9,000 losses. I would not call that insignificant and unimportant.
You note: 'As you yourself have mentioned Franek, even the RAF made errors'. I have claimed all the time they did, and actually did a lot of them. Several of those are not verifiable, despite much more complete sets of documents available than in case of Luftwaffe. I know this, because for the Polish AF we have a really unique combination of surviving records, coming from different archives. Mind you, that we have documents allowing to verify (with a margin of error) every flight made by almost every Polish Squadron (there are some gaps) during the war, be it operational or not. You do not have such possibility for the RAF, not to mention Luftwaffe. Thus based on my knowledge of PAF/RAF system I extrapolate my conclusions on the Luftwaffe. Of course, there were some differencies in both systems, but they should not be way off.
In case of mentioned CEAR, we likely have a simple typing error, perhaps due to misreading handwritten notes. This happened, happens and will happen. Nonetheless, you failed to reply, why so called accurate Luftwaffe documents provided completely bogus data?
I am not sure what do you mean by words: 'the 315 Sq and October/November 1944 were not a very good combination'. 315 Sqn claimed no victories at the time, and suffered few losses, so indeed I may agree, it was not a good time.
Andreas, I am not sure what the passage about memories was about to meant. I have an impression, that you try to consider any information coming from Allied sources as insignificant, unreliable and unimportant, even if it is a photo or other physical evidence, like a bit of parachute.
Andreas, one simple question. Galland estimated losses for Big Hit as 2,6 aircraft destroyed per airman killed. Statistics of Polish Spitfire losses are not as optimistic, but IIRC they were about 2,1 aircraft per airman. German losses for 1941 the Channel offensive are 1,2. Please explain me, why the latter are so much different, and what was the source of Galland estimations.

[Andreas Brekken]

Hi, Franek

1. I never have and never will state that information coming from the allied side should be neglected, it should not! I only state that if the ONLY evidence we have are eyewitness accounts, no physical evidence like debris, a crashsite or a captured pilot or crew, no guncam film, no nothing, we should treat this 'evidence' from both sides in a stringent way - record it but not accept it as the simple truth, and especially not try to say that because this and that chap was such a great person he could never have made a mistake. I have talked to enough WWII pilots from both the allied and german side to at least acknowledge that they were all in a situation were stress related errors could have been made. The major stress release factor at the time, at least that is what the chaps I talked to relayed, were alcohol - not necessarily the best memory enhancer.

2. With regards to replacement aircraft, the easy answer is that the unit requested replacements through the line of command. The requested replacements were gathered by a unit that from my recollection was called L.In.16, and the aircraft were allocated to the unit via the commanding Luftflotte. They were then transported from the production or repair facilities, often via a Luftpark facility, to the storage areas and finally to the frontline units. Records of these daily allocations to the Luftflotten exist.

3. With regards to your calculations, it is a bit hard to make a statement based on the data you provide. By 'Big Hit' do you mean the Battle of Britain, or the Grosse schlacht PROPOSED by Galland but never used?? Also, it would be of interest to see the data you have used to make your own calculations. I can offer a statistical analysis of all fighter losses in the frontline Luftwaffe units from 22.6.1942 to end of January 1945, and the corresponding personnel losses in return.

I would also be very grateful if we could decide to stop using so much time and energy on these discussion - you will probably never agree with me anyway - and rather go back to gathering as much information as possible in an ordered system.

Regards,
Andreas B

[yogybär]

Gentlemen,

I also work in such a big company with >400.000 employees. And it is a german company.

We have reporting structures, "divisions", (business) units and "Stäbe". We have very good software for tracking workhours, costs, profit etc. pp. And also, there is politics inside this organization. I KNOW that in some places comfortable lies are prefered. Wether it is to camouflage own faults of to get more resources then really necessary in order to lower the risk in ones own "Abteilung" (department or wether it is just to blow up ones own importance... there are a lot of possible motivations.

Similar motivations were in the Luftwaffes "employees" also, I am sure. Therefore, I am sure that even in the german Luftwaffe figures were manipulated on different levels to different extents.

Examples, some historically proven, other from fantasy:
- A Mechanic in III/JG54 knows that his pilot is on the edge of his nerves. So, he finds out that the 190D-9 has a "Masseschluß" (electrical problem) and the "poor" pilot cannot fly on ops. One more A/C unservicable.
- Staffelkapitän XY wants to be protect a pilot who wrecked his plane by error, so writes a report "due to tech. reasons". Or even better: Lt. Lipfert forgot to lower the wheels of his 109 during a landing. Explanation afterwords: They didn't want to come out... ts ts ts, always mechanical problems
- Kommodore XY's I./JGZZ has several A/C crashlanded on the AF due to enemy fire / dogfights. His team had to use them as "sparepart-spender", so one week later he is happy that he can report them as "blown up when retreating from the AF" or such.

Surely there were a lot more reasons and even more excuses used in the organizsation "Luftwaffe", which we do not know any more today. Similar to the excuses we find all over the place in our "perfectly organized" "Global Player" companies.

And I am very sure that this was and still is the case in all other Air Forces all over the planet. Maybe even worse in the VVS, where one can read a lot of examples of deliberate excessive claims etc. pp.

Therefore it always would be good to countercheck all information available to get a full picture. But still one should consider that it is only a picture!