lack of NF attempts

[Bruce Dennis]

Reading about the operations in 1941 of British aircraft operating from Malta against Axis convoys, I am struck by the absence of encounters with German or Italian nightfighters. The Allied aircraft were predictable in their actions and routes taken, visibility was seldom an issue, yet they flew unmolested virtually the whole of that year. The raids on Malta were frequent and determined, so it is clear that there were enough Axis aircraft within range, and the British planes doing the most damage to the valuable supply convoys were Swordfish, Wellingtons and Beauforts operating at low to medium heights: basically good targets.

I know developments on the Eastern Front are to be taken into account if looking at the numbers, but that is not what puzzles me: it is the lack of night interceptions even attempted. Or am I missing something?

Bruce

[edNorth]

Yes, Radar.

[Bruce Dennis]

Ed,
Succinct but not complete: the Allied aircraft in the area didn’t have radar until late 1941 when the first ASV equipped Swordfish arrived. The night-time flying conditions were vastly superior in the Med to those of the English Channel, where both sides had sent out nightfighters early in the war without radar, and got some results. Meagre results perhaps, but the scales were so delicately balanced in the Malta campaign that a few modest victories would have paid enormous returns: it was the same handful of Swordfish crews (830 Squadron FAA) over and over again sinking ship after ship on the Tripoli run. When friendly fighters were dispatched, it was usually one or two Fulmars flying independently 40 to 60 miles away, in the anticipated path of any Axis nightfighters. They seldom met any opposition. A ‘maximum effort’ on the part of 830 Sqdn usually would see eight or nine Swordfish flying unescorted in good/moderate visibility towards an Axis occupied coast. Visual interceptions were routinely carried out over Europe under much worse conditions.

The point is that RAF and FAA aircraft were operating almost without interference at night, inflicting devastating damage to the Axis supply lines, and I can see no reason why a few determined Axis aircraft could not have halted this campaign.

Nope, there was more to it than just lack of radar. I suspect the maritime aspect of the theatre fell into the Reichsmarshal’s ‘blind spot’, as he had fought so hard to retain control of all German air forces despite the clear requirement for specialised naval groups. Perhaps navigation was the stumbling block?

Bruce

[SES]

Hi,
In 1941 the German nightfighting force and the supporting ground environment system (GCI-stations) were still in a build-up phase in Western Europe. There simply were not enough resources to cover all areas, and the Germans in the nature of things gave priority to defending the home-land.
bregds
SES
www.gyges.dk

[edNorth]

Bruce,

Your question is otherwise very good, yet SES answers really gives the reason (lack of materiel). Given the time period, countering the night flights of Allied strike aircraft on Axis shipping / convoys, is in my opinion too, an overlooked aspect but on the other hand, more long patrols over (mostly) hostile waters of the area whould possibly not have changed turn of events. The only type available for the job in 1941 were the Ju 88 C-2 / C-4 and they had to cover a very large area with just one or two Staffeln. I belive their main targets were normal RAF bombers, not the FAA / RAF ASV strike aircraft.

Best regards
ed

[Bruce Dennis]

Ed et al:
I must confess my ignorance of the details of the Luftwaffe disposition in the Med, except for the popularly available material. My research into a few Allied personnel led me to read some of the diaries and ORBs concerning their time at Malta. What leapt out was the intensity of the effort put in by Axis air forces on day operations against the airfields serving Malta.

Not to labour the point, but there were very few instances of night air to air engagements instigated by the Axis forces, although a few daring raids by the RAF/FAA on Italian fields at dusk showed the possibilities.

At the same time (1941) I believe German aircraft were still being harassed over southern England by RAF nightfighters without radar, guided by GCI close enough to their targets to allow visual contact. This GCI wouldn’t have been needed around, for example, Tripoli harbour, which was visited by Malta night strike forces so many times that the FAA pilots listed it as their ‘second home’. A single Axis aircraft on standing patrol when convoys were expected or shipping activity underway would have been almost certain to catch Allied intruders: they were very predictable. Likewise, the tactics used by the Malta air forces against convoys in transit were equally predictable. A shadower would move ahead of the main striking force and give guidance to those following, usually by flares and flame floats until ASV was available.

After the Swordfish had completed their attacks, their return to Malta was inevitable, so any competent fighter controller would know where the slow British biplane bombers would be and have a very good idea of their route. Faced with this assortment of sitting ducks, and since the opportunity was consistently ignored, it is almost as if there was a policy against such interceptions.

Bruce

[PeterVerney]

Actually a low, slow target is a difficult target for a night fighter, whether radar assisted or not. Day fighter pilots with little or no night flying experience would be as much of a danger to themselves as to their opponents.
I well remember hearing a survivor of the Swordfish attack on the Scharnhorst and Gneisnau vivdly describing how Fw 190s had great difficulty hitting them and when they did many shells went straight through the canvas covered wings without exploding