Change in Bombing Priorites 1941

[Brian Bines]

Regarding these German bombers landing in the UK a few years ago I read somewhere that on 14/15th.Feb.1941 a He111 landed at RAF Debden. It apparantly taxied over to the Control/Watch tower and quickly took-off again. the article also claimed a German bomber landed at Feltwell the same night. Has this story ever been comfirmed. As far as I knew apart from the Dyce defection and the late war ones most of the other landings were navigation errors by Bf109's and Fw190's.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

"Obviously we have not been able to verify this for ourselves, but if true it has enormous implications" That says it all really, "we have no actual evidence, but imagine if we had ..."

Nick, the fact is that the Hess files are closed, and that egregiousness makes the subject interesting.
No one should accept the fact of the files remaining closed, and certainly not Sir Max Hastings, who when he was being knighted could have said; "Your Majesty, about the Hess files. The integrity of WWII historiography requires they be open to historians. As your trusty servant, may I please have your permission to drive over to Windsor to examine them and report their contents to your subjects."

However, Chris has got an answer of sorts, so mission is accomplished. For that is what most people want from this site - help with ideas and references. I was well satisfied with the results of raising the subject of the Roer Dams and Rhine bridges.

Anyone interested about the unresolved issue of Hess can read 'Double Standards' and make up his/her own mind. I thoroughly recommend it. The book is apparently well-researched, and its conclusions are explosive.

Tony

[Chris Goss]

Tony: In all honesty it does not answer my question. Following 10-11 May attack on London, other attacks do occur (11-12 May airfields; 12-13, 13-14, 15-16 coastal targets; 16-17 Birmingham; 17-18, 18-19, 19-20 coastal) before (reduced) city attacks recommence in June. Could it be that coasatl/shipping attacks were simply in advance of and in support of the escape of the capital ships and the general reduction in response to the mass movement of yet more bomber Geschwadern to the east/Balkans and Mediterranean?

[Many Souffan]

Hello Chris.

Maybe there is nothing special about this date (10-11 may 41)?

To thwart the inflation of the night missions of the LW, RAF Command created the "Fighter night" (march 41). It consisted to make a grid (over London) of flights separated of 300 meters from east to west and 200 meters higher other flights from north to south. For the RAF the "Fighter night" were considered as offensive missions.

During the 2 days before and the 2 days after the full moon (as 10-11 may 41), some Fighter squadrons had their Hurricane painted with a black semi mat washable painting (type DTD 441), before to participate to these "Fighter night".

with a good weather and a full moon, the meeting between RAF and LW was effective.

For the 16 april, another massive attack (+ 600 bombers) against London, there was no meeting, because no "Fighter night".

Thank you.

[Bombphoon]

Hi Chris
Not specific, but if my memory serves me right, in the World at War, Adolf Galland says that Hitler told him and his assembled Luftwaffe officers that there would be a final heavy air raid to distract attention away from German preparations re. Barbarossa.
Incidentally, re. 'secret files': now we all know authorities can be trusted as far as they can be (over)thrown, but I've often heard the rumours about empty box files with a note in saying 'documents transferred/removed' etc. If authorities really wanted to cover up something, surely they'd replace the papers with fakes or simply just steal/destroy/chuck the whole file away?
Austin

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Chris Goss

Tony: In all honesty it does not answer my question. Following 10-11 May attack on London, other attacks do occur (11-12 May airfields; 12-13, 13-14, 15-16 coastal targets; 16-17 Birmingham; 17-18, 18-19, 19-20 coastal) before (reduced) city attacks recommence in June. Could it be that coasatl/shipping attacks were simply in advance of and in support of the escape of the capital ships and the general reduction in response to the mass movement of yet more bomber Geschwadern to the east/Balkans and Mediterranean?

Chris, maybe, but the Germans were worried by carriers and not land-based aircraft, and the carriers were beyond the GAF's reach.
Hitler had the Taranto raid in mind, and was worried about an attack on Bismarck by carrier-based torpedo planes. He told his naval aide that he had foreseen the torpedoing of Gneisenau at Brest.
Hitler visited Bismarck on May 5, and was dismayed to hear Luetjens point out that though Bismarck need fear no other capital ship, there was a threat from enemy carriers and their torpedo planes.
However, before May 20 when the Admiralty received evidence from the Swedes that Bismarck was in the Kattegat, BP detected increased LW activity pointing to a major naval operation.
I do not know how BP made that connection.
This and the thought on the Hess connection represent the sum of my knowledge on this subject.

But while I have you on, so to speak, I have just consulted your book, 'Luftwaffe Hit-and-Run Raiders', to see if there is anything to be added to the following extracts from my book on the battles of Kervenheim and Winnekendonk. Specifically do you have any information about the identity of the pilot who shot up the Kervenheim road on the night of March 1/2 and the pilot who dropped the bomb on the Winnekendonk cross-roads on the night of March 2/3. Also, do you know if these pilots were operating out of Germersheim, Bonn-Hangelar, Twente or Zwolle? And do you have any observation to make about these two attacks? The one on Winnekendonk almost obliterated 2 Lincolns' Battalion HQ, and was an extraordinary piece of flying.
I have identified the places in the attached Google-Earth map.

Kervenheim, March 1, 1945
At last light the Germans supported by 50 howitzers were holding Kervenheim strongly, especially Müsershof, Rittergut and the cemetery. Their departure as they slipped away during the night was not noticed by the extensive patrolling of the Warwicks, nor did a unit from 53 Division realise that Weeze was emptying. Two Warwick patrols, which must have gone out early in the evening before the Germans disengaged, reported that both Oberfeldshof and Müsershof were occupied by the enemy at 5.45 am. But one hour later, the G Ops log records that returning patrols had found the Germans gone from there and from Müsershof. It had been reduced to a burnt-out ruin containing the charred corpses of five German soldiers. Oberfeldshof was also empty and the patrol heard motor transport in the area. The Germans had slipped away just before first light rather than earlier, ensuring that the British focused on their set-piece attack to give the Germans several hours’ grace before the advance could be continued. Likewise Weeze was found to be very quiet with all its bridges blown.
While the Germans were preparing to leave, at 2 am (March 2) a German aircraft machine-gunned transport on the track running from the Üdem-Weeze road towards Kervenheim, alongside the wood where RW Thompson and the Norfolks had spent their long wait. This could have been a deliberate attempt to create a diversion. The Duty Officer of 185 Brigade was convinced it was a German aircraft and informed G Ops 3 Division who checked with Corps. They replied that it was definitely enemy action. A discussion then took place between Division and Brigade about dispersing vehicles when possible, but with their air superiority unchallenged the allies had long before decided to ignore the Luftwaffe..................

Winnekendonk, March 2, 1945
George Wall of 2 Lincolns recounted what happened after dark in Winnekendonk;
'During my advance I had been joined by another soldier from where I don't know. Anyway, he stayed with me until I asked 'Mousy' from Bermuda if I could help him as he had been shot through the leg. I asked if he wanted my first aid. He replied: "You had better get down or you'll be shot". By then I had swapped my rifle for a Bren gun. It was whilst talking to 'Mousy' my Bermuda friend that I saw the KOSB putting in their attack with the bagpipes playing. I made my way into the white house, to be confronted by an officer. Seeing I had a Bren gun, he shouted: "Hey you, cover that window with your gun, there will be a counter-attack any minute". I took up my position looking into the yard where three British soldiers lay dead. One was a blond youth of about 18 years old. I remember him well by his blond hair. He was always asking us when we would be having a go at the Germans - and there he was a few weeks later laying dead on German soil.
Whilst all this was taking place I was peering out into the yard all night. I was told the Germans might send bombers over to bomb the village. I didn't believe that - not their own village. Just after midnight I heard the drone of a single engine plane go over the village. He made a pass then came back. I heard a plonk! never giving thought that it would be a delayed bomb. It dropped right on or near the crossroads about 50 to 100 yds from the white house. There was a terrific explosion. I should imagine the pilot intended to drop it in the field. We were told the next day, had it not been on clay soil it would have collapsed the house we were in. Come daylight we were stood down. There was still spasmodic firing - I handed over my Bren gun to a white house Sgt who pointed out there were only seven rounds in the three magazines. Terrible wasn't it?”
The German attack was by a FW 190 G of NSG 20 dropping an SC 1,000 Kg general purpose bomb. The Luftwaffenkommando West War Diary contains the following on the raid: "40 Fw 190 (NSG 20). Attack on enemy concentration in Goch-Üdem area. On the target: 38 aircraft from 1845-0043 at 1800-700 m. Explosions and several fires observed. After discharging bombs, road traffic shot up without any special results being observed."
Nachtschlachtgruppe 20 was commanded by Maj Kurt Dahlmann, who had received the Knights Cross as commander of I/Schnell-KG 10 on June 27, 1944, and Oak leaves on January 24, 1945. The aircraft were based 300km from Winnekendonk at Germersheim, where they had been since January 1945, or they had just moved to Twente or Zwolle in the Netherlands at a distance of only 100 km.”

Tony

[Chris Goss]

Tony: I am afraid that all the information I have is included in my book and I cannot add anything more

[Nick Beale]

Like you, all I have is that during the night of 1/2 March, NSG 20 sent 40 Fw 190s against concentrations in the Goch - Udem area, two breaking off with technical problems. Explosions and several fires observed. After dropping their bombs they shot up road traffic without observing the results. 23 sorties were flown by NSG 20 against targets west of Cologne.

It looks like aircraft were out practically from dusk to dawn. AFAIK at this period all these operations would have been from Twente. I don't recall that Germerheim was ever an operational base. NSG 20 went from Bonn-Hangelar to Limburg on or about 11 January. A detachment of 8 Fw 190s stayed at Bonn until the 23rd. The transfer of the entire Gruppe to Twente was in progress on the 27th and completed by the 30 January but for a Restkommando of 13 aircraft.

[tcolvin]

Thank you both.
Sorry to impinge on Chris' thread; I will start a new one.

Tony.

[Larry deZeng]

Perhaps an irrelevant point, but regarding Germerheim (Germersheim), I have two citations for it in our history of NSGr. 20:

NSGr. 20
11 November: transferred to Germersheim to support Heeresgruppe G along the upper Rhine area but thick fog prevented operations.
----------------
13 January: transferred from Limburg-Linter to Germersheim for assignment to II. Jagdkorps, then returned to Bonn-Hangelar on 27 January.

Sources:
(1) ULTRA signals HP7399, BT521, BT930, BT1264, BT2025, BT2074, BT3777, KO2010.
(1) Schwendtmayer flight log.
(3) Möller, Christian. Die Einsätze der Nachtschlachtgruppen 1, 2 und 20 an der Westfront von September 1944 bis Mai 1945 – Mit einem Überblick über Entstehung und Einsatz der Störkampf- und Nachtschlachtgruppen der deutschen Luftwaffe von 1942 bis 1944. Aachen: Helios Verlag- und Buchvertriebsgesellschaft, 2008. ISBN: 978-3-938208-67-0.

So Germersheim did see some use by NSGr. 20 but not at the time of the attack under discussion, as Nick pointed out.