Response to Glider and Juha.

[glider1]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

And why is that? The problem with the 2nd TAF's fighter bombers were three-fold:

1, Complete lack of armor protection making their operations highly risky
2, Lack of accurate delivery of ordonance to target
3, Lack of the ability to carry suitable ordonance

None of these above problems exists in the case of dive bombing, armored Stukas dropping 1800 kg bombs, for example. FBs could fire up trucks and other soft targets on the roads, but there was a clear gap in ability in the West between shooting up things that couldn't shoot back, and and smashing big targets like marshalling yards and railroad junctions.

1, The Typhoon did carry a respectable amount of armour. There are photos in the 2TAF of Typhoons with the armoured sides, one after crash landing
2 Comments have been made about the failure of the JU87 when attacking bridges
3 The 2TAF had the ability to deliver any weapons needed and those it didn’t have the ability to destroy could be given to the Heavies to carry out up to and including the Tallboys

If you mean from interception, it's true - but it's also true for bomb-laden Typhons or any other fighter bombers, they are easy targets for opposing fighters, being both slow and unmanouverable and if they drop their bombs to engage, its a mission kill.

I certainly agree that intercepting the Typhoon would be a mission kill, the difference of course is that the Ju87 or IL2 when intercepted had a significant chance of being an aircraft kill, not just a mission kill

But, appearantly every air force in the world in convinced that speed does not make up for the lack of armor - a few hits will be always scored. The Soviets had their Sturmoviks, the Germans choose to up armor their Stukas, Hs 129s and Fw 190s for ground attack task, and the trend is still present today - see the massively armored A-10 and Su 25

When was the last time you saw an A10 or Su25 being operated where they didn’t have control of the air? Also, when I last counted it was ONE western air arm (hardly every airforce in the world) that went down this route and even here, the US Marines who know a thing or two about Ground Attack, went for the Harrier not a naval version of the A10.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by glider1

1, The Typhoon did carry a respectable amount of armour. There are photos in the 2TAF of Typhoons with the armoured sides, one after crash landing
2 Comments have been made about the failure of the JU87 when attacking bridges
3 The 2TAF had the ability to deliver any weapons needed and those it didn’t have the ability to destroy could be given to the Heavies to carry out up to and including the Tallboys

1, Uhm, no to the first part. We know that the basic Typhoon carried very little "armor" (though the airfame was tough). From the GA POV, it was unarmored. As Juha pointed out however, we know there were two mods designed, one with a small armor augmentation, and another which was quite serious. Now we have to know how service planes looked like, and how many were modded etc.

2, Exceptions to the rule can be made, being better for the role does not guarantee success. The Halifax was much better for night bombing, both in load capacity and navigation/aiming aids than say BoB era Do 17s, but there are cases where the Halifax did very poorly. Back to the topic, I do not think that anyone could seriously claim that any fighter bomber was better at destroying pin point targets than the Stuka.

3, I beg to disagree. First of all the weapons available for the Typhoon were quite unsatisfactory for many tasks. Rockets were far too inaccurate, the bombs it could carry were way too small for bigger targets, and only simple HE bombs were developed, lacking much more effective bomb types like German or Soviet AP and AT cluster bomb containers. There were no large caliber autocannons for tank destroyer operations. They could fight soft targets like trucks, which was very damaging overall indeed, but there was a serious lack of capability in CAS. Typhoons had no staying power over the Battlefield like Il-2s did. After all, it was not built for this, but pressed into a role as it wasnt very good in its original role of as fighter, and it was available, and could carry more ordonance to a decent, than the Spitfire. Its basic limitations are still appearant.

Heavies couldn't close that gap, as they neither had staying power, neither could respond on a short call for support, and could only operate in pre-planned missions, for which opportunity was rarely presented. Accuracy was absymal from their dropping heights - even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter - and low altitude bombing is a stupid thing in a heavy bomber. It didn't work out for He 177 for sure, they are huge targets for AAA.

I certainly agree that intercepting the Typhoon would be a mission kill, the difference of course is that the Ju87 or IL2 when intercepted had a significant chance of being an aircraft kill, not just a mission kill

Every aircraft can be shot down of course. The point is that Ju 87s or Sturmos could carry on with their task even they were intercepted, keeping in formation, and provide themselves with defensive fire. They could also stay above the battle and provide continous support or suppression (Il-2s for example often did this). They can also attack more effectively, part a, because they can operate slower b, had less concern to ground fire c, at least in the case of Stuka, there were proper aiming sights, not just guesswork with the reflector sight.

When was the last time you saw an A10 or Su25 being operated where they didn’t have control of the air?

They always had control of the air, just like the Allies in 1944. It simply follows that the Allies could use a dedicated GA plane.

Also, when I last counted it was ONE western air arm (hardly every airforce in the world) that went down this route and even here, the US Marines who know a thing or two about Ground Attack, went for the Harrier not a naval version of the A10.

The USMC operates the Harrier within a special scope, for them its a hybrid between an attack chopper and a fighter. The main advantage of is that it can operate from small carriers and from frehsly seized land bases, something the A-10 can't do. But compared to the A-10, its tactical qualities are in every aspect inferior. Its a useful specialist tool for a specialist force.

Now as for the Su 25, unlike the A-10 it is freely available to anyone with the $$ in the pockets (long live the Perestroika!), is very popular abroad and is in service in about a dozen countries. Its quite clear that there is need for such plane - this is especially true in light of current COIN operations.

[MW Giles]

Sorry tried to ignore it but cannot let the following go

Every aircraft can be shot down of course. The point is that Ju 87s or Sturmos could carry on with their task even they were intercepted, keeping in formation, and provide themselves with defensive fire. They could also stay above the battle and provide continous support or suppression (Il-2s for example often did this). They can also attack more effectively, part a, because they can operate slower b, had less concern to ground fire c, at least in the case of Stuka, there were proper aiming sights, not just guesswork with the reflector sight.

Neither aircraft could carry out their task even when intercepted, they were both hacked out the sky in large numbers. Like everything else,they did the Russians just kept producing more and more until they bludgeoned the opposition into submission (quite an effective solution if you have the numbers to start with and don't have to worry about winning elections)

After 30.06.40, in just which western front battlefield did the Ju87 just stay above and provide support or suppression?

These systems only work where you have some sort of air superiority, which is why the Il-2 improved significantly in effectiveness as the war went on, it had more space to work in. The Ju87 disappeared as the Luftwaffe lost control of the skies

Martin

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by MW Giles

After 30.06.40, in just which western front battlefield did the Ju87 just stay above and provide support or suppression?

After 30.06.40, what western front battlefields are you aware of until four years later..?

Dismissing the whole Sturmovik and Stuka operational records and characterizing it as human wave attacks and 'being hacked from the sky' is ridiculus, really. The whole point of the thread is that the Western Allies could use a dedicated ground attack aircraft, which they lacked. And if you continously miss the point arguing that 'these aircraft need air superiority', because the Allies had this in 1944/45..

BTW which aircraft operates well when the enemy controls the skies? Hmm?
Even B-17s could not..

[The Kohler]

Very interesting discussion!

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

After 30.06.40, what western front battlefields are you aware of until four years later..?

What’s about the war in Nord-Africa as well as the campaign against Malta? In both cases Stukas did not make a lasting or decisive impression.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

- even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter -

But you have to admit they needed just 2 hits to sink the mighty Tirpitz hence mission accomplished!

It is possible that the 2TAF was fighting with “inferior” weapons such as Typhoons and Spits but history shows they accomplished the job! Theoretically there is a possibility that a better result could be achieved by using airplanes like Il-2 and some sort of dive-bomber, obviously not such outdated models like the JU 87 or A-31 Vengeance, a Douglas A-1 Skyraider would be ideal but this type was not available 44/45. But these types were not available hence 2TAF had to operate with available resources.

With current knowledge of the ETO outcome it is very easy to propose strategy changes but these types of suggestions are always some sort of what-if and they cannot rewrite history.

IMOH it’s not fair to blame this situation on the 2TAF commando. Fact is they made the best out of the situation und supported ground troops as best as they could.

[glider1]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

1, Uhm, no to the first part. We know that the basic Typhoon carried very little "armor" (though the airfame was tough). From the GA POV, it was unarmored. As Juha pointed out however, we know there were two mods designed, one with a small armor augmentation, and another which was quite serious. Now we have to know how service planes looked like, and how many were modded etc.

With the moods as you said yourself, the Typhoon had a similar scale of protection as the Fw190 which is sufficient to give significant protection against light weapons, all aircraft were vulnerable to 20mm+ but clearly IL2 and Hs129 could take more hits on average.

2, Exceptions to the rule can be made, being better for the role does not guarantee success. The Halifax was much better for night bombing, both in load capacity and navigation/aiming aids than say BoB era Do 17s, but there are cases where the Halifax did very poorly. Back to the topic, I do not think that anyone could seriously claim that any fighter bomber was better at destroying pin point targets than the Stuka.

A previous posting listed 6 bridges so failure in this role on the western front was not a one off.

3, I beg to disagree. First of all the weapons available for the Typhoon were quite unsatisfactory for many tasks. Rockets were far too inaccurate, the bombs it could carry were way too small for bigger targets, and only simple HE bombs were developed, lacking much more effective bomb types like German or Soviet AP and AT cluster bomb containers. There were no large caliber autocannons for tank destroyer operations. They could fight soft targets like trucks, which was very damaging overall indeed, but there was a serious lack of capability in CAS. Typhoons had no staying power over the Battlefield like Il-2s did. After all, it was not built for this, but pressed into a role as it wasnt very good in its original role of as fighter, and it was available, and could carry more ordonance to a decent, than the Spitfire. Its basic limitations are still appearant.

I cetainly agree that the 2TAF lacked weapons against individual tanks but this was a deliberate decision. A Tempest was trialed with 40mm but the decision taken was not to procede. Large scale tank battles with hundreds of tanks in the open as seen in the East did not happen in the west so their value was less.

Heavies couldn't close that gap, as they neither had staying power, neither could respond on a short call for support, and could only operate in pre-planned missions, for which opportunity was rarely presented. Accuracy was absymal from their dropping heights - even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter - and low altitude bombing is a stupid thing in a heavy bomber. It didn't work out for He 177 for sure, they are huge targets for AAA.

You are the first person I have known who has said that the Lancs of 617 and 19 squadron were inaccurate. I think I can say that they had an unequalled record of destroying the pin pont targets assigned to them. However you miss the reason why I said Tallboys, they didn't have to hit the target, they were earthquake bombs and a near miss was equally effective.

They always had control of the air, just like the Allies in 1944. It simply follows that the Allies could use a dedicated GA plane.

You forget that GA strikes had been going on through 1942 and 1943 with cross channel raids with Typhoons and Whirlwinds

The USMC operates the Harrier within a special scope, for them its a hybrid between an attack chopper and a fighter. The main advantage of is that it can operate from small carriers and from frehsly seized land bases, something the A-10 can't do. But compared to the A-10, its tactical qualities are in every aspect inferior. Its a useful specialist tool for a specialist force.

First I am confident that if they had wanted the A10 it could have been made carrier capable, second, the Harrier can and did operate where control of the air is not assured, the A10 cannot.

Now as for the Su 25, unlike the A-10 it is freely available to anyone with the $$ in the pockets (long live the Perestroika!), is very popular abroad and is in service in about a dozen countries. Its quite clear that there is need for such plane - this is especially true in light of current COIN operations.

So every other country in the world is now down to 12-15, so how many airforces does that leave who don't operate A10/Su25 type aircraft?
Also if there is one country in the world that appreciate the need for air support its the Israeli Air Force and what do they use?

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
re your message #150, that’s was why I began my message #148 “…at least some CAS Typhoons…”

Your message #152“…even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter…”
In fact 617th and 9th had no great difficulties to hit Tirpitz if they saw it, on the first attack one of the first bombers which succeeded to drop the Tallboy towards rapidly under smokescreen disappearing Tirpitz put the end of Tirpitz career as a seagoing warship and when Germans were surprised and there was no time to generate adequate smokescreen, Tirpitz was sunk rapidly.
On CAS planes from 60s to 80s. RAF and French AFs used Jaguar for decades as their main CAS/Battlefield interdiction a/c, RAF alongside it Harrier, standard NATO CAS plane for long time was Fiat G-91, IAF used A-4s etc.
Juha

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by glider1

With the moods as you said yourself, the Typhoon had a similar scale of protection as the Fw190 which is sufficient to give significant protection against light weapons, all aircraft were vulnerable to 20mm+ but clearly IL2 and Hs129 could take more hits on average.

Its still a question wheter this was a paper mod fitted to a handful of planes, or regular mod. FW 190Fs with extensive armor were serial produced. I've been trying to identify pictures of Typhoons with extra armor, but could find none so far. So I am inclined to believe that most Typhoons went into the battle naked.

A previous posting listed 6 bridges so failure in this role on the western front was not a one off.

And the listing of 6 bridges that weren't destroyed by Stukas does not, for even a brief moment, put into question wheter the Stuka was a much superior ground attack and precision bombing instrument than converted fighters of the 2nd TAF.

I cetainly agree that the 2TAF lacked weapons against individual tanks but this was a deliberate decision. A Tempest was trialed with 40mm but the decision taken was not to procede. Large scale tank battles with hundreds of tanks in the open as seen in the East did not happen in the west so their value was less.

Hmm... so what was Monty doing at Caen for two months, a town that was to be seized on, uhm, in six days? Were large scale tank battles involved perhaps?

I am not going to blame them, they had very little experience, only mimicing with the 2nd TAF what they did in NA: use a Hawker fighter that did not turn out to be so great as a mud mover, for the sake of utility.. they had limited experience, and limited foresight. OTOH, the Soviets had even less before the war and figured it out right..

You are the first person I have known who has said that the Lancs of 617 and 19 squadron were inaccurate.

Facts on Tirpitz raids:

1st attack: 17 bombs dropped, one hit on bow
2nd attack: 32 TB bombs dropped, one near miss
3rd attack: 29 TB bombs dropped, one near miss, two direct hits

Well, it only took 3 months and 78 bombs dropped to make a static, unmanaevring ship on mooring to be sunk. So the best of the best could hope to place 3 bombs out of 80 into a target area 250 meters long and 40 meters wide - the size of a rather large bridge, say the Elizabeth bridge on the Danube, which is somewhat larger than the Tower Bridge in London. Wait.. does that sound like precision bombing or carpet bombing to you..? I am sure that was impressive, by Bomber Command's stadards, that is... Yet Roma was sunk by a couple of Do 217s with much smaller bombs, and Marat by a handful of Stukas, in a single attack for comparison. It didn't took 3 months, it didn't took giant bombs, or huge amount of effort spent. So I DO question the RAF's capacity about dealing with pinpoint targets.

Certainly they had results, as in their usual pig-headed way, they kept trying and trying and trying, until achieved success or bled dry while trying. But that's not capacity, that's exactly the kind of human wave attack the VVS was supposed to be doing.

I think I can say that they had an unequalled record of destroying the pin pont targets assigned to them.

Sure, its like saying that someone who finishes a single university in 20 years unequalled record of completing his/her studies. After all he/she did complete them in the end?

However you miss the reason why I said Tallboys, they didn't have to hit the target, they were earthquake bombs and a near miss was equally effective.

True, no doubt.

You forget that GA strikes had been going on through 1942 and 1943 with cross channel raids with Typhoons and Whirlwinds

And the point is...?

First I am confident that if they had wanted the A10 it could have been made carrier capable, second, the Harrier can and did operate where control of the air is not assured, the A10 cannot.

Uh, I suggest you look up what role the USMC uses their Harrier IIs. Not on carriers, but on rather small size hybrids of "LST-Carriers": the Wasp class amphibious assault ship. Its a troop ship that can make landing, support the USMC force with ie. medical care, and provide limited air support with six Harriers and a number of helos.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...Wasp_LHD-1.jpg

Do you think that any kind of aircraft, save Harriers and the like can take off from that thing? That's the only reason they use Harriers, they're still better than attack helos. Other than that, Harrier IIs are obviously inferior to A-10 in just about every respect. They are slow, have very limited range, and uhm, no, they don't really have any better A-2-A capabilities, and but the fraction of the A-2-G capabilities of an A-10. They are splendid little things no doubt, and very useful in this purpose. But they have sacrificed a lot to get a very special ability.

So every other country in the world is now down to 12-15, so how many airforces does that leave who don't operate A10/Su25 type aircraft?

Enlighten us - besides the fact that these type of aircraft are extremely popular in South America, for example? Besides the fact that these aircraft were product of Cold War, where everyone was aware that in an armed conflict, they could count on that the Big Brother's A-10s/SU 25s would appear in hundreds above the battlefield?

Also if there is one country in the world that appreciate the need for air support its the Israeli Air Force and what do they use?

Enlighten us. Besides I find it equally puzzling why the USMC and IAF are the final words in the world of GA aircraft. The IAF and IDF weapon procurements are special cases, everybody knows why..

[tcolvin]

Glider, to respond to your questions of May 15.

1. The construction of the Wesel bridges was not the problem. Nor, as Kurfuerst says in Post 140, was it lack of the right ordnance. The problem was 2TAF's lack of an accurate delivery vehicle and/or procedure to deal with Flak. Shores & Thomas state that “all types of bridges could succomb to dive-bombing (they mean glide-bombing) but it required a high degree of accuracy” which of course 2TAF lacked with its glide-bombers. 2TAF's answer was to ask for Heavies that could fly above the Flak, but the B-17s and B-24s failed.
2. “Postwar they plumped for Mediums.” This statement was misunderstood by you. What happened was that a postwar RAF audit decided 2TAF should have used its own Mediums on the Wesel bridges and not relied on the strategic Heavies. The Mediums were even less accurate than Heavies, so it was no real answer.
3. I neither rate nor overrate 2TAF's Flak suppression. 2TAF saw nor need for a Flak suppression capability, relying on aircraft speed rather than armour. Arsenal in this thread has been posting overdue correctives to the predominant RAF opinion. IMHO the RAF should have armoured and up-engined the Fairey Battle while dropping two of its three crew members, to create a British IL-2 that could have done the job of concerted Flak suppression. In the air-superiority environment that existed in NW Europe, the field would then have been clear for the Vengeance dive-bomber. Shores & Thomas would presumably agree with this conclusion, stating that “it was not considered advisable to take on Flak positions in a direct attack unless absolutely necessary as the odds favoured the gunners”. The obvious need was to create a combination of equipment and technique that would move the odds in favour of the attackers, but 2TAF never addressed the problem and thereby showed it was unfit for purpose.
4. You contradict my statement that MGs and PAKs were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing, and you believe a fast in-and-out pass by 4 x 20mms could destroy them. Such an attack might puncture the tyres of a PAK, I suppose, if caught in the open, but entrenched MGs and PAKs needed accurate bombing. Shores & Thomas would seem to agree; “Typical targets for the Spitfires would be strongpoints, dug-in tanks or artillery, while the Mustangs and Typhoons with their ability to carry 1,000lb bombs would also take on more durable or larger targets such as bridges, HQs or communication centres”.
5. I don't need to provide examples of calls for support being declined to justify the statement that 2TAF's Spitfires and Typhoons would not press home attacks against defences heavily defended with infantry weapons. The RAF reserved the right to decide how to respond to calls for support, and losing a Typhoon to an MG42 would not be risked if the support could be delivered outside MG42 range. The ORB wrote up such missions as having been successful simply because ordnance had been carted to the map reference provided by the Army. Accuracy and effectiveness never part featured among their success criteria.
6. Therefore the Typhoon pilot downed by an MG42 was not unlucky but rather had miscalculated. (You state 2TAF's FBs were well-protected against LMGs, but you will have to provide some evidence; eg the Spitfire lacked all armour except the pilot's seat-back). The comparison is between the Typhoon and Spitfire's tentative and rapid in-and-out and no-going-back attack with the slow and methodical triple-run attack of the IL-2 described by Arsenal as being the norm.
7. Hardened defences were beyond 2TAF support. You ask for an example; how about Hillman. 2TAF's weapon of choice was a Medium and not a dive-bomber with a bunker-busting hollow-charge bomb that we discussed above.
8. You ask for specifics about Mediums, but I can't help and neither can Shores & Thomas who exclude Mediums from consideration in their Chapter 12 'Operational Techniques and Tactics”.
9. You are right in general that the Hurricane IV replaced the Hurricane IID, but wrong in implying that this occurred in Europe.
10. The relations between 2TAF and 21AG were flawed at the personal level (Coningham hated Montgomery and the feeling was mutual), at the operational level (decided at nightly meetings at Army/Group level which was far too elevated for effective cooperation at the unit/squadron level), at the relationship level (2TAF was 'in support' and not 'under command' so the Army had to accept the air's ineffectiveness and could never insist on an operation being repeated even when it could be proved to have failed) and at the equipment level since the RAF refused categorically to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft in spite of Army pressure to do so.
11. Slow speed in terms of vulnerability to enemy fighters was not an issue in an environment of air superiority, and nor would it have been an issue if 2TAF had taken seriously its obligation to find a way of suppressing Flak, so your objections to the Vengeance hold no water.

Tony

[glider1]

Again I thank you for the effort that has gone into this. I may not agree with some of it but the effort is appreciated. Taking them one at a time

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Glider, to respond to your questions of May 15.

1. The construction of the Wesel bridges was not the problem. Nor, as Kurfuerst says in Post 140, was it lack of the right ordnance. The problem was 2TAF's lack of an accurate delivery vehicle and/or procedure to deal with Flak. Shores & Thomas state that “all types of bridges could succomb to dive-bombing (they mean glide-bombing) but it required a high degree of accuracy” which of course 2TAF lacked with its glide-bombers. 2TAF's answer was to ask for Heavies that could fly above the Flak, but the B-17s and B-24s failed.

The Issue I had was that you used the Wesel Bridges as an example of the failure of the 2TAF. However they were never attacked by the 2TAF, the 2TAF were never asked to attack them during the battle and in the Air Plan decided before the battle it was assigned to the 8th Airforce so I don't see how it could be seen as a failure of the 2TAF.

1. “Postwar they plumped for Mediums.” This statement was misunderstood by you. What happened was that a postwar RAF audit decided 2TAF should have used its own Mediums on the Wesel bridges and not relied on the strategic Heavies. The Mediums were even less accurate than Heavies, so it was no real answer.

I agree with you that the mediums would not have been sufficient. The Wessel Bridges were exceptional structures and a medium wouldn't have been sufficient

1. I neither rate nor overrate 2TAF's Flak suppression. 2TAF saw nor need for a Flak suppression capability, relying on aircraft speed rather than armour. Arsenal in this thread has been posting overdue correctives to the predominant RAF opinion. IMHO the RAF should have armoured and up-engined the Fairey Battle while dropping two of its three crew members, to create a British IL-2 that could have done the job of concerted Flak suppression. In the air-superiority environment that existed in NW Europe, the field would then have been clear for the Vengeance dive-bomber. Shores & Thomas would presumably agree with this conclusion, stating that “it was not considered advisable to take on Flak positions in a direct attack unless absolutely necessary as the odds favoured the gunners”. The obvious need was to create a combination of equipment and technique that would move the odds in favour of the attackers, but 2TAF never addressed the problem and thereby showed it was unfit for purpose.

As I have said before I would have dropped the battle pre war and replaced them with Skua's. For the 1943-45 period aa defences were such that an armoured Typhoon was in my opinion a very good option. Dive bombers or IL 2 aircraft would have had serious losses. On this we will have to agree to disagree

1. You contradict my statement that MGs and PAKs were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing, and you believe a fast in-and-out pass by 4 x 20mms could destroy them. Such an attack might puncture the tyres of a PAK, I suppose, if caught in the open, but entrenched MGs and PAKs needed accurate bombing. Shores & Thomas would seem to agree; “Typical targets for the Spitfires would be strongpoints, dug-in tanks or artillery, while the Mustangs and Typhoons with their ability to carry 1,000lb bombs would also take on more durable or larger targets such as bridges, HQs or communication centres”.

With the tyres go the crew but you supply the details in your posting. You keep calling a 2TAF fighter bombers glide bombers, a 60 degree dive attack is no glide, I have done similar approaches a number of times in gliders and feel as if you are going straight down. I believe that these are accurate enough but agree a 90 degree dive would be slightly better.
The 2 TAF were as accurate as most, examples include the following attacks XV Armee HQ 23rd October Amsterdam Gestapo HQ November and Rotterdam Gestapo HQ all individual building, if you could hit these then an individual strong point is just as vulnerable.

r support being declined to justify the statement that 2TAF's Spitfires and Typhoons would not press home attacks against defences heavily defended with infantry weapons. The RAF reserved the right to decide how to respond to calls for support, and losing a Typhoon to an MG42 would not be risked if the support could be delivered outside MG42 range. The ORB wrote up such missions as having been successful simply because ordnance had been carted to the map reference provided by the Army. Accuracy and effectiveness never part featured among their success criteria.

I do belive that you need to support this accusation. Of course the RAF reserved the right to have the final say as other things can get in the way such as other missions, availability, weather. I can only repeat that German airfields and shipping were being attacked on the last day of the war, the most heavily protected targets around, to say they were afraid of losing aircraft because of an LMG is beyond the pail.

1. Therefore the Typhoon pilot downed by an MG42 was not unlucky but rather had miscalculated. (You state 2TAF's FBs were well-protected against LMGs, but you will have to provide some evidence; eg the Spitfire lacked all armour except the pilot's seat-back). The comparison is between the Typhoon and Spitfire's tentative and rapid in-and-out and no-going-back attack with the slow and methodical triple-run attack of the IL-2 described by Arsenal as being the norm.

Typhoons were well protected, the modified armour fitted to these was on a par with the Fw190F, Spits were as far as I am aware were not. PS there is a photo of an armoured Typhoon that has crash landed in Shores and Thomas.

1. Hardened defences were beyond 2TAF support. You ask for an example; how about Hillman. 2TAF's weapon of choice was a Medium and not a dive-bomber with a bunker-busting hollow-charge bomb that we discussed above.

Hillman wasn't attacked by the 2TAF, neither was it requested. However I do agree that a hollow charge bomb would have been ideal.

1. You are right in general that the Hurricane IV replaced the Hurricane IID, but wrong in implying that this occurred in Europe.

The 2TAF had one squadron of Hurricanes which was quickly replaced with Typhoons but these were mk IV

1. The relations between 2TAF and 21AG were flawed at the personal level (Coningham hated Montgomery and the feeling was mutual), at the operational level (decided at nightly meetings at Army/Group level which was far too elevated for effective cooperation at the unit/squadron level), at the relationship level (2TAF was 'in support' and not 'under command' so the Army had to accept the air's ineffectiveness and could never insist on an operation being repeated even when it could be proved to have failed) and at the equipment level since the RAF refused categorically to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft in spite of Army pressure to do so.

I certainly agree that Coningham and Monty were at each others throats But the evening meeting was also to ensure that both the RAF and Army knew what was happening the next day/days so plans could be made by both parties. If the Army were asking for something that couldn't be done then that was raised then and adjustments made.

I have never heard of the Army suggesting what aircraft the RAF should be equipped with, have you any example?

1. Slow speed in terms of vulnerability to enemy fighters was not an issue in an environment of air superiority, and nor would it have been an issue if 2TAF had taken seriously its obligation to find a way of suppressing Flak, so your objections to the Vengeance hold no water.

Sorry but on this I firmly believe you are wrong. Slow Speed at low altitude in an unarmoured Vengence after coming out of a dive, is a recipe for disaster, the AA fire would tear you apart. I still feel that you exagerate how easy it is to supress flak, its very difficult.

David