Book on French AF 1939-40?

[The_Catman]

Hi

Thanks Juha, but the book is probably not easy to find.

Reter, your book looks exactly the sort of thing I am looking for, but unfortunatley my interest won't quite reach to the price. I am sure it is excellent value for money to someone with a serious interest in the events and period, but as i have amore casual interest I will have to have a look for it in a couple of years time.

Regards
Alex

[Peter Cornwell]

Alex,

Understood. Try your local Reference Library - it may hold a copy.

[Tango Echo Dog]

Alex
The French Air Force had numerous problems; fragmented command, poor pre-war training which emphasised daylight/fair-weather operations (but then so did the RAF) and a failure to achieve maximum effort, especially the fighter units which rarely seemed to average more than one or two sorties per pilot per day.
The French certainly used a great deal of comint and appear to have had their own Ultra system for they (and the British) had lots of notice of Unternehmen 'P' (Paula). They were helped by poor Luftwaffe signals security in which an Enigma signal clearly stating that Object P was Paris was sent to one Kampfgeschwader. The French also had a form of airborne early warning with Potez 631s tracking enemy bomber formations targeting Paris and providing a running commentry. The British had extended their RDF system into northern France and had begun handing over stations and sets to the French during the spring.
If you really want to know about the French Air Force go to the Chateau de Vincennes and the air force archives. Even if you speak poor French you can get by and the staff are very helpful.
I agree about Invisibles Vainquers and there is a useful background book 'The Forgotten Air Force: French air doctrine in the 1930s' by Anthony Christopher Cain. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington/London, 2002 ISBN 1-58834-010-4 which you might be able to order through your local library. There is a book shop specialising in aviation in Paris with loads of French language books but I have forgotten the name and address. I am sure other members will be able to help you.
Tango Echo Dog

The whole "ULTRA" deciphering activity in Britain, which provided the Allies with incredibly important and useful intelligence, started in Poland thanks to the Polish secret service (I presume) and in particular a young Polish mathematician who was a genius and a member of the team. They had performed all the fundamental and the most important work already when Poland was invaded. They passed the whole thing to the French, who continued the work already 1939 with the help of some Polish experts and kept the British entirely informed, with some British officers taking part in the ongoing work. Numerous German messages were decrypted already albeit they were only a small fraction of the whole coded radio traffic. They probably decrypted some decisive messages on operation "Paula" but I understand at least the French had a well-placed German agent in Luftwaffe headquarters, too (Schmidt; I think he was a relative of LW general Schmidt). Britain certainly had some good agents in Germany too.

When France was invaded too obviously the whole Enigma-business was passed on to the British, who further refined and developed it, hence Bletcheley Park etc.

There is no doubt that all this remarkable activity was started by Polish experts.

You see, it is fully possible to discuss Poland and France at the same time without wholesale insulting a whole country or a whole air force. That's a relief!

Originally Posted by The_Catman

Hi

Are there any decent books about the French Air Force from Sep 39 until the surrender?

(...)

Alex

The_Catman

Well, my dear fellow, if you’re looking for books in English only (which you added later) you ought to have said so in your first post! (It would have saved me a lot of time) It seems that in your eyes a “decent book” can be written in English only, which is a little bit restrictive. Believe me, a few decent books were written in other languages : the “Holy Bible” for example, to name but one, and of course most books on the air war from September 1939 through June 1940, which took place mainly over France and the French-speaking part of the Benelux-countries. There are lots of books in German, French and Dutch : a vast majority! So it is not at all obvious that all decent books would be in English…

There are only very few and those I know are mere booklets having something like 150 to 220 pages of normal size (not the large A4 which is so fashionable now). English books deal almost exclusively with the operations of the British army and with the retreat to and from Dunkerque, a few deal with the other British retreat, after Dunkerque. In most British eyes the French Campaign ended on the very minute when the last British soldier left Dkq. and sailed back to his mummy in order to be consoled after those horrible German soldiers had shot at him (very nasty!). In fact there was a lot of French-German fighting (a little British-German also), in the air too, after June 1, 1940.

An interesting contribution can be read on the Internet (see URL below) :

The French Air Force In 1940



Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics?



Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, USAF (Ret.)

Quote Kirkland : << DURING the Battle of France in May-June 1940, French Army commanders complained that German aircraft attacked their troops without interference by the French Air Force. French generals and statesmen begged the British to send more Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter squadrons to France. Reporters on the scene confirmed the German domination of the skies, and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe came to be accepted as one of the principal causes of the French collapse.
The air force was a convenient scapegoat for the French Army generals who dominated the Vichy regime that ruled France under the Germans. By attributing the defeat of French forces to weakness in the air, the army officers diverted attention from their own failures. Moreover, the Vichy leaders were able to strengthen their claim to legitimacy by blaming the parliamentary regime they had supplanted for failing to provide a sufficient number of aircraft. The Vichy leaders also reproached the British for holding the bulk of their air force in the British Isles. Concurrently, the Vichy army officers used the defeat of the air force to justify abolishing the air ministry and the air force general staff, incorporating their functions into the war ministry and army general staff and returning the air force to its former status as a branch of the army. With the army controlling the postwar sources of information, for many years there was no voice to challenge the official position that France had lost the war because the prewar politicians had not equipped the air force adequately.

Since the mid-1960s, fragments of information--aviator's memoirs, production reports, aircraft inventories, and Anglo-French correspondence--have come to light. These sources reveal four new facts about the French Air Force.

• The French aviation industry (with modest assistance--about 15 percent-from American and Dutch producers) had produced enough modern combat aircraft (4360) by May 1940 to defeat the Luftwaffe, which fielded a force of 3270.2
• The French planes were comparable in combat capability and performance to the German aircraft. >>
• (Etc.) …………………………

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/kirkland.html

Sometimes this author, Kirkland, is all too pro-French, especially about the last days of fighting, which led him to make some wrong statements about the capability of the Armée de l’Air (AA) to prevent defeat :

Kirkland :

<< Could the French Air Force Have
Seized Command of the Air?

(…)

Mastery of the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff began to order its units to fly to North Africa. >>

Of course this last sentence was all too optimistic. The German onslaught could have been be stopped, though, from 10 through 13 May 1940 and also later.

I can only repeat that I recommend an English book very warmly – not for the first time – because it is astoninshingly comprehensive, very informative and very honest ; the few errors are unimportant :

Air War over France 1939-40,
by Robert Jackson
===================================
(see my first reply for details). If you read it entirely – and it is a cheap small book so you need not invest a lot of time or money – you’ll have at least a fundamental, balanced knowledge of this period of air war. It doesn’t include French operations only but all others too : British, Dutch, Belgian and German. It should be fairly easy to find a copy (I purchased a second copy on the Internet for a friend : it was cheap and in excellent condition).

Nonetheless many books dealing with the whole of the French Campaign (10 May-24 June 1940) and often with the “Phoney War” too (3 Sept. 1939-9 May 1940) include airpower and some degree of air operations. If I remember correctly

“To Lose a Battle”, by Alistair Horne, 1969

is quite a decent book and often quoted from, even today. Paperback, approx. Can. $ 10. There are some others, like for example “Blitzkrieg”, by Len Deighton (very cheap in paperback), which certainly includes air operations.

As for “Twelve Days in May”, aka TDIM, published 1995 by Brian Cull (“Brian”) et al, it deals almost exclusively with the fighting performed by the RAF “Hurricanes” based in France before they flew back to mummy too. What you’re looking for is books on the FRENCH Air Force so this once can only disappoint you. In 12 days these RAF Hurricanes claimed 499 victories plus 123 “probables” totalling 622. Not bad (in 12 days only) for a real complement of approx. 100 fighters, taking their losses and replacements into account. This is an average claim of 6.22 victories per existing fighter in 12 days (without the help of radar etc.). At the same rate, during the 83 days of the Battle of Britain from 10 July through 31 September, the fighters of 11 Group – approx. 250 Hurricanes and Spitfires – fighting with the enormous advantages of the radar and radio control system, from airfields which were not threatened by enemy tanks or artillery etc., would have claimed no less than 10,755 victories including the “probables” too (actual German losses were approx. 1,410). In this book the authors lowered the number of actual victories in 12 days over the continent to about 300 “only”. At his rate Fighter Command 12 Group would have won approx. 5,000 (five thousand) actual victories during the same period, July-September.

Chapter IV contains two fairly interesting passages :

[12 May] Page 88 (top of page) ; the Hurricanes attacked very numerous bombers escorted by Me 110s. (…) “To the relief of the fatigued Hurricane pilots, French fighters put in an appearance when Moranes and [Curtiss] Hawks from GC I/5, GC II/2 and GC III/7 supported Hurricanes from 501 Sqn in combating the hordes of German bombers.” Indeed, French fighter pilots were very eager to fight, to win victories for their own personal advantage (glory, promotions, decorations) and, last but not least, to defend their own burning country, which they could clearly see, and their fellow-countrymen against the bombing and machine-gunning hordes. They were quite busy too.

[TDIM too] Page 94 (bottom) : (…) as one historian remarked : “Considering the seriousness of the threat, one does get the impression that the French fighter squadrons, whose pilots were already short of sleep, did not press home their attacks with every ounce of vigour.” [And this after less than 3 days of fighting.]

Strangely this “one historian” does not seem to have a name. Is he too cowardly to sign this particularly disgusting, dirty and above all inaccurate statement? The above statement is typical of the many unjustified insults hurled at 1940 French airmen. How can we be so sure? This is really simple indeed : just look at their losses. Out of approx. 750 fighter pilots serving with the French Air Force 1940, including Poles and Czechs, about 150 were killed in but 5 weeks (the 6th week was almost completely idle). Everybody is in a position to see for himself in the cemeteries all over France (especially North-Eastern France) and Belgium, and even in the NL and Luxembourg. There is no way you can falsify the number of aircrew killed fighting the nazis. The lists of names and grave locations can be found at the historical dept. and in various books including Peter Cornwell’s very recent monster-book (very big, weight not far from 3 kg or 6 lbs, and very useful). These French losses are exactly the same as RAF losses during the Battle of Britain, taking the duration into account, albeit there were approx. twice as many RAF fighter pilots (the many “few”) as with the French Air Force, which means that the latter’s fighter pilots had a loss rate TWICE the British rate in the BoB. Who is chicken? Who is a coward “preferring to drink his vermouth in elegant bars rather than attacking the German bombers which were destroying the city nearby” and “not attacking with every ounce of vigour”? Let us ignore and forget these ludicrous, dirty, never-proved accusations in decent English books and stick to the facts : number of actual victories, losses, French pilots and hundreds of other French aircrew killed fighting the nazi air force etc.

Page 224 of TDIM contains some interesting information :

“The new commander of 60 Wing, Wg Cdr Harry Broadhurst (…) had arrived (…). His first impressions were not good :

“I found that my predecessor had been invalided home with a nervous breakdown and that the three squadrons on the station were without serviceable squadron commanders. To say that chaos reigned would be an understatement (…).”

I never heard such things about French fighter units or wing commanders. No nervous breakdowns, no chaos, just at least one groupe de chasse (corresponding roughly two RAF Sqns) had not one single capitaine (out of at least four) left after the campaign – they all had been killed, or one or two of them possibly wounded, but I think there was no surviving capitaine (flight lieutenant in the RAF).

Page 309 : “few [RAF] squadron commanders led their squadrons in the air.” This is an astounding admission. Chicken? Contrary to this ALL French (and German, and Belgian) sqn commanders (most of the French ones were capitaines, see above) took part in the fighting very actively and flew most missions, so that 30 % of them were killed in 5 weeks ; at this rate none would have been left by September, when the BoB was still in full swing (RAF Sqn Ldrs were not at all exterminated - as far as I know). French commandants (Sqn Leaders) were NOT supposed to fly and fight but to lead mainly on the ground and take care of all the administrative burden and the hated paperwork. In spite of this 30 % of them, too, were killed in combat.

On some other page (which I wasn’t able to find again today) of this same book, “TDIM” (or was it some other book?), we can read that RAF bombers escorted by French fighters were attacked by German fighters “but luckily the French fighters fended off the attack” (or held the 109s at bay). So it seems that they weren’t cowards after all.

Peter Cornwell’s recently published book (released in February I think) “The Battle (sic*) of France Then and Now” obviously is in English and comes close to what you are looking for/needing. It is an enormous monster : 591 large-sized pages, relatively expensive [look at “After the Battle”’s homepage to learn more] but I think it’s worth it. It is essentially a very long list of aircraft and aircrew losses suffered by all waring parties (Italy too, at the hands of the French) with an incredible wealth of detail – day by day from September 2, 1939, through June 24, 1940. Add 2 long alphabetical indexes of person names and locations, a “Roll of Honour” giving the list of all RAF personel killed (no equivalent for other nationalities, which is a pity, but the names and ranks of those killed or wounded are to be found in the main text), the descriptions of half a dozen RAF airfields in France and general information and explanations for every day : 1/2 to 2 pages including some large photographs, two pages for “The Balance Sheet” (loss statistics, in a chart, for every air force, day by day, aircraft DESTROYED (not the damaged ones) and personnel). The book contains very numerous photographs of all kinds (hundreds and hundreds), often very interesting, mainly RAF and LW-AC as victims of the RAF. In spite of a few errors which are not really serious it is a “must-have” if you’re interested in this period. Besides, it’s difficult to separate the French Air Force cleanly from all the others during this period, and conversely. They often were intermingled. For example on many occasions both French and British fighters fought the same German formations, or French fighters escorted British bombers and conversely. French losses were German victories (sometimes British ones) and French victories were German losses (sometimes a few “Battles” or “Blenheims”)…

As for Arnaud Gillet I have the strongest reservations about what he published (in French so this doesn’t mean you). His French is terrible and reveals a very poor education level, which is disquieting for historical work. Numerous photographs show sweet little HIM wearing a ferocious camouflaged jungle-hat which undoubtedly makes a tough commando-warrior out of him. He is very firmly convinced that the firepower of a fighter was the same thing as the number of rounds it carried. If we follow him a 0.25 calibre lady pistol with 6 rounds has twice the firepower of a 360 or 406 heavy navy gun with three rounds. He now insists that a “Hurricane” had a firepower (2,800 machine-gun rounds – acording to HIM!) “over four times higher than a Morane 406”. In fact, according to respected UK-expert Alfred Price’s figures, a Morane’s firepower was 20 % higher than a 1940 Hurricane’s or Spitfire’s and 8 % lower than a Me 109’s, but his criterion (missile weight only) doesn’t take the devastating effect of explosive shells, as compared to simple bullets, into account, nor the French cannon HS 404’s very high muzzle velocity and rate of fire, which were great advantages. (The mediocre German cannon, type MG FF, had both a low muzzle velocity and a low rate of fire, two big flaws in actual air fighting). In his last volume (published 2008, a few months ago) he called “liars” and “Vichy-propagandists” all those who (in the past or also today) dared publish any French victory figures not complying with His Supreme and Definitive Very Low Results. I wonder what gives him (a beginner) the right to call other authors names. Most of them are very experienced and/or included numerous first-hand reports and personal accounts from veterans, some of them took part in the 1940 fighting. This person’s results and conclusions are extremely doubtful – I personally deem them squarely erroneous – and ALL known French experts including Jean-Yves Lorant (and others too of course) expressed strong reservations. In one word, I would not rely on what this guy wrote as best he could in his poor French. He did the right thing when he searched the archives in France, Germany and England but, unfortunately, he obviously has not got the right stuff to publish own ideas which make sense. The photographs and original documents (primary sources) are interesting, though.

I regret I was forced to add this negative opinion – contrary to my original plan - by a very positive post above. Too bad : otherwise I wouldn’t have mentioned it at all.

To sum up: what you want is (one) book(s) IN ENGLISH on the 1939-40 French Air Force. They are FEW and FAR BETWEEN. So few! Here is my advice : 1. Air War over France, by Robert Jackson. 2. The Battle (sic) of France Then and Now (2008), by Peter Cornwell, if you can afford it. You can! You’re lucky it’s a very recent work and a good one. 3. Blitzkrieg, by Len Deighton, and To Lose a Battle, by Alistair Horne (both are cheap paperbacks).

Just my opinion!
====================================
* Actually it deals with the Phoney War (Sept.-May 9) and the French Campaign (May 10-June 24) including the Battle of France (the last phase of the campaign : June 5-24). The Phoney war was, in every respect, an entirely different period of the war. Obviously most of the book is devoted to the FC for aerial activity was much higher : for ex. of 1,814 German aircraft destroyed 1,460 (80 %) were lost during the FC. Many losses suffered by all countries during the Phoney War were accidents caused by bad weather, much less so, in percentage, in May-June 1940.

[FalkeEins]

..I wondered whether you'd quote from Kirkland and his 'work' - most sensible French commentators wouldn't of course...and while British authors haven't written extensively on the air battle for France, the events that led to Dunkirk have been thoroughly researched - try Sebag-Montefiore's recent large tome for an account of the (French) mismanagement and indecision that led to their Allies bailing out...let's face it, they had even acquired the German war plans, yet failed to take any counter- action! We agree about Jackson's book, but it is about time that more up-to-date research was exploited in English, including Gillet's - which is where Peter's work comes in..

The only reason why I mentioned Kirkland is that his article is in ENGLISH as demanded by him who started this thread. Contrary to what you seem to think a lot of what Kirkland wrote does make a lot of sense. It is true, for example, that after an incredible defeat ON THE GROUND (a scandalous army defeat) the French Air Force was used, by the army generals who were the main culprits but were appointed by Pétain as top commanders of all French forces (except Gamelin), as a scapegoat to get rid of any responsibility in the defeat. Virtually everything was the Armée de l'Air's fault.

It is interesting to know that from 1933 (when Hitler came to power) through 1940 the French army and navy commanders were incensed at every single centime spent on the Air Force, on these glamorous fancy "acrobats". They fought bitterly to prevent the Armée de l'Air from receiving any money at all, if possible - or only for recce. Only their own recce and close recce aircraft and a few fighters for their protection interested them. Accordingly French bombers were precious few in May 1940 (but this changed rapidly) and there were not enough fighters to face approx. 3,500 aircraft actually engaged by Germany. Together, the Allies could engage about as many fighters as Germany so they were about even BUT Germany deployed 1,120 twin-engined bombers plus 342 "Stukas" which suffered appalling losses at the hands of Allied fighters, mainly French, and Allied AAA, but there were simply too many - not Stukas but twin-engined ones.

I wouldn't simply discard Kirkland and I have been working on this very subject for 30-40 years (which admittedly doesn't make me unfallible). We should read his contribution, and many others, carefully.

A very true remark has been made often by historians : in the 1940 French Campaign (only) the Germans had got a very big, very "unfair" advantage : according to Hitler's and Göring's nazi methods and habits they risked everything at once, no matter the cost, in an effort to force a quick and definitive decision. The Allies never had the stomach to do such a thing, they always wanted reserve forces, thought of a "long war" and husbanded with their air forces, especially the UK. Germany won (this time only) - at a high cost for the Luftwaffe but to them this didn't matter. What did was the result. They all were convinced that after their incredible success the war was over, that they had won ; most people all over the world believed this too.

It should not be forgotten that the key to the 1940 German success was the big breakthrough at Sedan, across a rather big and wide river (the Meuse) mainly with 7 of the 10 German armoured divisions! This operation was incredibly risky : it was simply madness. No reasonable C-i-C would have accepted these terrible hazards but Adolf Hitler was not reasonable, he was a fanatic and a lunatic. Nonetheless he had foreseen that the French would be too slow and not react properly in time. So to speak, the French moved on foot when the Germans attacked with fast vehicles at 30 mph or so. Too bad Hitler was so right. If the French generals, mainly Huntziger and Georges, had reacted simply in a normal way (without needing to be military geniuses) the German forces would have been stopped in their tracks BEFORE crossing the Meuse and they would have suffered appalling losses, their offensive would have been dead by 14 May... This same Huntziger became the French C-i-C after the defeat!

To sum up, this unique German victory was the result of a madman's gambling. It worked fine this time, afterwards it didn't... All discussions about the respective air forces etc. are very interesting but the German victory was won on the ground, mainly with ten armourded divisions deploying about 1,000 real tanks plus 2,000 small, vulnerable tankettes (the French alone had got 3,300 real tanks, all with a good armour and most of them with a good gun). The German air force supported the army and made their victory quicker and easier but it didn't win the French Campaign : the German army did, mainly thanks to a crazy attack plan which worked.

May I repeat once more that even 1944-45, in spite of their fantastic air superiority and - as a whole - good strategy and tactics, the western allies and the USSR still needed millions of men on the ground and tens of thousands of tanks etc. to win the war in Europe. They would not have achieved this with their aircraft alone.

[Ruy Horta]

Grozibou

On a side note, have you read The Republic in Danger - General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French Defence, 1933-1940, by Martin Alexander? Curious about your thoughts if you did. Have a copy, but unfortunately still unread.

No I haven't but I can try very hard!

[Brian]

Here we go again!

Hi Grozibou - nice name but why are you hiding behind this nickname when you call other 'historians' whose names are not revealed, "cowardly, disgusting, dirty and inaccurate?" You appear to be extremely self opinionated - or is this just my impression? And some of your language is extremely childish and insulting - "flew back to mummy" for example. Implying that because some RAF squadrom commanders did not lead their squadrons into battle meant they were "chicken" comes out of comic books.

Are you a professional historian?

Perhaps you are. I am certainly not, and I doubt whether many of those who have contributed are. But we are all keen amateur historians (I have been fortunate in having some of my work published) - interested in the air war for various reasons - and if we didn't make our contribution, we would have to accept the opinions of others - perhaps even yours!

You mention my TDIM - OK, it's not 100% accurate in the light of more recent research, but it was researched and written in the late 1980s/early 1990s, and did offer an insight to how the RAF Hurricane pilots fared in the fighting during those fatal/vital twelve days. Probably the first English language book to achieve this, but that's all. That's what I set out to do, with the help of my contributors. It was not an account of the Battle of France and wasn't intended to be.

The latest offerings have access to material that was not available to me - that's called prgress. Personal opinons expressed were not mine, but of those who were involved. They were contemporary feelings and sentiments. Why delete them? Political correctness?

I anticipate a broadside from a proud Frenchman (?) but I am always up for a fight, being a proud Englishman!

Cheers
Brian