B-29 bombing missions to Hokkaido Island

[Stig Jarlevik]

Scott

I cannot locate a single source giving details about any B-29 missions to Sapporo either on
the 14th or 15th of July 1945.

Very odd details indeed.

I also agree with Martin that the loads vs number of aircraft etc just don't make any sense.

Cheers
Stig

[twocee]

Vol. 5 of the official Army Air Forces WWII History has a list of incendiary raids on secondary Japanese cities. It shows no such attacks anywhere for 14 and 15 July, and no such attacks at any time on Hokkaido cities.

[R Leonard]

Originally Posted by 25Kingman49

https://pacificwrecks.com/provinces/japan_sapporo.html
It appears the only source for these two B-29 missions to Sapporo on 14 & 15 July 1945 is Pacific Wrecks, normally a reliable source. However they ‘Pacific Wrecks’ do not site their source(s) so this content is little better than uncorroborated hearsay. If anyone here has contact with Pacific Wrecks perhaps a source citing could be requested for this content, or failure of that a retraction this Sapporo content altogether on their web site.

You could, of course, click where it says "Submit Info" at the top and ask them yourself.

[25Kingman49]

Thanks for your suggestion. request summitted.
https://pacificwrecks.com/provinces/japan_sapporo.html
What is the Pacific Wrecks source for this content relative to two B-29 bombing missions to Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan on 14 & 15 July 1945?
Now lets see if they respond.

[25Kingman49]

By the way. If anyone else here wishes to contact Pacific Wrecks relative to this Sapporo, Hokkaido content please do so. More than one voice requesting this content and fact based source may result in a more rapid and complete response by Pacific Wrecks. Thanks in advance to all for your continued support this topic.

[RSwank]

Scott,

On the Sapporo website which talks about the 14/15 July Air Raids here:
https://www.city.sapporo.jp.e.ain.hp..._21/index.html
I looked at link 11 (on the right side) which was an attack on Shiraishi railway station:
https://www.city.sapporo.jp.e.ain.hp..._11/index.html
The wording is interesting as talks about locomotives “shot by machine guns”. This sounds like a low level staffing attack (probably by navy carrier planes). This might imply that the 14/15 July attack on Sapporo was just the navy attack on those dates mentioned earlier. No B-29s involved.


Unfortunately, I then found this map (click it to enlarge) which shows where the various navy units (planes and ships) attacked at the end of the war. Note there are no navy attacks on Sapporo shown on any dates.
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/...ages/p_127.jpg

[25Kingman49]

Thank you, Rolland.
Most interesting indeed, and the map you found seems to support content here
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/...hron-1945.html where as USN forces were concentrating their attacks on the southern end of Hokkaido it appears due to bad weather in the region.
This further begs the question of who bombed Sapporo so significantly. It is beginning to look like 20th Air Force B-29s were not the attacking force. However if not them then who beyond the USN had the reach to bombard this city? The mystery continues.

[twocee]

On 15 July aircraft from TF38 attacked targets in the Otaru/Ishikari areas, close to Sapporo. Presumably these attacks are what the website is referring to.

As regards the B-29s, I should think it extremely unlikely that Army bombers would have been allowed to operate in an area under attack by TF38. No doubt there was a demarcation agreement covering the Northern Honshu/Hokkaido strikes.

[RSwank]

George,

The TF38 attacks July 15 on Otaru/Ishikari you mentioned would show that the navy strike map I found is incomplete and there were navy attacks close to Sapporo.

It think it is possible that there may not have been any B-29 attacks on Sapporo or even Hokkaido during the war.


This is an article about the "Longest" B-29 bombing mission which went from Guam to Akita:

https://www.pacaf.af.mil/News/Articl...ended-on-guam/

Akita is in northern Honshu.

[R Leonard]

From a report by CDR C E A Owens, RN, liaison officer with TF-8 staff to the commander of the BPF date 26 Aug 1945:

19. On July 14th despite distinctly unfavourable weather, TF 38 launched strikes against Northern Honshu and Hokkaido from a position approximately 80 miles from Land. Fog unfortunately covered the primary airfields, but the coast line and a few airfields near it were clear and the damage caused to shipping was worthy of note. A total of 76 ships of 41,000 tons were sunk and 100 ships of 58,000 tons were damaged, these included all 7 ferries in the Railroad Ferry System between Hokkaido and Honshu a most valuable prize. The above figures include the following:

SUNK
5 Medium Cargo Vessels
7 Small Cargo Vessels
4 Train Ferries
1 DE
1 Patrol Craft
28 Luggers
27 Small Craft

DAMAGED

7 DE
3 Train Ferries
1 Large Cargo Vessel
7 Medium Cargo Vessels
6 Small Cargo Vessels
6 Small Oilers
15 Small Freighters
38 Luggers

20. Weather hampered operations considerably against airfields, but nevertheless 27 aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 40 damaged in the air no opposition was encountered, but 2 Betty’s to shadow the Force and were turned away before sighting by the CAP, one being shot down.

21. Poor visibility at the Force caused cancellation of strikes after 1300. A total of 336 tons of bombs were dropped and 1800 rockets fired. Our losses were 13 Aircraft shot down and 11 lost operationally.

22. The flying off position on the 15th on July had been altered 30 miles to the SE in order to be in warmer waters where there was less probability of fog. Even so, conditions were again poor, both at the carriers and in the target area, but fortunately the coast line was clear in places and again Japanese shipping suffered considerably - 17 ships of 30,000 tons being sunk and 13 ships of 18,600 tons damaged. Many land targets were hit and the toll of locomotives for the 2 days rose to 84 exploded and 41 damaged. 10 A/C in combat and 7 operationally were lost, but only 6 pilots. Lack of Air Sea Rescue facilities in the way of lifeguard submarines and Dumbos mad necessary the abandoning of 3 pilots shot down near Otaru.

23. While the air operations were in progress the surface ships were also enjoying themselves, two bombardments by heavy ships and one cruiser and destroyer sweep taking place. The results of indirect fire bombardments were each carried out in daylight by 3 battleships and a cruiser division against the steel works at Kamaishi and Muroran were on the whole disappointing Photographic evidence showing that only 9% and 1% of roof damage respectively, had been done to the targets. On the whole the lack of damage was due to bad air spotting under difficult conditions which led the ships to believe at the time that their salvoes were falling on the target. CTF’s 38 Staff, although realizing the moral effect of a ship bombardment both to the fleet and to those at the receiving end, were of the opinion that the dispersal of strength and the complications they entailed to any strike program made them unproductive specially as it was considered that more damage could have been inflicted to these plants by the total CAP flown to cover these three groups during their absences for TF38, that is 120 fighters sorties each carrying a 1000 lb bomb. The cruiser and destroyer sweep on the night of 13-114 July close in shore between latitudes 40 and 41 North in an area which had been covered by strike aircraft, drew the expected blank. Good ship recognition saved a heavy attack on the Bombardment group bombarding Muroran, as for an unexplained reason, one large strike suddenly saw them through the clouds when they had no idea friendly ships were in the area.

24. In the evening of July 15th, TF 38 retired to the fueling rendezvous where next day all ships were fueled and re-armed in readiness for the two day strikes in the Tokyo area. TF 37 less Indefatigable, was in the fueling area and joined Third Fleet. That morning a meeting was held in Missouri which was attended by the staffs, of TF 37, TF 38 and ACI to clear up any outstanding points and was a great success. As expected TF 37, under tactical control of Commander Third Fleet was stationed 12 miles on the Northern flank of the 3 groups of Task Force 38 and for all intents and purposes acted as the 4th Task Group of Task Force 38, but to keep within the law all signals to CTF 37 made by CTF 38, were repeated and not addressed to him. No difficulties were foreseen or expected in working together except the tightness of TF 37's fueling arrangements.

End of extract