Vengeance vs Typhoon, and associated matters

[Jim Oxley]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

No, but if you read the campaign histories you will find that the advance was slower than expected (and planned) because of the tendency of the leading units to stop upon reaching opposition and call up the fighter-bombers.

I'm sorry Graham but that view shows very little understanding of the difficulties and challenges confronting the Allied armies, especially the British, in their battles in Normandy. And is a great injustice to those men who served in that campaign.

I highly recommend that you read "Decision In Normandy, The Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign", by Carlo D'Este. D'Este is a retired US Army Colonel and, unlike many, actually provides a very reasoned and balanced view of all participants involved in the Normandy campaign.

He's quick to point the finger of blame where it's warranted (at all levels), but also looks into, and analyses, the reasons why the battle didn't go as planned. By both sides. And one aspect that he highlights with many specific examples is the less than successful efforts of 2nd TAC and the 9th AF in their support of the ground forces. In most cases due to inaccuracy, not effort.

It was a case of constant friction between Army and Air Force leaders throughout the campaign. It was only following the final breakout into the more open plains south of Paris that air support became a significant contributor, when distance and space lent themselves to the fighter bomber tactical smother approach.

[RodM]

Jim Oxley; Oh dear Rod, that's very easy as it's all on public record!

Hi Jim,

thanks for that, yes it is proof of the first part of the original statement that you highlighted - it does clearly show that the AM wanted to suppress to positive aspects of the dive bombers performance, but I would've thought (and stand to be corrected) that scrapping of the Vengeances was either (i) a condition of the lend-lease agreements, or (ii) a simple matter of economics when dealing with the disbandment of Far Eastern air units, rather than specifically to 'hide' the success of a particular aircraft. As to the other parts of the original statement, I doubt that anyone can find proof positive. There is no truth like half-truth...

I freely admit to being out of my comfort zone, in terms of knowledge, but it appears to me that the AM made a decision to base CAS upon existing types ('fighter-bomber') in the European theatre, because of reasons that are not completely unreasonable - economics and survivability (I don't doubt the accuracy of such aircraft, I just doubt their ability to survive more than a couple of missions. The RAFs experience in this latter regard between 1939-43 is well known). I might add that as far as I can tell, the Americans took the same line in Europe and used ex-fighter types.

While with hindsight, we have the luxury to argue the pros and cons of the decisions made. Our modern-day conclusions are not tested on the fields of battle. The decision to deploy any dive bomber in Europe would have had to be have been made at a time well before the Allies actually gained air superiority, yet the criticisms of the AM's decision are based upon the assumption that a dive bomber would clearly have been a success in European skies. Had the RAF gone with a dive bomber in 1941-43, and the aircraft got shot out of the skies (and I see no reason why it would not have), then this would be just another argument about how the RAF failed to follow an American lead and use fighter-bombers.

Frankly, I think that the AM's decision not to deploy a dive bomber in Europe is insignificant compared to, say, a lack of foresight with respect to the development of a long-range fighter and continuing to bomb the residential centres of German cities in 1945.

Cheers

Rod

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Jukka Juutinen

Very much disagree. And since when did the "ultimate weapon", according to zillions of Aeroplane Monthly articles, 60 lb rocket, become capable "penetrating whatever thickness of armour it was presented with"? Are you seriously claiming that it could e.g. penetrate 100 mm of armour?

I've read that the solid shot RP was tested on German tanks and found not to be satisfactory at piercing armour (it was used against U-boats though). However, the 60 lb RP had a very satisfactory shock effect on tanks, i.e. the damage it did was not dependent on penetration. The shock of the explosion could damage negine mountings or knock sighting optics out of alignment for example.

[Juha]

Hello Jim
IIRC, I wasn’t unduly impressed by “Decision In Normandy, The Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign", by Carlo D'Este and IIRC read only parts of it. It seems that I have no recollection of D’Este’s arguments. It’s rather long time ago when I last time looked the book. So, did he wrote that Allied lacked a proper dive-bomber? I asked this because in British sector German front line was within RN artillery range almost the whole time of the slow advance of Allieds. And that situation was because the decision of Hitler, against the will of his generals, who were very impressed by naval firepower and wanted to withdraw their troops southwards outside the range of RN guns. Now I cannot think what dive-bomber could do but naval guns with aerial spotters couldn’t. What was D’Este’s opinion?

Juha

[Jim Oxley]

Rod,

The whole argument of a specific aircraft for use as a dive bombing dates back to the late 20's, early 30's. The RAF was fighting for it's very existence as a seperate entity as opposed to merely an arm of the Army. Many generals, who at that time controlled the War Office, still saw the RAF in an extended role of that played by the RFC in the Great War ie army co-op and support.

The RAF wanted it's own specific role, and from that desire grew the whole concept of bombing as both the main arm of the service and the way to win future wars. From that position the RAF never deviated. And thats basically (in a very simplified manner) why the RAF so ardently resisted the concept of the dive bomber.

The same attitude also prevailed within the USAAF, which Arnold was fighting strongly to present as an independant force - a battle that wasn't won until after WWII.

The concept of the fighter bomber developed through the RAF's need to project force into Europe in 1941/2, when medium bombers were limited to bascially Blenheims and Bostons - aircraft that could not survive on their own. Modifying fighters to carrying bombs eg Hurricanes, helped fill that role. But in the eyes of the RAF they still were fighters first and foremost. Readily available in numbers, they were in fact the natural progression of a strike aircraft from that of the dive bomber. What they lost in accuracy they more than made up in volume.

Juha,

Interstingly D'Este does not draw any comparisons between fighters bombers and dive bombers. Fighter bombers were the aircraft available, so it was their performance that he analysed. That's what I like about his analysis of the Normandy campaign. He only looksat what was available to the opposing sides - he doesn't deal in "what-if's".

[RodM]

Hi Jim,

thank you for that interesting clarifications. Other than the dive bomber issue, it seems that the powers-that-be could have done more to improve the accuracy of delivery of the existing fighter-bomber platforms, but then, I guess, at the time of D-Day, quantity of delivery became more important than quality of delivery.

Cheers

Rod

[Juha]

Hello Jim
after reading your answer I read a couple short traces from D’Este’s book. The description of terrain and of the use of it by Germans was good but standard. Bocage just was very good terrain for defender and very bad for attacker, especially for tank-heavy attacker, was it Allied with Shermans or Cromwells or German with Pz IVs and Pz Vs. And Germans used it cleverly by dispersing its troops to small groups which were unprofitable targets for artillery and air power. And East of the real bocage the villages were so near each other that they formed excellent grid of fortifications. This all is well known to those who are studied Normandy campaign and I cannot see how dive-bombers had helped in any marked way.
On the other hand the events leading to decision to withdraw 22 Arm.Br. from Hill 174 and Tracy-Bocage is well told and analyzed.
So I agree with you that D’Este’s book is a good introduction to Normandy land campaign with all its difficulties.

Juha

[DavidIsby]

1. The specification that led to the Avro Manchester required a dive-bombing capability (remember that next time we deride the He-177).
2. The world could use a study of the USAAC/USAAF relationship with divebombing, which ranged from scorn to frantic embrace (orders of large numbers of A-24/A-25/A-31 etc.) to limited operational use (A-24s throughout the Pacific in 42-43, Kenney ordering A-31s out of Fifth Air Force, successful use of the few A-36s in the MTO and CBI in 43).
3. The issue of keeping the aircraft out of the fragmentation range of bomb was also key and became more so as you moved to lower drag aircraft and those without dedicated dive brakes. The USN and USMC in particular lost a fair number of WW2 veterans this way in Korea.

[Franek Grabowski]

Well, I am wondering that it could be actually a more complicated issue. Certainly, RAF as an independent force did not want to go under Army control again, but it somewhat did, forming TAFs. At the time, a new design was just impossible, but there is indeed a valid question about Vengeance.
Then, there is a question of responsibility, as if RAF leadership proven wrong, some of them certainly would have been sacked.
Another issue is of business-political nature - British manufacturers certainly were not that very fond of Lend-Lease, as it reduced placed orders for production. The fact is that several (not all) British designs were either out of concept or completely outdated and production stopped as alternative appeared. Many of minor manufacturers then turned for licence production, major overhauls and similar, not very profitable jobs. Appearance of a new US design both reduced production and was an excellent example of somewhat black PR - another excellent US type, that proves American production is better than British.
Then, there is another related question - which of British manufacturers was able to make a design and make a series of modern dive bombers back in 1930s? All major manufacturers were busy with their designs. Minor ones lacked technologies and production force (or whatever it is called). Having in mind this and all the above, how would you explain that to politicians?
As Ronald Reagan once said, politician is second oldest profession of the world, and actually not very different.