Book on French AF 1939-40?

Originally Posted by Brian

Here we go again!

Hi Grozibou - nice name but why are you hiding behind this nickname when you call other 'historians' whose names are not revealed, "cowardly, disgusting, dirty and inaccurate?"

Sorry but I really can't give you a full reply now. Perhaps later (?). I hope you'll admit that my contributions to this thread ar fairly long and voluminous already - some people certainly are going to add "awfully long and boring, terrible".

To answer the above question I can tell you :

(1. about myself and my nickname) that virtually everybody here, except perhaps the most recent "members", knew at once that my real name is Yves Michelet. A few short remarks or "smileys" added by some other guys show this fairly clearly. I could have replied that Grozibou, "Big Owl" or even "Fat Owl", is the most dignified and accurate name I could find. A lot of people here use far less transparent nicknames including such monsters as "dr9dong" or some. Why not ABC or XYZ. Nobody ever protested this anonymity. Once more I am unique (I am used to this) insofar as in some people's eyes I am the only person not authorised (at least by you) to use a nickname instead of his own one. "Brian" is not that clear either, Mr. Brian Cull. There are lots of Brians so you could be anybody. I saw one in (I think) the first "Police Academy" film, a young schoolboy who refuses to go to school and a horrible brat : Brian too. Luckily police officer Tuckleberry (?) knew how to deal with him and he went to school all right. You ought to do the same thing : you'd learn a lot of useful stuff.

(2. about << other 'historians' whose names are not revealed, "cowardly, disgusting, dirty and inaccurate?" >> ) Firstly, it was ONE historian not "historians". Let us be exact please. Yes I confirm my opinion entirely. I criticised ONE such filthy fellow, only ONE, whose anonymous statement was printed in your book "Twelve Days in May". He who insults a whole category of soldiers from a certain country - here French fighter pilots - in a hypocritical, cowardly way ("It seems...") - without having the guts to sign his own statement is a coward. He who reproduces this in a "historical", serious-looking book (I don't know who it was, there are 3 names on the dust-jacket) is unserious and dirty himself because it is dirty to wholesale insult other people anonymously. Everybody who is even just a little aware of history knows perfectly well that such wholesale judgements and insults ALWAYS are totally wrong, including "All Germans are Nazis". A few real cases, IF ANY, are not a rule and don't justify such dirty statements, which meant even the 195 or so French fighter pilots (Paul Martin's figure of 186 in his 2nd edition, plus a few others from local "chimney flights" etc.) who lost their lives fighting nazi Germany. With the exception of the Poles they were the very first to do so - but the Poles had been attacked so they fought back (gallantly), whereas the French, who were not involved in the Polish war, declared war on Germany because it had attacked Poland : there is a difference. Almost all of them (about 160) were killed within 5 weeks of fighting during the French Campaign in May-June 1940. At this rate they all would have been dead by September. Had RAF Fighter Command been exterminated by September 1940 yet? I never heard such a terrible thing (thanks God, Dowding and Park!). We already had a similar discussion, here at TOCH, on unclever and inaccurate wholesale insults aimed at a certain category or nationality, like (in the preceding thread) Italian soldiers, who "were the bravest I had under my command", or something of this kind (general Erwin Rommel's opinion).

Besides, the mentioned, dirty, anonymous statement - "... it seems that French fighter pilots did not press home their attacks with every ounce of energy" is particularly stupid and it was a serious error to print it except, of course, if it expressed your own opinion but in this case you ought not to have hidden behind "an historian" (Mr. X). It is stupid because, as I underlined often already, including in this very thread, RAF pilots had exactly the same number of people killed during the BoB, taking the different duration into account. Nevertheless RAF fighter pilots were twice as numerous as their French colleagues and brothers in arms, so that the French KIA-rate was twice as high as the RAF one. So : who was not brave enough? Who was not eager to fight? Certainly not the French! Not the Britishers either : they fought for their country too, they obeyed orders too and they often lost their lives.

I would particularly like to draw your attention on the fact, an INDISPUTABLE fact,

that I often wrote on these questions, including in two books I published on WW II : "Les premiers et les derniers", by Adolf Galland (I translated it and added 100 pages of annexes, explanations and comments), in English "The First and the Last" (a very poor English translation, by the way), and "Invisibles vainqueurs" on the French Air Force 1939-40, by Paul Martin and myself; being the publisher I didn't mention my name as a co-author (50 % of the contents plus obviously the flamboyant title!) too,

BUT I never retaliated in kind - in fact I never even THOUGHT of doing so - after all the criticism and the incredible insults hurled at the French for nearly 70 years by mainly British, or rather English, people, like world-star Peter Townsend, a princess' dream, who had become a real cover-boy in France, where he lived (Paris-Match, Historia and many more popular magazines-covers). So I never even suggested that RAF fighter pilots or other aircrew, or other British soldiers including infantrymen, were chicken, were cowards etc. even though they took to their heels at Dunkerque and elsewhere, all along the French coast down to the Spanish border in the South (and the dumb French helped them as best they could and always were the rearguard making these reembarkments possible in the first place, including at Dunkerque). Never ever. Quite on the contrary I underlined at every opportunity that they were "brave" and "as brave as any" and I am still of this opinion.

This is one of the few things which make the difference between myself and an average English author (some are perfectly all right). According to Peter Townsend in his modest book "Duel of Eagles", published in France (in Paris I think) there were no brave Frenchmen 1940 (only roughly 90,000 were killed in 6 weeks, three times the WW I-rate, as compared to approx. 3,000 British soldiers, 30 times less) . Townsend certainly knew what he was talking about : he never took part in the fighting over "the continent" in May-June 1940 so he obviously was an expert at French fighter pilots (whom he libelled very heavily) in particular! He had been spending these months -as a fighter pilot - at a safe place, far beyond the sea, in England, and never heard or saw any Me 109-cannon fired in anger - and never experienced any Flak-fire - before the BoB so he was the most competent man in the world to write on what happened in and around France in May-June 1940 and hurl wholesale insults at the whole French nation and population. Many French people dislike or even hate the British, yes (there are ALWAYS such problems between neighbours, like Mexico and the USA, Germany and Poland, Italy and France, England and Scotland, Poland and Russia etc.), but I never read or heard one single French statement on the British as insulting as millions of British statements on the French. Clearly the British "race" (!) is vastly superior, which gives its members a special right to insult others.

Originally Posted by Brian

You mention my TDIM - (...) It was not an account of the Battle of France and wasn't intended to be.

Well, even though I am a brain-amputated French fool I was aware of this fact, I had noticed. My copy of TDIM, like dozens of other German, English and French books on WW II*, especially on the 1940 French Campaign, is on the shelf close to me and I only need to stretch out my arm to grab it, which I quite often do - a horrifying experience but I, too, am a brave man (it's easy to be when you've got no brain). This explains that I am able to give very exact quotations from it.

* The only way to be well-informed - and not one-sidedly like most British authors - is to read them all if possible (all which have been published), or as many as possible. This means having an excellent command of three languages (4 if we include Dutch) : Fench (after all it was the French Campaign...), German (the most important language for it is hardly disputable that Germany played a major part in this campaign) and English, last and least for the British part in the 1940 French Campaign was a sideshow : they came and they left! (Can you imagine : those naughty German soldiers shot at them! This was outrageous!). This is confirmed by the respective losses in combat (excluding losses aboard ships sailing back to England) suffered by all waring parties. So English in fact really is the least important language (about the BoB it's exactly the reverse) but obviously virtually all British authors are unable, and they wouldn't dream of, reading even one single page of a French book on military operations, which does not prevent them from knowing everything better, being aware of everything and writing great, sweeping, resounding historical statements like "The Luftwaffe swept the French Air Force from the sky at once" (the truth is very exactly the contrary of this nonsense : "The Luftwaffe FAILED to...") and of course the famous "French fighter pilots were not eager to fight... had no guts... ate lunch instead of taking off to fight... drank their vermouth in elegant bars whereas German bombers destroyed the nearby city... didn't press home their attacks*..." and on and on, all this being to be found in highly scientific, historical English books).

Those who allow themselves to publish judgements on 1940 French soldiers without having read at least 20 books in French (not translated) on this subject are quite simply crooks for they commit a fraud. They get paid for a book containing nonsense. All right - some other people do this too.

* Well, at least (quote) "it seems that" they did attack and "even" possibly opened fire at the German aircraft- that was better than nothing.

[Ruy Horta]

ORDER....ORDER

Gentlemen, lets not pursue this debate on a personal level. As I've asked before, and repeated more than once, this debate is too interesting too be spoiled by insult. Passion should not stand in the way of constructive and I'd like to add friendly debate.



I hope that it is possible for the participants to shake hands and continue in a constructive manner.

Originally Posted by Brian

Implying that because some RAF squadrom commanders did not lead their squadrons into battle meant they were "chicken" comes out of comic books.

You didn't get it (to be clear for non-English native speakers : you didn't understand). This was IRONY. It was really harmless indeed after all the British insults the French had to endure for over 68 years, including "there were no brave French people 1940" (Peter Townsend in "Duel of Eagles"). It meant : "Were RAF Sqn Ldrs possibly as devoid of courage as the French?" (who had 30 % of their number killed in action in 5 weeks). If they had been 100 % of them would have been dead by October at the latest (this takes the lull 25 June-10 July into account). Were they?

[Ruy Horta]

Small correction, Townsend quotes Sholto Douglas. I've got (and read) his two part autobiography and I can get a full quote of the events if need be. Overal Douglas is very positive about the french. Townsend can only be criticized for quoting without double checking the events.

Many thanks for this Ruy. Who typed these long quotations? You? It must have been a lot of work! So thanks again - much obliged. Said quotations are very interesting.

I am really sorry but I can't reply in detail today, not to Nick Beale's post either, which I regret : I have the tax office on my tail and I MUST do something about it - in particular that hated paperwork. Rats!

It seems clear that they really meant June 3, 1940. As I already explained several times I consider this impossible. You don't round up any top-ranking generals and admirals to an airfield on the very day you know the Huns are going to bomb that same airfield! This is absolutely hair-raising. Any airfield was a most dangerous place anyway during the war. Darlan was the Commander-in-Chief of the whole French navy (it was much smaller than the British navy but much bigger than the German one, with six battleships, 60 good submarines (twice the German sub force), 1 aircraft carrier, many cruisers and destroyers etc. and more of these being made, under Darlan's top responsibility too : several fast battleships and several aircraft carriers, etc. - this work was stopped by the armistice). Vuillemin was the C-i-C of the French Air Force. I think nobody can imagine that these four most important men would have gathered under falling German bombs just for fun. Possibly S. Douglas mixed up different days when he wrote this (such errors will happen often).

In any case it is a FACT that no French fighter unit was based at Villa on June 3. If really 3 fighters took off these were the airfield's own protection fighters (so-called local flights or "chimney flights") for several important aircraft factories were situated at or near Villacoublay and the new AC were test-flown there : Breguet (Br 693 / 695), LeO (LeO 451), possibly more. Nevertheless there was no local defence flight at Villa, probably because several well-armed fighter airfields were situated around Paris. Often the few defending fighters were flown by local test pilots (one of them, having started from Châteauroux or Bourges, won a victory flying a prototype fighter - as a civilian! Probably a very rare occurence in WW II.) Of course it is quite possible that some fighters were parked there, in particular awaiting repair of battle damage. The Morane-Saulnier factory of Puteaux was not far away and the new AC were flight-tested there (at Villa), but MS 406-production was being phased out : the Armée de l'Air received 7 in April, 10 in May and the last 4 in June. During the same months they received 371 D.520s (including 196 in June only - in 24 days not 30! In a complete month of June well over 250 D.520s would have been delivered), production rate still rising strongly (made far away from Paris : in Toulouse, where I was borne, heh heh heh, which is not surprising for a future old owl).

"The aircraft (MS 406) are assembled and flight-tested at Vélizy-Villacoublay" (sic : I think the double name didn't exist yet 1940). Found in the book "Le MS 406", a remarkable monograph published by "Avions"-Lela-Presse (12 authors including Mathieu Comas, Christophe Cony, Michel Ledet, Lucien Morareau, Lionel Persyn et al). So yes Villa was Morane-Saulnier's aerodrome too so possibly a dozen or more MS 406s can have been there on 3 June 1940 but with no fighter pilots, no ammunition and probably they were not airworthy.

Remember, please, that the Breguet 690 series had been originally designed and ordered as heavy twin-engined fighters (hence probably the powerful armament of one cannon and several MGs in the nose, more firing backwards) and were produced at Vélizy, which later merged with Villacoublay : nowadays the city's name is Vélizy-Villacoublay. Not surprisingly the produced Br 691, 693 and 695 were test-flown at Villacoublay airfield and yes, they could very much look like fighters - they had been designed as fighters! But if SD's story is true at all, which I strongly doubt, these were new Br 693s / 695s he saw; they had just rolled off the factory and were being or would have been test-flown in those very days. The "fighter-pilots" he "saw" in the officers' mess were certainly no fighter-pilots but test-pilots at best, possibly no pilots at all but other personnel (there were about 100 men for 1 fighter pilot in the A.A.). In any case these AC, whatever the type (most probably Br 693/695), had not been test-flown and certainly carried no ammunition to shoot at the naughty German bombers. Taking off among exploding bombs is a lot of fun (why did SD not take off himself with one of the 50-60 "fighters"?) but not really useful if you're unable to fire your guns.

Enough now : this in-credible story quite simply is not true, that's all.

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

When Geoffrey Blake and I landed at the military aerodrome at Villacoublay, just outside Paris

Grozibou : actually it was more the aerodrome used by the surrounding aero-industry producing Breguet, LeO and Morane-Saulnier aircraft. This means a production of hundreds and hundreds of aircraft. No wonder the LW wanted to bomb it. Obviously during a war the Air Force will use any aerodrome which suits their needs.

With nature of our welcome determined, Colyer and Blake and I rushed off to the nearest air-raid shelter. It was a not very reassuring mound of sandbags and corrugated iron, and just as we got to it the first bomb came down, bursting on a hangar about thirty or forty yards away. And then came a whole salvo of bombs which fell all over the aerodrome and the hangars.

- Visibly he was scared out of his wits by a few harmless small bombs. This'll kill me! (I'll be an innocent victim of those nazi bombs over 68 years later!)

There were some fifty or sixty fighters of the French air force standing parked around the aerodrome, and we saw a number if them blow up in the raid. Just as we were landing I saw three of the French fighters take off, but as far as I can ascertain these were the only fighters that attempted to go into action from Villacoublay that day.

- Yes, if this story is not 100 % invented for some reason, it is even surprising that as many as 3 airworthy fighters were to be found there, for French HQ had concentrated elsewhere all fighter units they could get their hands on. But perhaps 3 test-pilots just wanted to fly one aircraft each to safety in order to avoid its destruction. The other guys in the mess most probably were mechanics or possibly pilots of any kind (including bombers) who had not got any airworthy AC to fly at the moment, all other AC not being able to fly. In any air force of the world it is very difficult to know what kind of a pilot you are seing : they all wear the same pilot's badge. (I was an officer with the A.A. myself and I am used to this) Only the unit's badge can give you a clue but you have to be an expert to make the difference between hundreds of different, mostly strange or even weird badges. A pilot wearing his pilot's badge (RAF : his "wings") can be a bomber pilot or a young lad flying only light liaison AC (commandeered tourism AC), ambulance AC etc.

He continues describing visits to both Darlan and Vuillemin, finding these encouraging and reassuring, having completed arrangements for cooperation with the French both at sea and in the air.

- This is ludicrous. Such arrangements had been completed as early as 1938 and possibly 1939, which didn't make some refinements or changes impossible but the main work had been performed long ago.

What types of aircraft could Douglas have seen at Villacoublay? He must have recognized fighters for what they were, but might he have overlooked if they were operational or not?

- You hardly can tell by just looking at them. An aircraft must have sustained really heavy damage if you want it to be obvious to the onlooker that it can't fly at the moment.

Those men in the Mess, were they fighter pilots?

- Certainly not. The fighter pilots were in their fighter units, based on all possible airfields but not at Villa. Civilian test-pilots of the companies Breguet, LeO and MS at best, most probaly unable to perform air-to-air shooting, in particular without any ammunition. In France no civilian person, no matter his competence, is authorised to use any military weapons in anger at war, not even a simple pistol or rifle.

Could culture and circumstance be part of the mix up, mistaking sang froid and nonchalance for lack of keenness?

- French personnel were used to be attacked, British generals were not. What's more, even the most eager test-pilot or bomber-pilot is unable to fly a fighter in combat if this fighter is a Br 693 bomber which is not airworthy and has got no ammo.

...giving it the weight of rank and thus credibility.

- Yes! Frankly I can't imagine how an RAF general or AVM or whatever should have known everything on the various insignia and badges of the FRENCH Air Force : this was not his business, he had to deal with quite different matters at top-level. His rank does not make his story more credible. As I already mentioned a top-ranking German general published a book in which he stated that the Japanese had conquered Midway (Adolf Galland). You could say : "Come on! Galland was a general! He could not possibly be wrong!" Bullshit.

IMHO it is not worth the energy to fight this one piece of writing (two if we count Townsend) as it is to discuss French operations and their effects in general. By constructive debate we can create a better picture and even help dispel the notions of the defeatist and ineffective air force. To villanize an author is not the way to be taken seriously. Dispel the myth by reason, and reasonable debate.

- In theory you're perfectly right. Unfortunately Sholto Douglas is a very famous man, Peter Townsend, princess' lovelace, even more so, in particular in... France! His book is widely spread and often quoted from. You can be sure that even in 500 years people are going to "prove" French airmen's cowardice "thanks to" Townsend's book. This will never end so it must be fought "with every ounce of energy". Books, in particular historical books - here we have got TWO, written by S.D. and by P.T. - have an important characteristic (feature) : they never disappear, once they are here they are here to stay so such insulting libelling must be fought immediately (if possible) and with the last ounce of energy.

A last "small detail" : according to excellent airpower historian Raymond Danel ("Icare" N° 54) the huge German attack on June 3 gave the following results : on operational airfields 6 (!) French AC were destroyed on the ground, 7 were damaged, 32 men killed. 5 non-operational Amiot 351s were destroyed at Le Bourget and 5 D.520s of the naval aviation at Orly totalling 16 AC destroyed on the ground (none at Villacoublay, as you can see : zero aircraft destroyed by boms at Villa on 3 June). Damage to railways, factories etc. was insignificant.

And now back to the tax office. Sorry. HELP!

[Franek Grabowski]

For a moment I have thought that GCD I/55 was based at Villacoublay on 3 June 1940, but it was not, being at Etampes. Nonetheless accounts of Polish pilots, five of them being attached, of whom three achieved ace status later in the war, just confirm Park's comments. In the effect Poles refused to fly with French, and wanted to fly with Czechs. According to Zumbach, on 3 June only one French pilot actually engaged enemy. Poles had little success due to faulty aircraft, and in general both Czechs and Poles complained they had worsest aeroplanes.
One thing is worth to note, though. Frenchmen were one of the most communised societies in Europe, and post-war it was even feared that communists may won free-elections! In 1940 communists supported Germany, organised strikes or sabotage (hey, this happened in Britain too, eg. in Castle Bromwhich AF), and perhaps this was one of factors behind the French collapse.

[Sylvester Stadler]

Yves aka Grozibou wrote:

"It should not be forgotten that the key to the 1940 German success was the big breakthrough at Sedan, across a rather big and wide river (the Meuse) mainly with 7 of the 10 German armoured divisions! This operation was incredibly risky : it was simply madness. No reasonable C-i-C would have accepted these terrible hazards but Adolf Hitler was not reasonable, he was a fanatic and a lunatic. Nonetheless he had foreseen that the French would be too slow and not react properly in time. So to speak, the French moved on foot when the Germans attacked with fast vehicles at 30 mph or so. Too bad Hitler was so right. If the French generals, mainly Huntziger and Georges, had reacted simply in a normal way (without needing to be military geniuses) the German forces would have been stopped in their tracks BEFORE crossing the Meuse and they would have suffered appalling losses, their offensive would have been dead by 14 May... This same Huntziger became the French C-i-C after the defeat!
To sum up, this unique German victory was the result of a madman's gambling. It worked fine this time, afterwards it didn't... All discussions about the respective air forces etc. are very interesting but the German victory was won on the ground, mainly with ten armourded divisions deploying about 1,000 real tanks plus 2,000 small, vulnerable tankettes (the French alone had got 3,300 real tanks, all with a good armour and most of them with a good gun). The German air force supported the army and made their victory quicker and easier but it didn't win the French Campaign : the German army did, mainly thanks to a crazy attack plan which worked."

The German victory in May-June 1940 was not the result of some madman's gamble but it was the result of careful and thorough planning which was carried out by a superb military force which had a modern military doctrine and the modern combined arms tactics to carry out the mission. The "madman" was not Hitler but it was the outstanding military mind of General Erich von Manstein, the author of Operation Sichelschnitt, who saw that the standard strategy of attacking through Belgium and Holland would not result in a decisive military victory (the old Schlieffen plan), but that it would result in prolonged campaign which might not achieve a German victory. Every military operation involves a degree of risk especially more so when the German Army had no superiority of numbers or quality of weapons. What the German Army had which the French, British, Dutch and Belgians did not have was the doctrine of subordinates deciding on how to carry out a mission which is called Auftragstaktik. When I was in the USMC, the one organization which was admired by Marines was the German Army and the Waffen SS, not the British Army or the French Army or even the U.S. Army (Marines have nothing complimentary to say about the Army).

The war games and map exercises, with the input of the creator of the Blitzkrieg, Heinz Guderian, confirmed that armor could travel through the Ardennes forest. Guderian had fought there during WW I, was thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the road network, and he stated that it would be no problem of moving a panzer division through there. When his corps, the XIX, was given the mission, he stated that he wanted all three of his divisions, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 10th PD, to move in mass. Klotzen, nicht kleckern (Mass, not dispersion). He was also given the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment. Guderian was the right officer in the right place at the right time. His armor,infantry, engineers, artillery, anti-tank, flak, etc. had perfected the combined arms doctrines as a result of the Polish campaign and the additional training prior to May 1940. The French and British had not learned the lessons of the Polish campaign, prefering to believe for various reasons that the Poles were simply too weak and not capable of stopping the German Army. The Allies believed they would have no problem stopping the Germans since they had a superiority in numbers.

The German Army had another tremendous advantage in that the leaders of combat units fought at the front and could immediately size up the situation and take immediate action. The U.S. Army finally learned this after the Vietnam war and prior to Desert Storm. Books on this war credit the Isaraelis with this concept but they themselves had studied the armored warfare of the Wehrmacht. In Desert Storm, the battalion commander was with his leading company; the brigade commander with the leading battalion; the division commander with his leading brigade; and so on. This was nothing new to the Germans.

The armored divisions of the XIX Corps moved faster through the Ardennes and reached the Meuse at Sedan and when the first units arrived, they immediately crossed the Meuse without waiting orders from higher HQs. Immediately, the Stukas and bombers were called for fire support and all available weapons used--machine guns, mortars, a few artillery pieces, a few tanks, assault guns, flak(especially the 88mm)--to pin down the French on the opposite shore. The first to cross were the infantry and assault engineers who destroyed the French bunkers. This made it possible to build pontoon bridges to get the tanks across. But it was the infantry of the 1st Rifle Regiment, 1st Panzer Division, commanded by Col. Hermann Balck and the Grossdeutschland Regiment which made this possible. He faced the French 55th Infantry Division and the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Men such as Feldwebel Rubarth and eleven men of the 10th PD performed heroic tasks in eliminating many French bunkers and firing positions. He was awarded the Knight's Cross. His performance was typical of the German soldiers at Sedan. Once across Guderian's forces had achieved the prerequisite to the successes which were to follow.

The armed forces of France, Britain, Belgium and Holland were actually superior in numbers to that of the Wehrmacht. The Allies had four million men versus three million of the German Army. Other comparisons are as follows:
151 Allied divisions v. 135 German (inc. 42 reserve)
14,000 artillery guns v. 7378 German guns
4204 Allied battle tanks v. 2439 German tanks
Aircraft have been covered elsewhere.

The French have not been able to win a war on their own since Napoleon. They have required the assistance of the British Empire, Russia, and finally the U.S. which came to their rescue in two world wars. The Germans fought more effectively in WW I when they knocked out Russia but the U.S. was required to turn the tide for the French and British Empires which outnumbered the German Empire. During the 40-day campaign in 1940, the German fought more effectively as demonstrated by the casualties of both sides:
Germany lost 43,110 KIA and MIA
France: 124,000 KIA and MIA
Great Britain: 11,010
Belgium: 7500
Holland: 2890
Allied total dead and missing: c.145,400
The ratio of German to Allied dead and missing is 1:3.37.
This demonstrates a German superiority in skill and doctrine since they did not have the superior firepower that might have caused such a disparity.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Sylvester Stadler

This demonstrates a German superiority in skill and doctrine since they did not have the superior firepower that might have caused such a disparity.

But we can all be grateful that shortly afterward Germany went on to make a complete pig's ear of the Battle of Britain.

[CJE]

Well, Nick, BoB is not a "military" war but, at the beginning at least, a political war.
Up to Sept. 40, Hitler had no intention to crush the British as he could have done at Dunkirk.

Chris