Thunderbolts and Mustangs versus the Jagdwaffe (split topic)

[drgondog]

Nick - the 'why so many types' answer is just what you said - fight with what you have and then concentrate on the best mix.

The 9th AF was originally going to be equipped with Mustangs and as I recall only the 354th was still equipped with P-51's until forced to fly P-47's in November through Feburay, 1945.

The 8th AF was going to increase the P-38 inventory and had planned on the 38 as the 'long range escort'. The failure of the P-38/Allison engines over cold northern Europe coupled with the incredible potential offered by the Mustang when the 354th FG came to Europe in December 1943 and was loaned to 8th AF - caused the massive inventory juggle.

Doolitle swapped the 358th in exchange for the 357th FG and the inbound stream of P-51's destined for the 9th AF were switched to the 8th. P-38's and P-47's for the 8th AF were diverted to the 9th AF and 12th and 15th until there were enough Mustangs to go around for long range escort duties.

As to the bombers.. The B-24 performed better than the B-17 in all respects except performance above 20,000 feet and durability...so the Pacific Theatre got the majority of the B-24's and the ETO got a majority of the B-17's until there was enough to go around. Then more and more B-24's came into the ETO.

The B-26 was a better bomber than the B-25 but there were still a lot of B-25's around in 1943 when the 26's started coming on board in significant numbers.. ditto the A-26 which replaced both the B-25 and A-20's.

At the end of the day, strategic interests dictated the diversion to Mustangs to 8th and 12th and 15th AF's, while low level performance (and perceived low level survivability/load capability) dictated the mix for tactical air with P-38's and P-47's.

You could ask the same questions re: armament, as you did for the P-39, but focus on USN doctrine versus the USAAF. The USAAF finally standardized on the .50 Cal with only two exceptions - the P-38 and the P-61. The Iron Dog P-39/400's went to Russia where they were loved...and thus removed the 37mm from the inventory

But the Navy had a mix of 30 cal (SBD and SB2C rear gunner) 50 cal (most other forward firing weapons), 20mm (mix of F4U's between USN and USMC - and I think the F7F at end of war)

After 1943 I don't understand why anything less than 50 cal was on any a/c

Regards,

Bill

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

Since this is an air war forum we tend to focus on the air war. As such the Mustang's added range becomes something mythical. However, if we look at the crucial air campaign during the Normandy invasion and break out, that range becomes less important. The main battle is not over the Reich. At the time the P-47 was still the most numerous American fighter in the theatre.

Ruy
It is a clear case of non understanding the Normandy air war. Actually, the range of both P-47s and P-51s was a decisive factor in annihilating the Luftwaffe and it cannot be underestimated.
Direct comparison of both types is not possible, as too many factors are decisive. Nonetheless British decision to use Mustangs instead of Thunderbolts in the ETO is a clear evidence of the former's superiority.
In regard of numbers, quite often Big Week argument is used. Indeed, most of the job has been done by Thunderbolts, but those were Mustangs flying over Berlin.

[Jens]

My opinion is, that Mustang was clearly superior to T-bolt and Lightning. It's also backed up by datas. Normal P-51D was faster and much more turny than the others. Also duration was higher.
Also the US-Experts vote Mustang superior to P-47, P-38.

Also losses of Luftwaffe in Normandie were not that high, i had in mind for some years. Take i.e. June 1944 in France were LW lost ~800 planes and ~240 dead and missed personel losses.
http://feldgrau.slacker.se/wwiilexic...-m-fbottom.htm

Of course these losses were high, but not for breaking backbone.

[Juha]

Hello
I'm with Ruy in this. IMHO T'Bolts did much of the foundation laying work for the later success. P-47D was also faster than P-51D in high up, at least over 27000ft because its turbo. Of course it had its problems, for ex. rather low critical Mach number (reason for dive recovery flaps for it and for P-38) and both early C/Ds and Ms suffered engine reability problems during the early parts of their careers in UK because of bad corrosion protection for sea-transit and because of problems in engine electronics.

[Smudger Smith]

Gents,

Slightly off topic, but I could not help but reply to some of the above posts. Other than a brief mention of RAF Fighter Command it seems to me that ALL credit for the demise of the German fighter arm is accredited to the US 8th and 15th Airforce’s.

I am not a Fighter Command researcher, my field is Bomber Commands bitter and costly bomber campaign. ( stay there I here you say. ) However from the little I know I feel Fighter Commands contribution is too easily dismissed. The air-war, or more specifically the gradual attrition of German fighters over Northern Europe did not start with the arrival of the P51 or P47, I was under the obviously misguided assumption it started in 1941 with the fighter sweeps carried out by Fighter Command. I freely admit that the losses were not on the scale of those submitted by the US, nevertheless losses were suffered by the G.A, including a number of respected German pilots prior to the arrival of the P47 & P51.

RAF Fighter Commands daily sweeps MUST have had an impact on the Germans effectiveness and efficiency.

So come on chaps, credit were credit is due, Fighter Command was also there.

These are my opinions, so I expect the experts to "shoot me down in flames". Pardon the pun.

Smudger

[Ruy Horta]

Of course attrition of 1941 was a factor, but it is also clear that it did not strain the Jagdwaffe. They pretty much had the situation under control, or at worst simply avoided combat. RAF Fighter Command did not strain the german system...

If we mention Fighter Command in 1941/42, then we might as well say that attrition started with the Battle of France in 1940, which meant that the Luftwaffe could only replace their losses for the upcoming Battle of Britain, instead of building up their strength. The same happened again against the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe having mainly replaced their Battle of Britain losses.

And if there is one steady attritional factor that's overlooked its the Eastern Front meat grinder, which from the start took a steady toll (the opening round always shocks me, although the gains were great during Barbarossa, so were the losses - leaving the Luftwaffe more or less punch drunk in the winter of 1941/42).

However when we discuss the Mustang we automatically focus on the Battle over Germany proper, when the Jagdwaffe could not avoid confrontation, but had to fight at any cost and when the german system was really put to the limit and over it...

Although serious historians will probably shudder at the thought of these childish type vs type discussions, howver I still persist that while the Thunderbolt did the real work (or as some might say, lay the foundation), the Mustang took the credits.

Too much credit is given to some of the advantages of the Mustang, apart from the economics of being able to buy two of them for the price of one competitor (would be interesting to compare manhours, which unlike the money is a real a factor in war economy).

Speed is relative, certainly when applying hit and run tactics. Also it is arguable which a/c proofed to be the superior weapons platform in the most common attack form - a high speed bounce.

But this discussion is practically meaningless without supporting figures, just a nice bar room conversation

[Smudger Smith]

Ruy,

Yes your right, a good topic to discuss over a pint of beer.

Appreciate you comments, but tend to see the similarities between post-war hype of the precision daylight bombing by the US bomber formations versus the ‘area bombing’ attacks by RAF Bomber Command and the apparent brainwashing that the US fighters single-handed destroyed the German fighter forces in the west.

I do appreciate that the US fighters did a tremendous job ( especially the Jug, my own personal favourite) over Europe. I just think Fighter Command also did.

PS : I was under the misguided impression the US Fort and liberator gunners destroyed the German airforce, considering the over-claiming that went on.

On that note, I’m off down the pub.

Smudger

[Juha]

Hello Smudger Smith
at least I was not trying to ignore the contribution of RAF but I had time only for a short note as I was and I still am at work, so I concentrated only to some points not mentioned earlier in this tread, that's why I also left out the main weakness of the the P-47D as a escort fighter, range. Now back to work for a quarter of hour and then to our War Archive.

All the best
Juha

[Jens]

Wether type vs. type comparsions are childish nor useless. On the other side, of course the they tell only one point of the whole story.

If you read the german veterans especially Galland, the picture of Luftwaffes defeat is drawn by P-51. Only due the range and perfomance of P-51 the Luftwaffe get no break to revcover the suffered losses.

Just take a look on claims, losses and bombs dropped.

http://members.aol.com/forcountry/ww2/eak.htm

It can be seen, that P-51 had a much greater impact on air superiority.

[Ruy Horta]

First the range is a matter of temporary advantage, the Thunderbolt was playing catch up with the Mustang (the Lightning was already in the same ballpark or very near).

I don't doubt that the Mustang's record will look impressive, but if you take into account that during Big Week the Thunderbolt was still the most numerous US fighter type, I'd feel comfortable in adding that by the spring of 1944 the air war in the west had run its course. Sure, more pilots would die, more a/c would be built, but the matter had been decided before the impact of the Mustang could be felt.

Now I'd risk another statement. The loser loves to blame a wonder weapon. During the Battle of Britain it was the Spitfire, during the RVT it became the Mustang. Its easier to blame technology, since the Mustang was a world beater, all other considerations being secondary. The failure is aleviated by having to face (supposedly) superior technology.

Galland especially with his infamous Spitfire quote is the epitomy of this thought (taken out of context or not). If only we had something like a Spitfire, the Bf 109F was a retrogressive step, the Mustang was a wunderwaffe, Hitler messed up the Me 262 program...

So my main points are:
1. The main battle had been waged before the Mustang made its presence felt.
2. The Thunderbolt (and Lightning) could have done the same job if required, it might have taken a little longer that's all.

Of course this discussion becomes a bit of a generalization for the sake of focus and clearity. 1944 confuses the picture because of stepped up fighter production and en equally stepped up training program, yet the pilots manning these fighters do not have the same quality as only a year before, in essence the Luftwaffe is training cannon fodder, nothing more and nothing less...the Mustang had its place in history as it could pick the fruit of earlier labor.

So in the war over Germany, how much of a turning point is Big Week?

(sorry, I am leaving out RAF Bomber Command's strategic offensive completely).