Should the Me262 been used exclusively as a jabo ....

[George Hopp]

with SC500 bomb

normal range:
@ SL - 270km/168mi
@ 6km - 475km/295mi

max range:
@ SL - 330km/205mi
@ 6km - 550km/342mi

(radius of action is always less than half the range)

endurance @ 100% thrust:
@ SL - 0.36hr
@ 6km - 0.71hr

max endurance:
@ SL - 0.75hr
@ 6km - 1.21hr

max speed:
@ SL - 718kph/446mph
@ 6km - 750kph/466mph

Interesting, but didn't the Me 262 generally use the AB series of bombs?

[Juha]

John
“Would German troops on the ground prefer to face a force of IL2s going in at low level against them and taking out their positions, or a high level bombing force dropping bombs in such a pattern that there was a good chance they wouldn't get hit?”

I know that this is off the topic but I’d anyway comment that. I really don’t know. If we look Finnish experiences, Il-2s did their worst against horse-drawn supply and even that wasn’t very decisive. Finnish light infantry battalions seemed not to be much bothered by them, but in one conversation I heard that an Il-2 attack had dispersed a line infantry coy which was waiting orders in rather open and stony terrain. On the other hand the terrain was one of worst kind for infantry and I know that at the same area an infantry battalion was almost wiped out by heavy Russian artillery concentration. And Finnish AA gunners thought that Il-2s accuracy was poor and 20mm AA troop had good chance against Il-2s. What was feared most was the very powerful Soviet artillery not Il-2s. And I think that Germans who had experienced Allied carpet bombing didn’t like that experience at all.

[Nick Beale]

So, getting back to the subject, can we conclude that using some of its Me 262s in the bombing role was not an entirely irrational choice for the Luftwaffe to make in 1944?

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by George Hopp

Interesting, but didn't the Me 262 generally use the AB series of bombs?

You will have to ask J. Richard Smith and/or Eddie Creek.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

You will have to ask J. Richard Smith and/or Eddie Creek.

You can ask me, if you like. The evidence of a large number of deciphered messages is that they used AB containers for much of time (but profile painters and model makers seem to prefer the SC 250!).

[Juha]

Nick
Of course it wasn’t entirely irrational, LW must try everything to hinder Allied ground troops but that’s a different thing that to say with a hindsight that that was a right thing to do. I have read a couple of British divisional histories and a couple of tank brigade histories and some memoirs of British tankmen and i cannot recall anything on being attacked by jet a/c, some mentions on attacks by 109s and 190s but they were usually ineffective. Only effective strike I can recall was LW’s night bombing strike against Orne? bridges on the first night after beginning of Operation Goodwood which according to the history of 11. ArmDiv, written straight after end of war, caused heavy losses among replacement tank crews which happened to be at target area on their way forward. No numbers were given though. Once asked on that attack on this board but nobody answered or at least nobody could give details on the attack on LW side.

So can the efforts used in 262 jabo attacks be justified by results achieved. I really don’t know but doubt that.

Juha

[Vati]

If we are concentrated only on the final efficiency of 262 jabo, there is of course the usual classical line of 'wrong role for the 262'.
But for those who have military background or at least some firm theoretical knowledge of air support, understand that 262 jabo was a correct decision.

The result of of its use is unfortunate mix of expecting too much under the stress of poor avg. pilot jabo training, communication heer/lw, new technology, logistics and state of war.

Just because you hit your fingers when using hammer, it does not mean that it is not the right tool for the job.

[Nick Beale]

It seems to me that, all things being equal, a fighter-bomber that spends less time flying its mission (i.e. one that can make the round trip to the target faster) ought to have an improved chance of survival.

So far so good - a fast jet has potential in the role. But, if you are then so concerned to preserve the jet's secrets that you only allow it to bomb from 4000 metres or above (without a bombsight), as was done with the Me 262, then you have just squandered that potential - your aircraft may survive but it won't often hit any tactical target, so you may as well leave it on the ground and save the fuel.

[Juha]

Nick
I agree partly but IMHO with hindsight, after some use as Jabo to see how it worked out it should have been used as a fighter and in tactical recce role. Not that that kind decision would had any impact on how the war went.

IMHO it would had made 262 better Jabo if it had had cannon with flatter trajectory than MK 108, of course only if 4000m restriction was withdrawn.

Juha

[Richard T. Eger]

Dear All,

The subject of how to employ the Me 262 as a bomber was discussed at quite some length at the famous Göring conference of late May 1944. Notes of this conference reveal to me rather surprisingly just how much Göring delved into the technical weeds of this issue. I can't possibly imagine an Air Marshall or Secretary of the Air Force being so involved with the nuts and bolts of a particular problem, let alone having sufficient technical background to do so.

That said, they really wrestled with the issue of how to practically utilize the Me 262 in the bomber role. It was readily recognized that the Me 262 could not be held in a dive nor dove at particular steep angles for very long at all before exceeding its operational speed limitations. The question of what gunsight to use was discussed, the current gunsight being proposed, accepted essentially without discussion, and the subject moved on, seemingly because no one had a better idea and not because it was an effective solution.

Eventually, as most know, the 2 Lotfe bomber test vehicles were developed to get around the shortcomings of a simply modified fighter. Tests with these proved quite successful. However, by this time in the war, it was really too late to move forward with their deployment. It should further be noted that these were, short of bombs, unarmed, and thus were purely bombers without fighter capability.

Regards,
Richard