Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

[tcolvin]

Hi Juha.

I'm afraid this well-researched subject will yield no further revelations from the National Archives, and AFAIK there are no books on the subject, and never will be since irrefutable evidence exists that electricity generation was rejected as a target by BC from first principles, aka prejudice.
I asked you about it because it appeared you had a source, but you don't.

The subject is well-known and crystal clear, and not worth pursuing further because of Occam's razor (entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity" - entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem). There is no necessity to look further than the following facts, which IMHO preclude any doubt on this subject, in spite of Kutscha's quote which gives no detail. When told they had missed the one target that could have ended the war, and therefore had egg all over their collective face, the RAF would have claimed that they "extensively debated" it, wouldn't they? But they never produced any evidence, and none has surfaced AFAIK.

The facts:
Butt led to Gee, which by February 1942 had been fitted to 200 bombers.
On February 14, 1942 BC was directed to strike at full force (no more conservation of strength) for 6 months (time estimated before the Germans jammed Gee) against German cities to destroy 'the morale of the enemy civil population, and in particular of the industrial workers' through area bombing.
This remained the gospel for the following two years. Why?
Because on February 22, 1942 Harris took command of BC.
Harris immediately ruled out all 'panacea' targets - oil plants, aircraft works, ball-bearing factories, molybdenum mines, submarine works, etc, etc, including electricity generating stations.
Harris argued that even if his bombers could find and hit these 'panacea' targets, as he contemptuously dismissed them, "their destruction would probably have nothing like the effect prophesied by our economic experts. And as, for the most part, such targets could not be found and hit by night, and as our bombers could certainly not survive over Germany by day, it followed that our offensive must be directed against something much larger. The only really large objectives of indisputable value, it was alike clear to Harris and the Air Staff, were Germany's great industrial towns......... In this frame of mind, and with a calculated determination to resist all unnecessary diversions to other ends, Harris embraced his new task". Richards & Saunders, Vol 2.

Note the glaring fallacies, and why it is instructive even now to point them out:
1. Every target, other than cities, was dismissed as a 'panacea'. So bye-bye any discussion of electricity generation - 'Don't waste my time with another panacea', Harris would have said. Do you believe, Juha, that in this environment Harris would listen to reasoned argument? Or that anybody would have been fool enough to bring an argument to him? Harris is an open book; you can hear him on film explaining himself. This man was on a mission to kill Germans until those who remained alive lost the will to resist and capitulated. This was called 'destruction of morale' by the RAF spin-doctors.
2. The only strategic weapon that existed for Harris and the Air Staff was the inaccurate heavy bomber operated at night. So bye-bye the accurate A-36 dive-bomber and Mosquito skip-bomber operated by day. Portal (see earlier in this discussion) dismissed as a technical impossibility the very idea of a long-range fighter, let alone a long-range fighter-bomber. Harris would not have been interested in them because of their pathetic bomb-load which could not set alight city centres and kill masses of Germans.
3. A 'panacea' is a 'cure-all; a remedy for all diseases, evils, or difficulties'. So why was area bombing not itself dismissed as a panacea? The answer is because the boss said so, and the boss was Harris, and Harris was on a mission to kill Germans until those alive cried uncle.

Tony

[Kutscha]

The contract for 500 A-36A aircraft fitted with bomb racks and dive brakes was signed by Kelsey on 16 April 1942. The first A-36A (42-83663) was rolled out of the NAA Inglewood plant in September 1942.

The A-36A-1-NA joined the 27th Fighter Bomber Group composed of four squadrons based at Rasel Ma in French Morocco in April 1943 during the campaign in North Africa.

So what is Harris suppose to do for a whole year until some A-36s show up?

What a/c were going to escort these heavy bomb laden A-36s deep into enemy territory with a potent LW?

[tcolvin]

The first RAF Mustang 1 came off the production line on May 1st, 1941.
So the RAF knew its capabilities.
If they had wanted the A-36, they could have ordered and received it by February 14, 1942.

If escort were needed - a big 'if' given it could operate below the German radar - then it could have been provided by A-36s without bombs with a max speed of 356 mph in clean condition at 5,000ft.

Tony

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The first RAF Mustang 1 came off the production line on May 1st, 1941.
So the RAF knew its capabilities.

Tony

The RAF sort of knew of the capabilities of the Mustang. They also knew the capabilities of the P-39 but found problems with them later when they had arrived in GB.

The 1st arrived in Oct '41 but there was still 8 or so months of testing and training of pilots before the 1st mission took place in July '42. Delivery date is of no consequence.The date of the first operation is more important.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

If they had wanted the A-36, they could have ordered and received it by February 14, 1942.

Tony

What crystal ball were the Brits looking at? It was only by accident that the Mustang was converted into a dive bomber. It then took 13 months from the date ordered before the A-36 went on a mission.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

If escort were needed - a big 'if' given it could operate below the German radar - then it could have been provided by A-36s without bombs with a max speed of 356 mph in clean condition at 5,000ft.

Tony

Early Mosquito missions were flown below German radar and they suffered high losses. Once the coast was crossed the Germans didn't really need radar. You expect missions deep into enemy air space not to be intercepted. No big 'if', escorts certainly would be required. What a waste having A-36s carrying no bombs. But, then if there were Mustang Is.......

As for the 300 mile combat radius, that is a straight line. Missions were not flown straight from base to the target. Zigs and zags would reduce the combat radius possibly up to a 100 miles. Low level navigation is not that easy especially when the pilot had to fly the a/c and also do the navigation.

[Juha]

Hello Tony
third time, if the top civil-military institution, Imperial Defence Committee or whatever, or top brass of RAF had decided, that attacks on electrical grid was the answer and ordered Harris to attack it, Harris would have had in the end only two options, obey or step aside. So what the Harris think or want didn’t matter in the end game, look Transport and Oil plans, what happened? Did the Harris’ opinion matter?

Did they build Mossie bombers or not?

You must accept that there were bosses above Harris, so in the end they decided what BC did, Harris had to operate inside boundaries given to him. Again, look what happened with Transport and Oil Plans, if you find out that Harris was compelled to bomb those “panacea” targets how he could have refused to bomb electicity grid targets if he had ordered to do that?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Now I understand your point, Juha.
Harris was not under control in the way you think until March 1944.

Perhaps these quotes from Maj-Gen Sir John Kennedy's "The Business of War" will explain what went on bewteen 1942 and 1944. Kennedy was a participant.

Page XV (written by Bernard Fergusson) "The powers of the Chief of Staff Committee had certain curious limitations. In two respects the RAF was independent of it, and held an unwritten charter from the War Cabinet (ie Churchill). The Chiefs of Staff, as such, had little say in the bombing policy, or in deciding what types of aircraft should be built. The RAF had had a precarious youth. Although now of age, and highly robust at that, it still had a tendency to look on the Royal Navy and the Army as wicked uncles who, although ostensibly reformed, might once again revert to predatory instincts. Who could say what might happen if the two older Services should taste blood, in the shape of selecting targets, or in the form of aircraft specially designed for close support of the Army and Navy. (I remember as late as 1943 an Air Chief Marshal telling me in Cairo that he regarded every transport aircraft built at the expense of a bomber as a major tactical defeat)."

Page 247; "The Naval and General Staffs would have agreed completely, at that time (Fall of Tobruk in June 1942) on the following order of priority of tasks for the RAF;
First: Fighter Defence of the British Isles.
Second: The essential needs of the Navy.
Third: The essential needs of the Army.
Fourth. Long-range bombing with what was left.
At this particular moment, Churchill's obsession for bombing Germany resulted in the Navy being very short of long-range aircraft at sea, and in the Army not having the support of bomber aircraft in Egypt to hamper the use by the Germans of the North African seaports, which now included Tobruk".

So long as Harris had only to answer to Churchill, he did what they both (and later Spaatz) wanted - ie concentrate on area bombing of Germany. This lasted for two years from February 1942 (see an earlier post). But in 1944 pressure on Harris finally emerged with Zuckerman's Transportation Plan, which was bought by Tedder and Leigh-Mallory in the AEAF as well as by the government and Eisenhower. Harris was instructed to begin the Transportation Plan in March 1944.

Harris was placed under Eisenhower's command for Overlord on April 14, 1944, and BC was used as a battlefield weapon in support of the army. Harris always did what he was told, and did it to the best of his ability even when he disagreed, as he always did, with any non-area bombing 'panacea' targeting.

Oil became a priority on September 3, 1944.
But note that despite the RAF's and Harris' claims regarding the great importance of oil targets, Harris had opposed assigning the highest priority to oil targets but acknowledged post-war that the campaign was "a complete success" with the qualifier: "I still do not think that it was reasonable, at that time, to expect that the [oil] campaign would succeed; what the Allied strategists did was to bet on an outsider, and it happened to win the race."

In summary, there was no boss above Harris (except a complaisant Churchill) from February 1942 to February 1944. Harris had no boundaries because Churchill supported Harris' area bombing campaign. Therefore there could be no plan to attack the 'panacea' electrical generation system. In 1944 priorities changed when Eisenhower got control of Harris and Spaatz. By then Harris and BC had lost their credibility, and Churchill had lost his authority to the Americans who increasingly made all the decisions.

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
That is what I have been saying
what Harris thought doesn’t matter, what mattered was what above him thought. Now, was it USA, GB , Germany or Soviet Union, the ultimate decision power was in the hand of the civilian leader, FDR, WC, AH etc. In WC’s case as long as he had the backing of the majority of MPs. So what matters was what WC thought, that’s why I mentioned earlier Lindeman, WC’s chief scientific adviser and Committee of Imperial Defence or whatever which was the highest civil-military organisation, which laid down strategic guidelines.

That’s why BC used so much effort for ex on naval targets, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Tirpitz, Hipper, U-boat pens. Do you really think that Harris and his predecessor did that from theirs free will? No, when WC was worried on KM he ordered BC to concentrate much of its efforts on naval targets. Harris was even right in his opinion that pre Tallboy period bombing U-boat pens wasn’t very cost-effective way to use BC, even if collateral damage hampered U-boat arm.

And contrary what Kennedy writes there was bombers in Middle-East, Wellingtons (at that time 6 sqns, 7th had just completed its conversion to a torpedo-bomber sqn), one of the main targets of Wimpys were just the ports, and lighter have been there already a long time and Halifaxes (2 sqns) were just about to arrive, first Hali losses happened in early July 42 in Med. During the summer 42 there were also 2 Liberator sqns and the USAAF B-24s of HALPRO. At that time even BC had not very many heavy bombers. The first Hali combat loss in MTO was during an attack on a port.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Of course you are right that Churchill ran the war, and therefore Churchill is ultimately responsible for what Harris did. How could it be otherwise - ditto Hitler, Stalin, FDR.
But Churchill abdicated his responsibility to Harris, and accepted Harris' priority.
The Chiefs of Staff (COS) under Churchill as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence were tasked with coordinating all the armed forces.
But, as Kennedy said, Harris was beyond the power of the COS, and allowed - by Churchill - to do his thing of area bombing with every other target dismissed as a panacea.
Every now and then Churchill would listen to the COS and direct Harris in the way you describe.
For example - where was BC when the U-Boat pens were being built? Answer, bombing Germany. Only when Britain faced starvation, and the completed U-boat pens were beyond the possibility of destruction, was Harris told by Churchill to bomb them. BC destroyed the French ports but never damaged a submarine. Is that a sensible way to run a war?
The direction of the war was disorganised and ultimately incompetent because of the Churchill/Harris axis. The COS complained, but got nowhere with Churchill and Harris.

I would not dismiss Kennedy. This was a note that he wrote at the time of Tobruk, and certainly reflects COS thinking(page 247);
"In my view the only well-founded ground of criticism of our central war direction now lies in the use we are making of our air force .... If we had diverted, say, 20% of our long-range bomber aircraft to the Middle East, it is doubtful whether Rommel could ever have started his offensive, and more than doubtful whether he could have sustained it at his recent tempo. I should like to take 50% of the bomber effort off Germany even at this late hour, and distribute it in the Atlantic, and in the Middle East and Indian theatres. The price we pay at sea and on land for our present bombing policy is high indeed".

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
not wanting to defend too much Harris, whom also I think was much too single-minded, but

Quote: “For example - where was BC when the U-Boat pens were being built? Answer, bombing Germany. Only when Britain faced starvation, and the completed U-boat pens were beyond the possibility of destruction, was Harris told by Churchill to bomb them. BC destroyed the French ports but never damaged a submarine. Is that a sensible way to run a war?”

IMHO that was more a double error of CID, if that is the right term, than Harris. Harris should have ordered to attack pens when they were under construction and should have allowed to give them less attention until Tallboys were ready after it was found out that even 2000lb AP bombs were inadequate against the pens. And with Tallboys bombers did damage at least some U-boats IIRC even sunk a couple or so. Halifaxis from 35 Sqn, not sure on sqn, hit Scharnhorst with 6 1000lb AP bombs at La Pallice during one daring and costly daytime raid. It wasn’t fault of those crews that all 6 went straight through the ship without exploding.

Quote:” The COS complained, but got nowhere with Churchill and Harris.”

Modern societies were built in that way, civilians had the last say. Now of course it would have been better that also Harris would have using his influence for a more flexible way to use bombers but one can also argue that if COS couldn’t persuade WC, most of blame should went on WC and his Cabined colleagues and some even to COS, it was up to them to find correct arguments to convince their civilian bosses to see their points. As one of your quotes said, Harris did what he was ordered as best he could, even if protesting, even direct ground support. If allowed to do what he wanted he bombed the cities and not was not giving enough attention to experts of Ministry of Economic Warfare, but when given an order he did what was told.

On Kennedy, now there had been some 100 Wimpys in NA (7 sqns) also much of RAF meagre torpedo-bomber force and some FAA anti-shipping sqns. Not checking front line strength of BC at the time I’d say that the NA Wimpy force wasn’t far from 20% of BC’s front-line strength. So not an insignificant force. And there is a limit, how many bombers one could operate effectively from a far away place. Don’t know how much more bombs were logistically possible to delivery to Egypt, light and fighter bombers also used lots of them, fuel probably was not a problem. The limit was,t already reached, because RAF was able to deploy 2 Hali sqns when the crises arose and keep the 2 Lib sqns, which were in their way to Far East, in NA for summer months of 42.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Thanks very much, Juha.

Sure "Modern societies were built in that way", but the British prided themselves on the COS system; but it failed them because of Churchill.

And that is the ultimate explanation for why dive-bombers were never used by the British in North-west Europe in WW2, and why the A-36 was replaced by the P-47 - because the Americans had to learn almost everything in WW2, including the COS system, but copied the British in letting the USAAF operate quasi-independently.

Good stuff on a difficult subject. And in spite of the millions of words already written about it, no one has yet convincingly put all of the details together.

Why don't you have a go?

Tony