Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

[CJE]

Thanks, Gents, for this passionate and most interesting debate.
Does anyone know where I can find a copy of the famous "Butt report"?
TIA
Chris

[Juha]

Hello Chris
look at Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report , scroll down to the bottom of the page. So at least you can find it at NA at Kew and Davis’ book might have at least very good info on its content. I didn’t open the Davis' book link, so cannot promise anything definite.

HTH
Juha

[CJE]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Chris
look at Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report , scroll down to the bottom of the page. So at least you can find it at NA at Kew and Davis’ book might have at least very good info on its content. I didn’t open the Davis' book link, so cannot promise anything definite.

HTH
Juha

Thanks, Juha.
The book looks interesting and answers my questions about this report.

[Kutscha]

You should look at the Davis link Juha.

from page 16

"On 4 October 1940 Sir Charles Portal became chief of the air
staff, a post he would hold until the end of the war; Sir Richard
Peirse became AOC, Bomber Command. On 30 October Portal
made his previous views official policy—lowering German
morale would no longer be the by-product of strategic air attack
but the end product. The air staff ordered Bomber Command
to concentrate on oil and morale—oil when visibility allowed,
morale when it did not. The command would devote
limited efforts to U-boats, communications, and airfields. The
initial draft of instructions suggested 20 to 30 cities."

So, long before Harris took command of BC, area bombing was policy.

[Juha]

Hello Tony
I'm pretty sure that there are some good secondary sources on the subject and anyway living a couple thousands kilometers from Kew digging archives for a such vast subject is beyond my means. I have limited my RAF studies on certain stations and sqns. And your quotes were from books which I have not read before so You gave me some new info, thanks for that!

Juha

BTW in Aug 42 205 Group, the Group which controlled Wimpy bombers in NA had 140 Wimpys, which agree with info that in late 41 the TOE of NA sqns was raised to 18 "initial equipment" a/c plus 7 more held in immediate reserve. On the other hand the first line strenght of BC was very low in May 42, only 417 bombers, but began raise soon afterwards. The heavy bomber units in NA were weaker than the othe sqns there, only 26 Halis and 25 Libs arrived during the summer 42, 4 Libs had arrived already in Jan 42. Plus 23 B-24Ds of HALPRO, but it lost some of its planes during its attack on Ploesti before it was committed against NA targets.

[Juha]

Hello Kutscha
I have read the same years ago fromNoble Frankland's Bomber Offensive (Purnell 1969) and from semi-official Richards' Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol I (1953). I don't know if it is in Davis' book but already by July 41 Air Staff knew that oil plants were too small to be found with the equipment and training level at the time, so Peirse was informed that targets were morale and marshalling yards.

But Tony's point was that COS could not control Harris, that's a different thing than Air Staff. IMHO power grid targets were not feasible for night bombers before late 43 when there was enough H2Ss and some ecperiences on their use and Oboe was established itself. IIRC Germans jammed GEE much earlier than British had anticiped but still had its function because it was working over North Sea and navigators could check their calculations against GEE positions for first couple hundred kilometers, so they saw for ex how exact was the forecast for winds etc and it also helped them during last couple hundred kilometers on way back.

And one should go through the British reports on effects on LW bombing to see how British power grid coped, that surely had its effects on how vulnerable target British saw the Germany's grid. I'm rather sure that there are books on the target selection and at least memorandums and service's own internal studies, for ex that on Photo recon was opened to general readers at PRO in 1978.
Juha

[Juha]

To a bit clarifying
Opinions in the Air Staff varied during the war, but it was naturally committed to strategic bombing campaign against Germany, just like Admiralty would have liked more a/c to support naval operations and Army would have liked more air support to land campaigns.

IMHO the Air Staff went for area bombing because,a) Politicians wanted to make Germans to pay their bombing attacks on British cities, b) they found out, well before the Butt Report revealed the truth to the other branches and to politicians, that real effects of bombing were much less than what was hoped for because of the difficulties crews had to find out ordered targets. The first area attack was against Mannheim on 16/17 Dec 40. It was a revenge attack to LW attacks on British cities, especially to those on Coventry and on Southampton.

When new navigational aids and better tactics came into use, inside Air Staff began again discussion on target priorities but Harris, with WC’s backing, opposed diversion from area bombing. What was behind Harris reasoning I don’t know, but he had participated the Air Policing in Iraq in 20s and might well be frustrated during 40-41 frequently changing priorities and decisive new techniques which should have bought the war rapidly to end but failed miserably. Also British knew from LW bombing on British targets that many targets were more resilient against bombing than had been thought and that nervously changing bombing priorities wasn’t the right way to go because knocking out targets was difficult, repairs were many times faster than anticipated, substitutes could be found, less necessary consumption curtained, use of reserves could delay impact of production shortages etc. IMHO when technical progress allowed it, BC should have returned to attacks on certain sectors of Germany’s economy. But what would have been the priority targets in addition of oil would not have been so easy to decide during the war. And Harris stubbornness at least prevented the dissipation of efforts to unsuccessful “war winning targets” even if I personally think that from late 43 onwards BC efforts could have been directed better.

Juha

[Juha]

Hello Tony
IMHO your RAF A-36 timetable in your message #30 is highly optimistic when we think that the first oper. sorties by Mustang Mk Is were flown in May 42 and the handling trials report for Mustang Mk I was completed at A&AEE in Aug 42. Because I don't remember that RAF asked other manufactures at that time to design a dive bomber version of their fighters, why should they asked that from NA. So IMHO earliest possible time for interest in A-36 was when NA got its prelimenary design of A-36 ready.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Juha and Kutscha.

If BC/RAF had understood and appreciated the possibilities of dive-bombing accuracy, and the vulnerability of German electrical generation in 1938 to small tonnages accurately placed, then they could probably have had the A-36 operational before February 1942.

But they could certainly have had a DH98/Mosquito dive-bomber with internal bomb-load like the Vengeance, operational by end 1940.
Britain could therefore have knocked Germany out of the war before February 1942 and saved itself from the recurring consequences of Russia and the USA winning WW2.

De Havilland presented his proposal in September 1938 at the time of Munich, but the RAF rejected it in October 1938, and did not even order a prototype until March 1940. They then faffed about until the middle of 1941 before ordering mass production.

The RAF was not alone. Arnold and Quesada were shown the Mosquito in April 1941, but the USAAF did not order it, having their own prejudices and blindness.

Tony

[CJE]

May I add my two cents?
Having butchered the Ju 87s over the Kent, I guess this very bad experience may have made the RAF overly cautious about the value of dive-bombers with no escort.
Apart from pin-pricks in airfield tarmacs, what success could the dive-bombers be boasting about during BoB?