The momentous cost of Bomber Command.

[tcolvin]

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.
b) The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership compared with Russian. So I do not know what point you are trying to make.

Steve, You are obviously as tired as I am of argument. Why don't you just state your conclusions after studying BC for 30 years. Perhaps some of us will learn something. I promise to say nothing.

Tony

[Icare9]

The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership

Tony, you're moving this into an arena which few of us can contend with. If you are now claiming that (despite Churchill tanks, which you were anxious to have more of) the D-Day Invasion forces had inferior equipment, then your opinions should be voiced in a more broader forum such as WW2Talk, than in an Aviation based one.

I feel that you are determined that your view be correct and will brook no contradiction. That isn't a reasoned basis for debate, you may find a more stimulating environment for your views elsewhere now you have broadened your arguments into an OVERALL strategic overview.

Like BC, the Army did the best with what it had, not just equipment, but use of tactics to outflank the Germans doggedly resisting the Anglo Canadians. Again, by totally absorbing all the German effort against them, they drew away defenders to allow the Americans to break through, culminating with the Falaise Gap and the abandonment of France by the Germans. And how, if everything they used was poor, did they achieve such a resounding defeat on the Germans?

BC by its continued Operations succeeded in holding back a vast amount of German manpower and resources, slowing development of what could have been war winning weapons such as the V1, V2 and jets. That allowed the Russians to achieve battlefield superiority sooner. However, I am sure you will have yet another answer to support your view.

Just don't hint that the lives of those who died were "thrown away" wilfully.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.
Tony

11/12 February 1943

Wilhelmshaven. This was an interesting and important raid by 177 aircraft - 129 Lancasters, 40 Halifaxes and 8 Stirlings. The Pathfinders found that the Wilhelmshaven area was completely covered by cloud and they had to employ their least reliable marking method, skymarking by parachute flares using H2S. The marking was carried out with great accuracy and the Main Force bombing was very effective. Crews saw through the clouds a huge explosion on the ground, the glow of which lingered for nearly 10 minutes. This was caused by bombs blowing up the naval ammunition depot at Mariensiel to the south of Wilhelmshaven. The resulting explosion devastated an area of nearly 120 acres and caused widespread damage in the naval dockyard and in the town. Much damage was also caused by other bombs.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

11/12 February 1943

Wilhelmshaven. This was an interesting and important raid by 177 aircraft - 129 Lancasters, 40 Halifaxes and 8 Stirlings. The Pathfinders found that the Wilhelmshaven area was completely covered by cloud and they had to employ their least reliable marking method, skymarking by parachute flares using H2S. The marking was carried out with great accuracy and the Main Force bombing was very effective. Crews saw through the clouds a huge explosion on the ground, the glow of which lingered for nearly 10 minutes. This was caused by bombs blowing up the naval ammunition depot at Mariensiel to the south of Wilhelmshaven. The resulting explosion devastated an area of nearly 120 acres and caused widespread damage in the naval dockyard and in the town. Much damage was also caused by other bombs.

Much of this caption is nonsense.
The attached Google Earth photo shows the aiming point in the naval dockyard in the town was 4kms away from the exploding Mariensiel arsenal. The bit of dock shown in your aerial photos is the Westwerft, which was mistaken by the photo interpreters for the naval dockyard.
I told you the raid happened in a NE gale which blew the skymarkers over Mariensiel before the Main Force arrived.
No doubt Butcher Harris put your pictures in his Blue Book together with the misleading caption.
By the way, where are these Blue Books today? Rumour has it there were three copies - one on Harris's desk, one on Churchill's desk, and one in the British Embassy in Moscow for showing to Stalin.

Tony

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I told you the raid happened in a NE gale which blew the skymarkers over Mariensiel before the Main Force arrived.
Tony

So the bombs were dropped where they were suppose to be dropped, on the sky markers. Not the bombers fault the sky markers weren't where they were suppose to be.

The bit of dock shown in your aerial photos is the Westwerft, which was mistaken by the photo interpreters for the naval dockyard.

Pure bull. You are saying that after years worth of photos taken of Wilhelmshaven, the photo interceptors didn't know what was what.

if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them

Soviet Union 1941–45, All branches of service - 10,725,345 KIA/MIA

British Commonwealth, All branches of service - 580,351 KIA/MIA

Hyde Park has a soapbox reserved with your name on it Tony.

[glider1]

If I may join in the debate.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.

There can be little doubt that this was a lucky hit, however there is equally no doubt that by looking at the two photos the damage to the docks were extensive. Harsly a building left standing and more importantly no vessels in the docks, they had been removed. The raid achieved what it set out to do.

b) The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership compared with Russian.

I would expect the loss ratio of any front line Infantry Unit of any army to be at a similar level to BC. I would however not expect it to rival the Russian Units as their tactics were hard on the troops and they put less resources to the removal and treatment of the wounded.
As for the equipment, lets take them one at a time.
Crap Infantry Weapons
The Lee Enfield was and is one of the all time greats and cannot be described as Crap.
Bren Gun, again a first class weapon as good an LMG as any produced anywhere.
Sten Gun totally agree, absolute rubbish

Crap Tanks
Sherman 75 was roughly as good as the T34/76 and the Sherman 76 a good match against the T34/85. You can argue which was the best but there was little in it.
Sherman Firefly was vulnerable but it did at least have the firepower so that it could destroy anything that could destroy it which evens things up.
The UK/Canadians did lack a heavy tank of that there is no doubt but they had the edge in specialised tanks. But then again the Russians lacked equipment such as the M10/M36/Achilles so take your pick as to which approach you want.

Crap Artillery.
Sorry but on this you are very wrong. The 25pd and the 4.5in guns which formed that backbone of the Anglo Canadians were second to none. Plus they were supported by a far more sophisticated and flexible fire control structure.
6pd and 17pd AT guns were at least as good as anything else on the battlefield.

Crap Tactical Support
Again you are very wrong. There was a difference in approach, the Russian aircraft being designed to take heavy damage but were easier to hit being slower and larger, whereas the Typhoon was less robust but harder to hit. The advantage the Anglo Canadians had was that at a push every allied fighter could be a very effective GA machine. In the 2TA even Spitfires were being armed with 1,500lb of bombs. Russian fighters were unable to carry the payload.

Crap Leadership.
Both sides had a selection of good and bad.

What Russia totally lacked was a strategic air arm. The RAF/USAAF bombers would have had a field day attacking targets such as transport choke points and the losses would have been significantly smaller that those caused by the German defences. The Daylight would have belonged to the USAAF high level bombers as Russia lacked a decent high altitude fighter able to take on the B17/B24 and their escort. The night would belong to the RAF as Russian lacked radar in any was apart from warning. i.e. an almost total lack of radar fire control or radar in nightfighters.

[Steve Smith]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.
b) The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership compared with Russian. So I do not know what point you are trying to make.

Steve, You are obviously as tired as I am of argument. Why don't you just state your conclusions after studying BC for 30 years. Perhaps some of us will learn something. I promise to say nothing.

Tony

Tony,

My 30 years of research tells me not to get into a argument with someone who obviously is conformational and argumentative. What I have learnt is that the death of 55,573 young men was not in vain.

[tcolvin]

Glider1, we're getting completely off-topic, but I will briefly comment on your points.

1. The Mariensiel arsenal explosion has been covered in my reply to Kutscha. The raid did not set out what it aimed to do, which was to destroy submarines on the stocks in the Bauhafen, 4 kms away from Mariensiel.

2.
- Crap infantry weapons; the British had nothing to equal the PPSh-41 or MG-42 in rate of fire, which is the important thing for infantry.
- Crap tanks; the only half-decent allied tank was the Churchill. The literature on this is extensive eg 'Death By Design' by Peter Beale.
- Crap artillery; the 25-pdr was 88-mm in calibre and could not match the weight of fire delivered by Russian 122-mm, or even German and US 105-mm artillery. No Katyusha or Nebelwerfer. No infantry divisional SP artillery after D-Day.
- Crap tactical support; no accurate dive-bomber, and no armoured IL-2, only vulnerable and inaccurate Spitfire and Typhoon fighter-bombers and mediums.
-Crap leadership; from Stalin down to battalion level, the Russians led everybody, including the Germans, in professionalism.

Tony

[glider1]

Taking your points one at a time

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Glider1, we're getting completely off-topic, but I will briefly comment on your points.

1. The Mariensiel arsenal explosion has been covered in my reply to Kutscha. The raid did not set out what it aimed to do, which was to destroy submarines on the stocks in the Bauhafen, 4 kms away from Mariensiel.

This is covered, I did say it was a lucky hit and there is hardly a building left standing. Also all the vessels had been moved (as far as I can say) so it was a damn good try.

2.
- Crap infantry weapons; the British had nothing to equal the PPSh-41 or MG-42 in rate of fire, which is the important thing for infantry.

You are being a little selective here. The PPsh-41 is a sub machine gun and I did say that the Sten was total rubbish, so we agree on that. I also agree that the UK didn't have anything like the Mg42, but neither did Russia.

- Crap tanks; the only half-decent allied tank was the Churchill. The literature on this is extensive eg 'Death By Design' by Peter Beale.

As is the literature for the performance of the tanks as outlined in my previous posting.

- Crap artillery; the 25-pdr was 88-mm in calibre and could not match the weight of fire delivered by Russian 122-mm, or even German and US 105-mm artillery. No Katyusha or Nebelwerfer. No infantry divisional SP artillery after D-Day.

The 25pd was at least as good as the Germand and US 105. It had a longer range than the former, it was reliable, flexible and in service from the start in good numbers. To compare it against the 122mm is a little off as the 122mm should be compared with the 4.5in which is a good match.
I certainly agree that the British had no Katyusha but I notice that you don't deny that the British fire control system was far more flexible which is a significant advantage in this kind of combat.
I also agree that the British Infantry divisions didn't have SP Artillery, but then again, neither did the Russian Infantry units. However the British Armoured divisions did, how many Russian Tank Divisions had SP Artillery?.

- Crap tactical support; no accurate dive-bomber, and no armoured IL-2, only vulnerable and inaccurate Spitfire and Typhoon fighter-bombers and mediums.

No more vulnerable or inaccurate than the Il-2 as I said before there was a different approach. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter bomber. One thing is for certain, the Typhoon was more able to defend itself against fighters. As for the mediums Russia didn't have anything close to a Beaufighter or Mosquito, let alone the mediums.

-Crap leadership; from Stalin down to battalion level, the Russians led everybody, including the Germans, in professionalism

That I would question, both countries had their good and bad moments.

[Allan125]

Tony

Just where are we going with this continuing discussion, are you trying to batter us all in to submission to accept your points?

Whilst you have stated “I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.....”

I find that I have to totally agree with the comment by Steve Smith “My 30 years of research tells me not to get into an argument with someone who obviously is conformational and argumentative. What I have learnt is that the death of 55,573 young men was not in vain.”

Are you writing your piece simply from your understanding of "Britain 1939-1945; The Economic Cost of Strategic Bombing", by John Fahey, and seeing matters with the benefit of 65 years of hindsight, and “reading online” at that – presumably in the comfort of your house - or did you actually take part in raids as a member of BC, or serve in an armoured unit in your much vaunted Churchill tank, where your comments might have more validity?

Personally, in my own family I had one serving in a fighter wing HQ in 2TAF from Normandy to Denmark, one flew a complete tour with Bomber Command between August ’44 – April ’45, one served in the 22nd Armoured Brigade of 7 Armoured Division from Normandy to the Baltic, and, finally, one served in the desert and Italy with the 8th Army. And all did their best with the equipment that they were issued with, and the orders that they were given at the time, which must have worked as we are deemed to be the victors!

Something which is confirmed by Icare9 in his comment “Like BC, the Army did the best with what it had, not just equipment, but use of tactics to outflank the Germans doggedly resisting the Anglo Canadians. Again, by totally absorbing all the German effort against them, they drew away defenders to allow the Americans to break through, culminating with the Falaise Gap and the abandonment of France by the Germans. And how, if everything they used was poor, did they achieve such a resounding defeat on the Germans?”

Whatever conclusions you come up with, as you do not appear to accept other peoples points of view, it won’t make a scrap of difference now as VE-Day was in 1945, not 2010.

Allan125