Thunderbolts and Mustangs versus the Jagdwaffe (split topic)

[Andy Mac]

Guys you all need to take a holiday

[Juha]

Nash
Thanks for posting the interesting table on typical Spitfire high speed dive.

Juha

[Franek Grabowski]

Bill
I disagree, Normandy was a disaster for Luftwaffe as they have lost not only pilots, but also everything they had in France including radar chain. They could recover from bomber offensive blow, but not from invasion.

[Ruy Horta]

Bill,

Thanks for reviving this older thread.

Your post is most constructive.

Incidentally I just finished Caldwell's and Muller's Defense of the Reich book (more on that still to come).

The combat entry of the Mustang (with the 8th AF) certainly marked a new point in the strategic air war, but I don't think it nor Big Week mark the real turning point. That seems to have come after Normandy.

The Jagdwaffe was always overstretched, after 1942 seldom capable of bringing up sufficient numbers to attain air superiority at any front. During the early phase of the Reichs defense (day) it was capable of waging a war of attrition, but it soon dropped behind losing qualified (pre-43) pilots faster than could be replaced.

There is a point during the battle over the Reich when the Jagdwaffe still knocks down a decent number of enemy heavies, but as a precentage of the increased air armadas their impact is shrinking fast. The Jagdwaffe at this stage has lost the production and training war. It can't bring up the number needed to maintain the same kind of pressure on the ever growing bomber fleet.

The Mustang certainly shrank the available airspace that the Jagdwaffe could control. It extended the range of escorted bomber sorties covering the all important oil targets. But I am still unconvinced that it was the key to this victory.

Arguably without the Mustang the 8th AF would have faced a more difficult struggle, but it could have absorbed the losses and the Thunderbolt was playing catch up. More Lightnings might eventually have done the job as well.

As long as the (numerically limited) Jagdwaffe kept concentrating on fighting the expanding US strategic (8th and 15th)bomber force, the expending US strategic fighter force was practically left to grow unchecked. Where they showed up (even when inferior in number) they basically held the initiative.

If the Jagdwaffe unit was lucky they still had light fighters (or even escorts) in their formation, if not they were handicapped by their specialized anti bomber equipment. As the nachwuchs Jagdwaffe pilots became more specialized in combatting bombers the easier they seem to have fallen to the escorts, like so many plums for the picking.

I'd venture as far as saying that the Jagdwaffe might have sustained a battle of attrition against unescorted US heavies, like they did against the RAF heavies in the night. But it could not fight the escorts as well, it was simply over stretching its limited numbers to the breaking point. However sustaining the battle and stopping the bombers from reaching and destroying their targets is not the same.

Der grosse Schlag might have worked in 1943 (at worst forcing them to join the RAF's night battle), but after that the US numbers were simply too overwhelming.

Although the qualitative breaking point is Normandy, the critical point is fall 1943, the strategic mistake 1940/41 (when the Jagdwaffe failed to grow and even shrunk!!). 1940 also the year of the "project" limitation.

Just some rambling from the ol' armchair ...

[smudger3]

Ruy,

Great tread even for an ardent researcher of RAF Bomber Command, I note you mention in your recent post

“I'd venture as far as saying that the Jagdwaffe might have sustained a battle of attrition against unescorted US heavies, like they did against the RAF heavies in the night. “

Can I just clarify that you are saying that the Jagdwaffe would not have achieved total dominance over the unescorted B17 & B24’s if no escorts were available? I find this hard to believe given the heavy losses sustained by the US “Heavy” bombers even with limited fighter escort and the difficulties these losses in both a/c and aircrew would have imposed on the effectiveness of the US bombing campaign.

Even the heavy armed B17 & B24 could not have survived over Germany, yes they would have inflicted losses of the Jagdwaffe but I feel this would be more in materialistic terms i.e. aircraft. I would hazard a guess and say that the actual loss of Jagdwaffe pilots would have been significantly lower, a similar situation as the RAF in the Battle of Britain, also I believe the Jagdwaffe would have had time to adapt and experiment with different methods of attacking the tight formations without the treat of escorting fighter interception.

[Kutscha]

As can be seen the LW losses more than doubled during the Jan-May 44 period over the previous Sept-Dec 43 period, with only a slight increase in losses from June-Oct 44.



Source: O. Gröhler, "Stärke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im zweiten Weltkrieg", Militärgeschichte 17, pp. 316-336 (1978).

from http://jg26.vze.com/

[drgondog]

Kutscha - thanks for reproducing this chart - I had lost 'memory' of source.

The LuftFlotte/Reich Losses for the period in contrast to the other Western Losses is precisely the foundation for my thesis re: the impact or importance of the Mustang at a critical juncture in Daylight Strategic bombing by 8th and 12th and early 12thAF Ops. The Mustang and to a lesser extent were the sole fighter assets engaging LuftFlotee Reich in this timeframe.

Many historians point to Big Week, and I think for the wrong reasons. The right reasons are that USAAF decided to once again go deep, in force, day after day after the pounding it took in Aug-Oct, 1943. It was the determination and the emergence of the long range escort in increasing numbers that make the Big Week the beginning of the end from my POV.

It is easy to point out that the Luftwaffe, particularly LF Reich continued to inflict 10%+ casualties on the bomber force in January, February, March and April - with the crescendo in April - then only once after April 29. When you look at Kutscha's referenced Reich losses in Jan-May 1944 in contrast to prior and post periods it seems intuitive that this is the period of greatest loss of experienced pilots and leaders with severe consequences on effectiveness after that.

Ruy/Franek - while I hold a separate opinion about the period in which the Luftwaffe was broken, my thesis surrounding the term 'broken' is the point at which the Luftwaffe could no longer inflict the kind of losses that threatened the execution of Daylight Strategic Bombing - there are of course many other valid deinitions and I will not argue against yours.

Regards to all
,
Bill