Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots

[GuerraCivil]

One thing that may give food of thought is how much combat experience Japanese pilots (IJN/IJA) actually adquired in China before the Pacific war. I came accross of this when I did read the interview of a Japanese bomber pilot who served in China in late 1930´s and early 1940´s. He told that he was never attacked by Chinese fighter or even saw one during his missions.

It may have been rather limited experience in China due to limited chances of air combat. For example it is known that IJN´s "Claude" fighters were equipped with drop tanks not only to escort bombers but also to force Chinese in air combat as Chinese usually avoided air combats near front lines. There were also repeated bans from Chinese Air command to be involved in combat with Japanese fighters (it was more important to shoot down bombers and not waste the limited number of planes in fighter vs. fighter combats).

The Chinese Air Force was hit pretty hard already by 1937, and the appearance of Soviet planes and volunteers did not turn the balance. In 1940-1941 Zero pilots managed to have very few combat opportunities against Chinese and they were probably the most one-sided air battles of all times. IIRC, Chinese lost in two combats 27 of their fighters while Zero losses were 0 (the only Zero loss in China in 1940-1941 was due to AA). This created the myth of "invicible Zero" - based on couple of combats against less trained and less experienced enemy flying inferior planes.

So I think that Chinese experience is somewhat overestimated as a practical school of Japanese fighter pilots. Of course some important tactical lessons were learned like the adoption of "loose V" formation which was a significant step ahead from traditional stiff "vic", which Japanese were using still in late 1930´s.

The Nomonhan war against Soviets in 1939 may have been actually more challenging school of combat as Japanese pilots had to fight against numerically superior enemy with technically equal equipment (I-16, I-153) compared to their own planes (Ki-27, Ki-10). It is also important to note, that among Soviet pilots there were battle-hardened veterans of Spanish Civil War (and China). It is a myth that Soviet pilots were all rookies. The best Soviet pilots were at least as good as their Japanese counterparts.

Leaving the massive (and even ridiculous) overclaiming of Nomonhan air war aside, the tactical result in fighter vs. fighter combats in Nomonhan favoured IJA pilots as IJAAF lost 63 fighters in air combat and Soviet fighter regiments lost 130 planes in combat. These figures are based on official loss records of both sides and thus give more reliable picture than the exaggerated claim records of both sides.

[mars]

In the air combat over Guadalcanal, JNAF Zero pilots had to fly 5 hours before they could reach the target area, then after the combat, they would have to fly another 5-hour trip back, that means they could not stay in the area over their target much more than 15 minutes if they wanted to have enough fuel left to bring them back home. If their plane was damaged or they were wounded, then there was a high chance that they would have to ditch in a shark-infested ocean with little chance to survive, not because Japanese Navy did not care about their pilots, it was because Japanese Navy simply did not have enough resource to deploy enough ships or submarines along such a long route for rescue mission. Finally because of the intensity of the combat, even they survived, they would have to come back again and again, very quickly they would be physically and mentally exhausted, So of course, Americans enjoyed a huge home base advantage above Guadalcanal

[GuerraCivil]

I have read that Johny Johnson indeed found Pips Priller´s claims to be accurate. However, he was very doubtful with Marseille´s claims (specially remarkable one day records) and made sceptical comments on them in his memoirs.

Going to IJA / IJN pilots, I do not know who of them or which units have been found to be the most accurate claim records. Who is the top Japanese ace or which is the top IJA/IJN unit by the verification of Allied records? It would be interesting to know - it might well be that the top pilots and top units were other than those ranked by official Japanese records!

I happen to know parallel from the Soviet-Finnish Winter War 1939-1940. Very top Soviet fighter unit was 7 IAP with 68 "confirmed air victories". The recent studies (using Finnish data) have dropped that figure to 9 verified air victories. Other Soviet unit 49 IAP was less successfull in Winter War with 16 "confirmed air victories". However 49 IAP was quite accurate in its claims and Finnish records have confirmed 9 of its air victories. 49 IAP was less rewarded and less famous than 7 IAP, but it destroyed equal number of Finnish planes as 7 IAP. The real difference between the two units was in their way of confirming air victories.

There may have been similar differences in IJA/IJN units depending on the commanders and some IJA/IJN pilots may have been more accurate in their claims than others.

[Broncazonk]

I've been reading John B. Lundstrom's, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign : Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 which is superlative. (I read it cover to cover, and then immediately began reading it again.)

Lundstrom mentions an interesting fact: in the after-action reports of the fighter squadrons that fought in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (24 August, 1942) "several officers commented on the visible deterioration of enemy pilot skills."

Already, in late August, 1942, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Indian Ocean raid, the Battle of Coral Sea, Midway and Aleutian Island foray had taken a visible toll on the quality of the naval aviators of the Kido Butai.

And the battle was only beginning in the Solomons. I never realized how utterly devastating the attrition in the Solomons was to Japanese naval aviation. By late September, Japanese commanders in Rabaul were worried by the quality of Japanese replacement pilots, and by late October of 1942, they were alarmed.

Bronc

[GuerraCivil]

One often forgotten factor is that the medical supplies and maintenance reserves of Japanese frontline units in the Pacific were less than those of the Allied units. For example many Japanese fighter units lacked quinine or other medicines to treat malaria - this was a big problem already in 1942 when Japanese supply lines were already over-stretched. The situation got worse with time when Japanese supply lines came under growing pressure and were often cut by the continuing sinking of Japanese cargo ships by US submarines and aircraft attacks.

At the average level Japanese pilots were more sick and less supplied than their Allied counterparts (who also suffered considerably of the trophical diseases). Many otherwise well-trained and experienced Japanese fighter pilots had to climb to the cockpit of Zero (or Oscar) being ill and almost all Japanese pilots at the South Pacific were weakened by malaria. I have read about some pilots going to combat even when they were suffering of fever. Perhaps this was not so much of stubborn "samurai/banzai" attitude than a reflect of the grim situation when even sick men were forced to combat by their superiors.

You can hardly expect them to have been in top-form in air combat - the sick man in the cockpit is slower to react in combat situations and his instincts are less sharp than those of the healthy (or less sick) pilot.

This may have been a considerable handicap for the overseas IJA/IJN units in South Pacific and one of the very reasons why the combat skills of Japanese pilots seemed to go down already during the mid/late 1942. When it comes to the training level and average skills of IJA/IJN pilots by late 1942/early 1943 I guess that they were still higher than by late 1943 and 1944.

[Juha]

For that Japanese can only accuse the shortsightness of their high command, in late 30s Java produced some 97% of the world's quinine supply, so they had lots of quinine available and could have transported it to the SWPacific area if they had decided so, on subs if necessary.

[Broncazonk]

Another interesting fact contained in John B. Lundstrom's, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign : Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 is the incredible distance Japanese pilots were flying to engage marine and navy F4F Wildcats, all of 560-miles ONE WAY (Lakunai airfield, Rabaul to Lunga Point.) The marines went ashore on 7 August, (Henderson Field became operational on 20 August,) and by 12 September, after only thirty-six (36) days of flying that enormous distance back and forth, mission after grueling mission, Base Air Force Rabaul was down to 97 operational aircraft from a pre-invasion T.O. of 277 aircraft. (45 operational Zero fighters, out of 106 operational Zeros on 6 August, (BUT only 17 of these were Type 21's that could actual get to Guadalcanal, the rest were Type 32's,) and 30 operational Bettys out of 120.)

Japanese planners took giants steps down the Solomons...without constructing intermediate support bases and airfields!

Bronc

[GuerraCivil]

If I have understood correctly the Japanese fighter pilots had to keep the drop tanks even during the combat over Guadalcanal in order to have enough fuel reserves to fly back to Rabaul or other Japanese airfields like the one in the Buka island. This must have been some handicap in the combat situation - drop tank means extra weight, more drag and less manouverability in combat.

Taking in account all the circumstances and the Japanese handicaps the real question is not why Japanese lost but how Japanese managed to keep pressure on Guadalcanal as long as they did.

The biggest problem in the Japanese strategy at the Pacific was that it was too ambitious for their limited resources like the inadequate logistics and maintenance structure.

By mid 1942 Japanese were already too overstretched to make any further progress and they could not replace their losses as easily as the US and its allies. Even when the air victory records were relatively good for Japanese, the relative losses were much higher for the Japanese side. A Wildcat shot down over Guadalcanal could be repaired or used for spare parts and its pilot could save himself by bailing out or making a belly landing. A Zero shot down was completely lost as well as its pilot.

One should note that by late 1942 Japanese were still relatively strong and could win some battles like in the Santa Cruz on 25.-27.10.1942 which to my knowledge was a clear tactical victory for the Japanese. I would dare to say that by late 1942 Japanese pilots and their planes were still quite competitive with their US/Allied counterparts although the balance was already favourable for the Allied side.

When one takes in account the US/Allied opinions of the "inferiority" of Japanse fighters pilots in late 1942 one should remember the common overclaiming factory, of which following examples of the air combat records over Guadalcanal:

24.8.1942 - US combat claims on 11 destroyed Japanese bombers and 5 destroyed fighters - real Japanese combat losses: 3 bombers and 1 fighter

26.8.1942 - US claims: eight bombers and five fighters destroyed - real Japanese losses: 3 fighters

Between 18.-23.10.1942 US pilots claimed to have destroyed as many as 50 Japanese fighters whereas the actual Japanese losses were 12.

Source: F4F vs. A6M Zero Sen - Pacific Theater 1942 (by E.M. Young 2013)

This kind of combat records (made in perhaps good but erroneus faith) must have added something on the comments of the "deteriorating combat skills" of the adversary....

[NickM]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

If I have understood correctly the Japanese fighter pilots had to keep the drop tanks even during the combat over Guadalcanal in order to have enough fuel reserves to fly back to Rabaul or other Japanese airfields like the one in the Buka island. This must have been some handicap in the combat situation - drop tank means extra weight, more drag and less manouverability in combat.

Taking in account all the circumstances and the Japanese handicaps the real question is not why Japanese lost but how Japanese managed to keep pressure on Guadalcanal as long as they did.

The biggest problem in the Japanese strategy at the Pacific was that it was too ambitious for their limited resources like the inadequate logistics and maintenance structure.


By mid 1942 Japanese were already too overstretched to make any further progress and they could not replace their losses as easily as the US and its allies. Even when the air victory records were relatively good for Japanese, the relative losses were much higher for the Japanese side. A Wildcat shot down over Guadalcanal could be repaired or used for spare parts and its pilot could save himself by bailing out or making a belly landing. A Zero shot down was completely lost as well as its pilot.

One should note that by late 1942 Japanese were still relatively strong and could win some battles like in the Santa Cruz on 25.-27.10.1942 which to my knowledge was a clear tactical victory for the Japanese. I would dare to say that by late 1942 Japanese pilots and their planes were still quite competitive with their US/Allied counterparts although the balance was already favourable for the Allied side.

When one takes in account the US/Allied opinions of the "inferiority" of Japanse fighters pilots in late 1942 one should remember the common overclaiming factory, of which following examples of the air combat records over Guadalcanal:

24.8.1942 - US combat claims on 11 destroyed Japanese bombers and 5 destroyed fighters - real Japanese combat losses: 3 bombers and 1 fighter

26.8.1942 - US claims: eight bombers and five fighters destroyed - real Japanese losses: 3 fighters

Between 18.-23.10.1942 US pilots claimed to have destroyed as many as 50 Japanese fighters whereas the actual Japanese losses were 12.

Source: F4F vs. A6M Zero Sen - Pacific Theater 1942 (by E.M. Young 2013)

This kind of combat records (made in perhaps good but erroneus faith) must have added something on the comments of the "deteriorating combat skills" of the adversary....

Well let us not forget that lots of the ace pilots (Sasai, Ota among others) of the IJN land based fighter force were killed over The 'Canal'; the long flight to & from Rabaul along with fatigue & illness certainly wore down the pilots of the Tainan Wing

[Kutscha]

That doesn't make sense GC. Fuel in the drop tanks would be used first.

I think a more logical explanation for keeping the drop tanks on is a lack of drop tanks. That is, supply could not keep up with demand.