Me-410 vs Mosquito combat

[Nick Beale]

The ineffectiveness of the barbettes throws an interesting light on the persistent Luftwaffe interest in such equipment. Perhaps they should have stayed away from this technical innovation altogether.

Was any bomber defensive armament — any type, any nation — all that effective, aircraft by aircraft? Or did it only come into its own in big formations?

[Juha]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Was any bomber defensive armament — any type, any nation — all that effective, aircraft by aircraft? Or did it only come into its own in big formations?

Of course much depends how one define effective but IIRC Do 217s of KG 2 shot down or crippled several night fighters.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Juha

Of course much depends how one define effective but IIRC Do 217s of KG 2 shot down or crippled several night fighters.

Sure, there were successes but I have wondered whether the gunners in a night bomber (e.g. a Lancaster) were more useful as look-outs, triggering evasive action, than as armed defenders.

[Juha]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Sure, there were successes but I have wondered whether the gunners in a night bomber (e.g. a Lancaster) were more useful as look-outs, triggering evasive action, than as armed defenders.

IIRC RAF thought after WW2 that if there was any reasonable benefit (when compared to the weight penalty and the cost of a rear turret) of the rear turret it was mostly from the gunners acting as look-outs and because of the appearence of rear-warning radars they dumped the rear turret. On the other hand USAF kept them, maybe at least partly because of their daytime experiences. The only post-WW2 aircombat fought in the Finnish airspace was between an US RB-47 and two Soviet MiG-17s.

[John Beaman]

Of course, in considering the effectiveness of gunners in bombers, one must also consider the claims the gunners made versus the real damage they did. For example, on the first USAAF 8th AF raid on Lille in 1942, gunners were credited with 102 Germans shot down. The real answer was 2. But the USAAF and the RAF considered it important to give these credits even though, via ULTRA, the Commanders knew them not to be true. So, was it important for the bomber crews, and the public at large, to feel gunners were being effective? Likely so, and no bomber commander would have considered removing the guns!

Positive propaganda and illusions of success are more important in wartime than the truth.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Juha

On the other hand USAF kept them...

As did the Soviets, come to think of it.

And, in reply to John, I read a book by Bill Gunston where he suggested that as more RAF bombers were lost by engine damage than injury to the pilot, statistical logic would have suggested removing the crew's armour and protecting the engines instead. The problem was that the crew had strong feelings about the matter and the engines didn't.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Juha

Of course much depends how one define effective but IIRC Do 217s of KG 2 shot down or crippled several night fighters.

Hello Juha,

Thank you for mentioning a case of which I was not aware. Do you know of any good sources which describe KG 2's encounters with night fighters? This is not something I have read about in detail before, so any hints would be helpful.

Originally Posted by John Beaman

Positive propaganda and illusions of success are more important in wartime than the truth.

Hello John,

You are right to an extent, but it can be safely said that it is not possible to win a war with "illusions of success" . The fact that the 8th and 15th Air Force bombers could inflict constant, if relatively minor, losses on German fighters is in fact a demonstration of the enormous degree of US technical superiority during the war. No other combatant could hope to achieve anything similar, the Augsburg raid by Lancasters in 1942 being just one illustration of the very heavy losses experienced on daylight raids. To put it explicitly, the USAAF had the equipment to do almost anything it wished, even in 1942. It was only when the 8th set itself extraordinary objectives, like bombing Schweinfurt, that it suffered unbearable losses. The RAF and especially the Luftwaffe would never have been in that position in the first place, since they did not posess the numbers of high-quality aircraft that US industry could produce.

Regards,

Paul

[Juha]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Hello Juha,

Thank you for mentioning a case of which I was not aware. Do you know of any good sources which describe KG 2's encounters with night fighters? This is not something I have read about in detail before, so any hints would be helpful...

Hello Paul
Ulf Balke: Der Luftkrieg in Europa Teil 2 (1990). It is the second part of the Balke's excellent history of the KG 2.

HTH
Juha

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Paul
Ulf Balke: Der Luftkrieg in Europa Teil 2 (1990). It is the second part of the Balke's excellent history of the KG 2.

HTH
Juha

Hello Juha,

Thank you, I will look up Balke in the next couple of months.

Originally Posted by Richard Aigner

Rawnsley was John "Cat Eyes" Cunningham's radar operator.
HTH, Richard

Hello Richard,

Thank you for the tip!

Regards,

Paul

[Rainer]

The gunners were certainly not very effective in destroying enemy fighters in high numbers, but they forced the attackers to develope other tactics or weapons to evade the field of fire of the gunners. The German night fighters for example developed the "Schräge Musik" armament that enabled them to fire at the bombers without being shot at by the tail gunner. Interesting is that the Allied night fighters did not use this tactic, probably because they never encountered bombers as heavily armed as the Lancaster or Halifax?

Compared to "Schräge Musik" that initially was a field modification which found its way to the industrial production, the barbettes of the Me 410 are in my opinion typical for the German "overengineering" of certain technical aspects.