US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production

[Dan History]

Originally Posted by ArtieBob

As the war progressed, the number of Ju 87 dive bomber and ground attack a/c were reinforced by Schlacht versions of the Fw 190. Were these also used in a air to air fighter role , thereby reducing the need for BF 109s and Fw 190 in a primary fighter role? I do not have data on this, but it would seem that the number of air to air victories by the ground attack units would be a primary indicator. I also have data that the per sortie loss rates of LW a/c were significantly lower in the East than in the West. This would seem to indicate that the needed replacement rate would also be lower in the East. Please comment.

Hello Art,

Good to be able to exchange thoughts with you again. I am glad my study from 2016 still attracts keen interest!

The Schlacht versions of the Fw 190 were not used in particularly great quantities until late into the war, something which is not easy to understand when reading the published literature. Some primary source statistics for February 1944, a month of heavy battles in the East:

Average Fw 190 strength for the month, in all operational units: 674
Average Fw 190 strength for the month, in Schlacht units only: 162 (hence, 24% of total Fw 190 strength)

The breakdown of the Schlacht arm by aircraft type during the month, the figures are again monthly averages:
Ju 87: 455
Fw 190: 162
Hs 129: 52
Hs 123: 10
Total (sum of above): 679


The total number of known aerial victory claims by Schlacht units on the Eastern front is less than 900 - Johannes may have an exact figure readily to hand, though of course not all Schlacht claims are known. Remember that ground-attack pilots were not trained for air combat, so even though the ground-attack Fw 190s were relatively high-performance types, compared to very inferior Soviet fighter aircraft, they could not routinely engage hostile aircraft.

The career of August Lambert, the ground-attack pilot with by far the highest number of aerial victory claims, illustrates the point very well. He claimed 97 of his 103 victories within less than a month over the Crimea - claims which should be regarded with considerable suspicion, both because they were submitted during such a short time period, and because they abruptly came to an end. When Lambert met USAAF Mustangs on 17 April 1945, he was rapidly shot down and killed.

There were not enough Schlacht Fw 190s in the East to make much of a difference until late in the war, and they were in any case only rarely used as fighters. To cite some more February 1944 figures, the Luftwaffe's average frontline single-engine fighter strength for the month was 1,725, of which only 362 were in the East. Even if all the 162 Schlacht Fw 190s had been in the East (41 were in fact in Italy), and even if they were all capable of being used as fighters, this would have changed the strategic situation very little.

You are right that, broadly speaking, German loss rates per sortie on the Eastern front were much lower than against the Western Allies, though this was not a universal phenomenon. As a percentage of strength, rather than sorties flown, losses in the East also became catastrophic in the later months of the war - the Luftwaffe was badly outnumbered and its pilots barely trained.

More broadly, the air war on the Eastern front has been grossly misinterpreted, along with many other aspects of the history of the World Wars, because it has been rarely analysed in full context - as a part of a multi-front, global war. The air war in the East was peripheral to the course of the First World War, and it became so at a relatively early stage of the Second. I have discussed some of these issues in an article available for free, online, see historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-nazis-no-air-power/

Best regards,


Dan

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

The air war in the East was peripheral to the course of the First World War, and it became so at a relatively early stage of the Second.

According to Koller's papers, in 1944 the combat sorties ratio East vs all other theaters was roughly 2:1 (it should also be taken into account that in the Northern and Southern Theater some part of the sorties (sometimes perhaps the largest) were also directed against the Soviet Union, but compared with the main figures, this is not very important).

In January 1945 this ratio was more than 3.5:1, in February 5:1, in the following months undoubtedly even more so.

22.6.41-1942 most of the sorties were also in the East, for obvious reasons.

The number of sorties in 1943 is unknown, but given that even in 1944 most of the sorties were in the East, it is logical to assume that in 1943 the ratio was far more than 2:1.

So why did the Luftwaffe do most of their combat sorties in the "peripheral theater"? What a tragic mistake for them!

And this is not to mention the fact that the air war was an integral part of the war as a whole, and not the most important one.

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hi Lynn,

Yes, in January-October 1944 the difference between the number of Bf109 (J + NA) according to RL2-VI/202 and Zellen according to R3/1926 was from minus 3.5% to plus 18.3% in favour of Zellen. This can well be explained without resorting to the hypothesis of deliberate lying.

In November and December, this difference increased to 54.9% and 116.5%. It seems to me that this can be explained (besides lies) by two reasons:

1. It is possible that planned numbers are given for November and December, and not actual ones. We do not know the date of this document.

2. Increasing logistical problems may have prevented the timely transformation of Zellen into fully completed Bf109s to a greater extent than it was prior to November.

Cheers,
Andrey

[edwest2]

Gentlemen,


The use of terms like "logistical problems" should be avoided and replaced with what can be shown in contemporary documents. After the RAF raid on Peenemünde in August 1943, construction of underground facilities began. SS General Hans Kammler was tasked with moving V-2 (A-4) production underground. By March 1944, the SS was involved in creating underground installations for the production of fighter aircraft, and in August, 1944, took over operational control for launching the V-2. The Allies realized the Germans were moving men and equipment at night and developed photo-flash bombs designed to work with a camera mounted on an aircraft. Final assembly of fighters also occurred inside unused railroad tunnels. I have seen an unpublished photo of several Fw 190s just outside a tunnel opening.


Best,
Ed

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello Ed,

Originally Posted by edwest2

The use of terms like "logistical problems" should be avoided and replaced with what can be shown in contemporary documents.

Undoubtedly, a lot of logistical problems were caused by air raids. It's obvious.

Best regards,
Andrey

[lritger]

Ed, there is no better way to describe the primary situation facing German production facilities in late 1944 other than "logistical problems". To satisfy your request though, I offer the following from page 1152, reel 12, frame 6580 of the Milch notes - a verbatim translation of the stenographic notes of the 9 Dec 1944 Rüstungsstab meeting:

"Dr Holzknecht reports on the expected slump in the output of 109, 190 and 152 as a result of transport difficulties due to insufficient urgency. Decision by HDL Saur as to whether program breaks can be accepted or whether transportation can be brought forward at the expense of other production."

So yes, "logistical problems" would certainly be a proper term to describe the myriad problems facing German factories and subcontractors in late 1944.

As an aside - an important one - Andrey's response prompted me to look back through the entirety of R3/1926 and I think I may have found the answer to the question of why those Nov/Dec 44 numbers are so far removed from reality. It's complicated, and required cross-referencing a number of other documents, but the short version is this: Andrey's proposal that they may represent PROJECTED completion numbers may be correct, based on other information in the 9 Nov 1944 Rüstungs-Notprogramm and a separate document found in T77-0032 covering projected fuel use requirements for 1945. And if it is correct, whomever put that chart together on page 88 of R3/1926 should be slapped. I'm working on a post which ties all this together... more soon.

Cheers,

Lynn

[edwest2]

Lynn,


Thank you for your reply. I don't wish to add further complications but other means had to be employed to continue aircraft assembly. I submit that as control of production was ceded to the SS, then operations like Bodenplatte occurred in 1945. Saur was only one component in a changeover in duties created by a situation of great urgency. This occurred at a time when it was assumed the Luftwaffe was starved of fuel and supplies. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that synthetic fuel and lubricants were available.

American G.I.s thought they'd be home by Christmas, 1944. They also did not expect the Wacht am Rhein situation.

Finally, I only mentioned "logistical problems" for the reason of providing context to your readers. Sometimes, people hear terms like this and don't really understand them.


Best,
Ed

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hi Lynn,

Originally Posted by lritger

I'm working on a post which ties all this together... more soon

That's very interesting! I'm looking forward.

Cheers,
Andrey

[lritger]

Good morning gents,

Well, the more I look at other production planning and delivery documents from late 44/early 45, the less I understand about the Nov/Dec 1944 figures in R 3/1926, pg 88. Andrey's suggestion that they could possibly be projected delivery figures is probably the best assumption, but in order for that to be true, we would have to ignore all previous precedent in how Luftwaffe production targets were documented.

The entire report deals with the potential impact of a 25% cut in production targets across the entire German armaments industry for the Rüstungs-Notprogramm of Nov 1944, as a result of material shortages; a header sheet for the report and subsequent Anlagen is found on page 72, dated 9 Nov 44. On page 83 we find a line concerning the Bf 109; it lists the production deliveries in July, Aug, and Sept and they all match perfectly with the report on page 88. So far, so good. It also notes the decreased monthly delivery target from 450 (Altes Soll) to 300 (Neues Soll) monthly... the intent was to run out production of the 109 in favor of the 262 and Ta 152.

However, a separate report dated 30 Nov 1944 which projected fuel needs for 1945 lists something entirely different (see attached). This document, found in NARA T77-0032, lists a monthly "Ausbringung" (output or delivery) for all Luftwaffe types still in service as of that date, and the projected delivery totals in that document seem to be much more in line with previous monthly deliveries; Dec 44 shows an original projected count of 1426 Bf 109s, and a 25% reduction changes that target to 1070. January 45 went from 1850 to 1388, Feb 45 went from 1860 to 1395, etc. All of those numbers fit with the production numbers from the first half of 1944, and also show a gradual decrease through 1945 as 109 production is wound down in favor of more effective aircraft.



So I don't know if the projected figures in R 3/1926 were intended simply as a "trial balloon" or what... nothing seems to fit. The numbers for other aircraft in Nov and Dec 44 are entirely reasonable - 35 Ar 234s each month, 325 Me 262s in Nov and 500 in Dec (this makes sense in the context of what they were hoping to achieve), 17 Ju 388s in Nov and 20 in Dec... those all seem reasonable. So why in the world would the 109 and 190 counts be so wildly out of line with everything else? I don't know that we will ever get a good answer to this, but there are enough other documents out there to state that R 3/1926's projections for 109s in Nov/Dec 44 would have to be considered outliers.



But we have to at least consider whether the info in this doc somehow made it down to the troops, even in the vaguest of terms. (Yes, I know it says "Geheime Reichssache"). If we look at the distribution list for this report, no one from the Luftwaffe is on it! Look at R 3/1926 pg 74 and 75... the distribution list goes to OKW (Oberkommando Wehrmacht), GenStdH (Generalstab des Heeres), and so on. Seems like we can't entirely discount the possibility that Army leadership said "Hey guys, just hang on, we're going to be seeing thousands of Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs ANY DAY NOW", setting an expectation which could never be met. (Again, this is merely a hypothesis based on the facts we know)

Anyways, it's a very interesting topic- Andrey, I appreciate you bringing this up!

Cheers,

Lynn

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hi Lynn,

thank you a lot for the pointing to T77-0032. A very interesting roll.

Originally Posted by lritger

On page 83 we find a line concerning the Bf 109

page 86, not 83

Since the document is dated 9.Nov.44, it is clear that the figures for November-December were projected indeed.

October 1944:
1642 Bf109 accepted by Luftwaffe (or, more accurately, so many Bf109s went through Lw.Gen.Qu, there could have been more in total) - according to RL2-VI/202;
1836 Zellen of Bf109 were produced, according to R3/1926.

So the 2,350 Zellen planned for Nov.44 don't seem like such a fantastic number. Undoubtedly, in reality they were produced much less, but other German plans during this period also came true poorly.

Originally Posted by lritger

Seems like we can't entirely discount the possibility that Army leadership said "Hey guys, just hang on, we're going to be seeing thousands of Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs ANY DAY NOW"

I think at that time the role of the last hope (game-changer) was performed by the mythical Wunderwaffe, and not by the countless fighters that were about to appear. But this, of course, is just a guess.

Cheers,
Andrey