Placing the Fairey Battle.

[Kutscha]

By the time the P-51s were flying escort to Berlin, in numbers, so was the P-47.

The P-47N gave excellent service escorting B-29s to Japan from the same bases P-51s were flying from.

[Graham Boak]

Thanks for your correction: I was indeed thinking of unit(s) within the 7th Armoured. However, this does not change the fact that the landing plans called for the capture of Caen on the first evening, and that the capture of Caen and the surrounding plains was of great importance for the operation of 2TAF in support of the Army. Hence the diferences that arose within the Allied Commands.

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

Re Right of the Line: this is a book that gives full backing to the strategic bombing offensive that you castigate, and completely fails to cover operations outside the UK, with the all-important emphasis of tactical operations and the cooperation between ground and air developed under Tedder, Coningham and Montgomery. I don't believe that the author has grasped wider issues of air power, particularly in this key matter.

Re the long range fighter: I stated that the matter of a long range fighter was continually raised in the highest quarters, not that Portal was personally in favour. The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events. Given that the RAF did not have long range bombers operating in daylight, it is easy to understand why the creation of a long range fighter escort force was not a priority, but neither was it totally ignored.

[RodM]

Hi Graham,

"The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events."

No. 11 Group was providing Mustang escorts for daylight Bomber Command raids from late 1944 onwards. Although I don't have figures immediately at hand, I can say that, as an example, the RAF raid on Hamburg on 31/3/45 was escorted by "12 squadrons" of RAF Mustangs.

Cheers

Rod

[Graham Boak]

Yes, but the orders were placed long before then. The RAF were supplied with limited numbers of P-51B/C fighters from 1943, but priority was given to the 8thAF. I feel that this was the correct priority for the overall Allied cause, but it gives a misleading impression of a lower RAF interest in long-range fighters than actually was the case. The numbers of aircraft supplied to the RAF rose after D-Day, permitting the conversion of more squadrons to the P-51: there is a suggestion that some of these were 8th AF veterans but I don't think that has been verified.

[Kutscha]

The first RAF base to receive Mustang IIIs was at Gravesend in Kent. The Mustang III initially equipped No. 65 Squadron in late December of 1943, followed by No. 19 Squadron in March of 1944. Later the Mk. III also equipped Nos 64, 65, 66, 93, 94, 112, 118, 122, 126, 129, 165, 234, 237, 241 249, 250, 260, 268, 306, 309, 315, 316, 345, 430, 441, 442, and 516 Squadrons and No. 541 Squadron of RAF Coastal Command.

The RAF Mustang IIIs began operations late in February 1944, escorting US heavy bombers as well as both US and RAF medium bombers.

[Kutscha]

The first P-39C (Ser No 40-2971) flew in January of 1941. The Army discovered almost immediately that the P-39C was not combat ready, since it lacked armor and self-sealing tanks.

Gee, your much toted P-39 did not have armor and self-sealing fuel tanks and flew some 17 months after WW2 had started. One would think that lessons would have been learned by then and been incorperated in the design from the start.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.
There were lots of 2TAF RP Typhoons around on D-Day, but no forward air controller. There was a naval liaison officer with 3 Div but he was killed, so no 11-inch guns could be used. There was no Flak to worry Vengeances had they been released from target-towing duties in Devon. RP Typhoons were unavailable but were not the answer. Sherman tanks were available but likewise not the answer. Maybe bombs delivered by the Vengeances were also no answer, but they were the best bet after ships' guns.
The infantry should have had dive-bombers under command, as the Royal Artillery had Austers under command flown by gunners but supplied and serviced by the RAF. Gunner forward observation officers lived with the infantry battalions who felt they had their 'own' troop of three 25-pdrs. The FOO had only to call in an emergency and the troop would always drop what it was doing and come to the help of 'its' infantry battalion. If the threat was severe, the FOO could call on a battery, or a regiment, or higher. The FOO's decision was never questioned - unlike the case in the US Army which never trusted their FOO's with that discretion.
The Army tried to develop this kind of unit relationship between squadrons and brigades, and between sections and battalions. But the RAF always categorically refused. All they would allow was the permament allocation of a Group to an Army. So Typhoon pilots never met the infantry they supported, and never got their feedback.
The wrong aircraft with the wrong weapon in the wrong organisation gave the wrong result.

[Juha]

Tony
“The RAF lost 47,000 aircrew, some say 55,000. Compare that with the 30,000 killed in the U-Bootwaffe.”

What the h… is the meaning of that comparasion? One can compare the losses of RAF vs LW or vs. VVS or losses of U-Bootwaffe vs Submarine servises of RN, USN or Soviet Navy but are you next time comparing losses of LW to the losses of Submarine service of RN?

“And there was no significant CAS on D-Day or for days afterwards.”

Sometimes I seem to be able to agree with you by some extent!

IIRC 12. SSPzD sent a recon detachment to the coast while waiting Hitler’s permit to attack the Allied beachhead. These armoured cars and armoured half-tracks arrived without too much inference by Allied a/c and were able to give useful info to div HQ.

And when the CO of 21. PzD finally arrived and started act correctly, the div was able to disengage from the eastern bank of was that Orne, move back to Caen, drive through that town and attack against advancing Commonwealth forces without too much inference by Allied a/c. IIRC it lost some 8 tanks in Caen or just outside it, but the attack of the tank-heavy Kampfgruppe was stopped by Commonwealth anti-tank screen with a loss of IIRC some 30 PzIVs. The infantry-heavy KG got to beach between two Commonwealth invasion beaches but was withdrawn because a supply drop to the British Airborne Div was interpret as an airlanding against their LoC. Now IMHO is that the KG would not change the course of battle because at least naval artillery would have made their life miserable near beaches but anyway they would have been a potential threat to the troops on nearby beaches.

So it doesn’t seem that the CAS on June 6th, at least outside landing beaches, was very effective. And it’s ironic that the clearly most effective CAS a/c was the transport planes, probably Dakotas, on that day.


“There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.”

IMHO you give too much importance to Hillman debacle. And Vengeances would not be able to help because to problem was lack of info. But you are right that the basic problem was the lack of RAF control team, what they were called, FAO?

Juha

[Franek Grabowski]

Tony
If I recall, 30,000 German sailors were some 3/4 of the force. How about RAF losses?
Concerning Il-2 article, I would have to finish it, add some new and astonishing details, and then translate to English, but who would be interested in publishing it?
Concerning deliveries, no RAF did not get anything they wanted (and there were serious conflicts as what they wanted), and not in quantities. Several aircraft were simply failures, say eg. Battle, Defiant, Warwick, other not available in quantities. Nonetheless RAF should not be blamed for incompetence of Army and Navy in their orders.

Concerning escorts, Polish Mustang Wing was operational in April 1944 and flew escorts deep into Germany. During Normandy and following diver campaign they were in the other duties but reverted to escort in the Autumn 1944.

[Graham Boak]

Tcolvin: Please read at least one book on the RN's ship building policy, particularly battleships, between the wars before blaming everything you see as wrong with British war preparedness on the strategic bombing policy. The newer British battleships were designed within the constraints of international treaties, in the context of a shipbuilding industry (and national economy) in deep depression, in a reluctance to invest in new gun and armour foundries, with the constraint of the lack of large drydocks in and outside the UK, and even a fear of torpedo boats. There were enough funds between the wars to build some new battleships: their size was chosen for doctrinal and industrial reasons rather than because of specific funding limits caused by the handful of heavy bombers. I rather doubt that the entire RAF Strategic Bomber force in 1935 cost as much as one battleship.

Perhaps you could also quote the real ratios of funds given to the Army, navy and AirForce in the 1930s?

You seem to have lost contact with reality. No one can just take an aircraft in use for target towing, strap a bomb on it, find some convenient airmen and send them out against an inconvenient bunker! You want a dive bomber force (in itself an perfectly arguable option) then you start preparing for it two years in advance to select the aircraft (which the RAF had, as a back-up policy), then select and train your crews. Could you perhaps tell us the thickness of this bunker, and then let us judge whether the bombs from any divebomber could have made any impression at all? If the firepower from the massed ranks of warships could not have been brough to bear because of the loss of the ground control, how was this nebulous force of divebombers with non-existing concrete-busting weapons to be brought to bear?