German & Allied radar

[edwest]

More info about German radar:


http://www.cdvandt.org/jagdschloss.htm



Ed

[Crumpp]

the most efficient solution had an emphasis on naval operations, with the air force in support.

I agree. IMHO, it would have take a comprehensive and prolonged assault with considerably more resources than Germany possed at the time.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Bruce Dennis]

In fact the coastal convoy routes were extremely vulnerable to attack from air and sea, and coastal artillery as well. The Royal Navy was not equipped to defend the Channel from air attack, which had been the responsibility of the RAF in all prewar planning, but the RAF had just been in a fight in France that had specifically not been a part of prewar planning. The threat to shipping was seen as paramount at the time, and shaped events that followed. German air superiority would have necessitated a drastic and possibly fatal rethink of the means of supplying the south of England with everything carried by the coastal traffic, from coal to wood. Since invasion was assumed to follow shortly after a German victory, priority was being given to defensive planning. There was no realistic alternative method of supply prepared, and the importance of British coastal trade cannot be emphasised enough.


Concerning radar, rather than get into a ‘what if’ debate, may I just say that the reasons for my conclusions are based on the appreciation at the time of where the greatest threats lay, and ‘how many fighters’ was only a part of that. What had been seen as enough fighters to defend the island had been depleted and the demands on Fighter Command were to become enourmous. The over-riding concern at the time was where to put the fighters and when to fly them. The other factors used by historians, such as fighter repair and replacement rates, would have been completely different if fed into a scenario wherein the front line aircraft were not used efficiently. That is where the advantage of radar and it’s efficient use must be placed, as the factor that enabled the controllers to obtain the maximum from the aircraft available, without wastage in false starts and late interceptions. It was not, as I see it, a case of the radar being merely a component of the system: the entire air defence of the UK was built around and dependent upon it with no effective means of filling the void had it been knocked out.

Bruce

[Jérémie Tarpon]

In order to assess the respective efficiency of the Allied and German radars, it is also useful to consider how the Luftwaffe performed against the Allied air attacks, especially from mid-1941 to mid-1943 when JG 2, JG 26 and JG 1/JG 11 resisted a growing air offensive in the West without having to divert strength from the Russian front. Of course, the objectives of Fighter Command were not those of the Luftwaffe in 1940, but it may be argued that its leaders did the same mistakes than Göring during the BoB, applying rigid tactics against a flexible fighter force guided by an obviously efficient ground control system. Besides other factors (like the superiority of Fw 190s over Spitfire Vs), the Luftwaffe had the advantage of being able to ignore the (rather weak in the mid-war period) effects of daylight bombing on occupied territories, so as to fight only when the more favourable conditions were met; but one important role of ground control is exactly to create these "more favourable conditions".

It would thus be interesting to assess the part played by the German radar and ground control system in this undecisive, but IMHO real German victory.

Jérémie

[Juha]

Hello Crump
the sortie rate in message #41 is probably misleading, probably comparing the real FC sorties to the LW sorties observed by British. According to Hooton's Eagle in Flame p. 14 LW flew Aug 12-18 2150 bomber sorties of which 1650 were daytime and 3825 fighter sorties vs 4730 FC day and 186 night sorties. So in daytime LW flew more sorties but FC flew more sorties than LW fighters. Of course I should dig out also BC sorties but I have not time for that right now.

Juha

[Crumpp]

Approx. 1/3 of FC's ~1100 fighters (~366) were not in the battle area. This gives the Germans an approximate 3:2 advantage in s/e fighters and over 3:1 overall in the battle area.

Not according to the RAF's official history of the Battle of Britain.

[Franek Grabowski]

Official histories tend to be subjects of propaganda!

[Crumpp]

Official histories tend to be subjects of propaganda!

Conspiracy theory.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Conspiracy theory.

OK, then official histories tend to represent a state of knowledge that is later improved upon.

[Crumpp]

OK, then official histories tend to represent a state of knowledge that is later improved upon.

Certainly.

Each must be taken in its own light. The official history of the Battle of Britain is far from the popular version.

The popular version has the RAF heavily outnumbered with England's fate teetering on the actions of the few in Spitfires.

While there is little doubt the most important factor of the battle was the men who fought it doing their jobs. The official history combines their bravery on the battlefield with the fruition of pre-war planning, a numeric parity combined with good tactical use of force multipliers backed up by one of the most innovative logistical organizations of the day.

There is simply nothing to compare to the CRO in Europe in 1940 AFAIK.

The pre-war production planning ensured the production assets were in place to completely outstrip German production. It allowed the RAF to increase the size of the operational squadrons and the overall force in a very short time period.

The CRO ensured that these expanded squadrons were rarely below strength when German units were operating at greatly reduced strengths.

The RAF documentation on fighter establishment, strength, and wastage very much backs up the official history version.

Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Bombers 1,569 1,481 998
Dive-bombers 348 327 261
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
Twin-engine fighters 301 289 224
Reconnaissance 246 195 151
Ground attack 40 39 31
Coastal 94 93 80
Total 3,609 3,358 2,550


Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Hurricanes 723 721 656
Spitfires 366 374 334
Total 1,089 1,095 990

In fact the logistical groundwork which paved the way for England's victory is studied today by professional defense force logistical organizations.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443

The primary mission of the Office of the Air Force Journal of Logistics is to publish the Air Force Journal of Logistics, the Air Force's only professional journal for logistics, engineering, and services.

http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/2_afjl_mission_page.html

All the best,

Crumpp