German & Allied radar

[Juha]

Hello Crumpp

Quote: ” The CRO would make up 99% of the losses by morning.”

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9. it seems that that had not happened. Most sqns didn’t scramble the supposed 12 fighters but 10-11 fighters. Only 11 Group reserve sqns at Tangmere sent oversized sqns and they scrabled exactly same number of fighters than they had had serviceable in the evening of 14th.

Quote:” Units did not repair or "own" the individual aircraft. As they were damaged, they were exchanged for new/repaired aircraft. The CRO would then repair and recycle the airframe.”

I know and have known for years. Or IIRC more exactly sqns repaired their own a/c if they had capacity to do that, if not they exchanged damaged for new/repaired a/c.

Juha

[Crumpp]

know and have known for years. Or IIRC more exactly sqns repaired their own a/c if they had capacity to do that, if not they exchanged damaged for new/repaired a/c.

Juha, I think you are thinking of the old system the RAF used. That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.

Prior to this period, each flight within a squadron was a self-contained unit for repair and maintenance, up to write-offs. This was altered to a three-flight arrangement under which two flights undertook day-to-day maintenance and the third flight all major inspections and repair. This system remained in force during the first year of the war, but experience in the Battle of Britain exposed significant weaknesses. As the operational tempo increased, squadrons were moved at more frequent intervals. The result was that squadrons became increasingly detached from their support staff. In some cases, they found themselves distributed across three stations. In December 1940, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the squadrons' servicing personnel to station maintenance units, significantly increasing the mobility of the Fighter Command squadrons. [24] These arrangements, with some refinements, rema ined in place until the end of the war.

Each squadron had three maintenance flights which rotated duties. The flight which was responsible for major repair and inspection did not perform major repair but was responsible for the exchange of aircraft.

This is why FC could maintain such high serviceability.

It could be argued that a better test of relative strength is serviceability. The comparative rates for Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe are shown in Figure 7. The Fighter Command data have been extracted from an analysis produced in 1945 on production and wastage during the Battle of Britain. [40] The levels appear to be higher than those quoted in other sources. [41] Another source states that Fighter Command serviceability rose from 70 percent at the outbreak of war to 80 percent by November 1939 but, having fallen to 76 percent in July 1940, recovered to 80 percent by September where it stayed for the remainder of the year. [42] All in all, it seems safe to conclude that serviceability remained fairly constant in Fighter Command throughout the battle, somewhere between 80 and 90 percent. [43]

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9.

Be careful with status reports. I have made this mistake before too but would have to see the specific reports before I definitely concluded you have also made the same mistake.

It was common for squadrons to make multiple sorties from early in the morning on. By the morning status, some squadrons were embarking on their second combat of the day. Battle is a dynamic state while the status is frozen in time.

The status reports used for PRO AIR 20/307 are gathered at midnight.

The Allies made this mistake at Deippe proclaiming they had destroyed a significant portion of the Luftwaffe.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Patrol flights around 13 Group

13th Groups contribution to the fighting is spelled out by the RAF. In a 10 day period they made 138 operational sorties not including the action on the 15th.

They were not included in the SWAG.




All the best,

Crumpp

[Kutscha]

You do have your troubles don't you Crumpp? Look up the histories of those squadrons in 13 Group and tell me how much aerial combat, er fighting, they participated in, in those 10 days.

[Crumpp]

You do have your troubles don't you Crumpp? Look up the histories of those squadrons in 13 Group and tell me how much aerial combat, er fighting, they participated in, in those 10 days.

Drop the personal attacks when the facts do not go your way. It is not very mature.

The document is just what it states, a comparison of the operational burden of the fight. It is from the RAF's official history of the battle.

In short it is self explanatory.

What is your source that 13th Group did nothing? Why don’t you try posting that so it can be compared and discussed?

Is it the same one that told you 11th Group fought the battle alone??

All the best,

Crumpp

[Juha]

Hello Crumpp

Quote:” Juha, I think you are thinking of the old system the RAF used. That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.”

No, I’m thinking of the system used during the BoB, badly damaged a/c were of course exchanged for new/repaired aircraft and even more lightly damaged if the sqn’s own maintenance and repair organisation was unable to cope.

Quote:” In December 1940, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the squadrons' servicing personnel to station maintenance units, significantly increasing the mobility of the Fighter Command squadrons…”

From your own quote, the second change was made after the BoB.

Quote: “It was common for squadrons to make multiple sorties from early in the morning on. By the morning status, some squadrons were embarking on their second combat of the day. Battle is a dynamic state while the status is frozen in time.”

Now the earlier morning of 15th Sept had been quiet apart some LW recon flights, that’s according to Price, I don’t have any original ORBs on that day or maybe that of 603 but have not time to go through my copies. Anyway LW was preparing for their big attacks on London. And the first FC loss happened at 11.40 am.

Juha

[Crumpp]

From your own quote, the second change was made after the BoB.

By the English dates sure, but the Germans have a much later date of May 1941 for the end of the Battle of Britain when they transferred their bombers east.

Hence my statement: That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9. it seems that that had not happened. Most sqns didn’t scramble the supposed 12 fighters but 10-11 fighters. Only 11 Group reserve sqns at Tangmere sent oversized sqns and they scrabled exactly same number of fighters than they had had serviceable in the evening of 14th.

I see what happened. The RAF expanded the number of squadrons in the force and in the week of the 15th reduced the size of squadron to 18 A/C. This is why you did not realize the larger size of the earlier organization.

The RAF began to replenish the ASU and reserve holdings as well.

Now it is easy to see that the RAF was at 96% strength with 83% of that operational at 152400 SEP 40. That does not mean we will not find outliers in the individual squadrons.




All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

badly damaged a/c were of course exchanged for new/repaired aircraft and even more lightly damaged if the sqn’s own maintenance and repair organisation was unable to cope.

We are thinking of the same system then.

In the Luftwaffe, the Geschwaders did not charge off anything that was repairable and owned the airframe even when it was transferred to organizational level maintenance. The US Army has a similar system depending on the warranty. Items sent for repair remain on the books and the unit does without that equipment until it is repaired.

If the RAF used this same system the squadron would continue to own the aircraft while it was at the ASU for repairs. It would mean the squadrons did not get a new aircraft until the airframe was repaired and returned.

The RAF's system allowed the operational unit to exchange the damage airframe for a new/previously repaired aircraft on the spot. Thus they maintained a higher operational readiness at the tip of the spear.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Franek Grabowski]

You must be kidding. Where in the paper is the increase of number of Squadrons, that would justify changing of establishment? By the way, the increase might be four foreign Squadrons that had been established at the time.
You seem to fail to note actual problems experienced by the RAF, as well as servicing structure. Otherwise, you obviously do not understand what an operational sortie is, and what is the difference between it and combat sortie. That said, Squadrons in the north did a lot of operational flying, but engagements were quite rare.

[Crumpp]

Where in the paper is the increase of number of Squadrons, that would justify changing of establishment?

Under the column labeled "Number of Squadrons".

You must be kidding.

Your emotional display is tiresome and I will ignore you if you cannot display some maturity to discuss the facts.

You seem to fail to note actual problems experienced by the RAF,

This is the RAF's own documentation and their official History. Perhaps some post war author knows better than they do the state of their forces?

operational flying,

Operational flying is a combat sortie credit. Wordsmithing does not change that fact. The bullets fired at 13th Group Operational Sorties are just as deadly as though fired at 11th Group.

The purpose of the table the RAF constructed was to show the operational burden of the Groups.

All the best,

Crumpp