Luftwaffe Myths

[Ruy Horta]

The bombers are "attackers" but in the air they are defensive. Escort fighters if not too tied to the bombers are offensive in all almost every sense of the word.

Franek, I keep wondering how many of these heavy bomber types were actually in operation and in significant numbers during the essential period I describe - 1939-41.

Let off the hook and having the freedom to allocate resources to these heavies was crucial in their development, production and deployment. That events happened as they did doesn't mean that they were the only possible outcome. That's 20-20 "blindsight".

It is not being disputed that the Luftwaffe was poorly led at the highest level. Williamson Murray's example of bad planning is a good case, although again it is not the only possible outcome.

The RAF had a very good training program, proof of good or even essential foresight.

Yet again that part of having been let off the hook is essential to the development of FC. Those experienced fighter pilots evolved during the 1941-43 period, so by 1944 FC had a large cadre of highly experienced men.

Certainly, flying over the channel in uncontested skies does allow the accumulation of many flight hours, steady confidence building of the pilot, his ability to handle his aircraft and a gradual exposure to (the stresses of) combat.

Apart from the bad political leadership and bungling of a number of high ranking Luftwaffe officials. Gambling on a short war everything was geared towards that end, including freezing long term development of aircraft, engines and weaponry. But also production and training suffered, again see Murray.

However a blanket statement like worthless is exactly that. The Jagdwaffe and essentially a good operational training program, granted not geared for massive wartime expansion, but capable of producing good fighter pilots as long as there were time and resources to do so. The early wartime trainees are perhaps the best operationally trained Jagdwaffe pilots of the war. Getting the best practical and operational training.

And if we shouldn't call all Germans Nazis, we can safely say that the majority of them believed in Hitler.

There were plenty of doubts about any military operation from 1938 onward, but every success made Hitler's position stronger. After the defeat of the Anglo-French - the evacuation of the BEF from the continent, and French armistice - he was at his zenith as so-called military leader. Those who thought it that it was madness (or stupidity) to attack the Soviet Union not voice this sentiment in public, certainly not act upon it.

That at its core Nazism stood opposed to Communism is just the irony of this most unlikely of partnerships, especially considering that they were in practically open warfare with each other only a few months earlier as the Spanish civil war was being wound down.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

In 1939-1940 production of heavy bombers like Halifax, Manchester/Lancaster or Stirling was being prepared. Obviously, designs were of 1930s rather 1940s, so it clearly contradicts your thesis.

Again, its difficult to see how was that any different than the bomber programmes in Germany. The He 177 programme started in 1935, by the end of 1939 the prototype made its first flight, and soon the order for serial production came again. Given the defeat of France and Britain in the Western campain, the orders were much reduced in June 1940, but re-instated in October 1940, after it become clear that the war would drag on. In other words, the German heavy bomber programme run parellel to the British, but because of its much more technically ambitious nature, it took a year longer to be fit for operations.

OTOH, I tend believe that the Luftwaffe wasn't in such a need for a heavy bomber as the Western Allies. The operational requirements could be just as well satisfied by the existing medium bombers with significantly less strain on logistics and production, and the introduction of a viable heavy bomber design would not solve the inherent strategical dilemmas: the US and the USSR's industrial areas beyond the Ural would be still out of reach; and given that bases were readily close to Britain, the Luftwaffe was not facing the same operational problem as the RAF BC (and 8th USAAF), ie. that medium bombers did not have the range/payload to hit target deep in Germany while taking off from British airfields - Luftwaffe bombers could take off from airfields in France.

[CJE]

Once again, you all forget the political aspect of WW2, particularly so on the German side.

In October 1941, Hitler forbad all night intruder activities of NJG 2 over the British bases, because he wanted RAF bombers being shot down over German territory to show his people that the Luftwaffe was doing its work. For over three years, RAF bombers were able to take off and assemble without any interference (apart from the short-lived "Gisela Unternehmen").
What a major mistake! But it was a political decision.

Hitler had no clear idea of what to do with the LW, except a close support of Panzers. He was an infantry man and did not know anything about a 3D war - hence his reluctance to launch more submarines into the Atlantic war.
The He 177 and Me 264 were only avatars of a long gone strategy Hitler never had.

Read Richard J. Overy and Williamson Murray.

[John Vasco]

Originally Posted by Six Nifty .50s

The bombers were the attackers, while the fighter escort mission was largely defensive in nature. When and if the numbers of fighter escorts increased dramatically, some might venture further afield to hunt for targets of opportunity. Otherwise the escorts could only react to enemy counterattacks, which tended to occur at a time and place of the enemy's own choosing.

Six Nifty .50s is spot on with this comment. And this was perfectly illustrated in one of the many conversations I had with Otto Hintze, who led the Jabo 109 Staffel of Erprobungsgruppe 210 during the Battle of Britain (for those who may not know who he is). Hintze said that en route to a target, inconcert with the Stab and Bf 110 Staffeln of the unit, his 3. Staffel were solely charged to get to the target and bomb it as their first responsibility (attackers). Once that was achieved, they could then move to protect the slower Bf 110s of the unit, as required (defenders). Going into the target last, things did not always work out as planned, as with the Croydon raid of 15/8/40, but the defensive work was amply illustrated on that raid by Lt. Marx trying to escort his Commanding Officer safely back to France but in the process getting shot down himself. The 109s of 3./210 illustrate perfectly Six Nifty .50s point about attackers and defenders, in this case in a single Staffel.

[Kutscha]

but because of its much more technically ambitious nature, it took a year longer to be fit for operations.

That was typical of Germany, forgetting the KISS principal.

The He177 was still a relatively bug ridden a/c, even into 1944.

[RT]

In October 1941, Hitler forbad all night intruder activities of NJG 2 over the British bases, because he wanted RAF bombers being shot down over German territory to show his people that the Luftwaffe was doing its work. For over three years, RAF bombers were able to take off and assemble without any interference (apart from the short-lived "Gisela Unternehmen").

In 1944 the Me410 of KG2 flew intrusion, they had some success against the Bomber
He177 hs been a failure because germans came late in dev. powerful motors nd no material to build Turbo, in any other case when we compare german cars nd american or brits, no speaking of the russian ones, they would built better
CJE great idea to hv change mat picture

Remi

[mars]

Originally Posted by RT

In October 1941, Hitler forbad all night intruder activities of NJG 2 over the British bases, because he wanted RAF bombers being shot down over German territory to show his people that the Luftwaffe was doing its work. For over three years, RAF bombers were able to take off and assemble without any interference (apart from the short-lived "Gisela Unternehmen").

In 1944 the Me410 of KG2 flew intrusion, they had some success against the Bomber
He177 hs been a failure because germans came late in dev. powerful motors nd no material to build Turbo, in any other case when we compare german cars nd american or brits, no speaking of the russian ones, they would built better
CJE great idea to hv change mat picture

Remi

This was a myth itself, in that time, the night fighter tactics was still in its infancy, and Luftwaffe only had very limited resource committing in its Nachtjager force, so in order to defend against the attack of RAF bomber commander, Luftwaffe HAD TO concentrate its limit night fighter units in the Europe coninent, see Peter Hinchliffe's "The Other Battle: Luftwaffe Night Aces Versus Bomber Command"

[Franek Grabowski]

The bombers are "attackers" but in the air they are defensive. Escort fighters if not too tied to the bombers are offensive in all almost every sense of the word.

God forgive, this way any offensive weapon when attacked turns defensive!

Franek, I keep wondering how many of these heavy bomber types were actually in operation and in significant numbers during the essential period I describe - 1939-41.

The war with Germany was in the years 1939-1945, so I do not know, why to limit the period up to 1941. Anyway, if you do not know, Halifax, Manchester and Stirling, apart of Wellington of course.

Yet again that part of having been let off the hook is essential to the development of FC. Those experienced fighter pilots evolved during the 1941-43 period, so by 1944 FC had a large cadre of highly experienced men.

Those fighter pilots evolved in the period 1939-1944! Quite to the contrary to the Luftwaffe, which lost or otherwise misused vast combat experience gathered since SCW. Management of resources is key issue here.

Certainly, flying over the channel in uncontested skies does allow the accumulation of many flight hours, steady confidence building of the pilot, his ability to handle his aircraft and a gradual exposure to (the stresses of) combat.

This is an utter nonsense. Every word of it. Sorry.

The Jagdwaffe and essentially a good operational training program, granted not geared for massive wartime expansion, but capable of producing good fighter pilots as long as there were time and resources to do so. The early wartime trainees are perhaps the best operationally trained Jagdwaffe pilots of the war. Getting the best practical and operational training.

This is no achievement. The problem is to build large and quality air force during wartime, and both Americans and British achieved this.

Those who thought it that it was madness (or stupidity) to attack the Soviet Union not voice this sentiment in public, certainly not act upon it.

Have you read Mein Kampf?

[Kildlawyrs]

"What you do not know is the content of the PM that passed between myself and the forum owner regarding the initial thrust/purpose of the thread. If you did, then my post #18 would make more sense".


Well since in fact I was the initial poster to this thread, I would be very interested in knowing what was passed back and forth. As you may recall, I received a surprising and extraordinarily hostile number of responses to my original posting (quite a welcome!). Now I am not some kind of panty waist who runs in terror anytime somone disagrees with me, but I have gone back and read, and re-read and re-re-read my initial posting, and I'm damned if I can find what upset some people so. If the Luftwaffe in its totality cannot be discussed here, then why are we all here in the first place? Very odd.

This is the Luftwaffe Discussion forum, right?

p.s. Even my screen name was attacked...!!?

[Six Nifty .50s]

When the escorting fighters were totally cut loose from the bombers, the fighters were not performing the escort function. They were instead freelancing, not unlike a basketball player who competes mainly to increase his personal score, and who seems to believe that he can defeat the other team by himself.

Some of the best-known fighter pilots appeared to place more emphasis on personal achievement than team goals. They may have said otherwise, but actions speak louder than words.

Some pilots in the USAAF and Luftwaffe felt that "releasing the hounds" was not the best solution to a long term problem. The main effect was that a small majority of fighter pilots greatly increased their tally of enemy aircraft shot down, or strafed on the ground. Unfortunately, it also caused more own losses than necessary.

Better to keep the dogs on a leash, they said, because the whole point of escort fighters was: prevent enemy fighters from interfering with the air strikes. It did not matter how many enemy fighters were shot down. But it did matter when the enemy broke through the escorts, or found a hole in the coverage because some of the escorts were off on a hunting trip.

The escorts could not fly too close to the bombers either. They required some flexibility as Adolf Galland and Hubert Zemke rightly noted, but just how far away they should be allowed to stray was a major point of contention.