Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

[AndreasB]

Originally Posted by jim norton

hi andreas and nick,

thanks for this info! too bad i still cannot download the files :-(

all the best
jim

Disable your pop-up blocker.

All the best

Andreas

[jim norton]

hi,

i already switched the pop-up blocker off, but it doesn´t work. too bad.

all the best
jim

[mjbollinger]

Hi everyone,

I am researching the role of ULTRA in shaping US policy with respect to the war in the Atlantic prior to 7 December 1941. My hypothesis is that Churchill provided information derived from ULTRA to the US administration in order to influence that policy. (One such case is well documented: the order from the Fuhrer to U-Boat commanders in June 1941 ordering them not to engage any US warships or any destroyers at all.)

I have downloaded all of the relevant DEFE 3 files. A friend is gradually photographing the HW 1 files. I currently have copies of HW 1/1 through HW 1/41 with HW 1/42 through HW1/305 still waiting to be photographed.

What I don't have now are any decrypts from the Luftwaffe, which brings me to HW 5. HW 5/1 through 5/8 cover the period prior to the introduction of the DEFE files and HW 5/9 through 5/42 covers the rest of the period of interest and overlaps with available DEFE 3 files.

First question: does anyone already have electronic versions of any HW 1 files from HW 1/42 through HW 1/305 that they are willing to share/sell?

Second question: does anyone have electronic versions of HW 5 up through HW 5/42 that they are willing to share/sell?

Third question: have I missed someting in DEFE 3? For the period prior to December 1941, DEFE 3 only includes the ZTP/ZTPG, OL and MK series covering, none of which covers Luftwaffe operations in the Atlantic. Are there other series in DEFE 3 with records prior to December 1941?

Fourth question: for those who have looked at both DEFE 3 and HW 5 files from February to December 1941, what will I miss if I only look at DEFE 3 files. I'm told that HW 5 adds more detail of an operational and logistical nature and that if information was of strategic or tactical importance, it would have been included in DEFE 3. Bottom line: do I need to get HW 5 files from February to Decemebr 1941 as well? Remember, I'm looking for information that if provided to the US might have shaped US policy in the Atlantic (e.g., British successes in the Battle of Britain, termination of Operation Sea Lion, etc.), not low-level operational or logistical details.

Many thanks

Marty Bollinger

[Bruce Dennis]

Hi Marty,
You may already have covered this, but there are good insights into the transfer of information in 'BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: Vol 1, ITS INFLUENCE ON STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS' by Hinsley. Pages 311-314 cover particular issues concerning the early exchange arrangements, and he quotes TNA sources.

'TRACKING THE AXIS ENEMY: THE TRIUMPH OF ANGLO-AMERICAN INAVAL INTELLIGENCE' by Bath is extensive in exploring the subject. Again, the sources are fully quoted.

The variety of points that typically have to be brought together for research usually defy all attempts to narrow down the search area. I know it doesn't directly answer the series of questions you posted, but my gut feeling is that individual files hold the answers to questions so suggest that you may as well look forward to reading as much as possible of the HW and DEFE series!

There will also political & diplomatic be information outside those series.

Hope this helps,
Bruce

[Nick Beale]

I'm not sure exactly what you're looking for in the Luftwaffe material - is it material with a bearing on naval operations? Naval Enigma hadn't been broken in 1940, had it?

1944-45 has been my main concern and the naval material in HW5 is very limited over that period. HW5 material about U-boats or coastal convoys often seems concerned with air attacks they have suffered or tactics to avoid such attacks, so I guess it is included for the RAF's benefit. I have also noticed that such items often carry both a "main series" serial number and a naval series one (suggesting to me that the original would be in the naval files).

There is a file devoted to Sea Lion: HW 48/1 "Intelligence reports and correspondence concerning German preparations for the invasion of Britain." I haven't looked at it myself though. Bletchley Park referred to Seelöwe as "Operation Smith" incidentally.

[mjbollinger]

Thanks, Bruce and Nick,

I do have all of the Hinsley volumes, and that is where the reference to the order of June 1941 comes from. I also have just about every other book written on this subject, including Bath's. Most are focused on activities after the US joined the war. My focus is the aggressive actions taken by the US in the Atlantic before Pearl Harbor.

My intent is to go back to primary sources and to try to correlate (1) the existence of UK decrypts of potential usefulness in persuading FDR to take more aggressive action, (2) a mechanism of transfer of that information to FDR (e.g., meetings with Churchhill, Halifax, Godfrey, Winant, Donovan, etc. and (3) consequent actions by the US that appear to have leveraged that intelligence. The "smoking gun" would be existence of information highly linked to Ultra decrypts in contemporary US intelligence records, though some of those records have never been declassified. (I am exploring ways to access those archives and may be able to do so.)

I am comfortable that DEFE 3 will give me the relevant naval enigma decrypts from the point at which they started in February 1941. The Luftwafe decrypts started in 1940 and it is that information I now seek. I don't think it is in DEFE 3 but instead in HW 5. So I will have to get access to the HW 5 records.

I am particularly keen to find the decrypts of 16 July 1940 since Stevenson has written (in a book criticized by many others for inaccuracies) that the King showed Donovan a decrypt from that day when he met with Donovan on 17 July 1940.

Thanks for the heads up on HW 48/1. I had not thought of looking there. Will do so.

Marty

[Bruce Dennis]

Me again. My strong impression, after viewing many files and drinking many cups of tea staring into the distance, is that the only way to see what influenced US decision making processes during that period is to start with the US facility for tracking U-boats (pre OP20-G). Although not as sophisticated as the UK Submarine Tracking Room, it was the only place the US authorities had where the whole story was available to view. It incorporated current and hstorical information into the assesments produced and, as such, became an intelligence source in it's own right. This is would have been the paramount source for policy-makers to study trends.

A single conversation with an OP20-G member a few years ago settled it in my mind. He was surprised that I would even ask: as far as he was concerned, the natural suspicion of code-breaking and SIGINT in general by many senior staff was overcome by the 'matter-of-fact' reports coming out of this source, and the doubters seemed able to ignore the SIGINT background.

As you no doubt appreciate, FDR had been moving mountains behind the scenes to prepare the USA for war, and he found a great partner in Churchill, but the British transfer of scientific equipment and intelligence information during 1940 began before Winston took control.

Bruce

[mjbollinger]

Thanks, Bruce.

Not sure I agree with your view that UK-US SIGINT cooperation predated Churchill. The transfer of SIGINT methods almost certainly began with the meeting on 8 Jul 1940 between Lord Lothian and FDR. While we don't know what was discussed on this specific topic in this meeting, we now know (as of recent 2010 NSA document releases) that FDR, Stimson and Knox approved the sharing of cryptological methods on 11 July 1940 and that Donovan took off for London three days later. This is prior to the Standardization of Arms Commitee meetings which I believe (without proof yet) were in part cover for the cryptological cooperation.

I've never encountered any data that suggest there was cryptological cooperation prior to that point. If you have some, I'm keen to learn more.

As for OP-20-G, they dragged their feet compared to the US Army. On 5 September 1940 Gen. Strong asked Gen. Marshall to include Army cryptological methods in the technical exchanges under the Standardization of Army Committee. Marshall agreed but could not get the Navy to participate. There are indications that OP-20-G was permitted to request SIGINT information from GC&CS beginning in late September but it is unclear when the first transfers took place. There are rumors of submarine tracking charts in OP-20-G that have annotations linked to ULTRA and I intend to pursue that line of research.

My sneaky suspicion is that the UK agreed to share submarine SIGINT-based information with the US (without indicated whether it came from basic Y-Service tracking or decrypted messages) in return for the US policies to openly broadcast the positions of any submarines sighted in the Atlantic. This would have provided cover in 1941 for any sudden success of Royal Navy escorts in tracking and destroying submarines, diverting suspicion from the fact that the Brits had broken the Enigma / Dolphin code.

Marty

[Bruce Dennis]

Hi Marty,
I will answer in more detail when I can access my library, but briefly ...

'The transfer of SIGINT methods almost certainly began with the meeting on 8 Jul 1940 between Lord Lothian and FDR.'

... is not the way I read the situation. The exchange of information and some technology was already established, on a less ambitious scale, since 1937 or 1938. The full scale pooling of resouces in the summer of 1940 was built on the succesful groundwork laid over the previous two years.

Will follow up soon.

Bruce

[mjbollinger]

Hello Bruce,

I have reviewed my sources and re-read Bath. Of of this affirms my earlier conclusion that discussion of SIGINT / cryptological technologies and methods began only in August of 1940. There was very modest cooperation in the area of SIGINT / traffic anaylsis but that, too, didn't become significant until mid 1940.

Marty