Me 262 should have been used as a bomber?

[Graham Boak]

The Typhoon’s lack of performance at altitude was only equalled by the Fw.190, Yak1, 3, 7 and 9, Zero, Oscar, Bf.109, and all other types with a single stage supercharger. On entering service, it was the fastest fighter in service in the world, with the greatest firepower fitted to a single-engined fighter (apart from its earlier stable-mate the Hurricane IIc). Although largely unarmoured initially, in common with all other contemporary fighter-bombers, armour was fitted to dedicated fighter-bombers in 1944 production. Please do not confuse half-truths seized on by its competitors for orders, and mindlessly repeated by armchair strategists, with absolutes. Compare the Typhoon with its true contemporaries, allied and Axis, and bear in mind both advantages and disadvantages of all, and not least consider the disadvantages coming from disrupted production in the event of any cancellation.

The lack of accuracy of the unguided rp was no surprise, being well known to ballistic experts and the decision-makers before its adoption. It was still chosen for wide-spread service, and perhaps a little thought will show why. A squadron or wing of Typhoons attacking a large military formation is not the same thing as a sniper picking out a solitary target at long range. Comparison should be made to the kill probability of a bomb, a shell or a rifle bullet. None are outstanding. In addition, the rp had a significant psychological effect greater than that of the bomb. Regardless, not all Typhoon units carried rockets anyway, perhaps half.

The operational analysis quoted was carried out some weeks after the battle, and covered only a limited part of the battlefield. Only wrecks indisputably caused by the rocket alone were counted. No allowance was made for examples with multiple weapon hits, none for allocation of a share of unidentifiable wrecks, none for removal of wrecks from the battlefield for any reason. No allowance was made for the effect of disruption on enemy movement. This survey has been used not only to attack the rp as a weapon, for which it presents some case, but also the fighter-bomber in general, for which it does not.

The Allied advance through France and Germany was inextricably tied to, and dependent on, the successful use of fighter-bombers to disrupt German movement and clear strongpoints. No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Except of course for all the damage it inflicted on the Germans. When I've located it, I'll post a deciphered German message about the effects of Typhoon attacks on Panther tanks.

If you care to read the deciphered traffic you will find a rich strand of evidence from the German side about the disruption caused by these and other "good for nothing" Allied fighter bombers. I posted four pages of this material elsewhere on TOC a few months ago, for example.

Nick.

I'll look forward to that with interest. I'm sure in the end we will agree.

My position derives from the conclusion of No.2 ORS Report No. 15, Enemy Casualties in Vehicles and Equipment During The Retreat From Normandy to the Seine;
"Effectiveness of weapons.
The principal weapons used for the direct destruction of enemy vehicles and equipment were cannon, machine guns, RP and bombs.
We have not been able to differentiate at all clearly between the relative effectiveness of the first two; both appear to have been very deadly to all except heavily armoured vehicles and the figures given in the preceding parts of the report speak for themselves. As indicated in 2(b) above, RP have not produced the results against armour which might have been hoped for, whilst against soft-skin vehicles they are clearly less suitable than cannon and machine gun fire. It is suggested that RP in its present form suffers the grave disadvantage of being virtually a 'one shot' weapon which even in the hands of the most skilful pilot has poor accuracy, whereas the protracted burst of fire from cannon or machine guns gives a far greater chance of scoring hits."

2 TAF commented:
"The circumstances of the examination did not make it possible to take account of the moral effects of RP. A lack of effectiveness in causing material damage cannot be accepted as a reason for abandoning RP as a weapon against armour until it can be replaced with something better."

The conclusion surely is that:
1. 2 TAF, like Bomber Command, was not interested in the material damage being caused but argued the effect on morale was sufficient justification for the enormous resources being devoted to Air.
2. Resources taken by Air resulted in fewer resources available to Ground.
3. There was something better, and 2 TAF knew it.
4. The Hurricane IIC was scrapped in North Africa because it required armour which had been ordered from the manufacturer. Armour was against RAF political correctness. RAF PC also killed the dive bomber.
5. Rudel had a famous postwar argument with 2 TAF pilots telling them he had tried RP and knew the gun was better. The 2 TAF pilots even then refused to believe him.
6. Surely this debate can now be put to rest. Of course Typhoons caused damage. But they caused less damage to the Wehrmacht than more suitable aircraft would have done. And they caused more losses to the wretched pilots KIA than more suitable aircraft would have done. That's all I think I am trying to say.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.

Graham.

1. It is true the ground units cheered the Typhoons and Spitfires giving the semblance of close air support. No one on either side could believe then , and some still cannot believe today, that all that sound and fury signifieth nothing - or not very much. Time and again I have checked 2 TAF claims that their sorties were "very successful" only to find they had missed completely.
2. The Hillman strongpoint, which had no Flak, held up 3 British Infantry Division on D-Day for hours and was one of the major reasons why Caen was not taken on the first day. 2 TAF provided no help. The aircraft that could have given the crucial assistance, the Vultee Vengeance, were being used to tow target tugs in Devon on that day. The Vengeance proved its worth in the Far East - it's all on the record.
3. Hindsight is 50/50. The Army should have had its own air corps. The Army Air Corps should have had Vengeance dive bombers and Hurricane IIC tank-busters. The RAF's role would have been to gain and keep aerial superiority and ensure the LW was kept away from the battlefield.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Nick.

I'll look forward to that with interest. I'm sure in the end we will agree.

1. 2 TAF, like Bomber Command, was not interested in the material damage being caused but argued the effect on morale was sufficient justification for the enormous resources being devoted to Air...
6. Surely this debate can now be put to rest. Of course Typhoons caused damage. But they caused less damage to the Wehrmacht than more suitable aircraft would have done.

Tony

Morale effect was maybe a consideration but what you seem to ignore is disruption. Allied air power severely restricted the mobility of German ground forces throughout the NW Europe campaign and the movement of supplies to the front. A tank is just as dead without fuel and shells as it would be from a direct hit.

Question 1: did this "more suitable aircraft" exist and if so what was it?

Question 2: do you think the German Schlachtgeschwader in the East were a waste of time too?

[RT]

Question 1: did this "more suitable aircraft" exist and if so what was it?

If you hv full air-control difficult to hv better than stuka type, one question why they do not use earlier a 20 mm cannon on this bird, could be useful....

Question 2: do you think the German Schlachtgeschwader in the East were a waste of time too?

In fact no-one achieve successes like those of the germans in the first years of the war, but they use almost more the 2.mot. bomber than the stuka

The fighter-bomber came at the moment where the armies learned how to protect against air-artillery, were more entrenched nd when the skies became dangerous for low flying aircraft

Remi

[Kutscha]

Vultee Vengence

In the European theater the Vengeance was considered too vulnerable to enemy fighters for front line use and was soon withdrawn for use in secondary roles such as training of attack squadron pilots and towing targets for gunnery training.

Is it true that the Germans made troop/supply movements during the night because it was too dangerous to move during the day?

[Graham Boak]

There are times when I hate this board – this is the second time today I have typed a long response only to have see it rejected and the text lost.

The Hurricane comments do not hold water. The Mk.IId was used in combat in the Middle East, where the weapon was shown to be effective but the loss rate high. This is because the weapon requires a low slow approach in full view of the enemy, followed by an overflight. The enemy is given time to direct his fire efficiently, and did so. In addition, the penetration was found to be inadequate against the latest German tanks, which were correctly expected to be present in greater numbers and proportions in the future. The gun also required extended training for the pilot. Despite this the gun-capable Mk.IV, which was armoured, saw service in Western Europe until just before D-Day, in Italy to the end of the European war, and in the Far East until the end of the Japanese war. One squadron in the Far East was trained and equipped as a specialised unit with the 40mm.

There has never been any serious argument that the gun is the most accurate choice, despite what any front-line officer without direct experience may have felt. The problem has always been the vulnerability that goes with its use. It should be remembered that only 10% of even an armoured division were tanks: if 2 TAF were more concerned with their overall effect on the enemy than on bean-counting holes in tanks, it is difficult to fault their judgement. Always assuming that the 40mm was capable of making those holes in the first place.

The Vengeance’s limited operational activities, experiences once tried not to be repeated, were only in areas without enemy fighter activity and with limited flak defences. This was not the case in Western Europe, on either side. Even Rudel was forced to leave his beloved Stuka and fly an Fw.190 in later missions. The Luftwaffe was never foolish enough to attempt to use the Stuka over Western Europe from 1944 onwards. The Vengeance was more expensive to build and to operate, with a notoriously unreliable engine. It called for a two-man crew, at a time when Britain was suffering badly from manpower shortages. The role required greater time in training, the aircraft had limited air-to-air defensive capability and its offensive capability air-to-air was nil. The value of a fighter-bomber is not just the capability of self-defence that the dive-bomber lacked. It was also in the escort fighters that weren’t required, and could be put to more productive use.

The only alternative role it could carry out was target towing, but this was a vital activity which should not be sneered at. If the Vengeance spent its time improving the gunnery of allied aircrews, this was more valuable than burying said aircrew in futile holes in Normandy.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Morale effect was maybe a consideration but what you seem to ignore is disruption. Allied air power severely restricted the mobility of German ground forces throughout the NW Europe campaign and the movement of supplies to the front. A tank is just as dead without fuel and shells as it would be from a direct hit.

Question 1: did this "more suitable aircraft" exist and if so what was it?

Question 2: do you think the German Schlachtgeschwader in the East were a waste of time too?

Nick, I don't ignore the need for disruption. Disruption would have been increased with better equipment.

But back to basics in an attempt to answer your question about suitable aircraft.
Any aircraft design is suitable only in relation to a felt need.
The army's needs were to destroy a) tanks, b) emplaced Pak/mortar/105-mm field guns/MG42 c) soft-skin vehicles providing re-supply d) bridges, and e) concrete hardened strongpoints.
Each need had a different solution.
Tank busting required a flying Pak like Rudel's Ju87, the He129 or Hurricane IIC.
Emplaced Pak/MG42/mortar/artillery, bridges, concrete etc strongpoints needed to be destroyed by HE delivered vertically for accuracy. The best dive bombers were the Vengeance and Ju87.
Destruction of soft-skinned vehicles and troops caught in the open needed attacking with an armoured plane carrying cannon and/or machine guns like the Il-2.
All the aircraft should be low-maintenance and able to operate from grass strips, and should be piloted by soldiers with personal acquaintance with the people they are supporting and who will get fast feedback about their effectiveness.
And to gain and maintain air superiority to protect them all you need high performance fighters which optimise speed and manoeuverability. This comes only by making them flimsy and operating from paved runways.

What is unsuitable is a failed air superiority fighter fitted with RP suffering from gravity drop, or with bombs which cannot be delivered vertically, and which can be brought down by any Landser wielding an MG42 or even a rifle - let alone the mass of Flak of 20-mm and 37-mm calibre manned by determined and skilfull LW personnel. And you don't want a failed air superiority fighter like the Typhoon having to operate from paved runways miles from the front line, piloted by those with no knowledge of the infantry they are supposed to be supporting, whose success criterion is the dropping of ordnance in the general direction of the enemy, and who never have to answer to anyone whose life depends on their actions, and with an engine described as a fitter's nightmare.

Concerning the East I do not have an informed opinion. But I do know they used different equipment, and a lot of it like the Katyusha, the IL-2, the Pe2, the T-34 and JS1 were very good. And I do know that IL-2 pilots were under command of the army. So if the gun they were told to destroy continued firing they had to return until the job was done. That raised their game.

[tcolvin]

Graham.

1. Your jaundiced view of the Vultee Vengeance would not survive a reading of Peter C Smith's book, would it? He persuaded me.
2. The fact is that the RAF was completely prejudiced against all dive bombers for a simple reason. They were specically designed for army support, and no self-respecting airman would accept that as part of his job description, which was to bomb German civilians until morale cracked. The army could then be despatched in soft-skin vehicles to occupy Germany. Anyone who talked to the Army about their needs was a traitor. Beaverbrook oredered the Vengeances, and the RAF ensured they were never used - except in the East where they became a raging success such that the RAF had to suppress the information and quickly scrap them before their embarrassment became public. That was the background to making the Vengeance tow targets.
3. And your statement that there was never any serious argument about the superiority of guns sounds to me like re-writing history. Apart from all the other evidence available that the RAF wanted RPs to succeed because they could strap them cheaply under Typhoons in the belief that speed rather than armour provided security over the battlefield, why would the Typhoon pilots have tried to sell Rudel on the benefits of RP, I wonder?

[Kutscha]

In the East where they became a raging success because there wasn't the opposition that there was in NW Europe. One can easily see that because even the Hurricane and other 2cd line a/c was used in the CBI when they were past their prime in Europe.

"re-writing history" Only see one person doing that and it ain't Graham.

Are you saying the P-47, Fw190, Me109 were a failed air superiority fighters and that is why they were used as FBs?

The fact is that the RAF was completely prejudiced against all dive bombers for a simple reason.

Yes it was a one mission a/c. It sure couldn't be a fighter while the fighter could do double duty. Just another a/c in the inventory and all that goes with that.

I wunder how the airforce was so prejudiced against the army that it had RAF personal with ground units to direct the FBs.

I guess you don't know about the improvised landing grounds that fighters used. Both in Normandy and in North Africa.