Friendly fire WWII

[Andy Saunders]

Brian

Without ploughing through all the posts, do you have the episode on 14 September 1940 when 73 Squadron were attacked by Spitfires? I suspect it may have been 222 Sqn, although am not clear if the Hurricanes engaged the Spitfires??

On the subject of 222 Squadron, I see that Sgt P O Davis attacked a "Dornier 17 Z" ten miles off the coast at Dunkirk on 16 July 1941 which he noted as follows: "Camouflage was brown and green with circles on top of the wing. Green 2 recognised this as a hostile type...." He claimed it as damaged. His description of markings makes one wonder what it was!

Many congrats on V1 book, by the way.

[Rob Philips]

Hi Brian,

Are you aware that friendly fire incidents in the UK Gun Belts in the summer of 1944 came about as the result of imperfect technology? Both the British and the American AAA gunners had gun laying radar that automatically directed the guns, and proximity fuzes, the combination of which enabled to fire at targets, and to hit these, without optical contact. That was a first in the history of gunnery. What could have been, but was not, automated, was a link with the British IFF system. This could have been integrated by the American radar designers, but the British wished to keep their IFF system classified - even to the Allies. The net result was that the IFF operator had to shout his observations to the gunnery officer, with four AAA guns firing as fast as they could right next to him. This was a receipt for incidents.
If you want the technical details, check out
http://www.ieee.org/portal/cms_docs_...Abajian074.pdf
for an interview with an engineer who worked on the gun laying radar.

Furthermore, the proximity fuzed shells were lethal way beyond the gun belt no-fly zone limits. This means that a pilot, flying outside the no-fly zone as ordered, could be hit with fatal results by gunners who were firing at a V1, and who could perhaps not even see the friendly aircraft. A direct hit, or an explosion in the proximity of the aircraft, meaning within about 15 meters, of a 90mm shell would be fatal to a fighter aircraft.

Finally, several fighter bases were located WITHIN the gun belts, meaning that pilots had no choice but to enter the no-fly zone. The gunners were - to a degree - allowed to fire in inland directions as well.

To this can be added the usual human factor. The AA gunners had to learn the job with new tools, in actual combat, no time for proper training. They were given a firing window, in which friendly aircraft were not supposed to exist. In other words: they shot at everything.

Considering the secrecy with which the new technology was surrounded, one may wonder who in high command had the full picture, that could have led to measures to prevent or reduce these friendly fire incidents. I believe that this would have been possible, without negative results for the higher goal of shooting down doodlebugs.

Such incidents were covered up, as a result of the effort to keep the effectiveness of this automated AAA technology hidden from the enemy. If not covered up, then the explanation came easy: the pilot was flying where he should not have flown. It should be obvious from what I state here that this explanation does not do justice to the complexities of the there and then, putting the blame on the one who could no longer defend himself: the pilot.

The blame should not be put on the AAA-gunners either. Such simplifications distort the complexity of reality there and then.

A question, resulting from the observations above. Have you identified causes for friendly fire incidents, other than the ones mentioned above? I apologize if this question has already been forwarded and answered. I did not read all the pages of this thread.

Regards,

Rob

[George Hopp]

Such incidents were covered up, as a result of the effort to keep the effectiveness of this automated AAA technology hidden from the enemy. If not covered up, then the explanation came easy: the pilot was flying where he should not have flown. It should be obvious from what I state here that this explanation does not do justice to the complexities of the there and then, putting the blame on the one who could no longer defend himself: the pilot.

Another example of this would be the orders for Sicily: If they're flying towards land they're ours. If they're flying towards the sea, they're the enemy. This was a bit hard on the C-47s who had dropped their sticks of troopers, and were returning to base.

Don't forget the informal anti-aircraft motto: If it flies it dies.

[Nokose]

06Nov43 near Linovyi Skitok
Major Aleksandr Sergeevich Romanenko (HSU) 91 IAP was killed when his Yak-9 was shot down by Russian flak. He had 21 victories and 5 shared at the time.

[mayfair35]

Brian:
While going through these various comments, I came upon your 5 Oct 2005 (Wow!) statement in which you mentioned your frustration in not being able to find anything about a Westland Lysander shot down on 22 Nov 1944 by a P-51.
I recalled hearing something about such an event and started searching. Our official report of the mission (#123) for that date says nothing about this incident; however there was an officer in the 318th FS who made rather complete notes about many of the missions, this being one. I will quote you what he wrote. This was a PTW mission to marshalling yards at Munich, Germany.

First part of his comments references the mission details. There is then this added part.

At 13:45 on the Groups return and from a height of 17,000 feet an observation aircraft was seen at 4,000 feet. Three P-51s (who?) made a pass at the aircraft. The flight leader closed in to identify the aircraft, the recognition from astern lead him to believe that it was a German aircraft and he fired a few bursts at it, observing hits on the wing and rear fuselage. The flight leader then called out to the other two aircraft of his flight to hold their fire, as the aircraft was British. The third man in the flight was then jumped by two Spitfires, he immediately turned into them and fortunately no one fired. The third man was then jujmped by a flight of 52nd Fighter Group P-51s, waggling his wings the 52nd Fighter Group aircraft realized their mistake and broke off. The flight leader believed on further recognition the aircraft attacked was a Wesland Lysander, no fire or smoke was observed and the aattacked aircraft appeared to be in good shape as it was left to make its way.

FYI the Formation leader of the Group for this mission is deceased as is the mission leader of the 319th FS; however, the mission leader of the 317th FS is still alive.

There was an earlier incident in which one of our aces was involved; however, he could not have been part of this incident as by November he was a POW.

Cordially, Art Fiedler

[Brian]

Thanks Nokose and Art for the latest - most interesting.

Art, do you think that the 317th FS mission leader will be able to help? If so, how can I contact him? Or are you in touch with him? He may not be prepared to tell me even if he does know!

Over to you again.

Many thanks
Brian

[Amrit1]

Found this whilst looking for something in the Australian Archives, and can't find any mention of it in the forum.

Beaufighter V8187, shotdown by USAAF Spitfires in the Med.

Flight Sergeants Waddle and Noonan killed.

Maybe someone can add to this.

http://naa12.naa.gov.au/scripts/imag...74941&I=1&SE=1

[Brian]

Thanks Amrit

I do have a good account of this incident, but thanks all the same.

Cheers
Brian

[Bruce Dennis]

On 12th February, 1942, the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eigen, plus naval escorts and Luftwaffe fighter cover, made the famous ‘Channel Dash’ past the Straits of Dover. Partly because of the surprise of the German ships moving in daylight, and to a lesser extent due to poor weather, they succeeded. Operation FULLER, the Allied plan to stop them, was ineffective, with poorly co-ordinated response and widespread lack of communication. The weather across the south of England and into France was low cloud, poor visibility and rain. Not surprisingly, there were friendly fire incidents.

The first known incident happened just after 10:40am when two Jim Crow Spitfires spotted the German ships through the rain, but believed they were British. They put the AA down to trigger-happy RN gunners. Then they saw two fighters below them, and having not been informed of any friendlies in the area, they dived to attack. At 500yds S/L Oxpring saw roundels and broke off in time. This was the first of many encounters for the day. RAF aircraft from all commands were scrambled as the RN got all available forces, from destroyers to minelayers, moving as fast as possible.

Some of the leading British MTBs encountered FW190s, flying low with undercarriage down, probably looking for the Swordfish: these FWs did not attack the MTBs, but whether this is down to misidentification or discipline is not recorded.

Around 3pm a badly shot up Beaufort flown by P/O Etheridge of 217 Squadron was limping back from his encounter with Scharnhorst when he was fired on by AA batteries near Ramsgate. The already damaged aircraft was hit again and belly-landed at Horsham St Faith, Norfolk.

About the same time, a returning 40 Squadron Wellington was shot up by AA batteries at Lowestoft, which continued despite the plane giving three-colour recognition signals. The pilot got the aircraft down at Lakenheath where his badly injured rear gunner was taken to hospital.

In the murk and mist of the Channel, the destroyer HMS Walpole had fallen out of the chase with mechanical problems. She was attacked suddenly out of the low clouds by two Wellingtons. Immediately a number of Bf109s streaked down the port side of the destroyer and successfully chased away the British bombers. The German aircraft then formed a defensive screen around the limping Walpole before realising their mistake and breaking away, firing a few rounds of MG. The Wellingtons bombs were close but Walpole had suffered no injuries or damage.

At 2:45, five of the British destroyers still in the pursuit were also caught in a similar mix-up. While steaming at full speed line ahead through a minefield in their desperation to cut off the German capital ships, a Hampden dived out of the clouds. The gunnery officer recognised it and gave orders to hold fire. The Hampden continued low on a course to pass between the destroyers Mackay and Worcester and nobody on either ship was alarmed. The first bombs exploded just astern of Mackay, drenching her AA crews. Her Gunnery officer shouted down the telephone “Check, check, check. Do not open fire, repeat, do not open fire! This aircraft is friendly although he has a funny way of showing it”. However, some of the other destroyers opened fire. The Hampden turned and straddled Worcester with bombs. Messages went from ship to ship including “Don’t do it. It really is a British plane”. The Hampden, its roundels plainly visible, turned back into the clouds and was gone.

When the five destroyers emerged from the minefield, confusion reigned. They were attacked again several times by both British and German aircraft, on one occasion fearing attacks from Bf109s and Beauforts flying in and out of the same clouds at the same time. Their report includes seeing, through breaks in the cloud, a mixture of Hampdens, Dorniers and Bf110s, sometimes wingtip to wingtip. Higher up they reported He111s and Ju88s flying next to Wellingtons, Halifaxes and Manchesters, plus Spitfires everywhere. Several Hampdens and Wellingtons were fired on by these destroyers before they were recognised.

There was more to come. The five destroyers in the above episode were rewarded by sighting and engaging the German ships just after 3:30pm. They pressed home their attacks through murderous fire from the larger German ships and their escort, taking very heavy damage and casualties. The two that came closest to the Prinz Eugen were HMS Mackay and HMS Whitshed, who closed to within 4000 yds and launched their torpedoes. Even after they opened fire with their main armament, Prinz Eugen did not fire at them because they were misidentified as German destroyers.

HMS Worcester had come very close to Gneisenau and paid the price. Now, wallowing helpless in the water from the multiple hits of the large German guns, she was a sitting target. Worcester and the other British destroyers were so close to Gneisenau that when 42 Squadron torpedo carrying Beauforts arrived in the melee, their CO, S/L Cliff, assumed all the ships were German. When he approached, he passed over some of the destroyers to press home his attack on the larger prize of Gneisenau, despite intense AA fire. HMS Campbell and Vivacious were moving in to shield and assist the burning Worcester (having originally identified her as Prinz Eugen in the mist) and witnessed the Beauforts launch their torpedoes at wave height about 1000-1100 yards from the leading German ship. Most of these were aimed at the German ships, but one of the flight aimed accurately at HMS Campbell and dropped his torpedo. To avoid destruction, Captain Pizey in Campbell ordered full speed astern, causing mayhem and death amongst the survivors from Worcester who were attempting to climb rescue nets to board Campbell.

At the same time that Campbell was avoiding the torpedo, a mile or two ahead the German destroyer Hermann Schoemann was firing all her AA at a Do217 which had just dropped two bombs near her and then came back to strafe. Moments later another Do217 nearly bombed the destroyer Z29 with the German Admiral Ciliax aboard, veering off at the last moment.

There were other misidentifications on that day, but the majority did not lead to gunfire. Almost all the squadrons aloft in the operation were unco-ordinated, being told to get into the air immediately their aircraft were ready. The fighter controllers of No 11 Group at Uxbridge had not been informed of the FULLER operation, and the codeword to implement it meant nothing to them. Esmonde lead his flight of Swordfish towards the target despite the nonappearance of four of the five Spitfire squadrons that were to meet him over Manston. He knew the identity of his target only because he had spoken directly to Swingate and the CO of Manston. If one single thing is to be isolated as a cause for the general confusion of the British air operations of the day, it must be the RAF decision not to tell the aircrews their target: the majority, if told anything at all about their objective, were told to search for “an enemy convoy”.

Bruce

[Brian]

Thanks Bruce - excellent

See PM

Cheers
Brian