Seeking *reliable* sources for French AF ops 1936-June 1940

[Ruy Horta]

H-E,

Please, especially since you've been a very active part in a legal battle before, I strongly suggest that you curb words like plagiarism etc.

At best we'll only hear one side of the case (your side), never enough to form a proper judgement.

If you have a quib based on your 1990 publication of Paul Martin's Invisibles vainqueurs I urge you to take this up with Patrick Facon, since he cannot defend his case on our forum and as such it is not the right place to conduct this discussion.

No harm done, but please let us not continue on this track.

Originally Posted by Christer Bergström

Now that sounds most interesting! What book?

All best,

Christer Bergström

- Well, I have been working on a book on the French Campaign for a very long time, and other researchers too (but our various books will be different and independent from each other even if we share some information from time to time). I feel the history of this campaign still has to be published, in any case in the way I see it.

If someone tries to overtake me and publish a competing book before I do in order to shoot me down he'll fall on his nose for he'll never be able to have MY thoughts and write MY book (and conversely I couldn't write someone else's book...), both being quite original, as you know. "THE" cult-book on the French Campaign now is "Invisibles vainqueurs", to which I very strongly contributed (50 % of the text - not the loss statistics - aprox. 74 % of the pictures, the dust jacket, etc.) and not "Ils étaient là...", published a few years ago. I guess there must be a reason for this difference, perhaps precisely my "wild nonsense" (élucubrations) - see below.

Of course I can't give away all my little secrets here but I can give you an example on top of the Facon plagiarism I mentioned in my other reply. I published it 1991 in "Invisibles vainqueurs" already so it's not new any more but almost nobody read my 30 pages in very small (too small) print except a few bilious, vicious people who heroically mentioned my "wild nonsense" in their low-grade magazines without ever giving one single example (quotations) of this wild nonsense.

Well, part of this "nonsense" was as follows : Since 1940 most French people and authors writing on 1940 wail and cry all the time, reporting sinister disasters only. "We had got nothing (in matter of armaments), we could do nothing, we were overwhelmed by huge quantities of German soldiers and giant armaments, oh, poor little us", etc. By now (almost) everybody knows this to be completely wrong. I gave an example : I always had read that French fighters were poorly armed and had a tough time trying to fight German aircraft possessing a powerful armament with huge quantities of ammunition (you always make your enemy bigger and stronger, this started when our ancestors lived (?) in caves).

In particular even French heroes among fighter pilots, having fought all the way (some of them on the fabulous D.520) and won many victories (considering the short time) were still complaining, 30-50 years later, about the "good cannon" which alas had "60 rounds only". Of course German cannon were supposed to be fed with at least 120, why not 300 rounds. (Remember that many Me 109 E-3s, and their cannon drums, were shot down during the Phoney war, some of them were captured). What a surprise it was to me when I started reading GERMAN documents and first-hand accounts : hear hear, German cannon equipping the Me 110 and part of the 109s had got... 60 r p g! Much later I "discovered" the respective technical data of the French and German cannon : clearly the French one was much, much better (in muzzle velocity or Vo, in rate of fire and in range... in one word, in everything). Besides, the French started introducing belt-fed cannon in June 1940 (Bloch 155) with 120 r p g, whereas the Germans waited until the introduction of the MG 151 about February or April 1940 (I'm not quite sure).

So there is still a lot to be said and I'm trying to do so. Be patient!

[Ruy Horta]

When presenting a case its wise not to overdo it.

In particular even French heroes among fighter pilots, having fought all the way (some of them on the fabulous D.520) and won many victories (considering the short time) were still complaining, 30-50 years later, about the "good cannon" which alas had "60 rounds only". Of course German cannon were supposed to be fed with at least 120, why not 300 rounds. (Remember that many Me 109 E-3s, and their cannon drums, were shot down during the Phoney war, some of them were captured). What a surprise it was to me when I started reading GERMAN documents and first-hand accounts : hear hear, German cannon equipping the Me 110 and part of the 109s had got... 60 r p g! Much later I "discovered" the respective technical data of the French and German cannon : clearly the French one was much, much better (in muzzle velocity or Vo, in rate of fire and in range... in one word, in everything). Besides, the French started introducing belt-fed cannon in June 1940 (Bloch 155) with 120 r p g, whereas the Germans waited until the introduction of the MG 151 about February or April 1940 (I'm not quite sure).

If french pilots complained about their cannon, it was their right, its not fair to answer their case by simply pointing towards the Germans and their lack of a superior gun. After all these were the pilots fighting the air war of 1940, not us...

Indeed "discovered" is the right way of putting it, this information has been fairly easy to obtain after WW2.

Explaining the Battle of France in terms of French supriority would not pay tribute to the men, nor do justice to the subject, in fact you'd probably end up with a french equivalent of "The Luftwaffe War Diaries".

Using the Bloch 155 and belt fed cannon development in 1940 is beside the point, since it didn't matter much in operational terms. How many of these a/c were operational during the Battle of France, and how many saw combat? Besides the equivalent of an operational MB 155 would be a Bf 109F, eventually with a MG 151 or MG 151/20, equally belt fed. This only shows that technological development progresses more or less evenly amongst the protagonists. Also, but that's my own opinion, it rarely pays to overextend one's particular knowledge or field. Those who specialize in general history or operational history tend to make bad judges of technology (and vice versa I must add).

The French AF had to do a difficult job, in some areas they did a superb job, in others they were less successful - reasons ranging from the technical to the political. But such variables come in to play in every war and every battle. The french aren't unique...

IF the French AND British (the latter seem to gloss over their role in the continental defeat) armies had been able to fight the Germans to a stand still, the French AF would probably have been able to perform at an inreasingly effective level - technologically and strategically. France didn't have the benefit of a sea to hide behind. The defeat of the French AF wasn't caused by the Luftwaffe, it was caused by the Heer. Their is no substitute for a tank on the runway...

What would be nice is to break through the British myths which form the basis of most (english) sources period.

I'd love to see an objective analysis on the air war over france, not a subjective glorification reversing the myth.

[Graham Boak]

As far as the RAF's contribution to the battle over France, I'd have thought that the books available covered the subject pretty well, with the distinct exception of the Lysander units. We are not without the equivalent books on the brief British contribution to the land campaign, though for details it may be necessary to resort to the individual regimental histories.

It is worth pointing out here that, as far as the air war specifically was concerned, the one major difference between the French position and the British was that the French had no radar chain and, more importantly, the command, control and communications that produced an overall defence screen. Perhaps the lack of unified control of the air units had something to do with this, but I would prefer to be more informed before judging. However, I would point out that the respective qualities of the aircraft and airmen are less significant than being able to place them in the right place at the right time. Difficult enough at any time for the French in 1940, but even more so in the teeth of the Blitzkrieg (whatever the origin of the name!)

[Ruy Horta]

The strength of fighter command and its radar network were inforced by the geographic position of Britain.

Fighters became the first line of defence (for lack of major german naval activity), its a unique situation for Britain, you cannot apply its variables on a one on one basis to another belligerent

Now think of France with a similar effective air defence system, yet no channel to protect its borders? The battle on the continent was one of armies and tactical aviation, not one of strategic air defence. The first line of defence was formed by divisions of infantry, tank regiments and supporting artillery, of aircraft used in a tactical role supporting the armies. The Battle of France poses a different set of rules, period.

The whole concept of British air defence is basically built upon the island fortress, the RN protecting the sea lanes, the RAF the air. Britain could always fall back, fighting on the seas and the periphery, waiting for the USA to join the fight at some point (if only to ensure the return of its loans etc in a post war world).

British focus on air defence, although effective when it came to home defence, made it impossible to really commit themselves to a continental war, always retaining one foot at home, recipe for defeat in 1940.

[Ruy Horta]

In the prvious post I wrote:

British focus on air defence, although effective when it came to home defence, made it impossible to really commit themselves to a continental war, always retaining one foot at home, recipe for defeat in 1940.

When I add this to another Britain related subject I posted, it would not surprise me if I ruffled a few feathers. So I'll repeat my apology here as well, as this was not my intention.

One could easily argue that the recipe of defeat in 1940, is the primary ingredient of a 1944/45 victory. Without fortress Britain, europe would have been a different place today.

I must share that I was somewhat inspired by the writing of John Terraine in The Smoke and the Fire, but may have misrepresented his case.

However to be fair, one should try and build a 1940 scenario won by the Anglo-French at least to the point of a continental stalemate, without stepping to far from reality.

What should have been done or could have been done to change the outcome of 1940?

One possible answer might be a(n anglo-)french advance in 1939, but would such a move have been politically or psychologically possible?

These questions are fair as long as 1940 is portrayed as somehwat of a french failure...

Dear Ruy, please don’t force me to write any long replies right now, I simply haven’t the time : I am filling moving boxes with books etc., or rather I am trying to. At the end of next week perhaps I’ll have more time…

And right now a German TV-network is showing the film « Independence Day », which I MUST see for the 3rd time while I’m writing this ! This is torture on an innocent veteran.

I don’t understand why I am the only person in the world who has no right to say the truth on certain books and their authors. You could call this « review ». Innumerable book reviews published daily all over the world are MUCH HARDER than mine about P. Facon’s mediocre book on the 1940 French AF. On TOCH we could read many very harsh book reviews, for ex. about Osprey and others. So what’s the matter ? Have I only limited civil rights ?

Let us see FACTS that even you hardly can dispute. Facon’s appendixes : page 270, Bf 109’s top speed 550 instead of 570, a figure so well-known that I have been knowing it by heart for 20 years. Even the French experts found out precisely this figure when they flight-tested some captured 109s 1939. The reports are in SHAA’s archive and Facon is « Directeur de Recherche » at SHAA.

Do 17 Z : « 7 machine-guns ». It was rather 3. We are still dealing with the French Campaign only not what happened afterwards.

He 111 H : top speed « 365 » (ludicrous, slower than the Stuka) – Armament one 20 mm-cannon ( !), one 13 mm-MG ( !), 3 light MGs. The heavy armament possibly was added during the BoB, I’m not quite sure, but in any case this never was standard equipment. I hope BoB experts can help on this point.

Ju 87-B Stuka : top speed 370 (faster than the He 111 H according to Facon), bomb load 1 000 kg instead of 500 (officially still 250 but OK, 500 quickly became standard).

I didn’t check everything in the more than 6 pages of such data…

We could generously say that 136 of the 305 pages (plus preface but including index and bibliography) are more or less devoted to the subject announced on the cover : L’Armée de l’Air dans la tourmente (Subtitle : La bataille de France 1939-1940). It is really incredible, for a man covered in honors and titles like Rudel was covered in medals, that this subtitle contains TWO major historical errors and they cannot be disputed either : the correct phrase is « La Campagne de France » (not bataille de France, which officially is the designation of the 2nd part only, starting on 5 June along the Somme and Aisne rivers). Even worse, it didn’t start 1939 but on 10 May 1940 ! And this man is a great historian ? This is precisely what a well-known, respected researcher disputed several years ago when he told me that Facon is considered unserious ; I fully agree with this.

On pages 169-170 Facon compares the numerical strength of SERVICEABLE French AC and ALL German AC, serviceable or not. This is how you can « prove » that we poor little Frenchies had got nothing but our heroical chests to stem the tide of millions of German tanks and giant aircraft. The truth is that France had made, and possessed, much more numerous and much better tanks than Germany. The only problem was the right way to use them (no place here to elaborate on this, see the remarkable German book I mentioned).

Now guess who wrote the following – was it me or Facon ? (… are the passages I deleted)

<< A first way of reporting the 1940 battle tells us that the Armée de l’Air was crushed on its airfields right at the start of the offensive… There is no other choice than to note how wrong this is. The French Air Force was no more nailed to the ground than were the Polish AF in September 1939 or the Belgian AF in May 1940. 47 airfields were attacked in the whole [French] country… and about 60 Ac of all kinds were destroyed. Such a figure is certainly not negligible but it is nonetheless very far from corresponding an annihilation of the French AF. In the Northern zone of air operations, where 16 of these attacks took place, the losses on the ground were « insignificant » according to the history of the Air zone, with the exception of one Groupe de Chasse which lost 13 fighters [from approx. 30]. The damage to facilities was fairly limited. …

THE ARMÉE DE L’AIR IS NOT CRUSHED ON THE GROUND

The figures trumpetted by OKW (German GHQ) could give the illusion of an immense success. Indeed, the Germans announced the destruction of 300-400 Allied planes on 10 May… [and so on]. At this pace, Armée de l’Air and BAFF would have disappeared within a few days [and Jochen Prien keeps spreading these figures in spite of my remarks about this already years ago, sometimes adding that these figures are disputed on the Allied side, which does not means that they are wrong]. But this is not the case. In fact the Armée de l’Air was not crushed on her airfields, neither on the first day… nor in the following weeks. French airpower did not become the system, deprived of all cohesion and unable to react, which usually many English-speaking historians, who are poorly informed to say the least, use to claim… French fighters are markedly effective already on the first day… More than 50 He 111s and at least 25 Do 17s were shot down [by all Allied forces including AA]. This is one of the little known facts of this May-June air battle… >> And so on.

Well, what do you say ? Whose style is this ? Who wrote this (in French) ?

Something else : history is officially considered part of literature. (For ex. a liter. Nobel prize can be awarded to an historian.) So it is very sad that Mr. Facon’s French really is very poor and he makes horrible linguistic mistakes.

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

H-E,

Please, especially since you've been a very active part in a legal battle before, I strongly suggest that you curb words like plagiarism etc.

At best we'll only hear one side of the case (your side), never enough to form a proper judgement.

- Why don't you make the same statement evry time a book is criticised here?

If you have a quib based on your 1990 publication of Paul Martin's Invisibles vainqueurs I urge you to take this up with Patrick Facon, since he cannot defend his case on our forum and as such it is not the right place to conduct this discussion.

- Of course he is able to defend himself! I am not cowardly attacking a defenceless little baby but a so-called "historian" who is a mighty man and has all advantages on his side : high positions, high university degrees, prestige, certainly influential friends etc. He can reply here any time if he so wishes. I think nobody will try to prevent him from doing so.

No harm done, but please let us not continue on this track.

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

When presenting a case its wise not to overdo it.
If french pilots complained about their cannon, it was their right

- Ruy, please! Read my statements before you answer them! I explicitely wrote that the pilots found their cannon "good" but lamented the small ammo provision, "only" 60 rounds.

its not fair to answer their case by simply pointing towards the Germans and their lack of a superior gun.

- I don't understand this remark. In any case you know I use to fiercely defend French fighter pilots but this does not mean accepting what they wrongly believed at the time (and even later) just because they did not have the information, which was not their fault.

After all these were the pilots fighting the air war of 1940, not us...

- I couldn't agree more and this fight was damn hard (for the German aircrew too).

Indeed "discovered" is the right way of putting it, this information has been fairly easy to obtain after WW2.

- Perhaps but in France you got the wrong data very long after the war. Indeed one of the greatest 1940 French aces published a book 1985. In this book he reported that the Germans had got "15,700" combat aircraft on 10 May 1940 and, if my memory is OK, "15,000 tanks with 15,000 more in reserve". This was 45 years after 1940! I respect and admire this man very much, he won many victories including on 109s and he very nearly was killed but this cannot prevent me to say that he is, or was, not an historian. This is not an insult but just the truth. I still respect him.

A war hero is rarely a good historian.

Explaining the Battle of France in terms of French supriority would not pay tribute to the men, nor do justice to the subject, ...

- Who spoke of "French superiority"? I did not. The French lost didn't they (but NOT in the air) so there must have been a strong overall German superiority. This German superiority was mainly in the BRAINS of the top-ranking military leaders and also, often, of the middle-ranking ones : Guderian, Rommel and others. Did you really read what I wrote? The French CANNON was better. This was good but not quite enough to establish a French superiority! I am not as stupid as you seem to think. I KNOW the Me 109 was better than all French fighters except the D.520, which came too late to have a decisive impact (but it did harm the Luftwaffe). Nevertheless we should never forget this : "better" is not the same as "invincible". Hundreds of 109s were destroyed in the French Campaign (not by the French only). Many were shot down "even" by supposedly "inferior" Morane 406s whose pilots were brave and above all good.

Using the Bloch 155 and belt fed cannon development in 1940 is beside the point, since it didn't matter much in operational terms.

- My God, this was just a technical detail showing the technical advancement of the Armée de l'Air in June 1940. The LW needed at least 6 more months, possibly 8 or 10, to do the same and introduce a belt-fed cannon which was the German equivalent of the French one. This progress in FRance in June 1940 had hardly any effect for just a few 155s saw any action at all. Just a few more months... Everything was in the pipe, was being produced in French factories. In Sept. 1940 (nearing the end of the BoB) air war over France would have been VERY different. It is not entirely UNinteresting to think of what would have happened, had the damned French and British armies held the ground a little better, which was fully possible, as you wrote yourself in another posting.

Besides the equivalent of an operational MB 155 would be a Bf 109F, eventually with a MG 151 or MG 151/20, equally belt fed.

- No, no, the 155 was an improvement but still slower than a 109 E, let alone an F. The French planned only a limited 155-production. But when the F entered service on the French side it would have faced D.524s, which were fully able to put up a good fight against any F, and D.551s, which simply were a fighter pilot's dream, and other, much-improved types (Arsenal...).

The French AF had to do a difficult job, in some areas they did a superb job, in others they were less successful - reasons ranging from the technical to the political. But such variables come in to play in every war and every battle. The french aren't unique...

[Just ask the dames!]

- Yes, all this is true.

IF the French AND British (the latter seem to gloss over their role in the continental defeat) armies had been able to fight the Germans to a stand still, the French AF would probably have been able to perform at an inreasingly effective level - technologically and strategically.

- Yes, I have been spreading this remark for the last 15 years. But more importantly, it was possible to get a standstill. Read my future book, in a few years, if you want to know how!

France didn't have the benefit of a sea to hide behind. The defeat of the French AF wasn't caused by the Luftwaffe, it was caused by the Heer.

- Yes, certainly. The German Army occupied the French airfields. What could the Air Force do? Fly to North Africa, which Government ordered it to do.

Their is no substitute for a tank on the runway...

- But the French had more tanks and better ones. What a mess!

What would be nice is to break through the British myths which form the basis of most (english) sources period.

- OH YES!

I'd love to see an objective analysis on the air war over france, not a subjective glorification reversing the myth.

- If you mean ME I certainly do not feel I glorified anything nor anybody. I just shared some information (facts) with the readers. I feel perfectly objective. For ex. I certainly do NOT like 1940 German soldiers but already 1991 (not 1990) I wrote in "Invisibles vainqueurs" that German aircrew (not fighter pilots only) were brave and fought on in spite of their heavy losses. These losses were in fact often appalling but they did not give up. And shortly afterwards they suffered new, heavy losses over England and didn't give up either...[/quote]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

It is worth pointing out here that, as far as the air war specifically was concerned, the one major difference between the French position and the British was that the French had no radar chain

- Yes, this is true. The French, too, were perfectly aware of radar and the famous ocean liner "Normandie" was equipped with it (as a protection against icebergs I think, and against collisions in general), but the French military did not understand its military significance (not the Americans either, and this as late as December 1941!!!). Alledgedly the French were supplied with several mobile radar units by the British but they didn't really understand how useful they could be, and these radars were not arranged into a network like in Britain...

and, more importantly, the command, control and communications that produced an overall defence screen.

- Yes, this is true. Nevertheless it is highly probable that the German invasion of France would have taken place in any case and all the radar stuff would have been overrun and captured, and made useless very quickly.

Perhaps the lack of unified control of the air units had something to do with this, but I would prefer to be more informed before judging.

- There WAS a unified control (HQ etc.) which already in the first days shifted hundreds of fighters towards Belgium-NL or back towards Sedan. It worked for ex. on 3 June in spite of heavy radio jamming by the Germans, which made it far less effective. On 5 June hundreds of French fighters were concentrated in the Somme-Aisne area and fought very effectively. I guess internally, within the AF, competent people were improving communications as fast as they could. The command system was not always very effective (but often it was) because French military communications were so poor and relied mostly on the civilian telephone network (!!!).

However, I would point out that the respective qualities of the aircraft and airmen are less significant than being able to place them in the right place at the right time.

- Certainly. The best AC in the world flown by the best aircrew in the world are not really useful in an area where nothing happens.

Difficult enough at any time for the French in 1940, but even more so in the teeth of the Blitzkrieg (whatever the origin of the name!)

- Hmmm... It was the French's top-ranking generals'own fault. They - and the British - had got enough warning early enough : in Spain, then in Poland, more than 8 months before the fighting started in earnest in the West. But they ignored what happened in Spain, then in Poland. "We are no Spaniards... We are no Poles...", they said with great superiority ("We are the best army in the world"). Their very costly 1918 victory had made them ridiculously pretentious. They just would not listen and not see. Their country, and the whole world, and the Jews and Gipsies, paid a very high price for this stupidity.

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

What should have been done or could have been done to change the outcome of 1940?

- I can't give away my answers publicly yet! Sorry!

One possible answer might be a(n anglo-)french advance in 1939,

- CERTAINLY, definitely.

but would such a move have been politically or psychologically possible?

- Why not? The Allied populations would have been enthusiastic. But the French generals kept repeating that their army was not suited for offensive!

These questions are fair as long as 1940 is portrayed as somehwat of a french failure...

- Well, it WAS a French failure to a large part, the greater part, but not only. Britain played a major part too in this and has NO reason to be proud either - except of her brave fighting men.[/quote]