Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots

[GuerraCivil]

I have read that the Japanese fighter most successfull in terms of downed enemy planes is Oscar (Ki-43) - and this could show something about the abilities of IJA fighter pilots! Of course there is a problem to figure out how many of the claims of Ki-43 pilots are legitimate (to be verified by Allied loss records). And the same problem goes also for the claims of Allied pilots vs. Ki-43.

When it comes to airwar, more interesting is my opinion the turning point in late 1942 or early 1943 than to analyze the rather onesided airwar of 1944-1945. At the late stage of war Allied had all the advantages: better planes, more tech and human resources, better average pilots etc. Only the very few remaining Japanese aces were still able to survive from combats and score occasionally.

Japanese as well as Germans were broken down by the war of attrition against superior enemy. One thing to add to Japanese misery was the prewar combat training program - in IJN case it was focused to produce small number of professional combat pilots but neglected the need to train decent reserve pilots for the long term war (the idea was that war would be a quick win so small number of elite pilots was enough). When this mistake was realised, it was already too late. When experienced pilot was lost, there were no decent replacement but only little trained novices available.

At the late point of Pacific War the average skill of IJA/IJN pilot was already so low that from the Japanese point of view it did not make much difference to send hastily trained novices to normal combat mission (in which they would be shot down in first air combat) or to kamikaze mission.

[bearoutwest]

Here’s a quick (“Reader’s Digest style) snap-shot summary of the pre-1941 air war over China.

In 1937, IJA operations centred round the North of China, crossing over from Manchuria towards Beijing in early July. IJN centred their operations around Shanghai in August 1937. The bulk of the better-trained pre-war Chinese aircrews were stationed in the south to defend the major centres (Shanghai, Guangzhou/Canton, and the then-capital Nanking). It was also Chinese government philosophy to fight the battle where western reporters could see the effect (and encourage more sympathy). Hence the major defence of Shanghai – especially directly across the river from the International Settlement. Almost all of the pre-war Chinese fighter strength was gathered around Shanghai. So, initially the Japanese army aircrews had a much “easier” time with more and more land-based (and floatplane) Japanese navy air units became involved in operations over Shanghai.

It was a stalemate for almost 2 months, with the Japanese Naval Infantry unable to break-out, and the Chinese divisions unable to remove them. It took further naval landings to outflank the defenders, and the subsequent inclusion of Japanese army troops (though I’m unsure of the exact timeline of their involvement) to push the Chinese defenders back along the Shanghai-Nanking-Wuhan axis. Almost all the Japanese involvement over this theatre of air operations was IJN, mainly land-based G3Ms and A5Ms, and some carrier-based A4N biplanes.

The next major air battles occurred in the defence of Wuhan Jan/Feb – October 1938. Initially some of the Chinese squadrons began re-equipping with Soviet-supplied fighters (Polikarpov 15s and 16s). Subsequently in mid-1938, two Soviet-manned fighter groups joined the fighting. At this stage the air operations in the south (around Wuhan) were still IJN based. The IJA units (starting to re-equip from the Ki-10 to the Ki-27) were based in the north, especially around the Manchurian-Soviet border, where incursions and skirmishes were taking place.

The main IJA air battles did not take place until the massive Nomonhan/Khalkhin-Gol air battles in late 1938 and early 1939 against Soviet fighters and bombers across a 100-mile front.

The impression I have from my reading (and this is from memory now), it that the pre-1940 Japanese army and navy air arms were relatively small. It would appear that in the course of operations between 1937-1939, the bulk of the pre-war IJN fighter force was rotated through the southern China theatre of operations. The 1937 to early-1938 air battles against pre-war Chinese fighter pilots (home-grown and American-Chinese volunteers, and predominantly German-trained) was a close-run thing until the IJN threw in large numbers of A5M fighters for escorts and fighter-sweeps. It became more evenly matched again when the Soviet “volunteers” arrived. It wasn’t until 1940, with the withdrawal of the Soviet aircrews and the arrival of the experimental A6M Zero squadron, that the IJN gained air dominancy in the south.

The IJA air units did not engage in significant air battles (mainly due to a lack of opposition) in their northern area of operations until the air battles against the Soviets over Nomonham. Almost the entire available force of Ki-27 fighters (supported by a few Ki-10 units) would be involved in the fighting. The Soviets would throw in larger numbers of reinforcements. Both air and ground fighting took place over a small patch of territory (the front was of the order of 100 miles). Both sides over-claimed dramatically in the air – again as a result of the very large numbers of aircraft involved over a small front. I don’t recall the exact numbers, but the leading Japanese ace claimed 93(?) kills. Total Soviet air losses were of the order of 100 aircraft. Both sides over-claimed in a big way, so I’m not just singling out the IJA crews.

From all that, I concluded with the opinion that by 1941, the IJN aircrews had a much longer period of air combat experience. The longer pre-war training process, which Leo indicated previously, meant the IJN land-based crews had as much flight experience as their IJA counterparts, and the IJN carrier capable aircrews were “a cut above” as with most naval aviation organisations…..and rightly entitled to swagger down the street (or is that just getting back on dry land again).

So all other things being taken into account, in December 1941, I would rate the average IJN aircrew being better than their IJA counterparts – better training, and more time to incorporate combat lessons learnt. The downside of being an IJN aviator, is that eventually you run up against similarly trained enemy (i.e. USN), and when your airfield (the floating one) is sunk, you stand less chance of surviving. At least an IJA aviator stuck on the ground and being bombed on his runway, can take shelter and live to fight another day.


...geoff

[Broncazonk]

This thread has been generating some great posts, (all but mine because I don't know anything) and to one and all, I say thank you.

There was racism, a lot of racist propaganda that was directed against the Japanese prior to, during and throughout the war--for home consumption. However, each of the Allied nations had a military attaché exchange program with the Japanese in the late 1930's, no? The actual abilities and capabilities of the Japanese army and navy air forces had to be known (should have been known) to someone in the British and US military pre-war, no? And if not, why not?? (The standard narrative is that the Japanese came as a big surprise to the British and Americans. The Zero certainly was. Were the Japanese THAT successful in hiding their abilities in the late 1930's?)

Bronc

[bearoutwest]

Hello Bronc,

In the context of the timeline, the Japanese capabilities were not really known. If you compare the pre-1930/40, French and British near-hysteria about the Luftwaffe super-fighter – the Bf110 (and subsequently the He113), information wasn’t really at a finger’s keyboard touch or book-search away. I mean how well do we really know about the JSF or the F-22 or Chinese J-20 and Russian Su-37(?) (Russian stealth-ski?)?

The Western powers had observers in the International Settlement in 1937 during the Battle of Shanghai. A Dutch Colonel (*) wrote a series of lengthy reports for his government (and I believe it was shared to some extent with other western governments), so Japanese naval infantry tactics were quite well known. Claire Chennault and his team of technical people were on the ground (and in the air) training and organising the Chinese Air Force, so there was a steady flow of information back to the US.

The Chinese ground effort in Shanghai was hampered by the lack of heavy weapons, and co-ordination between various divisions (lack of willingness to share the limited heavy artillery, lack of coordinated air force/army co-operation, etc). The Japanese naval infantry/ship/airpower coordination was superb – possibly more integrated than any other armed forces until the US Marines after Guadalcanal. Where the Japanese Naval Light Infantry didn’t have land heavy artillery, they had heavy cruisers and destroyers moored in the Whangpo River. I guess the Western army planners may well have decided that the Japanese only succeeded in Shanghai because of the lack of Chinese heavy weapons, and that a Western army with integrated infantry and artillery with tank support would hold out easily. Besides….everybody knows you can’t drive tanks in the Malayan or Burmese jungle (or the Ardennes Forest!). The Chinese air effort wasn’t noticeable over the city (except when their bombs overshot the Japanese cruiser and hit the International Settlement) – in much the same way the troops at Dunkirk didn’t notice the air battle 20-30 miles away.

Chennault’s insights would have been useful, but he was on the outer with US Army General Staff (considered a bit of a maverick because he thought a credible fighter force could actually intercept heavy bombers and cause significant casualties). Only at Presidential level was there an amount of support for him, but then Roosevelt would not have dealt with relatively minor combat evaluation reports on the Japanese Naval Air Arm.

The Soviets – through their “volunteers” in China and through their combat in Nomonhan – would have gathered a reasonable amount of intel, but considering the massive overclaiming at Nomonhan, and the state of the Soviet AF in 1939 (notable in the Russo-Finish War as well), I’m not sure how well they would have evaluated the info.

So although there was data out there in 1939-40, I don’t think Western military planners would have really recognised the significance of much of it. In the main part, they had their own fixed ideas about air operations – Douhet’s theory about the bomber always getting through, etc – and a small conflict in the exotic far east between a couple of non-Western countries wasn’t going to change any opinions….yet. The racist element – Japanese pilot’s are all myopic and can’t fly at night, and all their aircraft are just rip offs of the junk we sold them, i.e. Vought 143s, Seversky two-seater fighters, etc – was perhaps evident at the squadron level; but the planners sent Buffalos to the Far East because that’s all that was available at the time against a potential enemy. The top-line Spitfires and Hurricanes and P-40s were being used against an actual enemy.

By the way, the Dutch Colonel’s notes (*) have been compiled into a book “A Dutch Spy in China”. It makes for a good read. The book’s quite expensive to buy, so one for the inter-library request system perhaps.

...geoff

[GuerraCivil]

One thing that may give food of thought is how much combat experience Japanese pilots (IJN/IJA) actually adquired in China before the Pacific war. I came accross of this when I did read the interview of a Japanese bomber pilot who served in China in late 1930´s and early 1940´s. He told that he was never attacked by Chinese fighter or even saw one during his missions.

It may have been rather limited experience in China due to limited chances of air combat. For example it is known that IJN´s "Claude" fighters were equipped with drop tanks not only to escort bombers but also to force Chinese in air combat as Chinese usually avoided air combats near front lines. There were also repeated bans from Chinese Air command to be involved in combat with Japanese fighters (it was more important to shoot down bombers and not waste the limited number of planes in fighter vs. fighter combats).

The Chinese Air Force was hit pretty hard already by 1937, and the appearance of Soviet planes and volunteers did not turn the balance. In 1940-1941 Zero pilots managed to have very few combat opportunities against Chinese and they were probably the most one-sided air battles of all times. IIRC, Chinese lost in two combats 27 of their fighters while Zero losses were 0 (the only Zero loss in China in 1940-1941 was due to AA). This created the myth of "invicible Zero" - based on couple of combats against less trained and less experienced enemy flying inferior planes.

So I think that Chinese experience is somewhat overestimated as a practical school of Japanese fighter pilots. Of course some important tactical lessons were learned like the adoption of "loose V" formation which was a significant step ahead from traditional stiff "vic", which Japanese were using still in late 1930´s.

The Nomonhan war against Soviets in 1939 may have been actually more challenging school of combat as Japanese pilots had to fight against numerically superior enemy with technically equal equipment (I-16, I-153) compared to their own planes (Ki-27, Ki-10). It is also important to note, that among Soviet pilots there were battle-hardened veterans of Spanish Civil War (and China). It is a myth that Soviet pilots were all rookies. The best Soviet pilots were at least as good as their Japanese counterparts.

Leaving the massive (and even ridiculous) overclaiming of Nomonhan air war aside, the tactical result in fighter vs. fighter combats in Nomonhan favoured IJA pilots as IJAAF lost 63 fighters in air combat and Soviet fighter regiments lost 130 planes in combat. These figures are based on official loss records of both sides and thus give more reliable picture than the exaggerated claim records of both sides.

[bearoutwest]

Hi Guerra,

Don’t be too dismissive of the learning potential of the IJN air combat over China. In the air battles for Shanghai, formations of unescorted Japanese bombers were caught by the cream of the pre-war (and quaintly many were trained in Germany) Chinese AF fighter pilots flying Hawk II’s, III’s and Boeing 281s (export P-26s) and subsequently Gloster Gladiators. They caused sufficient losses for the Japanese Navy to replace the few squadrons of A4N biplanes with larger numbers of A5M monoplanes. Once the A5M “Claudes” arrived in numbers with better trained Navy pilots, the losses suffered by the Chinese fighter force was unsustainable, hence the temporary withdrawal to re-equip with Russian Polikarpovs. The Soviet volunteers also had reasonable numbers of Spanish Civil War veterans, including the Group and Squadron commanders.

You are quite correct in saying that even the arrival of the Soviet volunteers didn’t turn the tide, but it did mean the re-equipped Chinese fighters and the Soviet air groups were competitive. The air battles over Wuhan in 1938 were certainly not constantly one-sided Japanese victories. The Japanese Navy aircrews with similar quality aircraft and better average quality pilots did hold the upper hand. It is also reasonable to say they held local air superiority over the battle field most of the time, but it wasn’t until the arrival of the experimental Zero Squadron in 1940, that the IJN achieved dominance.

The bans against defending fighters from taking on attacking fighters is common sense. No one seems to blame the RAF in the Battle of Britain or the Luftwaffe over France in 1941/42 from refusing to be drawn into intercepting fighter sweeps. You will find that up until the appearance of the Zeros in 1940, escorted Japanese bombing raids over Nanking, Wuhan and Chungking were contested and the comparison of losses (you’re correct that losses better indicate comparison than claims) was not totally one sided.

Hakan Gustavsson’s website gives a good day-by-day account of the air battles over China from 1937-1945.
http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm

By the way, I think the myth of the “Invincible Zero” was more a result of the successes the Navy Zeros and Army Ki-43s achieved over Malaya, Java and the Philippines. No one in the RAF and USAAF seemed to be paying attention to the happenings over China in 1940.

Regards,
...geoff

[GuerraCivil]

The one-sided air combats of Zeros vs. Chinese-flown Polikarpov fighters in 1940 and 1941 created the myth of Zero´s unbeatable combat performance among Japanese pilots, not among Western observers. It also made them to convert more easily from the A5M4 (in which they were used) to more modern plane. In mock-fights the older Claude did beat Zero for being more nimble again and again. Zero was manouverable plane, but Claude was that even more. The mock tests therefore did not convince IJN pilots.

Japanese pilots were in fact quite conservative - initially they liked more of Claude with its open cockpit (good visibility) and fixed landing gears (easy landing and take off) and Claude had even better aerobatic qualities! But when Zero demonstrated its superiority over Polikarpov fighters, which had been challenging opponents to Claude, IJN pilots realised its potential and were willing to convert in more modern "unbeatable" plane.

I have not gone through the records of early Pacific war to see how Zero pilots made it initally against P-40E´s flown by Americans or Brewster Buffalos flown by British/Dutch. The common claim is that Zero and its pilots were superior in all aspects, but I´m not sure how true that assesment is. For example the probable kill/loss -ratio of Dutch Buffalo pilots was not that bad (IIRC, nearly 1:1 against Zeros/Oscars). Buffalo was a better plane than its reputation, when it was handled properly (like by Finns). Perhaps the Allied pilots in late 1941/early 1942 earn more respect than is usually given them. More of this theme:
http://www.amazon.com/Bloody-Shamble.../dp/094881750X

And if we go through the kill/loss stats of Wildcat (USNAF/USMC) vs. Zero (IJNAF) stats, they seem to show that it was about 1:1 during the mid and late 1942 air combats. This despite Zero´s better performance in speed, rate of climb and manouverability. The American Navy/Marine pilot program was not so harsh as the IJNAF program, but still it produced decent pilots who with right tactics could hold their own vs. elite pilots of Japanese Navy.

[Leo Etgen]

Hi Bronc

Prior to the war Chennault warned the US War Department of both the Nate fighter of the IJAAF and the Claude fighter of the IJNAF noting that not only did these possess excellent performance but also equally noteworthy being the fact that these were autonomously designed and constructed by the Japanese. He also passed along information concerning the Zeke estimating its top speed as 322 mph and its maximum climb rate as being over 3,500 fpm as well as the type's incredible maneuverability. The US Navy Fleet Air Tactical Unit Intelligence Bulletin of 22 September 1941 estimated the Zeke had a top speed between 345 and 380 mph, a cruise speed of between 210 and 250 mph and an armament of two 7.7-mm machine guns and two 20-mm cannons. It was these estimates that led to the development of the Thach Weave as a tactical counter to enable USN fighter pilots to engage the Zeke on somewhat level terms. Another aspect that should be mentioned that proved crucial to the ability of USN fighter pilots to hold their own against a well-trained foe with a superior aircraft was the emphasis the USN placed on training in deflection shooting which was unique in the world.

Hi GuerraCivil

The latest estimates that I am aware of have Dutch pilots claiming some 15 to 20 victories with the Buffalo. Unfortunately, I do not have losses of these units at hand but the usual estimate is some 30 or so. I do agree that the type actually was not that bad as is commonly thought; RAF/RAAF pilots over Malaysia and Burma felt the aircraft was faster than the Japanese fighters they encountered although inferior in climb and maneuverability. They quickly learned that to engage in a classic dogfight was suicidal and that the correct tactic to deal with the enemy was to engage only when enjoying an altitude advantage and to avoid turning combats. Unfortunately, due to the lack of advance warning or ground control, such a favorable situation was rarely to be experienced often resulting in the Buffalo units being bounced by the Japanese fighters while still attempting to gain altitude. It should also be pointed out that inevitably the Buffalo pilots of both the RAF/RAAF and KNIL met the enemy in conditions of numerical inferiority; the British, for example, never succeeding in putting up more than a dozen fighters in the air at any one time. The five RAF/RAAF squadrons equipped with the Buffalo lost 28 aircraft in aerial combat over three months which actually was not excessive when one takes the situation in the theater the Allies found themselves into consideration.

Horrido!

Leo

[bearoutwest]

Hi Leo,
I imagine that the US War Department would have passed the infomation on to both USAAF and USN. So I find it interesting that the USN found it necessary to develop tactics to benefit the F4F, whereas not a great deal seems to be written about any initial changes in USAAF P-40/P-39 tactics (apart from Chennault's directives to his AVG pilots).

Do you think it was because the USN had more time to reflect lessons learnt at Pearl Harbor before the next carrier clash in May 1942? Perhaps the USAAF in the Philippines being caught on the hop in December 1941 weren't in a possition to impement changes....and subsequently fighting on a withdrawal weren't able to make wholesale changes to tactics (i.e. heavy losses, lack of air raid warning, lack of numbers in the air, etc)?

Hi Guerra,
I see your point about the Zero Invincibilty Myth being in the mind of the IJN. I don't recall any changes in the manner that the navy fighter tactics operated. The IJN pilots always favoured manouverabilty, which was fine when you had large numbers of highly trained pilots, less fortunate when you had large numbers of rookies. Their flight discipline was always pretty good (I think) ....except when their Carrier CAP patrols all decided to chase after the Devestator torpedo bombers at Midway. The IJA flight tactics at Nomonhan (the large swirling bird-cage tactics) seemed to be similar to the ones Chennault reported over Rangoon. He (or one of his biographers) commented that it was like Samurai tactics of old....taunting the enemy to engage in one-v-one combat. The IJA seemed to dislike the AVG's "running away" hit-and-run tactics.

...geoff

[GuerraCivil]

To my knowledge is that at least US Navy Air Force had knowledge of the existence of Zero fighter by the early 1941 and accurate intelligence report was already circulating in USNAF units by the spring 1941. I do not know how it was with USAAF/RAF/NEI. When it comes to P-40 vs. Zero, I think that P-40´s reputation has suffered too much for the reason that so many P-40´s were destroyed on the ground in Pearl Harbor and Philippines. One should not look the stats of lost P-40´s on those grounds but analyze more the real Zero vs. P-40 air combat situation.

The problem as usual is the gross exaggeration of kill/loss -stats of both sides. If you read the book Samurai, it gives an impression that Zeros destroyed plenty of P-40/P-39 with very small losses of their own. But if you look the stats of Allied side, it gives opposite numbers. I have seen even a claim that for each lost P-40 Warhawk at least five Zero´s were shot down!

To confuse the matter more are the comments and stories of the pilots of both sides.

John Thach after Midway battle: "Any success of our fighter pilots may have against the Japanese Zero fighter is not due to the performance of the airplane (Wildcat) we fly but is the result of comparatively poor marksmanship of the Japanese, stupid mistakes of the Japanese by a few of their pilots and superior marksmanship and team work of some of our pilots."

A further American claim (Edward M. Young) is that Japanese lost 43 Zeros in aerial combats of Coral Sea / Midway while US fighter losses in those combats were only 31 Wildcats. The "best elite" pilots (air carrier Zero pilots) of IJN did not make it so well if the kill/loss stats are true. But this is an American claim, can we trust that it is 100 % neutral and that also Japanese sources have been consulted?

When it comes to air combats over Guadalcanal in late 1942, I think that some things should be considered. It was a great disadvantage for Japanese air units that they had to fly very long journey to get over Guadalcanal and getting back. I have read that Zero pilots could ever not afford to drop their extra fuel tanks in combat as they needed every available drop of fuel! For Americans it was the opposite - they flew near of their own bases and got warning of approaching Japanese formations usually well in time so they were already waiting Japanese in advantageous position. I have also read that the medical supplies of Japanese were scarce and their healthcare less good than that of the Americans, who were much better supplied. Many Japanese pilots were forced to climb in cockpit despite being sick and weakened by malaria.

If you have read the book Samurai! (Caidin), in it Saburo Sakai makes couple of comments on shooting skills of American pilots mentioning how they tended to overshoot (and these I believe are genuine Sakai comments not Caidin´s inventions). And these comments were made on US Navy pilots who were supposed to have practiced very much deflection shooting! Of course these quotes do not necessarily mean that American pilots trying to shoot down Sakai were poor but that Sakai was a pilot with good survival skill and thus difficult to shoot down.

But if we are to believe the story of Sakai surviving alone from the attack by 15 US Navy Hellcats which did not manage to get a single bullet hole in his Zero, it does not give a picture of good skills when it comes to deflection shooting. This is not the only story of its kind - another Japanese pilot told in afterwar interview that he managed to survive from the attacks of several Corsairs while flying a Val divebomber in a hopeless mission. Corsairs shot two of his wingmen down rapidly but found the remaining third Val difficult as the experienced pilot did the best tricks that he knew to safe his and gunners´s skin. Somehow Corsair pilots managed to overshoot and miss every time when they attacked his alone Val. Was it that he was simply so good or were Corsair pilots rookies like those Hellcat guys who did not manage to bring Sakai´s Zero down?