FAA Role in the Pacific.?

[Nicholas]

I don't want to comment too much on the American pilot's opinion otherwise I might end up in a rant too. This type of derision is common in AVG (Flying Tigers) writings about their RAF counterparts in Burma. Suffice it to say that Franek's observation hits the button.

Books to add to Jim's list are:

'Carrier Pilot' by Norman Hanson (about flying the Corsair - training in USA and BPF ops. Well written and illuminating personal account)
'The Forgotten Fleet' by John Winton (comprehensive classic account of BPF)
'Task Force 57' by Peter C Smith
'Corsair KD431 - The Time Capsule Fighter' by David Morris (fascinating forensics on the FAA's surviving F4U + veteran pilot's recollections of flying)

Two further observations:

1. FAA were first at sea with the bent-wing bird - after USN said it couldn't be flown from carriers
2. FAA Avengers at Palembang were observed being flown "like fighters" and scored victories over Japanese fighters using their forward armament.

[Graham Boak]

It should be pointed out that the US pilot's comments on BPF leadership, and specifically the handling of aviation, are echoed by the comments of FAA pilots. Read Crosley or David Brown on Vian. The comparative levels of training, experience and operations are simply a matter of very obvious record. Achievements on a tactical level do not cancel out failings elsewhere.

[R Leonard]

Anecdotally, and having nothing whatsoever to do with FAA performance critcism, my father who was, at the time, Jimmy Thach's assistant in the TF-38 ops shop had the opportunity to speak with an FAA F4U driver who had landed aboard Shangri-La in the late summer of 1945. The conversation was inconsequential, but my father, at the ripe old age of 29, was amazed by the apparent youth of the RN pilot, obviously in his very late teens . . . it struck home to him then that the British had really been at war for a long, long time for their pilots to be so young.
He later flew over to and landed on one of the British carriers and was somewhat relieved to find that most of the pilots were not quite so young, though there was an identifiable population of youngsters.

For what's worth.

Rich

[fsbofk]

In The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy, Clark Reynolds devotes a chapter to the RN's participation alongside the USN in the Pacific. He discusses some of the initial difficulties and familiarizing that the BPF faced in order to operate at the pace the US Pacific Fleet was used to, including at-sea refueling techniques that were inferior to USN methods. Quoting one British author, he notes that "the actual technique of attacking airfields and the aircraft upon them was something fairly novel to the majority of the Fleet Air Arm." One thing he credits the RN with is superior fighter direction techniques, due to their experience at intercepting LW aircraft; Reynolds states that Commander Lewin, who was Vian's FDO, needed a smaller number of defensive fighters than the US was using. Reynolds also points out that RN carriers' armored flight decks could better absorb a kamikaze hit in case their fighter direction let one slip by.

[Graham Boak]

It is worth adding that the Seafire L.III, despite (or perhaps because of) its known handicaps of range and strength, was faster and better accelerating at low-level than either the Hellcat or the Corsair, thus being better suited to the close-CAP role.

[Bruce Lander]

Hello Gentlemen,

I just came across this thread - at this late stage I feel that it is also worth noting that by 1944/45 the U.S. firmly believed that the War against Japan belonged exclusively to the U.S. and accordingly only grudgingly allowed the B.P.F. to participate in what was basically a supporting role.

Cheers

Bruce Lander

[John Beaman]

VERY good thread guys. Well done. Heavy discussion w/o personal attacks!


Keep one thing in mind regarding the armored deck RN carriers versus the non-armored USN decks: the USN carriers could be (and were) built much quicker w/o that armored flight deck, and held more a/c (always important), so its problematical whether those trade-offs were worth the occassional loss of a carrier due to Kamakazi attacks. I hate to be cold-blooded, but maybe it was better to have more a/c and more carriers.

[Revi16]

I haven't had time to read this entire thread yet.

After reading the book "The Seafire, The Spitfire that went to Sea" by David Brown, certainly makes the Seafire seem un-impressive.

Taken from the book,

" it will come as a surprise that Seafires were delivered to the Royal Navy in greater number -over 2000- than any other aircraft in the Service's aviation history.

in nearly three years of action and over 50 operations from the Arctic Circle to Tokyo Bay, the Seafire engaged enemy aircraft in fewer than 50 combats, in which it destroyed 37 and damaged another 26 fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft."

Regards,
Mike

[jeanba]

Thank you all for this very interesting topic

Originally Posted by JoeB

Generally late WWII USN pilots had more hours upon entering combat than other air arms, often 450hours. I've seen personal accounts of pilots who had 700.

Joe

As an indication, how many flight hours had British FAA pilots before going to combat ?

[Graham Boak]

Mike: I think you'll find that similar actions/scores were made by most of the FAA's aircraft. It was largely a matter of opportunity. The Seafire was too late for the comparatively intense European fighting of the early war and the more powerful US fighters saw most of the final year's actions - though it was the Seafires that saw the last dogfight.